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Abstract 
It seems trendy for current studies to argue that the term refugee is no more than a policy 
category which does not reflect the circumstances of the people that it subsumes. Such studies 
further argue that the circumstances of refugees are not necessarily different from those of 
local populations. This study argues that theoretical positions emanating from such 
observations do not have a universal application as illustrated in Nairobi where the term 
refugee is not merely a policy category or legal label but also experiential. Understanding the 
concept refugee is very much an outcome of empirical enterprise which locates those who 
bear the refugee status in specific contexts. The study draws attention to cases of targeted 
rape, raids, exclusionary discourses epitomised by negative stereotyping and xenophobia as 
well as refoulement which are specifically aimed at refugees in Nairobi. The refugee status is 
intertwined with other variables such as refugees’ ethnic, national and religious identities in 
ways that restrict inclusion of refugees into the host country.  
 
As a gendered experience, exile impacts on intra-household dynamics and transforms gender 
roles and relations within refugee households in ways that are simultaneously enabling and 
challenging for refugee women. Although local women also experience Sexual and Gender-
Based Violence (SGBV), for refugee women this intersects with the vulnerability that the 
refugee status entails resulting in refugee women being abused even by police officers and 
officials who are tasked to protect them thus leaving them with limited channels for recourse. 
SGBV thus becomes salient because of its targeted nature. Emphasised in the study is the fact 
that refugee women are heterogeneous such that it is more appropriate to refer to refugee 
women’s experiences rather than the refugee woman experience.  
 
Exile as occupation of marginal space is however not solely about constraints as it also 
creates opportunities and possibilities that may not have been available to the women prior to 
flight. Contradictory as it may seem, the refugee status is mediated by the same variables that 
lead to exclusion at a macro level in ways that facilitate inclusion at a micro, interpersonal 
level characterised by interaction between refugee women and locals as fellow congregants 
or as neighbours who share the same plight of poverty in Nairobi’s slums. This is coupled 
with refugee women’s agency by which they convert obstacles into resources and create 
space for themselves in a country which advocates encampment and expects refugees to 
reside in the designated areas. Through their own agency, refugee women are able to 
navigate structural barriers meant to deter integration in ways that demonstrate that the 
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absence of an official integration policy does not necessarily deter integration; individual 
agency has a countervailing impact on measures instituted to deter integration. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Entgegen den Argumenten, die den Begriff Flüchtling als eine einfache politische Kategorie 
darstellen, argumentiert die Studie, dass der Begriff Flüchtling empirisch begründet werden 
muss. Die Studie konzentriert sich auf Flüchtlingsfrauen und nimmt somit eine 
Genderperspektive ein. Im Mittelpunkt stehen die Erfahrungen von Flüchtlingsfrauen in 
Kenia, die sich eigenständig in Nairobi, an Siedlungsrändern von Flüchtlingslagern 
angesiedelt haben. Hierbei werden die unterschiedlichen Faktoren, die Integration 
bestimmen, betont. Dies betrifft die politischen, rechtlichen, ökonomischen sowie 
soziokulturellen Dimensionen von Integration. Ein besonders relevanter Aspekt der Arbeit ist, 
dass diese Dimensionen von Integration gleichzeitig ab- und unabhängig voneinander 
gedacht werden. Die Ergebnisse der Studie zeigen, dass sich der Begriff der Integration nur 
mit Hilfe holistischer Konzepte erschließt, die diese gegenseitigen Verknüpfungen 
berücksichtigen.  
 
Die Studie fokussiert die Erfahrungen der Flüchtlingsfrauen, die sie im Lager und vor dem 
Hintergrund von Repatriierungsvorhaben gemacht haben. Die Grundannahme der Studie ist 
es, dass Flüchtlinge zwar im Allgemeinen schwierige Lebenssituationen zu bewältigen haben, 
Flüchtlingsfrauen jedoch in besonderem Maß betroffen sind. Dabei sind Genderaspekte und 
der Sozialstatus von Frauen im afrikanischen Kontext von besonderer Bedeutung. 
Flüchtlingsfrauen sind aufgrund ihres Geschlechts, ihres Altes und ihrer Sozialposition mit 
speziellen Situationen konfrontiert. Viele Flüchtilingsfrauen erleben sexuelle Belästigungen 
und sind Opfer von Gewalttätigkeit. Diese Aspekte verschärfen die allgemeine 
Verwundbarkeit der Flüchtlingsfrauen zusätzlich. Aufgrund dieser geteilten Erfahrungen von 
SGBV unter Flüchtlingsfrauen, sind die Erfahrungen der Flüchtlinge als genderspezifisch zu 
bezeichnen. Genderspezifizischer Gewalttätigkeit (SGBV) bleibt ein sich über Zeit und Raum 
wiederholendes Phänomen in den Erfahrungen der Flüchtlingsfrauen.  
 
Diese Studie hebt hervor, dass Integration durch subjektive Faktoren gekennzeichnet ist. 
Diese Faktoren sind übersetzt in die unterschiedlichen Erfahrungen der Flüchtlingsfrauen 
und abhängig von ihren ethnischen, kulturellen und politischen Hintergründen. Diese 
unterschiedlichen Situationen berücksichtigend, zeigt sich Integration als ein Wertekonzept, 
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dessen praktische Bedeutung eng mit den Erfahrungen und Bedürfnissen der 
Flüchtlingsfrauen verbunden ist. Dies erklärt den Umstand, dass Integration ein 
angefochtenes Konzept bleibt. Wissenschaftler versuchen es mit Hilfe empirischer und 
theoretischer Erkenntnisse zu ergründen. Hinsichtlich des Genderaspekts sind 
wiederkehrende Erfahrungen unter Flüchtlingsfrauen der Ausgangspunkt gewesen, ihre 
Handlungsspielräume hinsichtlich der Integrationsprozesse zu untersuchen. Um die 
Verknüpfung von Gender und Flüchtlingsintegration zu verstehen benötigt es daher ein 
ausgewogenes Verhältnis von subjektiven und objektiven Faktoren. Diese Studie hat nicht 
zum Ziel, die bereits existierenden Ansätze anzufechten, sondern will einen empirischen 
Beitrag zur differenzierteren Sichtweise leisten. Neue Einsichten in die Handlungsfähigkeiten- 
und Spielräume von Flüchtlingsfrauen werden somit gegeben. Die Notlage in denen sich die 
Flüchtlinge befinden, werden derart als aktiv gestaltbare Situation umformuliert. Integration 
und Gender sind an bestimmten grundsätzlichen Faktoren zu erkennen. Die empirische Studie 
zeigt jedoch, dass es nicht immer nur objektive und generalisierenden Faktoren sind, an 
denen der Grad der Integration der Flüchtlingsfrauen erfasst werden kann. Auch 
kontextspezifische Dynamiken und wie Regierungen der Aufnahmegesellschaften mit 
Flüchtlingen verfahren, spielt eine wesentliche Rolle in diesem Diskurs. 
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
 
1.0 Situating Refugee Women in Africa 
For several decades Africa has witnessed many armed and violent conflicts which have forced 
millions of people out of their homelands into neighbouring countries and beyond. For the 
greater part, many African governments have opted to treat refugees as a transient and 
exceptional phenomenon and accordingly devised encampment as the appropriate regime or 
strategy of managing and containing refugees as they seemingly wait for repatriation. The 
encampment regime is the chosen way of managing refugees because i) it confines refugees to 
designated areas thus reducing competition for resources between refugees and locals, ii) it 
facilitates control and containment of refugees who are viewed not only as victims but also 
agents of insecurity, and iii) it facilitates easy identification of refugees for repatriation which 
host governments consider the solution. On their part, humanitarian organisations that assist 
refugees, particularly the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), have 
argued that encampment enhances refugee visibility to donors thus enabling them to 
understand the magnitude of the crisis and need besides facilitating easier administration, 
counting of the refugees and distribution of aid (Harrell-Bond 1986; Harrell-Bond et al 1992). 
Displaced people are expected to stay in refugee camps while they wait for the restoration of 
peace in their countries of origin. The camps as a temporary solution to a presumably 
ephemeral situation have instead become a permanent feature of the African landscape in 
what can be termed routinisation of the exceptional.  
 
The continued existence of refugees in Africa is aggravated by a combination of new conflicts 
erupting and generating new refugee influxes and failure to find lasting solutions to old 
conflicts. As a result, conflicts such as those in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan and Somalia have 
been characterised by intermittent escalation and de-escalation of hostilities and violence such 
that peace that could prompt refugees to repatriate has remained elusive for decades. The 
protracted nature of these conflicts has rendered specific nationalities refugees for 
generations. The longer the conflicts have prevailed in the African geopolitical space, the 
more complex the conflicts and the refugee crises have become. The complexities and 
protracted nature of the refugee phenomenon in contemporary Africa has prompted increasing 
numbers of refugees to self-settle in both rural and urban areas as they seek to forestall the 
unsavoury prospect of spending decades or even a lifetime in refugee camps. As refugees self-
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settle among local populations, this creates possibilities of integration which remains 
eschewed as a durable solution to the plight of refugees in Africa. This study endeavours to 
investigate the lifeworlds and experiences of refugee women self-settled in Nairobi, Kenya. 
The study specifically analyses these experiences within the broader framework of the 
encampment regime designed to prevent self-settlement and integration. 
 
The study takes a gender perspective which specifically focuses on refugee women self-
settled in Nairobi. Gender refers to “social construction of masculinity and femininity, in 
which culture elaborates on the sexed body” (Dover 2005). It is “a cultural construction which 
everywhere takes socially and historically specific forms” (Henrietta Moore 1986: 166; 1996: 
179). The study of women is not new. The 1960s and 1970s were marked by growing 
awareness of women’s rights. In the social sciences, there was an outcry on the male bias and 
exclusion of women or their presentation as a silent “Other”. Since then, gender has become a 
buzzword in both the social sciences and policy issues. Preoccupied with the agenda to make 
women visible in the sphere of knowledge production, much of the early work on women has 
been described rather sceptically as constituting an “add-women-and-stir” approach (Boxer 
1982: 258, cited in Henrietta Moore 1988: 3) which does not address the male bias in 
disciplinary theory and conceptual tools (Moore 1988).  
 
In the same way that the study of the broader category of women has been piecemeal, the 
incorporation of refugee women into refugee studies and refugee policies has been slow and 
hampered by structural obstacles (Callamard 2003). However, there has been increasing 
attention to refugee women since the 1990s with the UNHCR publishing Guidelines on the 
Protection of Refugee Women (1991) and Guidelines on Sexual Violence (1995). These 
gender-specific policies have been accompanied and influenced by increasing scholarly 
attention to gender and refugee women notable examples being the works by Kibreab (1995), 
Crawley (2001) and Forbes Martin (2004). Considering the circumstances of the majority of 
refugee women in many conflict-ridden parts of Africa, asserting that gender remains a salient 
feature of the experiences that come with displacement and exile cannot be dismissed as over 
generalisation. 
 
In so far as exile entails transformation of refugees’ lives in economic and socio-cultural 
terms, its impact is felt by both men and women but in different ways and with different 
consequences. In choosing to focus on refugee women, this study does not intend to confute 
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the challenges that refugee men face. Rather, it is premised on recognition of the gendered 
nature of refugee experiences and argues that refugee women face unique circumstances 
because of their status and responsibilities as women in African contexts. The gender division 
of labour in Africa generally translates into women playing the significant roles of providing 
food for the family and caring for its members. It is usually the women who flee with the 
children and take responsibility for the elderly, infirm and incapacitated because of the 
traditional feminisation of child-rearing and care-giving roles in many parts of the continent. 
As refugees, women have to cope with the task of ensuring that the consumption needs of 
their children and, where they flee together, of their husbands and relatives are met at a time 
when their normal livelihoods have been disrupted and destroyed. Against this backdrop, the 
study interrogates the implications of exile on African women with regard to fulfilment of 
their gender roles within the household and family. It describes and analyses the challenges 
refugee women encounter in the process of re-establishing livelihoods as well as the 
opportunities exile presents to them.  
 
The refugee status is not only gendered but is also characterised by heterogeneity; it 
encompasses populations that belong to diverse national, ethnic, social, cultural, economic 
and political backgrounds (Malkki 1997). The study seeks to understand refugee women in 
Nairobi within the framework of these diverse identities and backgrounds. It further 
investigates the role of legal protection in the process of adaptation to life in exile and 
integration into the host communities as well as refugee women’s resourcefulness as they 
seek to take their lives back to the pre-flight course or aspire for better living standards and 
circumstances in Nairobi. The study investigates the experiences of self-settled refugee 
women in a country that advocates encampment and whether the encampment regulation has 
an impact on the feasibility of local integration. This is against the background of literature on 
encamped refugees which shows the problem of keeping refugees in limbo waiting for 
repatriation which has proved to be elusive for millions of refugees in Africa. Indeed, 
movement of refugees from camps and self-settlement in urban areas such as Nairobi portrays 
refugees as voting with their feet against encampment. 
 
1.1. Definition of Key Concepts 
1.1.1 Refugee 
The term refugee broadly encompasses populations forced off their traditional places of 
habitation to pave way for development projects (Eastmond 2001), or forced to migrate 
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because of environmental catastrophes (Geisler and de Sousa 2001) and through trafficking 
(Castles 2003). A growing number of scholars argues that the boundary between political 
refugees and economic migrants has become blurred (see Kuhlman 1994; Korac 2001; Castles 
2003). However, this study argues that in many parts of Africa, political refugees have unique 
needs that often propel them towards countries where they can find security without this 
security necessarily being accompanied by better economic prospects. The situation of 
political refugees is exacerbated by the fact that movement is often a case of emergency 
which, at its acute level, is rarely if at all preceded by planning and strategising on how to re-
establish livelihoods in the asylum country. Political refugees move “not because they wish to 
make better lives for themselves in other places but because they are forced to leave in order 
to seek safety elsewhere” (Forbes Martin 2004: 13; see also Stein 1981; Hansen 1981; Feller 
2005; Owusu1). Where economic considerations determine the direction of flight, this is often 
part of secondary movement or what Kunz (1973) refers to as two-vector movement in which 
refugees leave the country of first asylum in search of economic opportunities as when they 
seek resettlement in a third country. 
 
The basic, literal meaning of the term refugee as provided above has been condensed into a 
legal definition enshrined in the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 
(hereafter the Geneva Convention) and the 1967 Protocol which lifts the temporal and spatial 
restrictions of the Geneva Convention to events before 1951 in Europe. The regional 1969 
Organisation of African Unity Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee 
Problems in Africa (OAU Convention), now the African Union Convention (hereafter the AU 
Convention)2 is also important in this study. For purposes of this study, the term refugee will 
be used to refer to political refugees who flee across an international border and whose flight 
is triggered by search for security and protection. The Geneva Convention defines a refugee 
as a person who, 
owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of particular social group or political opinion is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being 
                                                 
1 Maxwell Owusu (undated) “Reluctant Refugees: Liberians in Ghana”. The Journal of the International Institute 
http://www.umich.edu/~iinet/juornal/vol17no3/Owusu.htm (accessed 21.01.08). 
2 The OAU has since changed its name to the African Union (AU). As such, the OAU Convention is referred to 
in this study as the AU Convention. 
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outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable 
or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Geneva Convention, Article 1. A. 2). 
 
The AU Convention which was designed as a regional complement to the Geneva Convention 
adopts the definition above and the 1967 Protocol’s suspension of the temporal and spatial 
limitations. It also appends its own context-specific definition which addresses the causes of 
flight in Africa. The AU Convention broadens the Geneva Convention’s definition of a 
refugee to include  
every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or 
events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country of 
origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to 
seek refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality (AU 
Convention, Article I. 2). 
 
In adopting the above definitions, this author is aware of recent debates on the limitations of 
what have been termed “policy categories” by authors such as Bakewell (2000; 2002; 2008). 
This author argues that treating the term refugee as nothing more than an imposition by policy 
makers overlooks how the term takes primacy in shaping forced migrants’ circumstances in 
Nairobi and strips these migrants of the capacity to define themselves and articulate how the 
refugee status impacts on their welfare. Spradley (1979: 24) argues that ethnographic 
description “should flow from concepts and meanings native to that scene rather than the 
concepts developed by the ethnographer.” In addition, the observation that the term refugees 
may be difficult to apply to people settling among co-ethnics in border regions of the host 
country with historical, migratory and cultural ties with the sending country does not translate 
wholesale into urban contexts that are characterised by different configurations altogether. 
Considering the impact of the refugee status on refugee women in Nairobi, this study argues 
that to dismiss the term refugee as a mere label imposed by policy makers with no relevance 
to scholarly research is to overlook the experiential nature of the term as observed in Nairobi. 
The concept refugees is therefore consciously used to identify the women under investigation 
with due attention to the fact that the women identify themselves as such apart from the fact 
that the refugee status has a bearing on their experiences in Nairobi. As this study shows, this 
is not to argue that there are no other factors that influence these experiences independently or 
in intersection with the refugee status.  
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The Geneva Convention has been criticised for being androcentric, gender-blind, Western-
oriented, exclusionary and therefore out of date (see Hathaway 1991; Valji 2001; Pittaway 
and Bartolomei 2002). These scholars have argued that the Geneva Convention has become 
outdated and that it is high time its scope was broadened particularly its definition of the term 
refugee. For a contrary perspective, see Callamard (1999) and Crawley (2001). This study 
which focuses on political refugees adopts the Geneva Convention because: i) the Convention 
provides a comprehensive scope of refugee law which is broad enough to protect refugees, ii) 
forced political migrants are distinct from trafficked populations, economic, tourist, student 
and other categories of migrants emerging in the contemporary world and, iii) the Geneva 
Convention specifically addresses political refugees and remains the legal framework within 
which governments and humanitarian organisations tackle refugee issues. The term refugee in 
this study also includes those who fled human rights violations as is the case for political and 
civil rights activists and journalists who fled persecution because their ideas and writings 
were deemed subversive. 
 
Nor does this work treat refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) as synonymous 
categories for the reason that as much as the two categories are usually outcomes of the same 
problem, they cannot be conflated because they exist in different contexts calling for different 
legal arrangements and statuses (Kuhlman 1994; UNHCR 2007). How would the UNHCR 
and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) that assist refugees and claim that their 
mandates are humanitarian and apolitical compel the very state that may be responsible for 
internally displacing its own people to comply with international refugee law? This is 
particularly relevant in Africa where the rhetoric of international humanitarian organisations 
being tools of re-colonisation and accusations of interference in internal affairs of sovereign 
states have been invoked against foreign organisations their humanitarian agenda 
notwithstanding.3  It is the submission of this study that the experiences of refugees in a 
country of asylum cannot be generalised to those of IDPs and vice versa.  
 
                                                 
3 Omar al Bashir, the President of Sudan premises his refusal to allow a UN peace keeping mission into Sudan to 
improve security for people internally displaced by the Darfur crisis on the “argument” that the international 
community has a “re-colonisation” agenda. Conviction in such discourses is manifest in politicisation of 
humanitarian work and the increasing kidnapping and killing of aid workers. In the case of Zimbabwe, outdated 
anti-colonial rhetoric and discourses of sovereignty which remain a rallying point for many countries in Africa 
have seen the government of Zimbabwe seeking to constrain or even ban operations of mainly Western-based 
international NGOs because of their perceived “imperialist agenda”. Local NGOs are accordingly branded 
puppets of the “imperialist” West. Such discourses which are often a smokescreen for gross human rights abuse 
and persecution are also deployed to deter humanitarian organisations from assisting the affected populations. 
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1.1.2. Integration 
The concept of integration is fraught with definitional problems with different countries and 
groups having different emphases and meanings (Ager and Strang 2004; 2008). As such, 
“[t]here is no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model of immigrant and refugee 
integration. The concept continues to be controversial and hotly debated” (Castles et al 2002: 
114). In some instances, integration has been interpreted as synonymous with other 
terminologies leading to confusion and lack of clarity on what exactly it involves (Harrell-
Bond 1986; Kibreab 1989; Crisp 2004). Integration takes different pathways; there are 
different national models, government policies and administrative contexts all of which 
indicate that the meaning of integration is determined by the interests, perspectives and values 
of those concerned (Castles et al 2002). As a recommended solution to the plight of refugees, 
the obscurity and confusion that surround local integration in many African countries emanate 
from the existence of various refugee policies and arrangements ranging from the temporary 
to the semi-permanent and permanent. Integration in African contexts is particularly confused 
with assimilation and local settlement.  
 
1.1.2.1. Integration and Assimilation 
In Sociology, the term integration has been traced to Emile Durkheim whose ideas were 
further developed by Talcott Parsons who, at a time when functionalism was at the core of 
understanding society, sought to explain how social systems maintain themselves. The term 
assimilation can be traced to debates on nation-building associated with the liberal tradition of 
the 19th century. These debates focused on the merits, demerits and feasibility of absorption of 
minorities into “high cultures” with modernists such as John Stuart Mill (1946) advocating 
assimilation or the melting pot and homogenisation perspective in the United States of 
America (USA). On the other hand, writers in the 1960s and 1970s such as Walter Connor 
(1972) questioned modernists’ assimilation stance and advocated multiculturalism which has 
become central to discussions on integration in contemporary times.  
 
These debates summarised here show that even in the 19th century, there was no confusion 
between assimilation and integration as debates focused on which one of the two was 
appropriate for the nation-building project. While these debates capture the realities of 
Western states, they are largely problematic in many African countries where the nation-state 
superimposed on existing political boundaries has not eroded the ethnic diversities thus 
resulting in the continued existence of diversity and multiculturalism within the broader 
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nation-state category. Against this background, this section defines integration in the context 
of refugee hosting in a multi-ethnic and multicultural context such as Kenya. Similarly, 
functionalist ideas on integration and social system maintenance do not explain how refugees 
fit or fail to fit into their host country (Kuhlman 1994). 
 
The UNHCR defines integration as “the process by which the refugee is assimilated into the 
social and economic life of a new national community.”4 The problem with this definition is 
that it substitutes integration with the term assimilation which equally needs to be defined in 
view of the fact that integration and assimilation are not synonyms as shown above (see also 
Kuhlman 1991; 1994). Assimilation entails abandonment of refugees’ own cultural identities 
and adoption of host populations’ cultures and submersion or absorption into host 
communities to the extent that refugees become indistinguishable from local populations 
(Kuhlman 1991; Crisp 2004; Griffiths et al 2005). It involves “the complete merging [of 
refugees] into the majority society in a unidirectional process of absorption” (Valtonen 1998: 
42; see also Castles et al 2002). On the other hand, integration involves interaction between 
refugees and locals without absorption of the former. Assimilation is resisted by host 
governments and populations as it creates pressure on resources and generates fear of 
dispossession among local populations. It is also resisted among the refugees themselves who 
see it as an obstacle to repatriation or third country resettlement, preferably in Western 
countries in view of how refugees clamour for the latter (see Grabska 2006; Horst 2006a, 
2006c).  
 
1.1.2.2. Local Integration and Local/Organised Settlement 
Local integration is also confused with local/organised settlement yet the two are not 
synonymous and cannot therefore be used interchangeably. In an ideal situation, local 
integration is a permanent solution which eventually leads to acquisition of citizenship 
through naturalisation although refugees may become integrated without naturalisation and 
citizenship which confer political rights (Kibreab 1989; Crisp 2004). In view of the huge 
numbers of refugees Kenya hosts because of its relative stability in a largely volatile region, 
the Kenyan government objects to naturalisation for the reason that this would strain the 
country’s resources and create economic, social and political problems. Nonetheless, refugees 
can still integrate even if they do not naturalise and become citizens. The Executive 
                                                 
4 UNHCR The Integration of Refugees, Geneva (undated). See also Article 34 of the Geneva Convention and 
Sections 2 (e) and 8(c) of the Statute of the Office of the UNHCR which state that State Parties shall promote and 
facilitate assimilation and naturalisation of refugees. 
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Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme (2005) views naturalisation as an 
“opportunity” or a “possibility” for refugees “who have already attained a considerable degree 
of socio-economic integration.”5 On the other hand, local/organised settlement is a temporary 
measure adopted to deal with large-scale refugee influxes. Refugees are provided with land in 
spatially segregated areas where they can engage in economic production so that they live 
with a level of self-sufficiency and dignity while they wait for repatriation which is expected 
to take place as soon as the reasons that prompted flight cease to exist (Kibreab 1989; 
Jacobsen 2001; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003b; Crisp 2004).  
 
Local settlements are physically segregated so as to make refugees visible to donors (Harrell-
Bond 1986; Kuhlman 1994). They are a temporary solution based on the belief that refugees 
are transient but need to be self-sufficient prior to repatriation. On the other hand, local 
integration enables refugees to live among locals and interact with them and become almost 
invisible as refugees. Local integration is a durable solution in so far as it recognises refugees’ 
permanence in the host country in the event that repatriation is improbable or impossible. 
Local integration and local settlement differ in that the former allows refugees to settle among 
locals while the latter confines them to specific refugee zones where they are provided with 
land for agricultural production. Local integration and local settlement, as a durable solution 
and a temporary solution respectively, ideally seek to achieve contradictory goals in the long-
run and therein lies the difference between them even if refugees in local settlements may 
eventually become integrated if they cannot repatriate and move into areas inhabited by local 
populations. However, it has to be noted that local integration can be a temporary solution 
like local settlement when it is followed by repatriation (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003b). 
 
Scholars who have sought to define refugee integration underline different aspects as 
facilitators and markers of integration. Despite the different points of emphasis, one point of 
concurrence emerges: integration is neither local settlement nor assimilation or its antonyms 
namely segregation or marginalisation in which refugees do not have any kind of relationship 
and interaction with local communities (see Kuhlman 1994). What then is integration if it is 
neither assimilation nor local settlement nor segregation or marginalisation? Harrell-Bond 
(1986: 7) stresses the social aspect of co-existence between refugees and host populations 
which she measures in terms of conflict between the two sides not being worse than “that 
                                                 
5 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee 33rd Meeting, 2 June 
2005, “Local Integration and Self-reliance”. http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/42a0054f2.pdf (accessed 
05.04.08). 
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which exists within the host community”. On the other hand, Bernard (1973: 87, cited in 
Kuhlman 1991: 4) views integration as occurring when refugees become a working part of 
their host society and at the same time retain their cultural identity. Being a working part of a 
society means being able to participate in the various facets of life in the asylum country 
ranging from the economic, social, civic and, with naturalisation, political (see also Castles et 
al 2005; Ager and Strang 2004; 2008). Kuhlman (1991) proposes a definition that 
incorporates and synthesises Bernard’s and Harrell-Bond’s definitions. According to 
Kuhlman (1991: 7),  
[i]f refugees are able to participate in the host economy in ways commensurate with 
their skills and compatible with their cultural values; if they attain a standard of living 
which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements…if the socio-cultural 
change they undergo permits them to maintain an identity of their own and to adjust 
psychologically to their new situation; if standards of living and economic 
opportunities for members of the host society have not deteriorated due to influx of 
refugees; if friction between host population and refugees is not worse than within the 
host population itself; and if the refugees do not encounter more discrimination than 
exists between groups previously settled within the host society: then refugees are truly 
integrated. 
 
Where repatriation is not possible, local integration is “an economic, social and cultural 
process by which refugees become members of the host society on a permanent basis 
irrespective of how things develop in their countries of origin” (Kibreab 1989: 469). This 
study conceptualises integration as a legal, economic, social and cultural process (Crisp 2004; 
Feller 2005). Although integration has a political dimension by which refugees attain political 
rights, this study focuses on this dimension in so far as it shapes refugee women’s experiences 
because the attainment of political rights only takes place in the event of naturalisation or 
acquisition of citizenship which is absent for the refugee women studied. Firstly, local 
integration is a legal process that entails rights and entitlements such as the fundamental rights 
to gainful employment, engagement in income-generating activities, ownership and disposal 
of property and freedom of movement. Secondly, it is an economic process that facilitates 
access to employment, establishment of sustainable livelihoods, attainment of self-reliance 
and self-sufficiency that enable refugees to live without depending on host government and 
humanitarian organisations’ assistance. Thirdly, integration is a social and cultural process 
that enables refugees to live among local populations without fear of discrimination, 
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intimidation or exploitation by host authorities and populations. Ager and Strang (2008: 166) 
elaborate on this conceptualisation by highlighting the domains or indicators of integration as 
access to employment, housing, education, health, rights and social connection between 
refugees and locals which is related to language, culture and the local environment. 
 
The social and cultural dimension of integration has been the bone of contention with debates 
focusing on adoption of hosts’ culture and retention of own culture. As Castles et al (2005) 
observe, the term integration is used in two different ways. Firstly, integration is used in a 
normative way which implies a one-way process by which refugees adopt the dominant 
culture. Secondly, integration refers to a two-way process by which both refugees and host 
populations adapt to each other. Many scholars emphasise refugees’ ability to retain their 
cultural identities and co-exist with local populations with the presence of refugees in 
particular and their status as such not being the source of conflicts between the refugees and 
local populations (Kuhlman 1991). Refugees being absorbed and becoming culturally 
indistinguishable from local populations which is what assimilation entails carries 
connotations of permanence and is resisted by refugees, locals and the host government. 
Integration is accordingly conceptualised in this study as an interactive and two-way rather 
than a unidirectional process; it involves refugees’ engagement with the host communities, 
their ability to participate in societal spheres, access institutions without impediments and 
become part of their host community (Valtonen 1998; Castles et al 2002; Dryden-Peterson 
and Hovil 2003b; Griffiths et al 2005; Ager and Strang 2008). 
 
1.2. Historical and Research Background  
The UNHCR identifies three “durable solutions” to the plight of refugees namely i) voluntary 
repatriation, ii) integration in the country of first asylum or local integration, and iii) 
resettlement in a third country.6 Integration in the country of first asylum7 or local integration 
refers to the same solution whereby refugees become part and parcel of their first host country 
which is usually a neighbouring country. In this study, integration in the country of first 
asylum and local integration are used interchangeably as they mean one and the same 
                                                 
6 UNHCR Statute, Article 8.c and UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies, Second Edition. 
http://www.helid.desastres.net/gsdl2/collect/who/pdf/h0216e/h0216e.pdf (accessed 04.01.08). 
7 For some of the refugee women, Kenya is the country of second or even third asylum to which they moved 
from another host country or other host countries in the region. Refugees do not always flee in single-vector 
movements or linear movement from the country of origin to the destination country but also in two-vector 
movements (Kunz 1973: 126). Country of first asylum in this study is taken in its literal sense but in order to 
avoid confusion, Kenya is taken as such even for women who have lived in another country or other countries in 
the region prior to their relocation to Kenya. The latter is in the same region as the countries whose refugees it 
hosts and is not a third country of resettlement. 
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arrangement. The UNHCR recommends voluntary repatriation as the ideal solution; the 
refugee agency accordingly declared the 1990s “the decade of repatriation”. 8  The 
implementation of voluntary repatriation has however, proved problematic. The challenges of 
post-conflict reintegration, rehabilitation and reconciliation and how these challenges derail 
efforts at successful repatriation are clearly depicted by Crisp (1986, 2000); Zetter (1988b); 
Harrell-Bond (1989); Malkki (1995a); Kibreab (2002); Fagen (2003); Forbes Martin (2004) 
and Hammond (2004). Resettlement in a third country has been traditionally implemented in 
Western Europe, North America and Australia. For African refugees in particular, 
resettlement is restricted to a small number of refugees (Kuhlman 1994; Juma and Kagwanja 
2003; Cochrane 2007; Shandy 2007). For this reason, resettlement is a durable solution to a 
handful of refugees out of millions of refugees on the continent.  
 
Against the background of contemporary global politics and security concerns in the wake of 
the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, there have been low and negligible 
numbers of refugees who find a “durable solution” in resettlement in the developed third 
countries in fulfilment of the principle of burden sharing (Crisp 2000; Gibney 2002; van Selm 
2003). It is within this context that this study intends to examine the experiences of refugee 
women who have opted for or been forced by circumstances to seek local integration which 
takes place in the first country refugees arrive in after crossing an international border or one 
of the countries in the region. The country of first asylum is usually a neighbour to the 
country generating the refugees as is the case for Kenya in relation to some of the refugee 
nationalities the country hosts (see map on page 26 below).  
 
At a global level, refugee studies that have dealt with refugee integration have mostly 
subsumed the concept under resettlement in a third country in Western Europe, North 
America and Australia (see Valtonen 1998; Korac 2001; Olsson 2002; Mestheneos and 
Ioannidi 2002; Ager and Strang 2004; 2008). As indicated above, integration stands as a 
recommended solution on its own which merits studying outside the context of third country 
resettlement. Due to refugee policies or regulations pursued by many African countries the 
most conspicuous of which being encampment, local integration has mostly existed on the 
periphery of refugee studies in Africa. Many African host governments are reluctant to 
                                                 
8 Sadako Ogata, the former High Commissioner for Refugees makes explicit reference to this declaration in a 
speech she gave at the Informal Meeting of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme 
on the 26th of June 1992 in Geneva, see http://www.unhcr.org/admin/ADMIN/3ae68fae1c.html (accessed 
08.08.07). 
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implement integration and deliberately confine refugees to camps and local settlements that 
are usually located in remote and isolated parts of the countries of asylum. Encampment is 
buttressed by restrictions imposed on refugee movement that limit interaction with the 
surrounding communities and the country of asylum at large. Only a few countries such as 
Egypt and South Africa do not pursue encampment and allow refugees to self-settle 
particularly in urban areas.  
 
Extensive research has been conducted on refugees in Africa but much of it is on encamped 
refugees or those in local or organised settlements. A few illustrative examples include 
Mupedziswa (1993); Hyndman (1996); Malkki (1995a); Horst (2006a; 2006c). Mention of the 
term refugee in African contexts predictably conjures up images of camps similar to those 
portrayed in media coverage of the current crisis in Darfur, Sudan9 which is described by the 
United Nations (UN) as the worst humanitarian crisis in contemporary times. This is 
attributable to both the prevalence of the encampment regime in Africa and the humanitarian 
community and host governments’ emphasis on repatriation which has relegated local 
integration to a “forgotten solution” (Jacobsen 2001).  
 
Hitherto, the encampment regulation and the absence of government policies of local 
integration have not deterred refugees from self-settling outside the camps. Hundreds of 
thousands of refugees have self-settled along the border regions in rural areas as well as in 
urban centres in various asylum countries in Africa including Kenya. Of the 14,6 million 
persons of concern to the UNHCR in 2001, 60% was self-settled with 13% of these being in 
urban areas while 47% was in rural areas (Jacobsen 2005: 6-7). In 2006, the UNHCR 
estimated the number of refugees domiciled in urban areas in Africa to have risen to 18% 
(Jacobsen 2006). The majority of refugees remain in countries of first asylum without 
prospects of either voluntary repatriation or resettlement in a third country, a situation that 
warrants the need to investigate the possibility of integration in cases where refugees have 
self-settled among locals in urban areas.  
 
Refugee policies aimed at facilitating local integration in the country of first asylum have 
been shunned because of many African governments’ belief that the lasting solution can only 
                                                 
9 The Darfur crisis in Sudan has claimed at least 300 000 lives at the hands of government-backed Arab militias 
and displaced nearly two million people. As the militias commit atrocities in Darfur, the world has chosen to 
focus on whether the killings have reached proportions that can be called genocide. The USA has since invoked 
the 1948 Genocide Convention. The international community is divided and continues to dither on taking 
decisive action on the crisis. 
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be found in the country of origin rather than the country of asylum (Kibreab 1989). This 
belief is sustained by host governments’ quest to repel the economic and political pressure as 
well as social problems that come with integrating refugees in terms of employment 
opportunities, participation in political processes and balance of ethnic numbers which is 
salient in countries such as Kenya where ethnicity remains a critical feature of the political 
economy. Many African governments have accordingly declared commitment to resolving the 
crises that prompt people to flee their countries. Yusuf Omar, the Head of the Department of 
Refugee Affairs (DRA) in the Office of the President in Kenya who was interviewed for this 
study cited as the most durable solution “deal[ing] with the root causes of the refugee crisis” 
by “promoting and sustaining peace and stability”. He made reference to the role of the Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in this regard and that of Kenya in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in 2005 between the Government of Sudan 
and the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement.10  
 
In spite of regional efforts, the conflicts in Africa, besides being violent, have proved to be 
tenacious and intractable; many conflicts that span decades rage on with no end in sight while 
new conflicts are erupting thus prompting more people to flee and swell the numbers of 
refugees. Even in cases where peace agreements have been signed as is the case in eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, sporadic fighting remains an obstacle to 
voluntary repatriation. This has resulted in a situation whereby refugees spend decades and, in 
some cases, a lifetime waiting for elusive peace. For refugees who have decided to settle 
outside refugee camps without official approval, this decision is neither encouraged nor 
severely censured except in cases of perceived threat to national security. Foreign policies that 
have proved to be outright failures or moved gradually to solve problems in the country of 
origin and the fact that refugees have self-settled outside the designated areas point to the 
need for a better understanding of these refugees’ experiences in relation to local integration 
which is touted as one of the durable solutions.  
 
In comparison to camps, a few studies have focused on local integration among self-settled 
refugees in Africa notable examples being Hansen’s (1981) and Bakewell’s (2000; 2002; 
2008) studies of Angolan refugees in rural Zambia. The study of local integration has largely 
                                                 
10 Personal interview with Yusuf Omar, Head of the DRA, Nairobi, 26.02.07. IGAD which was formed on 21 
March 1996 is a body of seven countries in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. These are Djibouti, Ethiopia, 
Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda. Eritrea declared suspension of its membership in 2007 and such suspension 
comes into effect a year after the declaration. IGAD seeks to promote political, economic, developmental, trade 
and security cooperation in the region. 
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focused on refugees along the border where local populations usually share language and 
cultural ties with the refugees leading to the conclusion that such refugees easily integrate into 
the local communities (Rubin 1974; Schultheis 1989; Bakewell 2000; 2002; 2008). Low 
outcomes of voluntary repatriation and third country resettlement policies in addition to the 
inappropriateness of camps (temporary arrangements) for a phenomenon that has turned out 
to be enduring are beginning to direct attention to local integration as a viable solution (see 
Jacobsen 2001; Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003a; 2003b; 2004). There is a growing shift of 
attention from camps and rural self-settlement to urban areas examples being Kibreab’s 
(1995) study of refugees in Khartoum, Sudan; Grabska’s (2005; 2006) studies of Sudanese 
refugees in Cairo, Egypt which, like South Africa, does not pursue an encampment policy; 
Campbell’s (2005; 2006) studies of Somali refugees in Nairobi, Kenya and Dryden-Peterson’s 
(2006) study of refugees in Kampala, Uganda. However, much is yet to be accomplished in 
understanding refugee women’s experiences of local integration in African urban contexts.  
 
The stereotypical image of African refugees as mostly women belonging to rural backgrounds 
and the perceived connection between these backgrounds and refugee camps account for the 
limited attention in refugee studies in Africa to experiences of hundreds of thousands of 
refugee women self-settled in urban centres across the continent. Rural dwellers, specifically 
women, like their urban counterparts, make decisions on whether to stay in or outside the 
camps depending on their needs and aspirations in the country of asylum. Political crises, 
brazen human rights violations and violent conflicts in Africa are not confined to rural areas 
but also affect and displace urban dwellers. Refugees who self-settle in urban centres are 
largely invisible unlike their encamped counterparts thus resulting in host governments 
downplaying their presence in urban areas and consistently advocating encampment when 
more refugees are defying it and self-settling in urban areas. There is also need to appreciate 
the initiative refugee women in particular take in search of better prospects outside refugee 
camps. 
 
1.3. Statement of the Problem 
Four main issues prompted this study. Firstly, while the experiences of encamped refugee 
women have been widely documented, very few studies have focused on the experiences and 
circumstances of urban refugee women who live in a different milieu and are not readily 
conspicuous as refugees in an environment as cosmopolitan as Nairobi. What informs refugee 
women’s choice to self-settle in Nairobi and what are the experiences that this self-settlement 
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entails? Secondly, does Kenya’s encampment regime impact on refugee women who defy it 
and self-settle in Nairobi? While encampment deters integration, how are the circumstances of 
self-settled refugee women to be explained in relation to local integration? Thirdly, flight 
entails social and economic dislocation in the form of disruption of family relationships, 
networks and livelihoods. What are the implications of this dislocation on women’s ability to 
fulfil their gender roles? Fourthly, refugee women are heterogeneous and do women from 
different national, ethnic, cultural and economic backgrounds have different experiences in 
Nairobi?  
 
Integration in the country of resettlement is fraught with challenges for refugees in the form 
of racism, discrimination, language and cultural barriers as well as, for many refugees, lack of 
skills that can be transferred from (usually) a developing country of origin to the Western 
country of resettlement (Korac 2001; Ager and Strang 2004; 2008; Abusharaf 2006; Fangen 
2006; Shandy 2007; Holtzman 2008). What does integration entail in a country of first asylum 
and do African refugee women stand a better chance of integration and fewer social and 
cultural challenges in countries of first asylum that are usually neighbours to or in the same 
region as their countries of nationality? What chances are there for refugee women to 
integrate and what are the dynamics of integration in Nairobi? How do refugee women view 
their lives in Nairobi in relation to integration? 
 
Despite advocacy for encampment in Kenya,11 refugees who self-settle are not bundled and 
whisked away to the camps by the Kenyan government whose attitude towards refugees has 
been aptly described as “benign neglect” (Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005: 31) and a 
“somewhat laissez faire policy” (Verdirame 1999: 57). However, as Chapter Two shows, the 
government reacts to refugees’ presence in Kenya whenever it deems them a threat to national 
security. The study seeks to understand how the government relates with refugees and the 
impact of state institutions such as the police on refugee women. In addition, the UNHCR 
directs humanitarian aid to refugee camps and does not have assistance programmes for urban 
refugees in Kenya. The refugee agency advises refugees to relocate to the camps if they are to 
access humanitarian aid.12 The absence of UNHCR assistance policy and government support 
                                                 
11 The Head of the DRA stressed that Kenya does not have a refugee policy but a regulation which he termed “a 
silent regulation” of encampment. Kenya currently does not have an official policy or a law which enforces 
encampment hence the Head of the DRA’s reference to encampment as a regulation rather than a policy. He 
reiterated that Kenya has an encampment regulation because encampment enables the country to manage the 
huge numbers of refugees that it hosts (personal interview, Nairobi, 26.02.07).  
12 Personal interview with the UNHCR Community Services Officer (CSO), Nairobi, 19.02.07.  
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for refugees self-settled in urban centres warrants the need to investigate the incentives for 
refugee women’s choice to forego UNHCR assistance and live in Nairobi where they have to 
struggle for survival. Related to the absence of urban refugee policy is the hypothetical 
question: does the absence of official integration policy in Kenya deter refugee women’s 
integration?  
 
Refugee women are a specific social category subsumed within the broader politico-legal 
category of refugees. Although this is not a comparative study of refugee women and men, in 
addressing the experiences of refugee women the study shows in the process whether refugee 
women’s circumstances in an urban milieu differ from those of refugee men and in what ways 
refugee women’s experiences can be said to be unique. What are the implications of exile on 
refugee women regarding their performance of gender roles as subsumed in cultural 
definitions of womanhood? The study addresses the second hypothetical question namely, 
does exile change women’s gender roles? Furthermore, the study endeavours to find out 
whether refugee women’s experiences in an urban environment where they have self-settled 
differ from the widely documented experiences of refugee women in camp settings. What 
does it mean to be a refugee woman in Nairobi? Women’s perspectives are usually limited to 
identification and narration of their experiences of violence and post-flight challenges with 
limited focus on how they manage to rebuild their lives in exile. How do refugee women 
negotiate the difficult experiences of physical, social and economic dislocation that flight 
from their countries of nationality entails? What strategies do refugee women devise in order 
to adjust to new circumstances in Nairobi?  
 
The refugee status is a legal status which has a homogenising effect on those who bear it. Yet, 
refugee women are heterogeneous populations who bear diverse social identities; the term 
refugee is “a cluster concept” (Connolly1983: 14) or a loaded concept in which other concepts 
are subsumed (Haddad 2004). Do refugee women from diverse social, cultural, ethnic and 
national backgrounds encounter similar challenges and opportunities in Nairobi? The 
prevailing hypothesis that informs refugee hosting in many countries in Africa portrays 
integration as inimical to repatriation and posits that integrated refugees will not repatriate 
even if the conditions that prompted flight cease to exist. Despite that this hypothesis can only 
be proved or disproved by studying repatriated refugees, do refugee women’s circumstances 
shed light on the perceived integration-repatriation dichotomy? Questions raised in this 
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section guide the study towards a nuanced investigation of refugee women’s experiences and 
the possibility of integration in Nairobi. 
 
1.4. Objectives of the Study 
The study aims to understand the impact of the encampment regime designed to discourage 
and prevent integration on refugee women who have defied it and self-settled in Nairobi. It 
also proposes to explore the world of concrete experiences of refugee women in negotiating 
the political, legal, economic, social and cultural terrains in the process of adaptation in the 
country of asylum. The objectives of the study can be summarised as follows: 
• To establish the relationship between the heterogeneous refugee identities and 
prospects for integration among refugee women. 
• To analyse how refugee legal protection is translated into reality and how this 
translation shapes refugee women’s experiences in Nairobi. 
• To document and analyse the experiences and circumstances of refugee women 
self-settled in Nairobi and their implications for integration. 
• To explore and highlight strategies refugee women devise in order to rebuild their 
lives and carve a niche for themselves in Nairobi. 
 
1.5. Justification of the Study 
Self-settled refugee women have remained largely on the periphery of refugee studies in 
Africa that have focused largely on encamped refugees. Firstly, there is need to understand 
why increasing numbers of refugees are defying encampment and self-settling in urban areas. 
The second issue which derives from the first is that as refugees opt for self-settlement, there 
is need to understand the implications of this self-settlement for local integration in a country 
that advocates encampment. Thirdly, a growing body of literature epitomised by Blackwell’s 
(2008) study cited above is taking the perspective that terms such as “refugee” are “policy 
categories” that do not necessarily reflect the circumstances of the populations upon whom 
they are “imposed”. To what extent do the circumstances of refugee women in Nairobi sustain 
or challenge this perspective? The study also aims to understand the difference between 
Nairobi and the camps which are settings similar to total institutions such as prisons (Forbes 
Martin 2004) and mental asylum, internment camps and Bantustans (Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond 2005). Fourthly, a perspective that portrays refugee camps as expensive enclaves of 
political ferment (Malkki 1995a; 1997; Ibeanu 2004) and military activity and danger (Crisp 
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2000) has emerged. It is still not clear whether self-settlement in an urban context provides 
security for refugees, who in this case are women.  
 
With so many studies having focused on refugee camps in Kenya to the exclusion of refugees 
who live in settings where local integration can take place, it is still difficult to understand the 
dynamics of local integration in Nairobi. While the UNHCR cites local integration in the 
country of first asylum as one of the three “durable solutions”, much is yet to be 
accomplished in terms of understanding what integration entails and its feasibility in African 
contexts where first countries of asylum are usually poor neighbours of the refugee-producing 
countries. Local integration has largely existed in theory in contemporary African contexts to 
the extent that it is not clear whether its implementation can indeed provide a solution to 
refugees in Africa. This warrants the need for a study which seeks to understand the 
experiences of refugee women who have self-settled in Nairobi in relation to local integration.  
It is the position of this author that refugee experiences vary with context; the broadest 
interpretation of research findings on integration and resettlement in a developed third country 
would not fully capture the experiences and circumstances of refugees who have self-settled 
in a developing country of first asylum. Similarly, the experiences and circumstances that the 
refugee status involves vary with gender. Women usually constitute the majority among 
refugees and in the same way that conflict means different experiences for men and women, 
the experiences of local integration are also gendered. Besides insights provided by Crawley 
(2001) and Forbes Martin (2004), there is need for in-depth analysis of gender and how it 
shapes refugee women’s experiences in an African urban context.  
 
The concept refugee subsumes differences in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion, nationality 
among other social characteristics. These diversities are pertinent for integration and merit a 
nuanced study in order to underscore refugee women’ experiences in Nairobi. The study is 
also necessitated by the need to investigate the homogenising assumption in humanitarian 
circles that refugees are trapped in difficulties from which they cannot extricate themselves 
without humanitarian aid. The study investigates the perception of the refugee status as 
pathological and endeavours to bring into the limelight refugee women’s resourcefulness and 
agency which is defined as the individual actor’s “capacity to process social experience and to 
devise ways of coping with life, even under the most extreme forms of coercion” (Long 2001: 
16), the power to do things or “the capability to ‘make a difference’” (Giddens 1985: 14). It is 
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hoped that this study contributes to the growing body of literature on urban refugees 
particularly women in Africa. 
 
1.6. A Note on the Field 
Fieldwork was carried out in Nairobi, the capital city of Kenya. Kenya is located in East 
Africa and shares borders with Somalia to the east where it is also bound by the Indian Ocean, 
Ethiopia and Sudan to the north, Uganda to the west where Lake Victoria also lies and 
Tanzania to the south. Kenya has a significant topographical feature namely the Rift Valley 
which runs from the north to the south. The northern region of the country constitutes two-
thirds of the country and is hot and semi-arid as it receives comparatively little rainfall. The 
coastal region is humid, the famous Kenyan highlands are relatively temperate and the Lake 
Victoria region is tropical. Kenya is divided into eight provinces namely Central, Coast, 
Eastern, Nairobi, North-Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western. The country is renowned 
for its tourist attractions that range from wildlife, the Rift Valley, the port city of Mombasa 
and culture tourism epitomised by the Maasai ethnic group. 
 
 
Figure 1: Map of Kenya showing Fieldwork Site (Nairobi), Refugee Camps and 
Neighbouring Countries.13  
                                                 
13  Source of Map: http://oursurprisingworld.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/kenya_political_map_b.jpg 
(accessed 29. 10.08; map modified to show Kakuma and Dadaab Refugee Camps). 
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The country’s population was projected to stand at 35,265 million for the year 2008.14 Almost 
99% is African with the remaining percentage comprising Arabs, Asians and Europeans. 
Kenya’s African population is comprised of forty-two ethnic groups with the following 
groups constituting the majority; Kikuyu (22%), Luhya (14%), Luo (13%), Kalenjin (12%) 
and Kamba (11%). 15  Kenya’s Constitution provides for freedom of religion which the 
government respects in practice. Approximately 45% of the population is Protestant, 33% is 
Roman Catholic, 10% Muslim, 1% Hindu with the remaining percentage following various 
traditional religions.16 Some Muslims charge though that the government is hostile towards 
Muslims. Kiswahili and English are the official languages with English being used as a 
second language. Nevertheless, ethnic languages, particularly those spoken by the major 
ethnic groups, are also spoken in Nairobi.  
 
Relations among ethnic groups particularly in the rural areas are largely characterised by 
contestation for resources such as land, water and pasture, and politically motivated violent 
clashes. The country’s post-independence history is characterised by land clashes such as 
those that took place in 1992 and 1997 in the Rift Valley, Mt Elgon area and the Coast 
Province as well as in Molo in 2006 at the time fieldwork was conducted. Up to the end of 
fieldwork in February 2007, there were regular ethnic clashes particularly in Mt Elgon. Such 
clashes which also involve the violent activities of the Mungiki Sect have been analysed in 
terms of political tribalism and monopolisation of violence (Klopp 2002). Ethnic tensions 
culminated in large scale ethnic violence following the December 2007 general election in 
which the opposition Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) led by Raila Odinga charged that 
Mwai Kibaki, the incumbent president and leader of the Party of National Unity (PNU) had 
rigged his way back into office. Ajulu (2002: 265-266) describes the political contestation and 
violence that characterise post-independence Kenya as “championed by dominant elites with 
ethnicity acting simply as the organising principle”. 
 
The study was conducted four years after the landmark election which saw the ouster in 2002 
of the Kenya African National Union (KANU) Party which had ruled the country since 
independence from Britain in 1963 by the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). There is 
open acknowledgement that under the NARC government, the political and economic 
                                                 
14 Source: http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/Kenya/ (accessed 10.05.09). 
15 2006 Demographic Data. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics (Kenya) (accessed 08.08.07).  
16 US Department of State International Religious Freedom Report 2006. 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2006/71307.htm (accessed 01.08.07) 
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situation in the country has improved from what it used to be under Daniel arap Moi. Since 
1991 when suspension of donor funds prompted the country to return to multi-party politics, 
the country has seen the opening up of political space for more players. While this is a notable 
improvement in a country where the previous president, Daniel arap Moi had advocated one-
party state politics in which he rewarded loyalty and punished dissent (Barkan 2004), the 
impact of the violence of December 2007 on Kenya’s future politics is yet to be seen.  
 
The multi-party politics prevailing in the country is coupled with freedom of expression and 
association as well as increasing human or civil rights activism (Klopp 2000). At the time of 
fieldwork, there was constant reference to “our democracy” or “our second liberation” in 
political discourse particularly at political rallies and in broadcast fora on party politics, 
corruption and human rights issues. However, democracy in the country is still nascent, 
fragile and rife with ethnic factionalism (Barkan 2004) and regressions as illustrated by the 
violent contestation of results of the presidential election held on 27 December 2007. It is also 
largely a contested terrain as government, opposition politicians and civil society trade 
accusations on various issues relating to good governance particularly human rights and the 
fight against corruption both of which were topical at the time fieldwork was conducted. The 
expansion of civil and political rights in Kenya is marred by high levels of corruption (Klopp 
2000; Murunga and Nasong’o 2006; Transparency International 2006).17  
 
Kenya’s GDP Growth for the year 2006 was 6.0% and inflation for the same year was around 
14.5%. Unemployment rate stands at 24% of the country’s labour force and many Kenyans 
are in the informal sector or self-employed.18 Even though the economy registered significant 
growth for the year 2006, poverty reduction and inequality remain a challenge with income 
disparities having gone down in rural areas since 1997 while they have increased slightly in 
urban areas (World Bank 2007). Severe poverty in the rural areas declined from 34.8% in 
1997 to 21.9% in 2006, in urban areas it increased from 7.6% to 8.3% during the same period. 
                                                 
17 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2006. Transparency International makes explicit 
reference to Kenya’s Anglo-Leasing scandal and related scandals involving misappropriation of public funds 
through fraudulent contracts using sophisticated shell companies and bank accounts in European and off-shore 
jurisdiction. The Anglo-Leasing scandal was topical and discussed in debates that were broadcast in the Kenyan 
media at the time of fieldwork.  
http://www.transparency.de/uploads/media/06-11-03_CPI_2006_press_pack-deutsch.pdf (accessed 08.08.07). 
18 Source: http://www.economywatch.com/economic-statistics/country/Kenya/ (accessed 10.05.09). 
The category informal sector is problematic as small businesses that start in the informal or unofficial sector 
morph into large and official businesses that are part of the formal economy in terms of size, profit and the 
number of people they employ (Campbell 2005). However, informal sector is used in this study in reference to 
refugee women’s income-generating ventures most of which remain small, one-woman businesses operated on 
the fringes of the formal sector economy. 
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One in five Kenyans has consumption levels that are inadequate to meet basic food needs 
even if the individual were to forego all non-food consumption.19 Sixteen and half million 
Kenyans are poor with overall national poverty standing at 46%. Great wealth and prosperity 
are concentrated in the hands of a few.20  
 
Kenyans’ optimism and enthusiasm following President Moi’s defeat in the 2002 election 
have been replaced by disappointment with the NARC government’s performance (Murunga 
and Nasong’o 2006). This disappointment has been exacerbated by contestation of the 2007 
election results which led to formation of a government of national unity which retained 
Mwai Kibaki as President and appointed Raila Odinga as the Prime Minister. Nairobi, the 
capital city of Kenya, is divided into a continuum of sections ranging from affluent 
neighbourhoods to slums in a graphic illustration of the gap between the rich and the poor. 
The majority of refugees in Nairobi live in squalid conditions in the slums and crowded 
sections of the city where they have to eke out a living by competing with their Kenyan 
counterparts in the informal sector. The slums are characterised by poor infrastructure in 
terms of sanitation, drainage and accommodation. Residents in the slums live in overcrowded 
conditions and have to contend with the problem of violence and insecurity. In recognition of 
the high poverty levels, the government of Kenya provides free primary education which it 
extends also to refugee children. 
 
Kenya is one of the main asylum countries in East Africa and on the whole continent of 
Africa. Besides Tanzania which also hosts refugees in the region, Kenya owes its asylum 
country status primarily to its history of relative political stability and peace as well as its 
location in a region where most of the countries have been ravaged by wars that span decades, 
intermittent ethnic conflicts and general instability. The country’s prospects are threatened by 
insecurity in the form of the growing threat of terrorism and the prevalence of violent crimes 
(Barkan 2004). On 7 August 1998, Kenya and Tanzania became targets of terrorist attacks 
which were specifically aimed at USA embassies in both countries. An Israeli-owned hotel in 
the coastal city of Mombasa was also attacked in a separate incident by al Qaeda agents on 28 
November 2002. Such attacks affected tourism in the country prompting the government to 
establish a counter-terrorist unit. Kenya’s Muslim population demands that this unit be 
                                                 
19  Kenya Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation 2003-2007, June 2003. 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/KENYAEXTN/Resources/ERS.pdf (accessed 03.08.07). Unless otherwise 
indicated, statistical data in this paragraph was obtained from the website referenced under this footnote. 
20 JRS Eastern Africa Summaries of Refugee Situations and the JRS Projects in the Region (Kenya, Ethiopia, 
Sudan, Tanzania and Uganda (1998). 
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disbanded because it perceives it as intended to harass and victimise Muslims. Ten years after 
the terrorist attack in Nairobi, there continues to be predictions of more attacks by “Islamic 
terrorists”. The USA issues regular warnings of plans by Islamic militants to attack Kenya 
and provides anti-terrorist assistance to Kenya (see also Murunga and Nasong’o 2006).  
 
The country is sometimes subjected to sporadic cross border attacks by bandits from Ethiopia, 
militias and cattle rustlers in its North-Eastern Province and the Turkana District (see also 
Verdirame 1999). This is in addition to a high rate of violent crimes which has raised security 
concerns within the country.21 There is also proliferation of small arms blamed on Somalis. 
This has raised the levels of violent crimes in the country in the form of clashes among people 
belonging to different ethnic groups in the rural areas, between gangsters and the police in 
addition to armed robberies and shootings. In spite of the high levels of violent crimes, Kenya 
remains a safe destination country for populations fleeing violent conflicts from the 
surrounding countries. In view of the violent contestation of the December 2007 presidential 
election results, it is not clear whether Kenya will remain a safe host country for refugees. 
 
1.6.1. Overview of the Refugee Population in Kenya 
Kenya’s history of relative political stability in a largely volatile region (Barkan and Cooke 
2001) enables the country to host refugees from the Great Lakes region countries namely 
Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda; Horn of Africa countries of Ethiopia, Somalia and 
Eritrea as well as from Sudan. Thus, the refugee population in Kenya is mainly from eight 
countries and Kenya shares borders with four namely Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda 
(see map on page 26). Some of the refugees have been in Kenya for decades as is the case 
with Ugandan refugees who fled the war in the 1970s and Somali and Sudanese refugees who 
came in the 1980s. The Government of Kenya (GoK) pursues an encampment regulation and 
restrictive employment policies that require all refugees to reside in camps. At the time of 
fieldwork, camps at Walda in North-Eastern Kenya, Thika in Central Kenya and those around 
Mombasa in the Coast Province had been closed which means that refugees now have to 
reside either in Kakuma or Dadaab Refugee Camp. Both camps are situated in Northern 
                                                 
21 During the fieldwork period, between September 2006 and February 2007, Kenyan security forces clashed 
with Ethiopian bandits. There was also a series of clashes such as the ones in Molo and in Nairobi’s Kibera and 
Mathare slums. Security forces had to impose a curfew on Mathare in November 2006 following bloody clashes 
which left five people dead. The KTN channel broadcast on its 2100hours news bulletin of 29 January 2007 the 
then Minister of Security John Michuki expressing concern on the deteriorating levels of security within the 
country. The channel raised concerns on whether this was a sign of the Police Commissioner being under “siege” 
or it was a manifestation of police defeat in the war against crime. The Minister ruled out sabotage. Viewers in 
the country also expressed their fears on phone-in programmes on the same television channel. 
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Kenya which is semi-arid and under-populated thus providing the GoK with little incentive to 
invest in the region.  
 
Kakuma Refugee Camp is located in Turkana District in North-Western Kenya which is about 
1000 kilometres from Nairobi and 95 kilometres from the Kenya-Sudan border (UNHCR 
2006). 22  The Camp has four sites namely Kakuma I (mixed nationalities), Kakuma II 
(predominantly Sudanese refugees), Kakuma III (mixed nationalities) and Kakuma IV 
(predominantly Sudanese refugees).23 The UNHCR put the figure of refugees in Kakuma as 
of February 2007 at 84,000.24 Dadaab Refugee Camp is located in Garissa District in the 
North-Eastern Province, which is around 500 kilometres from Nairobi and 80 kilometres from 
the Kenya-Somalia border.25 While the camp was originally designed for 90,000 refugees, 
there were 136,019 refugees in Dadaab Camp as of 31 August 2006 and of this population, 
97.5% were Somali. 26  However, with the escalation of violence in Somalia and the 
subsequent ouster of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) by the Ethiopian-backed Somali 
Transitional Federal Government (TFG) forces in late 2006, there was an influx of Somali 
refugees in Dadaab. On 30 November 2006, a UNHCR official stated on the Kenyan NTV 
news bulletin that about 25,000 Somalis had crossed the border into Kenya and that if the 
influx continued, the UNHCR would find it difficult to cope with the large numbers of 
refugees. At the end of February 2009, Dadaab Refugee Camp held 255,000 refugees and the 
UNHCR estimates that this number could rise to 360,000 by the end of 2009 (Human Rights 
Watch 2009).  
 
Although the GoK follows an encampment regulation, not all refugees abide by this 
regulation as some have moved to urban centres such as Nairobi. In addition, the GoK does 
not strictly enforce the encampment regulation except in situations where foreigners are 
deemed a threat to national security as happened following the terrorist attacks in Nairobi in 
1998. The exact number of refugees currently domiciled in Nairobi is subject to conjecture 
because of double figures caused by the cyclic movement of refugees who shuttle between the 
camps and Nairobi. In 2001, the UNHCR provided the number of refugees living in Nairobi 
as 218,500 (Human Rights Watch 2002). The UNHCR Community Services Officer 
                                                 
22 UNHCR Briefing Kit on Kakuma Refugee Camp-Kenya. The same information is also provided in a UNHCR 
booklet, Information for Refugees and Asylum-Seekers in Nairobi. (See also Verdirame 1999). 
23 UNHCR Briefing Kit on Kakuma Refugee Camp-Kenya. 
24 Personal interview with the UNHCR Community Services Officer (CSO), 19.02.07, Nairobi.  
25 UNHCR Dadaab Operations in Brief, 31 August 2006. 
26 UNHCR Dadaab Operations in Brief, 31 August 2006. 
25
(hereafter CSO) estimated a figure of 15,000 refugees as residing in Nairobi.27 On the other 
hand, the refugee agency’s website cites the same figure as comprising Somalis alone which 
implies a significantly higher number if the other nationalities are included.28 In view of the 
escalation of the conflict in Somalia in recent years and the increasing trend of refugees 
relocating from camps to urban areas, it is likely that the number of refugees in Nairobi 
exceeds the 218,500 provided by the UNHCR in 2001. 
 
1.7. Refugee Hosting in the Context of Globalisation 
Debates on globalisation have focused on three main questions, i) what is globalisation? ii) is 
globalisation something new or part of the long history of transnationalism? iii) what are the 
consequences of globalisation? (Held et al 1999). Globalisation has largely been 
conceptualised as an economic and socio-cultural process. For Held et al (1999), debates on 
globalisation fall into three broad categories consisting of i) hyperglobalisers, for example 
Robertson (1994), who see the world moving towards integration and homogenisation, ii) 
sceptics, for example, Hirst and Thompson (1996), who point to the increasing importance 
attached to cultural difference and geopolitical conflict, and iii) transformationalists, for 
example, Giddens (2002), who perceive intermingling of peoples of the world as generating 
cultural hybrids and global cultural networks. Scholars in the latter two categories focus on 
the cultural revivalism, religious fundamentalism and xenophobic tendencies that can be 
observed in the contemporary world (Giddens 2002).29 Held and McGrew (2002: 3) refer to 
these categorisations as ideal types which do not necessarily describe what globalisation is but 
clarify the primary areas of consensus and contention. In recent times, there has been a shift to 
theorisation and analyses that transcend the integration-disintegration dichotomy and stress 
the complexity and contradictions of contemporary events and processes that straddle various 
aspects of human existence. For Manger and Assal (2006), globalisation needs to be 
conceptualised in terms of regional and local variation and possibilities on the basis of 
concrete empirical material in which micro-processes and dynamics are demonstrated.  
 
                                                 
27 Personal Interview with the CSO, Nairobi, 19.02.07. 
28  UNHCR: http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/466d68f94.html (accessed 29.06.2007). Obtaining credible 
information on refugee numbers in many African countries is an insurmountable task as some of the refugees are 
simply not captured apart from the cyclic movements leading to double counting. For instance, the JRS Strategic 
Plan 2007-2010 published in 2006 states that there are 15,000 officially recognised urban refugees in Kenya with 
a further 120,000 being unofficial urban. 
29 In recent times, the global media have reported incidence of usually violent attacks on foreigners in disparate 
cities such as Moscow, Berlin, Johannesburg; Accra, and Bamako. A Human Right Watch report of 1998 
illustrates the prevalence of xenophobia and abuse of immigrants in South Africa where foreigners were also 
attacked in May 2008. Sixty-two immigrants were reportedly killed. 
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Notwithstanding the different conceptualisations, globalisation has specific characteristics on 
which the various standpoints converge not for purposes of agreement but for aspects that 
make the subject of the diverse analyses. Held et al (1999) set out the characteristics of 
globalisation as: i) social, political and economic activities that transcend national, regional 
and continental boundaries, ii) growth and intensification of interconnectedness manifest in 
flow of trade, investment, finance and migration, iii) fast and efficient transport and 
communication systems that facilitate interaction and the exchange of ideas, goods, capital 
and information, and iv) the deepening impact of events in one geographical location on 
distant places and the impact of the local on the global. These four are characteristic themes of 
theories of globalisation. 
 
Globalisation affects the rooted and the mobile in complex and intertwined ways. It is the 
implications of globalisation on the mobile and sedentary that the concept is deployed in this 
study. Regional and global population movements are not a new phenomenon and can be 
traced through the history of humanity (see Held et al 1999). However, these movements 
became more conspicuous from the seventeenth century onwards (Held et al 1999), 
burgeoned in the 1970s (Castles 1998) and have become geographically extensive in 
contemporary times. Globalisation is characterised by contradiction as when 
deterritorialisation concurrently takes place with reterritorialisation as shown through 
formation of diasporas. Deterritorialisation which is a buzzword in globalisation discourses is 
believed to open up nation-state boundaries and facilitate inflow and outflow of people to and 
from neighbouring countries and beyond. The movement that accompanies deterritorialisation 
is restricted to things in the form of technologies, ideas and capital flows rather than extended 
to human beings or labour (Malkki 2002, emphasis in original). Deterritorialisation is 
accompanied by erection of physical and legal barriers for migrants that restrict the inflow to 
goods, information and migrants with a value in the global market for their labour, capital and 
cultural input thus denying basic rights to those who are perceived as not having contributions 
to make in the global market (Castles 1998; see also Shamir 2005). Globalisation is 
conceptualised as a process of segregation or marginalisation and a system of selective 
inclusion and exclusion which exacerbates inequalities among specific places and groups of 
people (Castles 1998; Baldwin-Edwards 2006; Nyamnjoh 2006). 
 
In the post-11 September 2001 period, globalisation has been conceptualised in ways not 
previously envisioned. Even though conflict and violence are not inherent features of 
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globalisation per se, globalisation in a broader framework entails disruption of existing socio-
economic structures and undermines established political authority thus creating causes for 
conflict and violence (James and Sharma 2006). Events of 11 September 2001 have led to 
conceptualisations that argue that apart from cultural and economic commodities, conflict and 
violence can also be transnationalised in an interconnected world. There is increasing 
theorisation that links globalisation with transnational conflict and violence that transcend 
national borders in ways that threaten to undermine perception of nation-states as self-
contained entities (James and Sharma 2006). The transnationalisation of conflict and violence 
currently expressed in terrorism and anti-terrorism discourses has been accompanied by the 
globalisation of insecurity (Camilleri 2006). The connection between contemporary conflicts 
with mobility accordingly affects populations on the move in the form of migrants, both 
forced and voluntary. It has implications for refugee hosting particularly where refugees are 
linked to conflicts perceived to be a threat to world peace and security. 
 
1.8. Ethics, Methodology and Research Methods 
Researching refugees poses ethical challenges. Confidentiality is central to such research 
considering refugees’ security concerns which in most cases account for the refugees’ 
decision to stay in Nairobi instead of the refugee camps. Participation in the research as well 
as the recording of interviews took place with the women’s informed consent. Although 
refugee women who participated in this study did not hide their identity as refugees, the study 
gives priority to informants’ confidentiality and security and uses pseudonyms to identify 
refugees and locals alike. The study does not reveal the neighbourhoods in which some of the 
refugees live especially for refugees with heightened security concerns as is the case for one 
family in which the man was accused of murdering two refugee children in an NGO shelter. 
 
Participant observation was the main research method. Complementary methods of data 
collection were crucial where participant observation alone could not yield all the required 
data. In addition to participant observation, data were collected through questionnaires, 
interviews, Focus Group Discussions (FGDs), websites and media discussions of issues 
relevant to the study which were topical during fieldwork. Complementary methods also 
provided more nuanced perspectives on the experiences of refugee women under 
investigation. For purposes of feasibility, one specific city was selected from several other 
smaller urban centres in Kenya. Nairobi was chosen because it has a refugee population that 
represents the eight nationalities that are in Kenya and this was ideal for the research which 
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sought among others to investigate whether experiences and circumstances among refugee 
women varied with national background. Because of the research’s focus on gender in 
relation to ethnic and national identities, the researcher made a conscious effort to include 
women from all the eight nationalities in Kenya. The study was not restricted to persons with 
UNHCR documents confirming their legal status as refugees but also included those who did 
not have such documents but identified themselves as refugees in terms of the definitions of a 
refugee adopted in this study. 
 
Refugee women’s experiences cannot be described as unique where there is lack of adequate 
understanding of the circumstances of refugee men. To this end, the research included male 
refugee informants whose experiences helped to provide insights into the gendered nature of 
the refugee status. Refugee men were included because the two categories of women and men 
are not mutually exclusive; refugee men’s experiences have ramifications for refugee women 
within refugee households and vice versa. The primary focus of the research was refugee 
women between the ages of 17 and 56 and men within the same age range. There were two 
cases involving a woman and a man in their 70s. The refugees who were involved in the study 
fled to Kenya between 1984 and 2005. The journey to Kenya involved staying in other 
countries such as the DRC, Tanzania and Uganda. Informants were initially identified through 
the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) Parish Outreach Programme (POP) which brought refugees 
from different nationalities together for food and medical assistance at Catholic parishes in 
Nairobi.  
 
In order to avoid bias towards refugees who were receiving JRS food aid and exclusion of 
those who were not beneficiaries of this programme, other refugees were identified outside 
the programme through refugee women’s social relationships and snowballing. The research 
also benefited immensely from spontaneous encounters with refugees since the researcher 
lived in Waithaka and Kangemi which are among sections of Nairobi that host refugee 
communities. Conscious effort was also made to include women of different marital statuses 
and from different backgrounds such as urban and rural. With the exception of the two 
informants in their 70s cited above and four other cases of refugee women, English was the 
language of communication. Inclusion of women who could not speak English in the 
questionnaire and semi-structured interviews was meant to avoid bias towards refugees who 
spoke the language. In these six cases, each interview was recorded and then translated 
verbatim twice by two different research assistants who were fluent in both Kiswahili and 
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English. Even so, translation is not the same as a direct interview in a language spoken by 
both researcher and informant. The research also included the UNHCR, NGOs, the German 
Technical Development Cooperation (GTZ), Refugee Community-based Organisations 
(RCOs), Kenyan citizens and the Head of the DRA already cited above.  
 
1.8.1. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire was used as a prelude to in-depth data collection from individual 
informants as it was considered the appropriate instrument in this study to elicit biographical 
and historical information from the refugees (see Appendix A). The questionnaire was 
administered on a total of 44 refugees comprising of 34 refugee women and 10 refugee men. 
The 34 refugee women came from eight nationalities namely: 8 Rwandans, 6 Ugandans, 5 
Sudanese, 4 Somalis, 4 Congolese, 4 Ethiopians, 2 Burundians and 1 Eritrean. The 10 refugee 
men were of the following nationalities; 2 Ugandans, 2 Rwandans, 1 Congolese, 1 Burundian, 
1 Somali, 1 Ethiopian, 1 Sudanese and 1 South African. 30  The questionnaire avoided 
technical concepts and was designed in simple everyday language which the women could 
easily understand. As an introductory phase of the fieldwork, the administration of the 
questionnaire created familiarity between the researcher and the refugees.  
 
The introductory section contained self-introduction by the researcher and explanation of the 
purpose of the research and the research objectives; these ethical issues are integral to 
fieldwork (Spradley 1979). The same section informed potential respondents that it was their 
right to choose to participate or not to participate in the study and that the researcher would 
respect their decision even where they decided not to participate.31 In order to obtain basic 
demographic data on refugee women, the questionnaire asked brief questions presented in a 
logical order that required equally concise but clear responses. Informants were asked to 
provide demographic information about themselves on characteristics such as age, marital 
status, number of children and profession as well as on flight and life in Nairobi. Besides 
collecting demographic data the questionnaire functioned to establish rapport. 
 
The majority of the women were literate, could read, write and communicate very well in 
English. Even so, the researcher administered the questionnaire because it became clear from 
                                                 
30 The South African man was the only citizen of that country the researcher encountered in Kenya. He was 
included in the research because it was unusual for a South African to be a refugee at a time when South Africa 
enjoys political and economic stability. The man claimed though that he was a writer and had published a 
newspaper article on a politician whom he declined to name and received threats leading to his flight. 
31 A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix B. 
30
a group of male refugees who self-administered the questionnaire that getting feedback was 
difficult and entailed pestering the refugees to return the completed questionnaires. With the 
exception of four cases in which the women self-administered the questionnaire and asked the 
researcher to collect it on agreed dates, the women made it clear that they preferred the 
researcher to administer the questionnaire due to time constraints on their part. Most of the 
refugees agreed to have their voices recorded at the same time that the researcher completed 
the questionnaire and this helped to cross check what the researcher had written down against 
the women’s recorded voices.  
 
1.8.2. Structured, Semi-structured and Unstructured interviews  
Interviews were preceded by informal discussions with a Jesuit scholastic familiar with 
refugee circumstances and this enabled the researcher to reconsider and edit some of the 
questions that had been designed before travelling to the field. The informal discussion was 
meant to gather basic, context-specific information or an overview of the circumstances of 
refugees in Nairobi and the nature of questions needed to obtain detailed information capable 
of answering the research questions (Fielding and Thomas 2002:125). Interviews were used to 
elicit information from refugees, the UNHCR, NGOs, the GTZ and the Head of the DRA that 
enabled the researcher to understand the field in relation to the overall research objectives. A 
total of 63 interviews were conducted. Of these, 34 were conducted with refugee women all 
of whom had answered the questionnaire above, 10 with refugee men on whom the 
questionnaire had also been administered, 10 with Kenyan citizens, 1 with the UNHCR, 1 
with the Head of the DRA, 3 with NGOs, 1 with the GTZ and 3 with Refugee Community-
based Organisations (RCOs).  
 
Structured/standardised interviews were conducted with staff from the UNHCR, the three 
refugee-oriented NGOs namely Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), Peace-building Healing and 
Reconciliation Programme (PHARP) and Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK), the German 
Technical Development Cooperation (GTZ), a German government agency as well as RCOs 
namely Africa Refugee Programme (ARP), Sudanese Women Action Networks (SWAN) and 
Zindua Afrika. Interviews with the organisations were conducted after those with the refugees 
so that the researcher could also obtain information on issues the refugees had raised on their 
relations with the organisations and verify the issues. Interviews with staff from the 
organisations and the government official were conducted strictly by appointment and usually 
in a formal setting such as an office. These interviews elicited information on the nature of the 
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organisations’ work with refugees as well as their perspectives on and relations with refugees 
in Nairobi.  
 
Semi-structured/semi-standardised interviews were also employed in the research. In this type 
of interview, the interviewer asks the important questions the same way across informants but 
has the room to probe and alter the sequence of questions. Semi-structured interviews were 
used to obtain data from refugee women and men as well as Kenyan citizens. The number of 
refugee men was kept lower because the research focused on refugee women in particular and 
data from refugee men was meant to measure the extent to which refugee women’s 
experiences and circumstances are unique. Interviews with Kenyans were complemented by 
data obtained through a survey conducted by Citizen Television channel on Kenyans’ 
attitudes towards refugees.32 In the semi-structured/semi-standardised type of interview, “the 
interviewer can adapt the research instrument to the level of comprehension and articulacy of 
the respondent, and handle the fact that in responding to a question, people often also provide 
answers to questions we were going to ask later” (Fielding and Thomas 2002: 124). Semi-
structured interviews sought to understand refugee women’s circumstances and experiences 
by seeking detailed information on the women’s backgrounds, how they fled their countries, 
how they earn incomes, the challenges and opportunities of life in Nairobi, relations with 
locals and how they view their current lives in relation to their pre-flight circumstances 
 
The third type of interview that was employed during fieldwork is the unstructured/non 
standardised or focused interview. In this type of interview, the researcher has a list of topics 
or a guide on issues respondents should address during the interview. Questions are 
formulated in any way that makes sense and the researcher can participate in the discussion 
and provide his/her own opinion on the issue under discussion (Thomas and Fielding 2002). 
Non-structured interviews were also used when informants spontaneously started discussing 
cultural issues in their communities such as female circumcision, country of origin politics, 
rape, pending outcomes of application for resettlement as well as discussion of mundane 
activities and events which provided invaluable information on how the refugee status is 
connected to everyday experiences. Both semi-structured/semi-standardised and 
unstructured/non-standardised/focus interviews facilitate flexibility (Weller 1998); this 
enabled informants to provide rich details and recollections about their experiences as 
refugees.  
                                                 
32 Citizen Television, a local television channel in Kenya, conducted a survey on Kenyans’ attitudes towards 
refugees in February 2007.  
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The interview sessions were recorded on a digital voice recorder with the permission of the 
informants and later transcribed using Express Dictate Software. With the exception of the 
UNHCR, GTZ, NGOs, RCOs (excluding JRS and Zindua Afrika) and two women from 
Rwanda, all the interviews were recorded and later transcribed. In these cases, interviews 
could not be recorded because respondents felt more comfortable with the researcher taking 
down notes. Even though the researcher interacted with a cross-section of the refugee 
nationalities in Nairobi, specific individuals’ circumstances, experiences and views were 
crucial for the study and these individuals were further interviewed through informant-centred 
interviews which sought to obtain more data on pertinent issues. 
 
1.8.3. Participant Observation 
In order to understand people’s everyday experiences, their perspectives and narratives and 
how these are connected or divorced from their experiences, the researcher need to live with 
the people under study. The researcher lived in the same compound as some of the refugees 
and became part of the women’s everyday lives. Living with the refugees enables the 
researcher to gain access into the lives of the refugees, she visited them in their homes, 
welcome them as guests, attended functions hosted for refugees, for instance, the Human 
Rights Day Commemoration held in Nairobi on 8 December 2006 (hereafter the Human 
Rights Day Commemoration), attended Sudanese women’s literacy classes and accompanied 
refugee women on outings on public holidays and joined them in mundane activities such as 
shopping. For refugee women who were in Income Generating Projects (IGPs) such as 
tailoring, the researcher joined them in the rooms where they did their work.  
 
The researcher also joined the refugees at one of the Catholic parishes where they received 
food rations and medical vouchers at the end of which she would go on home visits. The JRS 
runs its POP in eight parishes of the Archdiocese of Nairobi. Refugees went for vouchers for 
medical attendance at clinics and hospitals in Nairobi on Mondays and for food distribution 
on Wednesdays. The researcher chose one parish for the weekly food distribution visits 
because unlike visiting different parishes every week, visiting a single parish facilitated the 
development of familiarity and trust between the researcher and the refugees such that by the 
end of fieldwork, refugees could freely communicate with the researcher. For refugees’ 
security, the chosen Catholic parish is identified by the pseudonym St Faith. Except for 
Somalis and Sudanese who lived further from St Faith, the other six nationalities in Kenya 
were represented by the refugees who came for assistance at St Faith. The researcher had to 
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visit Somalis in Eastleigh and Sudanese at the SWAN Centre and in their homes. On food 
distribution days, the researcher was able to observe the interaction among refugees from 
different national backgrounds in a context which was not researcher-created. The researcher 
participated in the weekly gatherings for food assistance in the sense of assisting the social 
worker with recording names of refugees who turned up for food assistance every week as 
well as with the actual food distribution.  
 
1.8.4. Focus Group Discussions  
Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were employed in the study. These are defined as group 
interviews (Krueger 1994; Cronin 2002; Fontana and Frey 2005) or collective or “staged” 
conversations (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis 2005). This type of discussion enabled the 
researcher to assess whether she could draw a common conclusion from the experiences of 
refugees who shared characteristics such as nationality and ethnicity. Group discussions were 
conducted when the researcher had become familiar with respondents to the extent that she 
could easily identify their individual voices on the recorder and avoid mixing up refugees’ 
views during transcription. This was also facilitated by keeping the groups small and 
manageable. The researcher played the role of facilitator or moderator directing the discussion 
towards specific issues. There was a problem of respondents who dominated discussions and 
the other extreme of those who were reserved or what Fontana and Frey (2005: 704) refer to 
as “recalcitrant respondents”. This was countered by the other respondents allowing those 
who freely wanted to share information to do so and then asking the reserved respondents to 
give their views and prompting them to share more such that the data obtained in the end was 
from the entire group.  
 
A total of seven FGDs was held. The first two were held with Sudanese women who were 
attending literacy classes at the SWAN Centre in Nairobi. Seven Sudanese women in the 
morning elementary class and five in the afternoon intermediary class participated in the 
discussions. The third FGD was held with five women from the Great Lakes region and the 
fourth with ten women from Somalia. The fifth and sixth FGDs were held with two groups of 
male refugees from the Great Lakes region. The first group of male refugees comprised six 
men and the second consisted of six participants; five men including the South African man 
and a woman from Rwanda who chose to join the discussions and provided insightful 
comparative data. The last discussion was with three Sudanese refugee men.  
 
34
Table 1: Participants in the FGDs 
Nationality No. of FGDs No. of Participants in each 
Group 
Sudanese Women 2 7 and 5 
Great Lakes Region Women 1 5 
Somali Women 1 10 
Great Lakes Region Men 
incl. 1 South African and 1 
Rwandan Woman 
2 6 and 6 
Sudanese Men 1 3 
Total 7 42 
 
The FGDs generated a great deal of data and showed that refugees were eager to share their 
experiences in the form of discussions with fellow refugees. Unlike individual interviews that 
tended to have an air of formality, the FGDs stimulated respondents because they had an air 
of informality that provided a setting in which refugees could relax, freely talk about their 
experiences and sometimes laugh about them. Once one informant opened up on issues that 
were sensitive or considered private, the other refugees showed a willingness to share 
information of similar sensitivity. For example, refugees discussed how they fled their 
countries, relations with locals, experiences at the UNHCR offices, raids, rape and gender 
relations. In addition to recording the refugees’ voices and taking down some notes on issues 
arising from the discussions, the researcher also recorded some videos and took photographs 
during the discussions with the consent of the refugees. 
 
1.8.5. Documents 
A number of documents provided statistical data and gave the researcher an insight into the 
work of the various organisations vis-à-vis the experiences and needs of the refugee women 
studied. The researcher analysed UNHCR and NGO documents in order to find out how 
humanitarian organisations translated theory into practice in handling refugees in Nairobi. 
These documents include Newsletters, Annual Strategic Plans, Annual Reports, Magazines as 
well as UNHCR Guidelines and briefs. The JRS’s Annual Project Plans and Reports accessed 
from the organisation’s Resource Base provided great insights into the organisation’s mission 
and work. The researcher also used a Compact Disc (CD) with information on JRS’s work 
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with refugees and testimonial publications which contained refugees’ views on their 
experiences with the organisation.  
 
The researcher analysed UNHCR documents such as the Mandate Refugee Certificate (MRC) 
and the UNHCR Notification of Negative RSO Decision or Rejection Letter in refugee 
parlance. Records kept by the social worker at St Faith also provided invaluable data on 
refugees’ personal profiles. This provided supplementary data to the questionnaire used at the 
beginning of the research. Refugee women’s perspectives were also obtained from documents 
they wrote on various issues that affect them. Specifically, the researcher read documents 
written by an unmarried Somali woman on her views on cultural practices and conflict in her 
community and a document written and presented by a married Rwandan refugee woman. 
The latter focused on the challenges of raising children as a refugee mother and was presented 
at the Human Rights Day Commemoration referred to above.  
 
1.8.6. Websites, “Tele-observation” and Newspapers 
Websites for organisations such as the UNHCR and JRS were an invaluable source of 
statistical data and details of projects run by these organisations. Websites enabled the 
researcher to update statistical data and provided less time-consuming access to information 
in that they enabled the researcher to overcome bureaucratic hurdles such as the one 
experienced with appointment-making for the interview with the UNHCR. The methods 
above were supplemented by monitoring coverage of events relevant to the study in the print 
and electronic media. During the period of fieldwork, there was extensive coverage in the 
Kenyan media of the Somali conflict and the geopolitics of the Greater East Africa region 
which includes the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa.  
 
The researcher obtained crucial data through what she chooses to term “tele-observation”. 
This refers to conscious effort to follow television coverage of events and issues relating to 
the topic under investigation. This was complemented by radio broadcasts and the print media 
that also carried newspaper articles on refugees particularly those from Somalia. It was on 
television and radio that the researcher obtained uncensored information that would otherwise 
be difficult to obtain through interviews with staff and officials in which one always has to be 
wary of doctored data in the name of protecting the image of the organisation or the 
government as the case may be. The researcher capitalised on the fact that government 
officials, Kenyan citizens and the UNHCR imparted their views on refugees in Kenya and 
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Nairobi in particular through the media. This “spontaneous” data was cross-checked with data 
obtained through interviews. 
 
1.9. Scope and Organisation of the Study 
The study is comprised of a total of six chapters. The first chapter has situated refugee women 
in Africa, defined key concepts, provided an overview of local integration within the 
framework of the three durable solutions and outlined the goals and intentions of this study. 
Chapter Two provides the broad political framework within which refugee hosting takes place 
and portrays how global and regional geopolitics shape the process of refugee integration in 
Nairobi. Chapter Three discusses how the theory of refugee legal protection is mediated and 
transformed by individuals within institutions and the refugee women themselves. Chapter 
Four describes the differential economic, social and cultural circumstances of refugee women 
and discusses the assumptions upon which humanitarian assistance is based relative to refugee 
women’s needs and aspirations. Chapter Five describes the role of NGOs and the GTZ in the 
process of integration, emphasises refugee women’s resourcefulness and underlines that exile 
is not solely about challenges and barriers as it also presents refugee women with 
opportunities previously non-existent for them. The concept of agency runs through the 
chapters to demonstrate how refugee women strategise in different situations in order to 
obtain the best possible outcomes. Chapter Six summarises and concludes the entire study and 
presents theoretical reflections on gender and integration based on refugee women’s 
experiences and circumstances in Nairobi. 
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Chapter Two 
Local Integration: The Impact of Refugee Identities 
 
2.0 Introduction 
The process of integration begins with an encounter between or among groups of people that 
perceive implicit and explicit, real and imagined differences in each other. Contemporary 
theories of identity increasingly treat essentialist perspectives that focus on a self-contained 
otherness as outdated and obsolete. They point to the problematic of identity politics in a 
global context which is characterised by celebration of the “Other” and experiences of 
alterity. Welz (2000) argues for an alternative to both perspectives. In contrast to 
contemporary trends, identity as it relates to refugee-local relations in Nairobi manifests itself 
in terms of its traditional, primordial and essentialist sense as implied by concepts such as 
ethnicity, religion and nationality. Considering the emphasis on difference or otherness in 
Nairobi, the meaning of identity with regard to the findings of this study is captured by 
Jenkins’ (2008: 18) definition of the concept as denoting “the ways in which individuals and 
collectivities are distinguished in their relations with other individuals and collectivities.” 
Integral to the encounter between refugees and local populations is the quest by each side to 
identify the other. In the contemporary world, identity issues have become increasingly 
politicised and contentious to the extent of being causes of, and for, violent conflicts.33 As 
distinguishing characteristics for outsiders, aliens or “Others” as opposed to insiders, locals or 
citizens in the asylum country, refugees’ identities have not been spared this contention and 
contestation. This chapter focuses on refugees’ real or imagined socio-cultural, political and 
religious identities and how local people and the host government (re)construct, interpret and 
relate with these identities.  
 
Although the host government and local populations do not distinguish between refugee men 
and women in their identity representation, this representation has gendered implications that 
are addressed in this chapter. The social construction of difference is not restricted to local 
populations and the host government. Refugee women also engage in a process of self-
definition and (re)definition of Kenyan identities and use their definitions to make choices 
                                                 
 33 Across the world, conflicts based on politicisation of ethnic identities can be observed as in the case of 
Kosovo and Rwanda. Kenya, where fieldwork was conducted, provides a typical example of politically 
motivated ethnic tensions (see Chapter One). In spite of the devastation such conflicts have caused, there is no 
sign of relenting. The contemporary world is grappling with the threat of terrorism whose roots can be traced to 
politicisation of religious identities and fear of that which is manifestly different. 
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that facilitate or impede their integration into the Kenyan communities. Identities as social 
and political representations by local populations, the Kenyan government, the media and 
refugees are analysed in this chapter with the aim to portray their relevance to the 
circumstances of particular refugee nationalities and the differential levels of tolerance 
extended to them in Kenya.  
 
2.1. Attractions of Urban Life for Refugees 
Particularly in Africa, refugee policies are based on two main assumptions namely: i) refugees 
are transient and camps are “temporary solutions” in which refugees wait until repatriation 
once the reasons that prompted their flight cease to exist, and ii) refugees depend on outside 
assistance for survival and as long as the supply of humanitarian assistance is constant they 
can stay in the camps until repatriation. A brief outline of the principles and policy that 
inform UNHCR operations in Africa in general and in Kenya in particular provides a basis for 
a better understanding of refugee women in Nairobi. The refugee agency adheres to the 
Kenyan government’s encampment regulation and, to this end, there is no specific UNHCR 
policy targeting urban, self-settled refugees.34 It is only in exceptional cases such as refugees 
having specific insecurity problems in the camps, seeking specialised medical attention in 
Nairobi or pursuing studies that the UNHCR sometimes assists refugees in Nairobi but the 
last two categories are expected to return to the camps once their needs have been attended to 
in Nairobi. Even so, the absence of employment opportunities in the camps encourages 
refugees to remain in Nairobi on completion of their studies. 
 
At the Human Rights Day Commemoration, a UNHCR representative reiterated that in Kenya 
refugees should reside in the camps and that the UNHCR “cannot work against the 
government” by assisting urban refugees. For refugees whose reasons for residing in Nairobi 
fall outside “exceptional cases”, the encampment regulation leaves them in a dilemma; living 
in Nairobi officially means forfeiture of UNHCR assistance as the UNHCR assumes that 
refugees who choose to reside in Nairobi have the means to sustain themselves and are self-
sufficient.35 Why then do refugees forego provision of basic needs in the camps and opt to 
live in Nairobi where they face a life of hardships and uncertainty? This section answers this 
question by providing the various reasons that account for the difficult choices urban refugees 
                                                 
34 This view was expressed by the CSO (personal interview, Nairobi, 19.02.07) and a UNHCR representative at 
the Human Rights Day Commemoration on 8 December 2006 during her address to the predominantly refugee 
audience. 
35  UNHCR’s position expressed by the refugee agency’s representative at the Human Rights Day 
Commemorations and by the CSO in the interview, 19.02.07, Nairobi. 
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make. While some of the reasons for living in Nairobi cut across gender, there are reasons that 
are unique to refugee women and those that are common among men. Reasons cited by two 
men, one Ugandan and one Ethiopian, for deciding to live in Nairobi are presented below in 
juxtaposition with those given by refugee women for purposes of illustrating this striking 
difference. Refugees’ capacity to find an alternative to camp life demonstrates agency or 
resourcefulness which is often downplayed in discourses advocating refugee encampment. 
 
2.2.1. Security Concerns 
The continued absence in the camps of circumstances that enable refugees to lead a 
semblance of their pre-flight lives explains the presence of refugees in Nairobi. Research 
findings on camps highlight their unsuitability for conflicts as protracted as those experienced 
in Africa (see Kibreab 1989; Harrell-Bond 1999; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). Many 
refugees interviewed during fieldwork explicitly cited security as one of the main reasons for 
opting to reside in Nairobi. Notwithstanding that it is particularly male refugees who are 
chiefly concerned about insecurity and reprisal attacks by their political adversaries, women 
also expressed fear of being pawns in the persecution of male members of their families and 
communities. The refugees generally believe that unlike in the camps, government agents or 
militias cannot easily track, locate and abduct them in Nairobi.  
 
Johannes,36 a male Ethiopian refugee stated that he could not live in the camp because he was 
an opposition political party leader and had fled when the Ethiopian security agents came to 
look for him at his house. He feared being abducted and killed. The camp as a restricted 
environment would expose him to heightened insecurity, a consideration that informed his 
decision to self-settle in Nairobi where he can manage his identity relative to his security 
needs and well-being. Similarly, the proximity of Kakuma Refugee Camp, where Sudanese 
refugees constitute a majority, to the Kenya-Sudan border and that of Dadaab Refugee Camp, 
which holds a Somali majority, to the Kenya-Somalia border enables country of origin rebels 
or militants and state agents alike to easily cross the border back and forth.37 This is despite 
the AU Convention’s provision that “for reasons of security, countries of asylum shall, as far 
                                                 
36 All the names used to identify refugee men and women as well as Kenyan respondents are pseudonyms. Real 
names are withheld for security reasons. However, names of government, NGO and RCO officials and 
journalists cited in this study are real. Where names of certain officials are withheld, this is in consideration of 
their request and such officials are identified by their positions in their respective organisations. 
37 In November 2006, the GoK alleged that the ICU was recruiting Somali refugees in Dadaab Refugee Camp to 
fight in the war in Somalia as violence escalated between the Ethiopian-backed government troops and the ICU.  
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as possible, settle refugees at a reasonable distance from the frontier of their country of 
origin” (Article 2.6).  
 
Although both men and women are at risk of being persecuted in the camps, the situation for 
women is exacerbated by the fact that they are targeted for Sexual and Gender-Based 
Violence (SGBV). Refugee women are the target of the increasing use of rape as a weapon of 
war not because they were involved in politics before flight but because they are women and 
therefore vulnerable. Out of the 34 women interviewed, only 26% came straight to Nairobi 
after leaving their countries of origin. The majority of the women had stayed in a refugee 
camp at some point in their lives in exile and the choice to reside in Nairobi was influenced 
by past experiences endured in the camps. Experiences of harassment, physical and sexual 
abuse as well as the horror of witnessing family members and fellow refugees being killed by 
country of nationality or asylum country militants and rebels in the camps and narrowly 
escaping death themselves makes the idea of residing in camps once again untenable (see 
Umutesi 2004).  
 
Claire from Rwanda explained that she had left a camp in the DRC because the Congolese 
armed forces would abduct refugee women and rape them. Even in the asylum country, rape 
and other forms of sexual violence against women do not abate as hostile forces view this as a 
form of “ethnic cleansing” (Vickers 1993: 18), “degrad[ing] the entire ethnic or political 
group” (Nowrojee 2008: 126), “weapons of terror and intimidation” (Sideris 2003: 715), 
“torture inflicted on women” (Crawley 2001: 3) and a way of emasculating men from enemy 
groups. Women are attacked because their reproductive and child-rearing roles cast them as 
the symbolic bearers of ethnic or national identity (Byrne and Baden 1995). It is in view of 
this that Honwana (2006: 5) describes warfare as “a profoundly gendered phenomenon.” 
 
The women also fear forced repatriation. Most of the refugee women from the Great Lakes 
region left Tanzanian refugee camps for Nairobi because the government of Tanzania, 
allegedly with UNHCR connivance, destroyed the camps and forced them to repatriate (see 
also Whitaker 2003; Veney 2005). Such allegations are validated by documentation of the 
deliberate pressure exerted on 1.2 million Rwandans who were forcibly repatriated from 
Tanzania and Zaire (now DRC) between 1996 and 1997 (Crisp 2000; Umutesi 2004; 
Whitaker 2003). Tania, a Rwandan woman stated that, “They [governments of Burundi and 
Tanzania] destroyed the camp twice when I was there and they [Kenyan government and the 
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UNHCR] think I am going to be collected again to go to the camp? No, let me struggle in 
Nairobi.” In a Focus Group Discussion (FGD), many Sudanese women who had lived in 
Kakuma Refugee Camp explained that they had come to Nairobi because of cross-border 
raids by Arab Janjaweed militias leading to a situation which can be described as flight taking 
place within flight.  
 
In the case of Kakuma Refugee Camp, the local Turkana people are hostile to refugees and 
often physically attack them and steal their belongings because of poverty and xenophobia.38 
Hali, a Somali refugee woman explained that even if refugees work hard, raids by members of 
the local community means that they “are always at zero”. Refugee women narrated 
experiences of how they escaped death during the Turkana raids by sleeping outside and away 
from their shelters. Somali refugee women who had stayed in Banadiri Camp around 
Mombasa before the closure of all the smaller camps related experiences in which Somalis 
clashed with the local Giriama people leading to the latter setting ablaze the whole camp in 
1997. In the case of Dadaab, the camp is located in a region inhabited by Somali Kenyans 
who found themselves on the Kenyan side of the Kenya-Somalia border when the colonial 
boundaries were drawn. Some Somali refugee women argue that even these ethnic Somali 
Kenyans are hostile to them.39 Hali stated that her mother was killed in the camp by Somali 
Kenyans. Hostility from local communities leaves refugees with little option but to relocate to 
the relative sanctuary of urban centres and this is particularly salient in view of frequent land 
clashes in rural Kenya which make rural settlement a risky alternative. 
 
The GTZ Programme Officer explained the uneasy relations in terms of cultural differences 
with the Somali Kenyans disapproving Somali refugees’ rigid adherence to religious and 
traditional cultural values. 40  Despite ethnic, language and cultural ties, conflict between 
Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees is triggered by the fact that the two groups “have 
different rights and obligations towards the state and the international community” (Horst 
                                                 
38 For more on refugee-Turkana relations see Ekuru Aukot, “‘It is better to be a Refugee than a Turkana in 
Kakuma’ Revisiting the Relationship between hosts and Refugees in Kenya.”  
http://www.yorku.ca/crs/Refugee/Abstract%20and%20Articles/Vol%2021/20No%203/aukot.pdf (accessed 
22.07.08). 
39 Hathaway (1991) argues that “ethnic relatives” or refugees who belong to ethnic groups that are found in the 
country of asylum have a likelihood of being accepted and integrated into the host country. However, the 
experiences recounted by Somali refugee women portray tension between them and Kenyans of Somali 
ethnicity. Positive relations between the Somali refugees and Somali Kenyans are created around clan 
connections (see Campbell 2005). Conflict and harmony are expressed through clan affiliation thus reflecting the 
situation prevailing in Somalia. Overall and as this study shows, Somali refugees are less welcome in Kenya 
despite having “ethnic relatives” in Kenya. 
40 Personal interview with the GTZ Programme Officer, Nairobi, 12.02.07.  
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2006b: 14). Kenyan members of parliament for the regions in which the camps are located 
aggravate the situation by inciting locals against the refugees (Juma and Kagwanja 2003). 
Protecting refugees from attacks by locals is certainly a difficult task for a government 
grappling with violent clashes and crimes among its own citizens besides lack of political 
will. Camps provide a setting in which conflicts in the country of origin are reconstructed and 
reproduced, and therefore spill over into the asylum country as groups with different 
grievances, allegiances and interests mobilise against each other leading to insecurity in the 
form of violent clashes among the refugees (see also Bukuru et al. 2002; Human Rights 
Watch 2002; Juma and Kagwanja 2003).  
 
2.2.2. Economic Opportunities 
The spatial confinement in camp settings rarely provides circumstances in which refugees can 
use their professional skills. Of the thirty-four women interviewed, only one woman who is a 
nurse by profession was employed in a Tanzanian camp. Even where employment is possible, 
there is a remuneration disparity between refugee and Kenyan employees. Michelle, a 
Congolese refugee woman complained that her husband had worked as a teacher in Kakuma 
Refugee Camp in Kenya but refugees are paid “incentives” which are very little in 
comparison to Kenyans employed to do the same job in the camps. Michelle’s husband 
earned Ksh3,000 (about US$42) where Kenyan teachers earned Ksh12,000 (about US$167) 
(see also Verdirame 1999; de Montclos and Kagwanja 2000; Bukuru et al. 2002). Camps do 
not provide conditions that are conducive for refugee women from both rural/agrarian and 
urban/professional backgrounds to re-establish their pre-flight means of livelihoods or even 
aspire for better socio-economic standards. Nairobi as opposed to the camps provides refugee 
women with the space in which to manoeuvre, to be innovative and find alternative ways of 
earning a life and transforming their circumstances. 
 
Quest to reduce competition for resources between locals and refugees and the arid conditions 
in northern Kenya mean that refugees are unable to engage in agricultural activities or keep 
cattle; they depend on food rations particularly in Kakuma Refugee Camp (Verdirame 1999). 
For refugee women who have established Income Generating Projects (IGPs) notably 
tailoring, camp life provides no incentives. Agfa from Uganda stated that it was better for her 
to live in Nairobi where she runs a tailoring business rather than “go and suffer in the camp”. 
The camps do not have a market for the artefacts refugees produce in their IGPs unlike 
Nairobi where tourists provide a market. For instance, at the JRS Mikono Shop, refugees sell 
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traditional and cultural items such as wood sculptures, shirts and outfits with African designs, 
beads, baskets, bags, bed covers and wall hangings with traditional and cultural designs 
among other artefacts.  
 
Refugee women pointed out that in recent years, food rations in the camps have dropped 
drastically and the situation is exacerbated by the fact that encamped refugees cannot engage 
in food production. It is the women’s responsibility to provide food for the household 
particularly where they have children. Limited access to food in the camps prompts them to 
move to Nairobi. Most of the refugee women pointed out that the food rations provided in the 
camps are inadequate and, for refugees from the Horn of Africa, unfamiliar. Maria from 
Sudan provided an overview of the food situation in the camps: 
In the 1990s the camp was very good. They used to measure food with big tins but 
now [it is] a very small quantity [that] it cannot even sustain you and we do not know 
the reason why. And some other people get more rations. I was there with my two 
children. With the two children in 15 days I could have a whole sack of [maize] flour 
which I could also give out to help other people but now even the family size you 
have, the food given cannot help you, just a little to keep you going. For me, it is better 
that I stay here [in Nairobi], […] make table cloths and bed sheets. You do small 
business and you take your children to school and thank God the school is free primary 
education and you, you do your things; […] you have time you come and learn [at the 
SWAN Centre which runs an adult literacy programme for Sudanese women]. 
 
Corroborating this view, Tania asked: “You stay there; they give you maize and beans. When 
we stayed in the camps in Burundi and Tanzania the children were young. How do you give a 
baby of three months maize?” 
 
2.2.3. Medical Needs 
Chronic shortages of basic health amenities in the camps, due in part to the underdevelopment 
of peripheral regions where the camps are located, feature prominently in the narratives for 
relocating to Nairobi. Due to overcrowding, Dadaab Refugee Camp has been declared a 
public health emergency (see Human Rights Watch 2009). For some refugees, the need to 
access specialised treatment combines with the inhospitable climate in northern Kenya which 
is detrimental to their conditions. Since they have to seek health services in urban centres in 
cases of complications, refugees face a major challenge in securing travel documents; some 
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die while waiting for such documents (Bukuru et al. 2002). The problem is compounded by 
reliance on NGO transport as many cannot afford to pay for public transport. On the other 
hand, with money generated from IGPs in Nairobi, refugees are able to independently and 
readily access medical services without facing huge and risky bureaucratic hurdles. For 
women in particular, reproductive and maternal health care and preventing malnutrition 
among their children are major considerations. Michelle bemoaned the death of her child and 
blamed it on negligence and inefficiency of medical staff in the camp. She alleged that 
doctors in the camps openly tell the refugees that they treat death as a normal part of everyday 
camp life. Predictably, such statements compound the anxieties of camp life.  
 
2.2.4. Education  
Refugee mothers emphasise accessible education for themselves and their children as one of 
the reasons for the decision to live in Nairobi. They believe that formal education holds better 
prospects for them and this coheres with popular belief and perception in Africa of formal 
education as a vehicle for upward social mobility. Moreover, 29% of the women have 
professional qualifications and were formally employment in their countries of origin as, for 
example, teachers, nurses and civil servants while some had their education disrupted by 
conflict and subsequently, flight. These women express the desire to continue with their 
studies and see more opportunities for sponsorship in Nairobi than in the camps. At a 
pragmatic level, there are no good educational facilities and tertiary institutions in the camps. 
Refugees argue that Nairobi provides a better learning environment for their children unlike 
the camps. For refugee parents from rural backgrounds, lack of access to land in the host 
country impedes their ability to transfer agricultural and pastoral skills to their children (Horst 
2006b; 2006c). Education becomes an alternative form of long-term livelihood strategy 
worthy investing in as it offers prospects for self-sufficiency in refugee households. Tania 
explained:  
I also want a good education for my children. It is better that I stay in Nairobi where I 
can do something to take care of my family. My parents were farmers but they 
managed to give me an education and I am a teacher. Now, here I am and I cannot give 
my children a decent education, what is that? 
 
2.2.5. Quest for Freedom and Self-determination 
Refugees also resent the enclosed, restrictive camp environment where their freedom of 
movement and even of association is monitored, controlled and therefore curtailed. Freedom 
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of movement and association is directly linked to refugees’ ability to engage in economic 
activities that ensure independent livelihoods (Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003a; 2003b; 
Horst 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). The camp, in Foucauldian terms is characterised by biopolitics 
or the government and regulation of populations, in this case refugees; it provides “the 
diagram of a power that acts by means of general visibility” (Foucault 1977: 171). It is 
characterised by the subjection of refugee existence to “the calculation and order of 
knowledge and power” (Smart 1988: 103). Camps facilitate observation of those within; they 
render them visible and easier to “know […] and alter […]” (Smart 1988: 86). They provide 
the ideal configuration for the UNHCR and host government’s “disciplinary gaze” (Foucault 
1977). The idea of camps being an intrusive enclosure where refugees are sequestered and 
their freedom of movement trammelled is presented through comparison of refugee camps to 
total institutions (Forbes Martin 2004; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). Refugees argue 
that the camp, which functions as a quasi-total institution, creates an environment which 
constrains their capacity to determine even mundane aspects of life such as what to eat and 
where and how to build their shelters (Simon Turner 2006).  
 
For instance, in November 2006 the Kenyan government reacted to reports of military 
training of Somali youths in Dadaab Refugee Camp by sealing it off. Movement of people 
and vehicles into and out of the camp was banned with the exception of aid agencies’ 
vehicles. The Permanent Secretary in the Kenyan Ministry of Internal Security explained the 
government’s decision to seal off the camp thus: “We cannot have refugees in a camp living 
like they are in a village. We cannot have a refugee camp with a bus stage [stop].”41 The 
camp thus becomes synonymous with “colonial governmentality where colonial subjects were 
not perceived to be fit to enjoy the full rights of citizenship” (Simon Turner 2006: 48). 
Refugees are people who have ambitions just like citizens and camps only allow them to lead 
a “bare/naked life” as they “are kept in limbo in the camp, stripped of citizenship and stripped 
of agency of any kind” (Simon Turner 2006:44-45), and forced to lead a life outside “the 
national order of things” (Malkki 1995b). As some of the refugees put it, life in the camp is 
“the best way to kill you”. Max, a male refugee from Uganda explained his presence in 
Nairobi thus: 
I do not want to go to the camp because the people who forced me to come to Nairobi 
wanted me to give up my rights of expression, my freedom of speech and they were 
                                                 
41 The Kenyan government’s reaction and the Permanent Secretary’s speech were broadcast on 12 November 
2006 on the 2100hrs News Bulletin on the Kenya Television Network (KTN) channel. 
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telling me to keep quiet, if not, they would silence me. So going to the camp will 
definitely mean they have done what? They have silenced me which I cannot swallow. 
How can I express myself in the camp? I continue writing what in the camp; any other 
life in a camp? Nothing you can do when you are there. When you are there you are 
turned into an eating beast. There is nothing else you can think about except to get 
something to eat. You see, they [UNHCR officials] can say that everything is there but 
this is in abstract terms, uh. When you look at facts on the ground, they are not there.  
 
Having stayed in camps for years, refugees described the frustration of waiting in the camps 
for elusive peace and how they could spend their lifetime waiting. If voluntary repatriation, 
integration in the country of first asylum and resettlement in a third country are the durable 
solutions, this can only make refugee camps a temporary solution (Simon Turner 2006). The 
question then is can refugees stay in camps under the presumption that they are transient 
when abundant evidence of camps being “home” to refugees points to permanency? This 
permanency rather than ostensible transience of the refugee phenomenon in Africa is one of 
the reasons why refugee women decided to self-settle in Nairobi. Refugees in camps are 
concurrently on the territory of the host country and outside it in an arrangement Simon 
Turner (2006: 57) aptly describes as “included exclusion” or in Victor Turner’s (1967) 
concept, a liminal phase in a crisis-context in which they are neither outside nor inside.  
 
Referring to life in the camp, Hali who attended the Human Rights Day Commemoration 
remarked that “there is no life in the camp, age is catching up with us” and posed a question 
to UNHCR and NGO representatives on how long refugees were supposed to watch their 
lives waste away in the camps. The UNHCR representative answered by saying that they had 
to wait until peace was restored in their countries of nationality while another member of the 
officials drew refugees’ attention to Palestinians and how they have lived for generations as 
refugees in camps. The idea of a stagnant life in the camps waiting for elusive peace back in 
the country of nationality has become unsustainable as refugees realise that they can spend a 
lifetime waiting in the camps for restoration of peace, security and stability in their respective 
countries. Tania put it as follows: 
The UNHCR says we must go to the camp but what kind of life do people in the camp 
lead? I stayed in camps in Burundi and Tanzania so there is nothing that I do not know 
about camp life. You live in this circle waiting for food handouts, eating and sleeping. 
In the camp people stay in their own communities, if you are from Rwanda your 
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neighbours are all from Rwanda. You can go to the other section, for example, the 
section for Sudanese but then when you get there what language do you speak? The 
best Kiswahili is spoken in Tanzania but because I was staying in a camp I never learnt 
it. In a camp one has no interaction with the local people and that is marginalisation.  
 
Hali recounted that when she stayed in Dadaab Refugee Camp, Somali community elders 
gave preference to members of their clan or asked for sexual liaisons with women thus 
politicising and sexualising humanitarian services within the camp. Nairobi provides an 
environment where refugee women can exercise a degree of independence and freedom from 
control by elders in their communities. Hali further related the difficulties of evading forced 
marriage and female circumcision performed on baby girls in a camp setting where women 
from her Somali/Muslim community are the midwives. Hali has two younger sisters both of 
whom are in what she described as “abusive” forced marriages in the camps. In Nairobi, Hali 
lives among refugees from the Great Lakes region who are predominantly Christian. She goes 
around without the veil, a strong but sometimes contentious religious marker for Muslim 
women (see Macdonald 2006). She observed that she would never go out without the veil in 
her own country or in Eastleigh, Nairobi where the majority of Somali refugees live because 
men in her community would interpret that as anti-Islam and kill her. The reasons thus far 
presented point to refugees’ capacity to mediate their situation and find ways to wiggle out of 
the unfavourable conditions prevailing in the camps. Refugees do not wait for humanitarian 
assistance but resort to their own agency and devices to change their situation for the better. 
 
2.2.6. Lack of UNHCR Documents 
There are also refugees who are in Nairobi because the UNHCR cannot grant them protection 
documents on the grounds that they are ineligible for the refugee status. As a result, such 
refugees cannot stay in the camps where refugees are admitted on production of valid 
UNHCR protection documents. Unable to stay in the camps and faced with the option of 
leaving Kenya altogether, refugees who are outside UNHCR protection choose to stay in 
Nairobi where they can hide themselves and avert deportation for being “illegal immigrants” 
(see also Sommers 2001). Some refugee women pointed out that if they had the UNHCR 
documents they would relocate to the camps.  
 
48
2.3. Convergence of the Refugee Status with Ethnic Profiling 
Refugee identities are used as reference points around which refugee-Kenyan relations are 
constructed and negotiated. While the official refugee regime has a tendency of homogenising 
diverse populations, the dominant discourse in Kenya points to locals relating to refugee 
populations in ways that go beyond the legal refugee status to break down the refugee 
population into its ethnic, religious and national component parts. The practice of refugee 
hosting is influenced by extra-legal factors such as locals’ perceptions of refugees’ 
backgrounds and identities rather than the theory upon which the international refugee regime 
is based. This section presents profiling or the objectification and assignment of people into 
suspect categories (Shamir 2005) and stereotyping of refugees on the basis of national, ethnic 
and religious identities and how such profiling leads to creation of identity categories into 
which refugees belonging to particular ethnicities, nationalities and in the case of Somalis, a 
particular religion, are pigeonholed. Stereotypes are “generali[s]ations based on membership 
to a category [or] beliefs that derive from the inference that all members of a given category 
share the same properties and are, therefore, interchangeable” (Leyens et al 1994: 17). They 
are “a crude set of mental representations of the world [that] perpetuate a needed sense of 
difference between the ‘self’ and the ‘object’, which becomes the ‘Other’” (Gilman 1985: 17-
18). Locals relate to refugees on the basis of beliefs, propensities or character profiling they 
presume to accompany their own interpretation of specific national, ethnic and religious 
identities. While stereotypes are both negative and positive, in Nairobi they largely manifest 
themselves in their negative form. The sections below discuss how labels and stereotypes 
shape refugee women’s experiences in Nairobi. 
 
Even though Kenya breaks down the refugee population into its component parts in terms of 
ethnicity, nationality and religion, the gender category is conspicuous by its absence. Within 
the framework of ethnic profiling, this gender omission is to be expected as stereotypes are 
based on the assumption that individuals who share the same category are similar (Leyens et 
al 1994). Nonetheless, the case of Somali refugee women illustrates that the male-biased 
(re)construction of identity and the ensuing labels that are imposed on refugees have a 
discernible impact on refugee women. Whether the distinctions below are real or imagined, 
disputable or valid, their inclusion in this study serves to demonstrate how they influence 
refugee-Kenyan relations and their potential to constrain or enable refugee women in their 
quest to create space for themselves in Nairobi. It is on the basis of the reconstructed or 
redefined identities that specific refugee communities are categorised as harmful agents of 
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insecurity or treated with indifference or tolerance as the case may be. Ethnic, national and 
religious profiling of refugees as presented below is based on characterisations that came out 
of interviews and informal discussions with Kenyans and refugees alike.42
 
2.3.1. Refugee Women from the Horn of Africa 
Refugees from the Horn of Africa come from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Refugees from 
these three countries are easily identified because of their physical features which distinguish 
them from the rest of Sub-Saharan Africans. Of these three nationalities, Somalis will be used 
to illustrate ethnic profiling in Kenya as this is the largest, most conspicuous and therefore 
most targeted nationality. Besides, most of the refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea have 
repatriated or are referred to as economic immigrants43 because of the general view that peace 
and stability have been restored in the two countries. Whereas Somalis attach more 
importance to the clan which is the traditional category upon which discourses of inclusion 
and exclusion in the Somali polity are based, in Kenya, Somalis are categorised and related to 
in terms of ethnicity and religion. Lewis (2002: 4-5) describes Somali people in general as 
having characteristic physical features that “immediately strike the eye […] their tall stature, 
thin bone structure and decidedly long and narrow heads. Skin colour shows a wide range 
from a coppery brown to a dusky black […] the Somali also exhibit evidence of their long-
standing relations with Arabia […] physical traces of their past contact with Oromo and Bantu 
peoples in this region.” This description is reflected in Kenyans’ identification of Somalis and 
people from the Horn of Africa in general. In this framework, people who come from the 
region but do not fit into the “typical” Somali, Ethiopian and Eritrean appearance are 
identified as Bantu.44  To be Somali, Ethiopian or Eritrean is to have a specific physical 
                                                 
42 This study benefited from my identity as an African which saw me being mistaken for a Ugandan or Sudanese 
refugee by Kenyans and a Kikuyu Kenyan by a Somali refugee man. This provided insights into refugees’ 
experiences in relation to their identities.  
43 Several scholars converge on the view that political and economic reasons for flight are intertwined to the 
extent that refugees and economic migrants cannot be treated as two separate categories (see Kuhlman 1994; 
Korac 2002; Shandy 2007). However, to suggest that refugees and economic migrants are synonymous 
categories is to suggest that there is no difference between asylum seeking and labour migration and that it is 
only the economically marginalised that seek asylum. Nairobi hosts refugee men and women from economically 
stable backgrounds who now have to depend on humanitarian assistance. In Nairobi, both refugees and the 
UNHCR perceive a clear distinction between the two categories such that some refugees have their refugee 
status challenged where they are viewed as having an economic agenda as opposed to security concerns.  
44 Bantu refers to a large number of linguistically related peoples. In many African languages, bantu in its 
variations means people. The term applies to a group of over 400 languages spoken in central, east-central and 
southern Africa belonging to the Central subgroup of the Niger-Congo language family. These include Kiswahili 
(officially spoken in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda), Kinyarwanda (Rwanda), Kirundi (Burundi), Zulu and Xhosa 
(South Africa). Source: http://www.answers.com/topic/bantu (accessed 14.07.07). The Somali Bantus are not 
native Somalis; their ancestors were taken from their native lands in the South Eastern part of Africa by Arab 
slave traders in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and sold through the Zanzibar slave trade. 
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appearance which looks different and to come from any of these countries without such a 
different appearance means to be Bantu. 
 
Somalis are considered as such within the broader categorisation of refugees into territorial 
entities and nationalities only to be split into Somali Bantus and (real?) Somalis. Somalis who 
are not Bantu are referred to as Somalis without an ethnic prefix or suffix thus demonstrating 
the rooting of particular ethnicities in specific territorial spaces (Malkki 1995b) even if a 
historical perspective may contradict such notions of belonging. Cultural territorialisation is 
not a given natural fact but an outcome of complex social and historical processes (Gupta and 
Ferguson 1997). The alignment of physical appearances with specific territorial space is not 
limited to the Somali and Somali Bantu categorisation of refugees but also experienced by 
Kenyan citizens who bear the Somali ethnic identity. Even though Kenyans and state 
institutions such as the police are aware of the presence of Kenyan citizens of Somali 
ethnicity in Kenya’s North-eastern Province, these so-called Somali Kenyans are victims of 
targeted harassment because of their different appearance which is in contrast to what is 
constructed as the Kenyan physical appearance.45  
 
Thus, if identities constructed around nationality conjure up notions of oneness, it is in the 
dissection of national identities into their smaller component parts that the otherness which is 
subsumed within the broader national polity is revealed. Despite the fact that Somalis are 
conscious of their clan and ethnic identities in the form of Bantu and non-Bantu Somalis, in 
Kenya it is the non-Bantu ethnic identity that is imposed on the whole Somali population to 
the exclusion of the so-called Somali Bantus. While Ethiopians and Eritreans are also 
identified by visible ethnic differences from Kenyans, for Somalis this ethnic difference 
combines with the Muslim religious identity to construct a specific Somali identity which is 
then related to on the basis of interpretations and meanings attached to this particular 
conflation of ethnicity and religion. The refugees from Eritrea who are still in Kenya are 
either subsumed under Ethiopians or under Somalis where the women are veiled, a marker of 
Islam.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.somalilandtimes.net/2003/68/6811.shtml (accessed 11.08.07). They are also descendants of earlier 
Bantu and Kiswahili speaking groups (Lewis 2002). 
45 On a programme on tribalism in Kenya on KTN television channel in November 2006, a Kenyan of Somali 
ethnicity drew attention to what he perceived as pervasive tribalism which he illustrated by pointing out that 
police officers at road blocks leave everyone else who “looks” Kenyan and ask only him to produce his national 
identity card. This is because he “does not look Kenyan” and he therefore has to produce evidence of citizenship 
in Kenya where physical features alone suffice for the other passengers. 
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Even though Ethiopia and Eritrea also have Muslim populations, Islam is mostly identified 
with Somalia which is predominantly Muslim. Somali ethnic and religious identities are 
conflated with the general view that most of the Somalis do not speak Kiswahili to depict an 
image of Somalis which is proud, arrogant, violent, hostile and reluctant to integrate (see also 
Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003a; 2003b). Stereotypes contain descriptive and evaluative 
components that homogenise members of the target group and accentuate its distinctiveness 
(Leyens et al 1994). In an informal discussion, Kenyans cited the almost two decade-long war 
in Somalia, what they described as lack of war fatigue, the absence of a functioning central 
government in Somalia and the fact that the TFG formed in Kenya could not relocate to 
Somalia until the Ethiopian military intervention in the conflict as justification for what they 
perceive as Somali war-like nature.  
 
Kenyans in the group ridiculed Somalis for being proud and, in the words of one of the 
participants, “thinking that they are better than us when they cannot govern themselves and 
come from a failed state.” Interestingly, other nationalities such as Ethiopians and Sudanese 
also have problems with Kiswahili but in their case inability to speak Kiswahili is interpreted 
as a sign of pride with hostility and violence being suspended. The conflicts in countries such 
as Burundi, northern Uganda and Sudan are also of a protracted nature but Kenyans refrain 
from describing these nationalities as lacking war fatigue. Profiling which overlooks gender 
differences has repercussions for refugee women. These are presented below in the section 
that details the challenges Somali women encounter in the process of integration within the 
framework of regional and global politics in connection with the Muslim identity. 
 
2.3.2. Refugee Women from Sudan 
Sudanese refugees who are mostly from southern Sudan are mainly distinguished by their 
dark complexion, tallness and slenderness as illustrated by John, a Kenyan respondent’s 
description:  
The people from Sudan are very tall and very black and men have some tattoos on 
their forehead [...] Sudanese look as dark as charcoal, I mean their colour is like 
darkness. Very dark I tell you and they are very tall, it is tall[ness] of almost touching 
the roof ceiling. 
 
Conversely, the researcher found it easier to identify Sudanese refugees in cases where they 
bore cultural marks or what Shandy (2007) refers to as “scarification” (visible on foreheads 
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and shaven heads particularly for men) and facial marks (for both men and women) which 
Sudanese informants explained as part of rites of passage into adulthood and distinguishing 
markers of ethnic identities. There are Sudanese who do not bear the physical characteristics 
described above and ethnic and cultural markers and this makes it difficult to identify 
Sudanese through these markers. Sudanese refugees are also said to stick out because of their 
reluctance to speak Kiswahili. According to Kenyan respondents, they can be identified in 
public transport vehicles and public places by their use of English as the medium of 
communication. Communicating in a language associated with affluence in a country where 
Kiswahili, an African language, is recognised as an official language only exposes Sudanese 
refugees to abuse and extortion. Although ethnic distinctions are problematic and entangling, 
they are accepted without question as part of the Sudanese identity in Kenya. People who bear 
characteristics presumed to be visible physical and cultural markers for the Sudanese are 
related to as Sudanese whether they are foreigners from other parts of Africa or Kenyans of 
Sudanese origin. 
 
There are multilayered consequences of such representation of identities and power, as 
exercised by Kenyans, to label and categorise the Sudanese in ways that easily mark them out 
as “Others”. That a specific label is attached to the Sudanese demonstrates appropriation of 
power by Kenyans and the vulnerable circumstances of the Sudanese. Kenyan labelling of the 
Sudanese includes the use of terms Sudanese women find derogatory and demeaning; they 
related that they are often subjected to verbal abuse and labelled “bush people” – meaning 
primitive and uncivilised which also implies war-mongering and bloodthirstiness because of 
the war in their country. They are also referred to as “Garang”, the name of the late leader of 
the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). While Sudanese refugee women 
identify with John Garang’s cause and show respect for him, they express exasperation with 
the use of his name to identify every Sudanese; both Sudanese men and women are viewed in 
the image of a late male Sudanese politician. As refugees, the Sudanese are taken by Kenyan 
citizens as lacking the capacity to define themselves and denied the right to use a name of 
their choice. Similar tendencies of taking refugees and economic migrants as inarticulate and 
silencing them are also noted among South Africans’ attitude towards foreigners (see 
Nyamnjoh 2006).  
 
As in the case of Somali refugees, all-encompassing labels are applied across gender. Yet, the 
argument that Sudanese can be identified by their use of English does not capture the 
53
circumstances of Sudanese women in general. The majority of Sudanese women who were 
interviewed learnt English in Kenya and some of them were still attending English classes at 
the SWAN Centre. Although the women argue that Kiswahili is a difficult language for them, 
those who have been in Kenya for a number of years speak fluent Kiswahili. Those who do 
not mostly communicate in Arabic rather than English and, indeed, point out that one of the 
problems they encountered in their country was denial of formal education to women and 
girls. The women who are subsumed under labels of war mongers view themselves as victims 
rather than active participants in the war – a view which rallies them to promote peace, justice 
and harmony through SWAN. Only one of the women participated in active combat and is 
nicknamed “Commander” thus showing how fellow Sudanese women treat her as an 
exception for her defiance of patriarchal taboo and how this has “de-sexed” her or 
transformed her into a “man woman”. In the Sudanese women’s narratives of experiences of 
war, trauma caused by rape and loss of men as fathers, brothers, husbands and sons are 
emphasised. Profiling does not recognise women as a specific social group whose experiences 
differ from those of men. Similarly, identifying every slender, tall and dark-skinned African 
as Sudanese results in foreigners being assigned the Sudanese nationality and categorised as 
refugees; there is a tendency among Kenyans to assume that African foreigners are 
refugees.46  
 
The conflict in Sudan is complex because of the various issues interwoven into it (Shandy 
2007). Nonetheless, the conflict is sensitive among Africans in that it is largely theorised in 
terms of domineering Arab Muslims in northern Sudan oppressing and marginalising 
Christians and believers in African traditional religions in the south (see Holtzman 2008). 
While Somali refugees are criticised for being war-like and violent on the basis of fighting 
against fellow Somalis, Sudanese refugees draw a degree of sympathy because theirs is a 
conflict perceived as a liberation movement against the Arab Muslim “Other”. Within this 
framework, Kenyan respondents describe the Sudanese as peaceful despite their perceived 
pride and unwillingness to speak Kiswahili and integrate. In political terms therefore, Kenya 
sympathises with Sudanese refugees as shown by its support for southern Sudanese against 
the Khartoum government (Kuhlman 1994). There were claims among refugees and Kenyans 
                                                 
46 At the UNHCR Branch office in Nairobi, when I produced my Zimbabwean passport instead of a Kenyan 
identity card, the security guards pointed out that I could not use that particular entrance because it was not for 
refugees and directed me to another entrance meant for refugees. It was only after explaining that I was a 
researcher who had an appointment with a UNHCR official that I was allowed to use the entrance. I was also 
identified as a Sudanese refugee on the streets and in public transport because I communicated in English. 
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alike that the Kenyan government allowed the now deceased John Garang and members of his 
SPLM to have offices in Nairobi.  
There are other explanations for the relative tolerance of Sudanese refugees despite the 
stereotypes: i) although some of the Sudanese refugees are Muslim, the conflict in Sudan is 
not perceived as a direct threat to the security of Kenya unlike the Somali conflict which is 
linked to terrorism, ii) the broader Sudanese conflict had subsided at the time of fieldwork and 
was overshadowed by the Darfur crisis involving Arab Muslims against non-Arab Muslims, 
and iii) Sudanese Muslims live among Kenyans mostly in Kibera slum just like their Christian 
counterparts and in some instances, Muslim Sudanese women do not wear veils as is typical 
of Muslim women but wear the African head scarves or no head scarves at all. The majority 
of non-Muslim Kenyans are not hostile to Muslims per se but to a Muslim identity which they 
perceive to be radical, militant and linked to terrorism; they see this identity among Somalis 
(see also Juma and Kagwanja 2003). Due to these factors and despite the view among 
Kenyans that Sudanese refugees are physically identifiable and the extortion by shop owners 
and security officials, Sudanese women have relatively positive social relations with their 
Kenyan neighbours thus enabling them to enjoy a degree of social and cultural integration. 
Zanie, a Muslim Sudanese woman stated that Kenyan women had taught her about her rights 
as a woman and how to survive in Nairobi. This is in sharp contrast to Muslim Somali women 
who categorically stated in the FGD that they did not relate “at all” with Kenyans. 
 
2.3.3. Refugee Women from the Great Lakes Region 
Refugees from the Great Lakes region are specifically from Burundi, the DRC, Rwanda and 
Uganda. This is the most difficult group to distinguish as the refugees do not have physical 
features and visible cultural markers that easily set them apart from Kenyans. According to 
James, a Kenyan man interviewed for this study: “[t]hose from DRC, that is Congo and 
Uganda, it is not easy to tell. There are many people [in Kenya] with similar features who are 
not at all refugees.” Refugees from the region have cultural ties with Kenyans and speak 
Bantu languages that have words in common with Kiswahili and some of the local languages 
in Kenya. Several of the refugees stated that they also spoke Kiswahili in their own countries 
even though it is not officially spoken there. Some refugees and Kenyans insisted that they 
can identify Africans by nationality if not ethnicity. Kenyans argued that they can identify 
non-Kenyans who speak Kiswahili by their accents in the same way that they identify fellow 
Kenyans’ ethnicities through intrusion of their mother tongue accents when they speak 
Kiswahili or English (see also Sommers 2001 for similar claims).  
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 Thus, in the absence of physical features to mark out refugees from the region, the set of 
criteria used to identify refugees from the Great Lakes region shifts from ethnic physical 
features and religious and cultural markers to language and accents that can then be traced to 
the region’s languages. It is in this context that refugees from the region pointed out that in 
some instances, Kikuyu speaking Kenyans shift from Kiswahili to Kikuyu and this enables 
them to identify and exclude non-Kikuyus. Claire, a Rwandan woman married to a Kenyan 
man, observed that: 
It is difficult to relate with Kenyans. Even if you are married to a Kenyan once they 
learn that you are a foreigner they cannot accept you fully. Even among themselves 
there are the tribes; if there is that gap among themselves, how much more gap is there 
if you are a foreigner? They look at the language and the people who visit you and 
know that you are a foreigner. There is individualism in Kenya. […] You as the 
outsider have to do a lot to get integrated into people who are not free and when you 
try to buy friendship you feel frustrated. You will not be able to intermingle with 
people and you keep a distance still. 
 
Notwithstanding, refugees from the Great Lakes region believe that they are in a better 
position to integrate compared to their counterparts from the Horn of Africa and, to some 
extent, Sudan. According to Mandy from Uganda: 
In terms of integration, I think I have an upper hand compared to people from the Horn 
of Africa because for me I can speak Swahili and most of these people [Kenyans] are 
Bantu. I am also a Bantu so at least when they speak their local dialect, I can pick 
some [words] and it is easier for me to catch their language and then I have not found 
much difficulty except that economic opportunities are not very open.  
 
Claire explained her situation thus: “But I am comforted by that with the skin colour no one 
can know that I am a foreigner. I look like one of them [Kenyans].” The difficulties of 
distinguishing Great Lakes region refugees from locals explain the fact that there are fewer 
complaints of targeted harassment and rape among Great Lakes refugee women. Whereas 
several Somali refugee women revealed during an FGD that they had been raped or had a 
relative who was raped, refugee women from the Great Lakes region generally view Kenyans 
as hospitable and most of them emphasise economic problems where Somali refugee women 
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highlight socio-cultural problems and what they perceive as targeted rape and victimisation. 
There are also cases of refugee women from the Great Lakes region married to Kenyan men 
or with children with them outside marriage. Their ability to physically blend into the Kenyan 
society gives them a better chance to fit in unlike Horn of Africa refugee women whose 
otherness is physically visible. The GTZ Programme Officer interviewed observed that Great 
Lakes region refugees are in a better position to integrate because “they are not physically 
recognisable as foreigners and speak Swahili” in contrast to the Somalis, Sudanese and 
Ethiopians who “have problems because they look different” – an observation with which the 
CSO and Mercy Muchai, the JRS Officer concurred. 
 
Profiling of refugees varies with nationality and also depends on relations between Kenya and 
the refugees’ countries of origin. Kenyan respondents described Ugandan refugees in 
particular as honest and hardworking. Ugandans constitute the majority of informants who 
view Kenyans as hospitable. One factor which accounts for the positive perception of 
Ugandans and Great Lakes refugees in general is that there is less likelihood of Kenya 
becoming embroiled in conflicts in the Great Lakes while the Somali conflict is sensitive to 
Kenya because of the perceived threat of terrorism and the fact that Kenya has a population of 
Somali ethnicity among its citizenry. Apart from proficiency in Kiswahili among refugees 
from the Great Lakes, the existence of a regional block in the form of the East African 
Community (EAC) which comprises Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and recently Burundi and 
Rwanda provides a formal and official channel of inclusion, recognition and extension of the 
social links noted in this section. The EAC has the objective to promote economic, social and 
cultural integration among member states. This places refugees from member states in a better 
position to integrate although there are still bureaucratic, legal and nationalist barriers by 
reason of which Ugandans, Burundians and Rwandans remain unquestionably outsiders in 
Kenya.  
 
2.4. Refugee Women’s Perspectives and Self-representation 
While the Kenyan government and citizens invoke ethnic, national and religious identities as 
the extra-legal criteria for inclusion and exclusion, among refugee women, economic profiling 
is the main extra-legal criterion of authenticating claims to the refugee status. Low economic 
status and struggling for daily survival are the basic criteria for distinguishing “genuine 
refugees” from those who are presumed to be using the identity as a pretext to stay in Kenya 
for other reasons. Marie, a Rwandan woman defined refugees as “people with problems”; the 
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term problem runs through many refugee women’s narratives. Problems in the women’s 
lifeworlds refer to lack of access to secure housing, struggling to pay rent for the insecure 
accommodation, lack of money to buy basic commodities, access medical services and pay 
for their children’s education. These are both facilitators and indicators of integration and 
when the women subsume them under problems, they are stressing the challenges they 
encounter in Nairobi. The women identify themselves by the term refugees and do not 
explicitly reject it but they are quick to point out that the term carries negative connotations. 
 
On one occasion, Hali invited this author to meet her neighbours who were two young women 
from Rwanda and Ethiopia. She stated that the two women were not eligible for this study 
because they were not refugees. She then explained that the Rwandan woman’s parents had 
left Rwanda because they feared arrest for alleged participation in the genocide while the 
Ethiopian woman’s now late mother had fled Ethiopia because of war. According to Hali, the 
two young women are not refugees because they do not need UNHCR or NGO assistance like 
herself and the other refugees; they both have family members resettled in Europe who send 
remittances. For women like Hali, a refugee is therefore one whose circumstances combine 
insecurity with low economic status which fits into the stereotypical, essentialist construction 
of a refugee (see also Malkki 1997). Thus, in the context of everyday life, refugeeness is 
defined as a legal status buttressed by low economic status. Across nationality and ethnic 
boundaries, the refugee status is closely tied to existential problems that essentially mark 
refugees as outsiders struggling to create space for themselves in Nairobi. It is striking that in 
stripping economically integrated refugee women of the refugee status and casting them as 
economic migrants, the refugee women ironically adopt the humanitarian discourse that 
portrays refugees outside the camps in the same way. The women thus deploy against their 
economically stable counterparts the same strategy that excludes themselves as refugees 
residing outside the camps. 
 
In the cases where refugee women enjoy a relative degree of economic integration, fellow 
refugee women label them economic migrants47 and spies for country of origin governments. 
Accusations of spying are rife among Rwandan refugees whose relations even among 
                                                 
47 The Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees distinguishes economic migrants from refugees by defining the 
former as people who voluntarily leave their country to take up residence elsewhere because of desire for change 
or adventure, or by family or other reasons of a personal nature. If people move exclusively for these reasons, 
they are not refugees. Economic reasons can, however, be tied to the refugee status if they are a form of 
deprivation or “persecution” related to reasons cited in the Geneva Convention’s definition of a refugee. See 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e1364.pdf (accessed 05.04.08). 
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themselves are characterised by mutual suspicion, fear and vigilance contrary to locals’ 
construction of a monolithic, criminal Hutu ethnic identity (see also Malkki 1995a; Turner 
1999; Sommers 2001 on Hutu Burundians in Tanzania). Refugee women’s criteria for 
measuring better economic circumstances include the ability to rent a stone-walled house 
furnished with sofas as opposed to a corrugated iron single room shared by all members of the 
family, possession of consumables such as a television set and radio, having children in 
boarding schools and affording “good” food which they listed as rice, meat, fish, cooking oil, 
bread and potatoes as opposed to the staple maize meal dish called ugali in Kiswahili served 
with green vegetables called sukumawiki or beans. Refugees are those who live in structures 
that do not meet cultural definitions of home and those who cannot afford basic necessities 
such as food, secure accommodation, health care and education. Refugeeness is therefore not 
only a legal status but also an economic or material condition. 
 
In this train of thought, economic well-being becomes incompatible with the refugee status 
and those who can afford these “citizen trappings” are labelled spies for the Rwandan 
government which allegedly pays them to monitor, compile and relay information on 
“genuine refugees” in Kenya.48 Accusations of spying point to the paradox of how the women 
escape the homogenising and impoverishing impact of the encampment regime only to 
censure those whose circumstances deviate from the stereotypical, essentialist and 
homogenising image of a refugee as poor. On the basis of many refugee women’s extra-legal 
criteria, there is a possibility of gradually sloughing off and relinquishing the refugee status as 
one’s economic circumstances improve in contrast to the status’ official, legal criteria by 
which one is either a refugee or not. If refugeeness is “a matter of becoming” as Malkki 
(1997: 228) observes among Hutu Burundians in Tanzania, for refugee women in Nairobi, 
refugeeness is an oscillating process of being whose intensity increases with further 
impoverishment and declines or abates with improvement in material conditions. It is not a 
fixed legal state of being but an economic continuum in which economic well-being creates 
conditions necessary for progression or metamorphosis from intense refugeeness as an 
essentialist category to economic migrants and possibly spies. 
 
Here, refugee women demonstrate the agency to redefine and operationalise the term refugee 
in ways they can easily relate to and link to their everyday experiences and lifeworlds in 
                                                 
48 Initially, Rwandan women were wary of participating in the research; one of them intimated that many among 
the women suspected that I was a spy for the Rwandan government. With time however, the women were 
convinced that I was not Rwandan and that my research had nothing to do with the Rwandan government. 
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contrast to the overarching, homogenising and universalising legal definitions. Agency also 
manifests itself in most of the women’s adoption of humanitarian organisations’ essentialist 
discourse that “pathologises” refugees in contexts where this discourse serves to justify rather 
than reproach their impoverished circumstances contrasted to their counterparts who run 
thriving small businesses in Nairobi (see Malkki 1997; Harrell-Bond 1999 for more on such 
discourse). In line with this discourse, the women fail to economically integrate not because 
they do not make conscientious effort to do so but because the refugee status is inherently 
synonymous with problems that make integration difficult without assistance to overcome the 
obstacles encountered. In this kind of logic, refugeeness, in the same way that it is a liability 
which closes opportunities for formal employment, becomes a resource when impoverished 
refugee women crystallise it into a regime of refugee self-portrayal and representation which 
they deploy to shield themselves from rebuke for lack of initiative and resourcefulness. 
 
In one instance, Marie who is a Tutsi married to a Hutu man accused Tania and her husband 
who are both Hutu of being spies for the government. Marie charged that it was the Rwandan 
government that was paying for the education of Tania’s children and that the family 
occasionally visited Rwanda, a journey a refugee cannot undertake until the cause of flight 
has been resolved. Nevertheless, Tania ran a tailoring business and the children were in good 
schools because they had scholarships.49  Interestingly, Tania harboured the same fear of 
fellow Rwandan refugees and lamented the loss of her house and money deposited in a 
Rwandan bank account as she could not go back to Rwanda. For Hutu Rwandan women, 
“economic profiling” places them in a particularly difficult situation in that where refugee 
women such as the Somalis counter exclusion from local communities by bonding together 
and resorting to mutual assistance and cooperation amongst themselves in order to make ends 
meet, Hutu Rwandan refugee women suffer double exclusion. They are wary of relations with 
non-members of the Hutu ethnicity and also shun each other thus ruining prospects of group 
cohesion and mutual assistance which play a vital role in facilitating integration as when the 
women establish mutually beneficial rotating loans.  
 
                                                 
49 This was corroborated by a chance conversation among teachers at the children’s former primary school in 
which they referred to the children in question and said that both had obtained scholarships because they had 
scored the highest grades at the school. In informal conversations, Tania often talked about her children’s 
sponsors. 
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2.4.1. Refugee Women Counter Ethnic Profiling 
Integration is about host populations opening up to refugees and the latter making 
conscientious effort to become part and parcel of the host country in a process that leads to 
mutual accommodation. In the cases where refugee women are socially connected to locals, 
this is an outcome of the women themselves taking the initiative to reach out and engage 
locals. Although refugee women generally adopt the macro ethnic discourse which pervades 
Kenya, this is not an outcome of blind conformity to this prevailing, local discourse. Rather, 
refugee women’s perception of Kenyans is largely informed by their experiences such that 
they talk about a Kenyan identity in some instances and split that identity into its ethnic 
components in others. Different refugee communities view Kenyans from different 
standpoints. Paradoxically, refugee women who suffer exclusion and experience social and 
economic barriers because of their stereotyped identities also resort to identity stereotypes in 
their relations with locals. This stereotyping extends even to fellow refugees; refugees who 
lived in the same community as Thando, a male refugee from South Africa denied that he was 
indeed South African. Such denial was not based on the question of how South Africa, an 
economically and politically stable country also esteemed as a beacon of democracy at work 
in Africa, was producing refugees but on Thando’s dark complexion which was said not to be 
South African!50  
 
The uneasy ethnic relations among Kenyans are replayed in refugee-Kenyan relations. While 
refugee women who had lived in Kakuma Refugee Camp expressed fear of the Turkana, in 
Nairobi, they fear the Kikuyu. All the ethnic groups in Kenya are referred to as Kenyans 
while the major ethnic group, the Kikuyu, is referred to by that ethnic name giving the 
impression that Kikuyu and Kenyans are two different categories. Refugee women cast the 
Kikuyu as grasping, a description which they elaborate to encompass vices refugees and non-
Kikuyu Kenyans associate with ruthless and heartless search and love for money. This can be 
understood in the context of the majority Kikuyu also owning most of the housing properties 
in Nairobi. According to Sandra, a Congolese woman, “[t]he best way to tell that a Kikuyu is 
truly dead is to drop a coin next to her body and if she do not sit up to pick the coin that 
means she is truly dead.” Mose, a Ugandan refugee woman portrayed the general attitude 
among refugees towards the Kikuyu:  
                                                 
50 Nyamnjoh (2006) addresses the problems of using complexions to determine nationality in South Africa and 
how dark-skinned South Africans who fit into the presumed appearance of African immigrants are victimised 
and harassed by South African police. The South African refugee was said to be Congolese. Although he spoke a 
bit of German apart from English and French and claimed that he could also speak Japanese, his ability to speak 
French was used to justify the claim that he was from the DRC, a Francophone country. 
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I would like to say the biggest problem for me is the children and the house that I am 
staying in. With the Kikuyu and money, ha! The Kikuyu owner has to be paid and I 
need food for my children. Recently, the Kikuyu landlady, you know among them it is 
the woman who handles everything; she told me that had it not been for this baby she 
would have thrown me out. When I tell her that I have got problems she says she also 
has got problems.  
 
Hali typecast the three major ethnic groups in Kenya as follows: i) the Kikuyu are money-
loving, heartless creditors, shrewd and unscrupulous businesspeople and thieves, ii) the well-
educated Kenyans are Luo, and iii) the Luhya are gossip- and rumour-mongers. On a visit to 
Eastleigh, a Somali refugee man assumed that I was Kikuyu and chased me out of a Somali 
money transfer facility and expressed his anger to Hali who had invited me by telling her that 
he did not want Kikuyus in the facility because they would steal. Asked to explain how she 
related with Kenyans, Zeinab, a Somali woman replied: “I got a young Kenyan lady to do for 
me kibama [household chores] and she stole some of the utensils, now I fear them [Kenyans] 
a lot.” On the basis of counter stereotypes, some refugee nationalities such as the Somalis are 
not eager to reach out to locals. Negative definitions of otherness between refugees and locals 
create boundaries that impede mutual tolerance and accommodation both of which are 
necessary for integration. By invoking discourses that accentuate rather than diminish 
barriers, many Somali refugee women place a wedge between themselves and locals and 
create a situation that hinders close interaction and mutual understanding.  
 
As retaliatory profiling against Kenyans particularly the Kikuyu, Sudanese refugee women in 
particular interpret the reconstructed Somali identity rooted in violence and aggression as a 
positive attribute and hail Somalis for “protecting” refugees by retaliating to Kenyans’ 
perceived abusive tendencies where refugees claim to be excluded from the Kenyan judiciary 
system to which they could appeal for recompense. In the absence of protection by the police 
and the judiciary, Somalis become an informal structure providing protection and justice thus 
illustrating refugees’ capacity to protect themselves where they deem formal structures 
unreliable. Perhaps another stereotypical description, Somalis have a reputation of “talking 
back” (Hyndman 1996: 117). Refugee women who make reference to the Somalis do so with 
admiration for what they perceive to be Somali boldness and assertiveness. According to 
Zanie:  
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You go to Eastleigh, Somalis … Somali! When a Somali do “rrrr to Somali-Somali", 
[gestures a sign of attack] he will get a knife to you. You put your gold watch here, it 
will be taken away but you go to Eastleigh with your gold [watch] and nobody will 
take it, nobody, nobody will take it. You take it, you are … knifed. Somalis defend 
everybody who is a refugee … They [Kenyans] know this is a Sudanese, they go and 
rob or pickpocket them and if a Somali sees you, that Somali will defend you but a 
Kenyan will not defend you, she will just point at you so that you are mugged. Garissa 
is a big shopping mall; Somalis are the ones who opened Garissa. We go to buy there 
because Somalis will not steal from us. And you cannot hike rent to Somalis; a Somali 
will kill you. Like you have seen it, me I am not saying it.51  
 
The Sudanese women also cast Kenyans as lazy people who just want money and claim that 
many Kenyans are flocking to southern Sudan not because of genuine interest in the 
construction of southern Sudan but because they are “looking for ways to make quick 
money.” Unlike Kenyans, refugees are not in a position to openly express these counter 
stereotypes as this can result in overt conflict. The circumstances of refugee women were 
resignedly captured by Sandra, a Congolese woman who pointed out that whichever way they 
are treated in Kenya, “We do not have any voice. What can we say? We are refugees.” This 
points to the low self-esteem that comes with the refugee status; other foreigners have more 
rights because they are not in Nairobi as objects of charity unlike refugees who are treated as 
not having any other choice and having nothing to offer to Kenya. Refugee women generally 
believe that although other foreigners are equally targeted by Kenyans for harassment, 
extortion and abuse, they are in a better situation than refugees who are looked down upon in 
Kenya. Hali observed that other foreigners who are not refugees can seek their embassies’ 
intervention but in her case, she has no access to such assistance. Similarly, refugee women 
from Rwanda and Burundi argue that even though their respective countries have embassies 
in Kenya, they cannot seek assistance from people who represent governments that are 
forcing them to live in exile. Nonetheless, that refugee women can generate their own version 
of “othering” suggests a level of agency at their disposal. 
 
                                                 
51 The latter part of the quotation was in direct reference to my experience of house break-in theft and attempted 
extortion. In one instance, a Sudanese woman told me that I was learning more about refugees’ experiences in 
Kenya through my own experiences with Kenyans.  
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2.5. Global and Regional Geopolitics: Ramifications for Refugee Women 
Political events at national, regional and global levels play a role in determining the nature of 
reception extended to refugees. Refugees from countries whose conflicts have drawn regional 
and global attention are targeted more than the other nationalities for politicised discourses. 
Although Rwanda and Burundi share political conflicts characterised by ethnic strife between 
the Hutu and Tutsi, it is the Rwandans who draw negative attention in Kenya because of the 
globally publicised 1994 genocide in Rwanda that targeted Tutsis unlike the 1972 genocide in 
Burundi whose target was the Hutu (see Malkki 1995a; 1997; Sommers 2001). Of the 
Rwandan refugee women who participated in this study, only one woman is Tutsi. Politicised 
discourses accordingly target Hutu Rwandans who are blamed for the 1994 genocide. Somalis 
are also targeted because: i) they have the most conspicuous presence in Nairobi, ii) the 
conflict in Somalia escalated at the time of fieldwork prompting anxiety about a refugee crisis 
in Kenya, and iii) the Somali conflict is the cause of regional and global trepidation because 
of its presumed connection with Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.52 The circumstances 
of Rwandan and Somali refugees are presented in detail to illustrate how politicisation and 
criminalisation of refugee identities impact on refugee women’s experiences and the 
possibility of integration in Kenya.  
 
2.5.1. Hutu Rwandan Refugee Women  
An aftermath of the 1994 genocide has been the reconstruction and criminalisation of the 
Hutu ethnic identity which is blamed for the genocide against the Tutsi minority. Although all 
the Hutu refugee women interviewed fled Rwanda during the genocide, Kenyans generally 
believe that Hutu refugees are criminals who fled reprisals and justice when the Tutsi-
dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in Rwanda. The situation of Hutu 
refugee women is complicated by women’s participation in the genocide (African Rights 
1995). This section is not a rebuttal of women’s involvement in the genocide and the presence 
of those who participated in it in Nairobi. Rather, it problematises ethnic profiling by taking 
as its point of departure a historical perspective which shows that the conflict in Rwanda is 
more complex than the Hutu-murderers-and-Tutsi-victims depiction. People belonging to both 
ethnicities were caught up in the pre- and post-genocide hostilities and massacres and women 
suffer a great deal regardless of ethnicity where rape and other forms of sexual violence are 
                                                 
52 There are a number of prevailing theories in respect of a resurgent Islam and its connection to Euro-American 
constructed terrorism. For an Islamic perspective on a theory of a “clash of fundamentalisms”, see Ali (2003). 
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used to enforce submission or make a political statement (see Umutesi 2004). Mamdani 
(2001) estimates 50 000 moderate Hutu casualties.  
 
The plight of Hutu women who were victims of both Hutu militias and the advancing RPF 
rebels, Hutu women married to Tutsi men, Tutsi women married to Hutu men and women 
whose parents were in these inter-ethnic marriages needs to be acknowledged. The 
complexity of the conflict was shown by some of the Hutu refugee women who stated that 
their Tutsi neighbours were keeping for them their houses in Rwanda until the situation could 
permit them to repatriate (see Sommers 2001 on Hutu Burundian refugees in Tanzania). 
Others cannot repatriate not because they fear prosecution but persecution because their Tutsi 
neighbours have occupied their land and houses or destroyed the latter (see also Malkki 
1997). Just like ordinary citizens in Kenya, state institutions such as the police also label Hutu 
refugees génocidaires and use this to extract money from them through bribery (see 
Verdirame 1999). The labelling of Hutu refugees as génocidaires which cuts across gender 
has resulted in a situation where these refugees are vigilant and wary of neighbours and 
strangers alike (see also Juma and Kagwanja 2003). The fear among Hutu refugees 
manifested itself in some of them suspecting that this author might have been gathering 
information about them for the Rwandan government (see Simon Turner [1999] on Hutu 
Burundian refugees’ suspicion of outsiders).  
 
The view that Hutu refugees are criminals is also expressed by officials in the Rwandan 
government. Following the issuing of an arrest warrant for Rwandan President, Paul Kagame, 
by a French judge in November 2006, the Rwandan ambassador to the USA invited as a guest 
on a phone-in programme labelled as criminals Rwandans in exile who phoned into the 
programme supporting the judge’s implication of Paul Kagame in the assassination of his 
predecessor, Juvénal Habyarimana.53 Without downplaying that some of the Hutu Rwandans 
in exile participated in the genocide, labelling all the Rwandans in exile criminals lends 
credence to refugees’ claims of retributive persecution on the basis of their ethnic identity 
rather than actual participation in the genocide. Labelling creates exclusionary divisions 
(Gupte and Mehta 2007). It is a non-participatory process of stereotyping and designation 
which assumes power such that “an individual identity is replaced by a stereotyped identity 
                                                 
53 Source: “Africa Journal” on Voice of America, aired at 2100hrs on 30 November 2006. A Rwandan who 
called from Norway stated that he was an ex-RPF combatant and that the RPF had a hand in the 6 April 1994 
shooting down of the plane carrying former Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana and his Burundian 
counterpart, President Cyprien Ntaryamira. In response, the ambassador labelled the caller a criminal and 
extended the label to the other callers who took sides with the French judge’s view. 
65
[…]” (Zetter 1991: 44). Labelling involves the slotting of people into existing pigeonholes 
(Douglas 1994). When the various stakeholders label Hutu refugees génocidaires, this results 
in the local people among whom they live treating them as such thus creating a situation 
where they feel rejected by both their country of origin and the asylum country. They occupy 
what Victor Turner (1967) refers to as the liminal phase.  
 
The stigma that comes with negative labels deters Hutu Rwandan refugee women from 
engaging in business outside their homes in that they only feel safe among people they trust; 
security plays a crucial role in the process of integration (Ager and Strang 2004). By using the 
genocide to portray Hutu Rwandans as not deserving hospitality, locals and state institutions 
such as the police interpret refugee hosting not as a humanitarian gesture but an extension of 
regional politics. In everyday life, refugee hosting is divorced from the official discourse 
which constructs it as non-discriminatory; it becomes a privilege bestowed and withdrawn at 
locals’ will. Refugee women’s experiences are thus influenced not by the formal discourse of 
refugee hosting but by what transpires in the informal context of everyday interaction. 
 
Although Kenyans, just as many others who are aware of the genocide, generally believe that 
the Hutu refugees are fugitives, the Hutu see the 1959 Tutsi Rwandan refugees who now carry 
dual Kenyan and Rwandan citizenship54 as more hostile than “real” Kenyans. “Real” Kenyans 
are hospitable and willing to assist the refugees but the problem is that they are poor just like 
the refugees.55 Hutu refugee women view “real” Kenyans as more accommodative than the 
Tutsi refugees-cum-Kenyans whom they accuse of using what the women term “the genocide 
ideology” against them because of their vested interests in Rwandan politics. Because of the 
impossibility of denying the genocide, the women express their political agency by 
categorising the genocide as a political weapon used against them. Hutu Rwandan refugee 
                                                 
54 Prior to the influx of Somali and Sudanese refugees (the famous Lost Boys of Sudan) in 1990, Kenya allowed 
refugees to integrate, enjoy rights to employment, freedom of movement and naturalisation. This explains the 
1959 Tutsi Rwandan refugees being citizens in Kenya. This open door policy ended in 1991 resulting in the 
post-1990 refugee populations’ inability to naturalise. 
55 The perspective taken by Hutu Rwandan refugees in Kenya can best be understood when contextualised 
within a historical perspective of the Rwandan ethnic conflict which spans generations as well as that in Burundi 
which also comprises Hutus and Tutsis (see Malkki 1995a, 1997; Sommers 2001). It is the 1959 Tutsi refugees 
who became combatants for the RPF that launched attacks that destabilised Rwanda, reportedly connected to the 
assassination of President Habyarimana and subsequently the genocide before they took over power from the 
Hutu dominated-government (see Umutesi 2004). Due to the ethnic and intermittent nature of the conflict in 
Rwanda, the 1959 Rwandan refugees were Tutsi while the post-genocide Rwandan refugees encountered during 
fieldwork are mainly Hutu. The 1959 refugees have Kenyan citizenship because they came to Kenya at a time 
when refugees were generally allowed to acquire citizenship and integrate through exercise of the right to work 
and freedom of movement. 
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women do not see their exile as an outcome of their participation in the genocide. For Epi, a 
Hutu Rwandan woman who was a university student when the genocide started: 
People who want to comment on the genocide do not want to take it from where 
exactly it started; it started when they killed the president [Habyarimana]. Now they 
say we killed people, look at me, can I kill someone? And now my children, they were 
born here in Kenya and now they are suffering, who did they kill?  
In their narratives, Hutu refugee women do not refer to the Tutsi as their enemies but instead 
express the view that the Hutu and Tutsi “are one people” who can live together. They 
appropriate the predominantly Tutsi discourse of “victimhood” which enables them to provide 
a counter-narrative which portrays both the Tutsi and the Hutu as victims contrary to the 
dominant perspective of Tutsi victims and Hutu perpetrators of violence. This illustrates the 
women’s agency in (re)defining themselves in order to legitimate their stay in Kenya. Marie 
expressed her views on ethnic relations in Rwanda as follows: 
My husband is Hutu and I am Tutsi. Even right now in Rwanda poor Hutus and Tutsis 
are living together. The problem is politics. Now if they say reconciliation we can go 
back home right now. But Kagame says no to reconciliation. Back in Rwanda we 
taught Hutu and Tutsi children and both were our children. In southern Uganda, Hutus 
and Tutsis are living together; the problem is Kagame. If the government changes we 
will go back home first thing in the morning. We will share with the Tutsis and live 
together. Tutsis are not bad; Hutus are not bad; the bad person is Kagame [who is a 
Tutsi]. My husband’s godparents are Tutsi and their children are keeping our house for 
us. The government of Kagame killed three of my husband’s brothers; they accepted 
the government of Kagame and stayed there and the government came and killed them. 
[…] We pray to God that the government is changed so that we can return to our 
country. We want a moderate president; Hutu or Tutsi, no problem. All Hutus are not 
bad and all Tutsis are not bad. My husband helped a Tutsi from the river and we all 
went together to Benako Camp in Tanzania. 
 
Hutu women view themselves as doubly excluded. They describe themselves as victims of the 
genocide and are at the same time branded criminals and excluded from the sympathy and 
tolerance accessible to other refugees in Kenya because they bear a “guilty” ethnic identity as 
shown by the international condemnation and call for justice. This double bind situation 
provides the backdrop against which they negotiate or reconstruct their identity, theorise 
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about home, governance, social acceptance and exclusion. Criminalisation of the Hutu 
identity has ramifications for integration in that it has instilled fear in Hutu refugees resulting 
in wariness in their interaction with locals. This criminalisation feeds into the fear and 
embarrassment emanating from international condemnation of this particular ethnicity 
resulting in the affected refugees feeling insecure, unwanted and less worthy of hospitality.  
 
The “genocide ideology” which is a strategic invocation of a people’s shared sense of guilt 
becomes a moral and legal strategy by which Hutu Rwandans are forced into self-exclusion 
thus losing the capacity to blame locals for their exclusion. Denied the right to residence in 
Rwanda, they do not belong to Kenya where they are resident. Indeed, that Marie yearns for 
an improbable return to her country where she is not welcome points to failure to find a new 
life in her asylum country. Most of the Hutu refugee women confided that they carefully 
choose the people they interact with and avoid having many friends so as to avoid landing 
themselves into trouble, a term which appeared frequently in their narratives. Above all, it is 
experiences such as these that inform the existential meaning of life as a refugee and the 
dreadful prospect of permanence to such presumably fated existence. 
 
Feelings of being unwanted and the ever-present insecurity in the form of fear of being “sold-
out” to the Rwandan government paralyse some of the Hutu Rwandan women to the extent of 
not being able to venture out and engage in income generation. The label génocidaires evokes 
the notion of pollution or contamination of the Kenyan social fabric. Following Mary 
Douglas’ (1994: 37) analysis of the concept of pollution, matter which is potentially polluting 
belongs to “a residual category, rejected from […] normal scheme of classification”. The 
concept of génocidaires implies uncleanness, dirt or “that which must not be included if a 
pattern is to be maintained” (Douglas 1994: 41). In this respect, the label génocidaires 
becomes a mechanism by which local populations and authorities control and limit the 
physical and social space occupied by Hutu Rwandan refugees and legitimise this exclusion. 
As such, Hutu Rwandan women are physically in Nairobi without necessarily being socially 
part of the city. Marie complained that she had stopped selling vegetables outside her house 
because her Kenyan neighbours would also start the same business allegedly to frustrate her 
efforts to earn an income. She struggles to provide adequate food for her family and regularly 
begs for food at a nearby Catholic parish while women who venture out to sell their wares are 
able to provide food for their households at the very minimum. Fear and distrust of fellow 
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Hutus and locals alike constrain these refugee women’s ability to create social relationships 
and cohesion amongst themselves or with locals among whom they live.  
 
2.5.2. Somali Refugee Women 
Following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA, the Madrid and London 
bombings of 11 March 2004 and 7 July 2005 respectively, the Muslim identity across the 
world has increasingly become politicised (Kimball 2002). The globalisation of terrorism and 
counter-terror military adventures and misadventures has been accompanied by a 
corresponding globalisation of suspicion, mistrust and fear. This feeds into the pervasive 
perception among non-Muslim populations of Islam and terrorism as synonymous categories 
(see also Shamir 2005). An aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks and the subsequent 
declaration of a “global war on terror” by the Bush administration has been the branding of 
asylum seekers and refugees, particularly those coming from Muslim countries, as a threat to 
national security and use of the latter as a pretext to abuse and exclude refugees (Castles 
2003; Juma and Kagwanja 2003; Muller 2004, Hughes 2007). This is despite that the 
terrorists involved in the attacks were neither asylum seekers nor refugees (van Selm 2003). 
The terrorist attacks have had an impact on USA-bound migrants and other Western countries 
as well as those heading for countries that are vulnerable to attacks as is the case with Kenya. 
This section presents xenophobic attitudes towards Somalis by focusing on discourses 
directed towards Somali refugees who are already in Kenya as well as Kenya’s reaction to a 
Somali refugee influx at the Kenya-Somalia border following intensification of the war 
between the Ethiopian-backed TFG and the ICU. 
 
In Kenya, as in other parts of the world, association of the Muslim identity with terrorism has 
had the impact of instilling fear and apprehension in non-Muslim populations. This 
association spurs xenophobia or “the intense dislike, hatred or fear of others perceived to be 
strangers” (Nyamnjoh 2006: 5). Local populations’ xenophobic discourses on refugees in 
Kenya are particularly directed towards Somalis. Firstly, the conflict between the ICU and the 
TFG in Somalia has direct links to fears of terrorism in the region. The USA’s association of 
the ICU with terrorism and the allegation that Somalia has become a haven for terrorists – 
since Somalis have been identified as the culprits in the 1998 Nairobi and Dar es Salaam 
terrorist attacks – has created anxiety that the ICU harbours the agenda to promote terrorism 
and destabilise the region.  
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With Kenya having been attacked by terrorists in 1998 and 2002, the global anti-terror 
discourse resonates with Kenya’s experiences and has ready listeners in the country. This 
situation is aggravated by warnings of further attacks issued by the USA which regularly 
states that it has intelligence on Somalia being used as a safe haven by terrorists and that 
“Somali terrorists” have Kenya as their target for more attacks. Although Kenya has a Muslim 
population of its own, USA warnings implicate Somali “Islamic terrorists”. As a result, 
escalation of the conflict in Somalia in December 2006 raised alertness and vigilance within 
the Kenyan military and drew USA military intervention in the form of air strikes as part of 
the “global war on terror”. The USA’s declaration of a war on terror has impacts that are felt 
across the world thus demonstrating how globalisation, in this case, globalisation of insecurity 
(Camilleri 2006), has a discernible impact on local situations (Held and McGrew 2002; Inda 
and Rosaldo 2002) as experienced by Somali refugees. 
 
Secondly, Somalis run thriving retail businesses in Eastleigh and live in their own community 
enclave perceived to be exclusionary to non-Somalis. While the majority of the other 
nationalities in Kenya are in small tailoring businesses, many Somali women in Eastleigh sell 
expensive jewellery imported from the Middle East. Somalis are ubiquitous in Eastleigh to the 
extent that the suburb is now referred to as “Little Mogadishu”.56 This exacerbates local 
resentment of Somalis and entrenches a clear Somali phobia among Kenyans generally. In a 
television forum, the Somali Minister of Foreign Affairs argued that refugees are not always a 
problem and recommended that the forum’s host tour Eastleigh and see how Somalis, through 
their entrepreneurial skills, had transformed that suburb into a thriving commercial centre.57 
All the same, resentment emanates from many Kenyans seeing these businesses as not 
benefiting and uplifting the socio-economic situation of locals but rather as detrimental to 
local entrepreneurship. For example, the razing to the ground in 2000 of Garissa Lodge, a 
Somali-owned retail shopping mall in Eastleigh was described as arson and blamed on the 
Asian business community which allegedly felt threatened by competition from the Somali 
business community (Campbell 2006). Verdirame (1999) and Campbell (2005) make a 
similar observation on Somalis self-settled in Kenya’s coastal city of Mombasa in 1991 and 
the government’s decision to relocate them to refugee camps in response to complaints by 
local entrepreneurs.  
                                                 
56 Mogadishu is the capital city of Somalia. 
57 The Minister expressed this view on “Eye on Somalia”, KTN Special Edition at 22:30hrs on 15 January 2007 
where the Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the First Secretary of the Ethiopian Embassy in Kenya were 
also present. 
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 Thirdly, intensification of the military conflict in Somalia and the ICU’s declaration to wage 
an Iraqi-style insurgency exacerbates fears of regional terrorism and a refugee crisis in Kenya. 
These events have increased Somali- and Islamophobia which has fed into discourses of 
discrimination, human rights abuse and marginalisation by Kenya’s own relatively small but 
increasingly vocal Muslim population. The local Muslim community has always urged the 
Kenyan government to disband the anti-terror police unit every time the terrorism discourse 
has reached a din. Lastly, Somalis are also resented for the hikes in rentals in Eastleigh which 
are explained in terms of Somalis having the money to pay exorbitant rentals for several 
months in advance thus displacing Kenyans who cannot afford to pay similar amounts. 
According to Kenyan respondents, Somalis can rent a whole apartment building and turn it 
into an all-Somali enclave to the exclusion and chagrin of Kenyans. While Kenyan home 
owners prey on the Somalis, Kenyans who do not own houses in Nairobi are forced to leave 
Eastleigh for less expensive neighbourhoods. Refugee integration cannot take place where 
locals feel displaced and resent refugees for this displacement (Jacobsen 2001). 
 
The labelling and stereotyping of Somalis as aggressive and violent can be understood against 
the backdrop of regional and global discourse on terrorism and its association in 
contemporary times with Muslims. Joe, a Kenyan respondent declared that he would not want 
Somali refugees in his neighbourhood because “they are extremists”. Such objection to the 
presence of “terrorists” in the neighbourhood subsumes refugee women under stereotypes that 
reflect behaviour believed to be exhibited by their male counterparts. As a result, the majority 
of Somali refugee women in Nairobi find protection in Somali-dominated Eastleigh while the 
other nationalities share compounds and neighbourhoods with Kenyans. The oversight on 
gender differences in labels such as “terrorists” and “extremists” has resulted in Somali 
refugee women being subjected to harassment and raids in the name of ridding Nairobi of 
“terrorists”. The women are rarely related to in their individual right as women; they are 
mothers, wives, daughters and sisters of men who in this case are branded terrorists. Kenyan 
security officers do not recognise the individuality of Somali women and treat them as 
chattels and appendages of men and, for this reason, Somali women are harassed, interrogated 
and imprisoned as substitutes for their husbands where the latter cannot be located.  
 
The predicament of Somali refugee women in particular was vividly illustrated in a case 
where Kenyan police imprisoned a Somali woman because her husband, an alleged terrorist, 
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could not be located. The human rights community in Kenya intervened when the Kenyan 
police refused to release the woman’s four-year-old daughter into the care of her 
grandmother. 58  Holding women as substitutes for their husbands or male relatives also 
represents an attack on their ethnic identity; women’s reproductive role portrays them as “the 
embodiment of a given ethnic identity’s maintenance” (Crawley 2001: 3; Byrne and Baden 
1995). Although women are not always aware of their husbands’ involvement in politics 
(Forbes Martin 2004), state agents and rebels alike assume that men, particularly husbands, 
confide their secret political activities in their wives or female relatives in general and that 
when these men go underground or flee, they do so with their wives or female relatives’ 
knowledge. Refugee women are related to on the basis of stereotypes and assumptions that 
they approve the political activities men in their families and communities engage in rather 
than on the basis of their individual beliefs, values, experiences, worldviews and political 
opinion. Treatment that constantly reminds Somali women that they do not belong to Kenya 
subjects them to a different kind of insecurity from the one they fled and creates a degree of 
uncertainty which deters rooting in Nairobi.  
 
The use of sweeping generalisations that lump together Somali refugee men and women gives 
the impression that Somali refugee women are militant. Although women possess political 
agency and engage in political activism (see Nhongo-Simbanegavi 2000; Acholou 2003; 
Gardner and El Bushra 2004), this study did not find evidence of this agency being expressed 
in the form of advocacy for or participation in violent acts of terror among Somali women. 
The principal narrative that emerged is one in which women are victims of gender-specific 
violence; the women express their political agency through advocacy for peace (see also 
Hassan et al 2004). In their narratives, Somali refugee women express frustration with the war 
in their country and state that they do not comprehend the agenda of the war. For them, 
whether the TFG or the ICU rules the country is inconsequential because “both are Muslim”; 
                                                 
58 In January 2007, the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR) together with the Kenya 
Human Rights Network (KHRN) released a statement in which they condemned the Kenyan police for what they 
described as arbitrary arrests, interrogation and incarceration of Kenyans and non-Kenyans. Over 70 people the 
majority of whom were Muslims were said to be in detention. Hafswa Swaleh Ali, a four-year-old Somali girl 
was detained for 25 days together with her mother who was among the three pregnant women in detention. The 
women were detained on the pretext of providing information and assisting the police with investigations. The 
second woman was also from Somalia and was reportedly nursing a bullet wound sustained when the Kenyan 
police shot at her at the Kenya-Somalia border. The third woman was from Tunisia. Some Kenyans of Somali 
ethnicity and Somali refugees and asylum seekers had been deported to Mogadishu. The KNCHR and KHRN 
stated that relatives and friends of alleged suspects were detained because they had been “apparently declared 
guilty by association”. http://www.knchr.org/dmdocuments/PressStatement.pdf (accessed 26.09.07). Muslims in 
Kenya charged that the detentions were meant to frustrate Muslims. 
http://muslimsinkenya.worldpress.com/2007/02/02/5-year-old-girl-being-held-by-the-kenyan-police-as-a-terror-
suspect/ (accessed 25.09.07). 
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for them the main issue is peace. The war has displaced them, rendered them vulnerable to 
targeted rape, further insecurity and robberies in Kenya. For Kadija, one of the women, the 
war has left her with the extra problem of taking care of a son who lost a leg because of the 
violence. This is coupled with raids, interrogations and harassment in Eastleigh.  
 
On the basis of these experiences, the women converge on the view that they are not part of 
Kenya and angrily state that if they were part of Kenya, those among them who were raped by 
Kenyan citizens and security officers would not have been subjected to such an experience. 
Somali women do not construe rape as a crime perpetrated against any woman but an 
expression of ethnic hatred specifically targeting them because of their identity hence its 
connection with feelings of not belonging to Kenya. They view the raids, robberies, rape and 
the general hostility which they experience as a sign of ignorance as when Zeinab asserted, “I 
do not at all feel at home here. I have never been treated well here and will never feel so due 
to the ignorance.” Kenyan security officers raid Somali refugees because they suspect them of 
being terrorists and criminals yet Somali refugee women also view Kenyans in the same way 
and accuse them of being criminals and corrupt. The women’s agency to take a stand for 
peace is however suppressed by stereotypes that overlook gender differences on interpretation 
of the war in Somalia.  
 
Within this context, Somali refugee women feel imprisoned and secluded in Eastleigh 
because of fear of attacks and sexual violence which can be perpetrated on them because they 
can easily be identified by their distinct physical features. The women leave the seclusion of 
the refugee camps only to find themselves in a situation that can be described as a camp 
beyond the camp. Seclusion aggravates the “them” and “us” attitude and mutual fear and 
distrust that characterise Somali-Kenyan relations, a situation that impedes social and cultural 
integration or the capacity to create conditions conducive for mutual understanding and 
respect as well as peaceful co-existence. It is difficult for refugees to achieve economic 
independence in a climate of insecurity (Harrell-Bond 1986). Integrated refugees are able to 
move freely without fear of physical threat and abuse, get to know the host community and 
“feel at home” (Ager and Strang 2004; 2008).  
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The Somali phobia in Kenya is vividly illustrated in a newspaper article that warned against 
the influx of Somalis in Kenya.59 The author of the article, Dagi Kimani, blamed Somalis for 
the outbreak of measles in Kenya and asserted that Eastleigh which accommodates thousands 
of Somalis was the epicentre of the outbreak. Another big influx of refugees, according to the 
article, would lead to environmental degradation if not a disaster. The third reason for the 
writer’s objection to Somali presence in Kenya is that Somalis are the main source of illegal 
firearms for criminals in Kenya (see also Juma and Kagwanja 2003). Charges that Somalis are 
responsible for the proliferation of small arms in Kenya come at a time when the country is 
grappling with a high rate of violent crimes.  
 
Although Somali refugees argue that the criminals wreaking havoc in Kenya are not Somalis, 
Kimani is of the view that, “[i]t is conceivable that if the Government continues to pursue its 
open-door policy, rival Somali gangs will soon be settling their differences on Kenyatta 
Avenue.” He then concludes with a recommendation that even though Kenya has an 
obligation to offer humanitarian assistance to Somalis like the rest of the international 
community, “[…] the primary obligation of the government is to that constituency known as 
Kenyans. No humanitarian interests should be allowed to tramp down on this basic truth.” 
The basic thrust of such alarmist Somali-bashing is unmistakeable: Somalis are part of the 
problem in Kenya and must therefore be treated as such. 
 
The anti-Somali rhetoric culminated in the refoulement of Somali asylum seekers in January 
2007 by the Kenyan government at the Kenya-Somalia border. As the war in Somalia 
intensified in January 2007, the GoK provoked international outrage when it barred Somalis 
fleeing the war from entering Kenya. The GoK argued that it would not give sanctuary to 
members of the ICU who were fighting against the Somali TFG. 60  John Michuki, then 
Kenya’s Minister of Internal Security, presented the government’s stance on the influx of 
refugees from Somalia thus, “We are not going to accommodate people who are fighting 
against a government which is friendly to us.”61 The refoulement had precedence in several 
incidents of anti-refugee rhetoric and actions. In 1997, the then president of Kenya, Daniel 
arap Moi issued an inflammatory speech which led to large-scale refoulement of Ugandan and 
                                                 
59 The article penned by Dagi Kimani was entitled “Alarm Bells Ringing: Somali refugees not healthy for 
Kenya”. The Daily Nation (Nairobi) 12 October 2006. 
60 The government’s perspective was carried in the Daily Nation (Nairobi) of 4 January 2007 in a front-page 
article entitled “UN protests as Kenya sends back refugees.” 
61 The Minister’s words are quoted from his speech when he appeared on KTN 21:00hours News Bulletin of 9 
January 2007. 
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Rwandan refugees (Verdirame 1999; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). According to the 
refugee women in Nairobi, following the 1998 terrorist attacks on the US embassy in Kenya, 
the GoK gave refugees in Nairobi a fourteen-day ultimatum to leave the country which was 
followed by another somewhat toned down ultimatum ordering them to go to the camps when 
the refugees failed to leave Kenya altogether. In 2001, Daniel arap Moi had the Kenya-
Somalia border sealed and cited insecurity for Kenyans as the reason (Verdirame and Harrell-
Bond 2005).  
 
The Somali crisis illustrates how politics determines who is granted or denied refuge. Foreign 
policy plays a part in asylum issues as asylum countries prioritise their relations with 
governments of refugee-producing nations and see granting asylum to citizens of such 
countries as undermining legitimacy of their allies (Valji 2001). The Kenyan government’s 
reaction lends credence to Castles’ (2003) observation that humanitarianism is no longer a 
neutral action (see also Shandy 2007). The history of refugee hosting also shows the politics 
involved (see Schultheis 1989). Although the refoulement was largely counter-productive 
taking place as it did along a porous Kenya-Somalia border, human rights groups such as 
Amnesty International reported that most of the asylum seekers denied entry into Kenya were 
women and children. Kenyans who criticised the government for sealing the border were 
concerned about Kenyans who had crossed into Somalia in response to the call for 
international jihadists or Muslim fighters to assist the ICU against the Ethiopians. These 
Kenyans were trapped in Somalia and vulnerable to US air strikes.  
 
The refoulement of Somali asylum seekers confirms Juma and Kagwanja’s (2003: 225) 
prediction of a situation in which, given the configuration in East Africa and the Horn of 
Africa, refugees have “become pawns in a wider geopolitical game in which they are 
redefined as agents of insecurity and terrorism.” Kenya accordingly gives primacy to Article 
33.2 which states that an asylum seeker or refugee may not be exempt from refoulement if 
there are reasonable grounds to regard him/her as a danger to the security of the host country. 
Predictably, what constitutes reasonable grounds is highly contentious. The current 
configuration in East Africa explains the difficulties Somali refugee women encounter and 
their criticism of Kenyans as “ignorant”. Kenya’s position in the refoulement case was 
strengthened by the fact that criticism came from Western countries which “have taken the 
lead to erode the right of asylum and undermining the principles of refugee protection” (Crisp 
2000: 162; see also Valji 2001; Muller 2004). The role of regional and global politics in 
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determining the situation of Somali refugees in Kenya was demonstrated by Raphael Tuju, 
Kenya’s then Foreign Affairs Minister’s response to the international outcry on the 
refoulement of Somali asylum seekers:  
We have refugees from many other countries and it is not fair to condemn Kenya for 
turning away refugees from Somalia when countries in Europe have been turning away 
people in boats on the high seas. That kind of moralising is not good.62  
 
The Somali TFG gave its moral support to the Kenyan government. The Somali 
representative to the UN, Idd Beddel Mohamed, asserted that “[f]ighters of the ICU are 
associated with al Qaeda. The government of Kenya should keep the border closed until 
further notice from the Somali government. Kenya is a sovereign state and can do whatever 
they want.”63 The GoK and TFG perspectives on the Somali conflict depicted the people 
fleeing Somalia following the Ethiopian invasion as Islamic militants who, according to 
Kenya’s then Foreign Affairs Minister, were “…trying to cross and trying to use this country 
[Kenya] as a base from which they can attack the Transitional Government.”64 Kenya has 
legitimate security concerns particularly considering its vulnerability to terrorist attacks. 
However, the wholesale refoulement of Somalis overlooked the gender dynamics of active 
participation in politics in Somalia. Under Islam in a Somali context, politics belongs to the 
public domain where women’s participation is largely proscribed thus making women victims 
rather than architects and perpetrators of the violence that accompanies war or “terrorism” in 
Somalia. 
 
In his reaction to the crisis, the High Commissioner for Refugees, Antonio Guterres, pointed 
out that as much as the UNHCR appreciates Kenya’s security concerns, the country has an 
obligation to allow asylum seekers onto its territory. The High Commissioner also noted that 
most of the asylum seekers were women and children and that turning these asylum seekers 
away was in contravention of the principle of non-refoulement.65 Kenya’s Foreign Affairs 
Minister took issue not with the UNHCR observation but with UNHCR expression of concern 
over the refoulement through the media. Loescher (2003) observes that in recent times, 
                                                 
62 The Minister expressed this view on “Eye on Somalia”, KTN’s Special Edition at 22:30hrs on 15 January 
2007 at which the Somali Foreign Affairs Minister and the First Secretary of the Ethiopian Embassy in Kenya 
were also present. 
63 Interview on Voice of America’s “Africa Journal”, aired at 21:00hrs, edition of 4 January 2007.  
64 Foreign Affairs Minister’s views presented on “Eye on Somalia”, KTN’s Special Edition on 15 January 2007. 
65 The High Commissioner’s Speech under the title “UNHCR calls on Kenya to halt Somali Returns” was posted 
on 3 January 2007 on http://www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/459bb8404.html (accessed 12.08.07). 
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UNHCR policy and practice reflect both State interests and the Office acting independently in 
ways not expected and sanctioned by the State. The case of Somali asylum seekers denied 
entry portrays the refugee agency’s dilemma of balancing its mandate, diplomacy and 
independence on the one hand with the host state’s interests on the other hand.  
Similar to the contradictions of globalisation which is described as “a process of accelerated 
flows and accelerated closures” (Nyamnjoh 2006: 1), the transnationalisation of terrorism and 
the concomitant “global war on terror” are characterised by the contradiction that terrorism 
generates refugees who are then dismissed as spurious and criminalised as terrorists. The lives 
of many refugees are thickly inscribed with this paradox of the global refugee situation. 
Acceleration of movement at a time of heightened security concerns has rendered refugees 
“outcasts of globalisation” (Hughes 2007: 934-935). The former UN Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan, made an apt observation of the growing tendency to equate refugees “at best with 
economic migrants, at worst with cheats, criminals or even terrorists.”66 As the GoK seeks to 
curb the inflow of Somali refugees, stereotypes become the readily available way to de-
legitimise Somalis’ entry into Kenya. Government and media rhetoric demonstrate how 
stereotypes “are activated in a more pragmatic fashion only when they provide the kinds of 
information useful for the judgments that have to be made according to particular situational 
contexts” (Locke and Walker 2000: 176). 
 
Despite the alarm raised in Dagi Kimani’s article quoted above, no cases of open Somali 
clashes were noted during fieldwork. The same peaceful co-existence was also noted among 
the other refugee nationalities in Nairobi with the exception of a clash between rival Ethiopian 
groups in Eastleigh and another clash between two refugee men from the Great Lakes region 
in February 2007. These are instances that demonstrate how the conflicts back in the 
refugees’ countries of nationality have a bearing on what transpires among refugees in the 
asylum country. Refugees also peacefully co-exist with locals and in some cases the latter 
assist refugees and work to create amicable Kenyan-refugee relations and facilitate refugee 
integration as presented in Chapter Five. Nevertheless, the case of Somali refugee women 
shows that the absence of overt conflict between refugees and locals does not necessarily 
mean that refugees are integrated. This is in contrast to Harrell-Bond’s (1986) and Kuhlman’s 
(1991) argument that integration has taken place if friction between refugees and locals is not 
worse than within the host population itself. More overt and violent conflicts among Kenyans 
                                                 
66 Kofi Annan’s comments at a conference held as part of a process called “Global Consultations on International 
Protection” launched by the UNHCR in 2001 and quoted in a UNHCR Newsletter Refugees (2001), Vol. 4, No. 
125; p. 8). 
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than between Kenyans and Somalis were observed yet Somali refugee women generally do 
not view themselves as part and parcel of Kenya.  
 
2.6. Refugee Identities and Geopolitics: Impact on Local Integration 
The cases of Hutu and Somali refugees illustrate how refugee-Kenyan relations are influenced 
by mutual perception and stereotyping. Integration has a strong interplay with refugee 
identities and global and regional geopolitics. Once whole nationalities and ethnicities are 
negatively stereotyped, they are in turn criminalised, shunned and most importantly, excluded 
from the local social milieu. In inter-group relations, stereotypes become a way by which 
those involved differentiate “WE and THEY” (Leyens et al 1994: 70). The circumstances of 
Hutu Rwandan and Somali refugee women demonstrate how identity and global and regional 
politics constrain refugees’ efforts to rebuild their lives and “feel at home” in Nairobi. For 
example, blaming Somali refugees for the high crime rate solidifies social boundaries thus 
making effective integration difficult. Largely resented and shunned, Somalis in turn cast 
locals in negative terms and “cordon” themselves in Eastleigh, a situation which makes 
execution of raids easier for the police.  
 
Somali clustering in Eastleigh is attributable to the tendency for refugees to settle among 
people from their own country and the Somali communal way of life in which spatial 
proximity facilitates mutual assistance and cooperation. However, the implication of Somalis 
in the 1998 Nairobi terrorist attacks, events of 11 September 2001 and the USA’s regular 
warnings of more attacks on Kenya also portray clustering as a conscious strategy to find 
security in numbers as the Somali women’s narratives indicate. Perception of Somalis as 
inimical to social stability and national security, fuelled by deployment of the contemporary 
discourse of global terrorism, obstructs acceptance of Somalis into the local communities. 
Somalis react by keeping their distance from locals and denigrating Kenyans and their 
“culture”; mutual stereotypes hinder interaction between refugees and locals (Valtonen 1998). 
 
Against this backdrop and because they are easy to identify in Kenya, Somali refugee women 
cite among other problems raids, targeted rape and harassment at a time when women 
belonging to the other nationalities observe that police harassment has abated since the 
change of government in Kenya in 2002. Somali refugee women’s social integration in 
Nairobi is hampered by security agents’ suspicion that they harbour terrorists. The police 
raids conducted in Eastleigh often lead to refoulement of both refugees who have self-settled 
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in Eastleigh and those trying to cross into Kenya. The closure of the Kenya-Somalia border 
has not deterred Somalis from attempting to cross the border but has bestowed upon Kenyan 
police the power to detain, harass, seek bribes and physically and sexually abuse and deport 
asylum seekers (Human Rights Watch 2009). With such experiences, Kadija described life in 
Kenya as “another war without bullets.” All except two women who were sceptical of lasting 
peace in Somalia categorically stated that they would repatriate as soon as peace prevailed in 
their country.  
 
The process of democratisation in Africa has seen politicians and newspaper editors exercise 
“their new freedoms by voicing sentiments about refugees that are often negative” (Veney 
2005: 13). As shown by Dagi Kimani’s article above, the local media plays a significant role 
in whipping up xenophobic sentiments or moral panic about refugees in Kenya. A direct 
outcome of alarmist journalism is that the stigmatised refugee communities are viewed as 
having nothing to offer to Kenya except trouble and are therefore viewed as irrelevant and 
detrimental to the country’s progress. This also applies to the global media such as the Voice 
of America through which politicians address international audiences as happened when the 
Rwandan ambassador to the USA labelled criminals those who called to corroborate the 
French judge’s charge that President Paul Kagame was involved in the assassination of his 
predecessor. Nyamnjoh (2006) makes similar observations on the role of the media in 
promoting xenophobia in South Africa (see also Human Rights Watch 1998). Dagi Kimani’s 
article does not distinguish between men and women and it is in this context that Somali 
women are targeted for raids and imprisonment for men’s “crimes”.  
 
Media pronouncements that Somalis are terrorists and that Hutu Rwandans are génocidaires 
incite locals against these two communities resulting in categorical objection to having 
Somali and Hutu Rwandan neighbours on the basis of identity. Negative depiction and 
categorical denouncement of Somali and Hutu Rwandan refugees in the media are replayed in 
relations between these communities and the local populations as when Peter, a Kenyan man 
laughed and remarked to this author in an informal conversation, “Which refugees are you 
talking about? The Hutu criminals who ran away after killing people?” When politicians whip 
up Somali- and Hutu- phobia through the media which are the fastest means of transmitting 
messages to a large, international audience, this has explicit implications for these 
communities who then face a crisis of legitimacy as refugees. This macro discourse only 
serves to polarise the targeted refugee communities and local populations which is detrimental 
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to social integration. Even though Kenyan Muslims also suffer as a result of association of 
Muslims with terrorism, as citizens they are not as vulnerable as Somalis who are refugees as 
shown by calls for the GoK to allow Kenyan jihadists entry back into the country from 
Somalia during the US air strikes in Somalia in January 2007.  
 
Much of the literature on refugee integration that focuses on Somalis portrays them as having 
more problems to socially and culturally integrate than other refugee communities (see 
Fangen 2006; Newland et al 2007). However, Somalis’ situation in Kenya is complex and the 
view prevailing among Kenyans that Somalis are simply hostile and reluctant to integrate 
does not adequately explain Somali clustering in Eastleigh. This view overlooks the role of 
local stigma and antipathy as implied in the label “terrorists” in demarcating physical and 
social boundaries for the Somalis. Ethnic and religious profiling and the accompanying 
stigma result in Somalis suspecting that locals do not respect their cultural difference and 
harbour the agenda to change this difference. This fear of assimilation or transformation of 
“Somaliness” into what Somali women term “Kenyan culture” is pertinent in a context where 
stereotypes based on their cultural and religious difference exert pressure on them to conform 
to local standards. Under these circumstances, the Somali enclave in Eastleigh which is a 
smaller version of Somalia, more than an expression of reluctance to integrate, is a barrier 
erected in self-defence and as a counter to the perceived cultural “contamination”. Notions of 
contagion, dirt and cultural corruption imply danger and disorder (Douglas 1994). Seclusion 
accordingly becomes “a resource for cultural preservation, self-identity and feelings of 
continuity” (Kibreab 1995: 8; see also Larsen 2004). Somalis’ quest to maintain their 
religious and cultural difference or “purity” is reinforced by the prevailing macro discourse in 
Kenya which they view as vindicating their suspicion. 
 
Segregation for Somalis, apart from being a form of resistance to local stereotypes, 
communicates the message of a self-sufficient community which is not at the mercy of locals 
thus portraying exclusion as a chosen rather than locally-imposed state of existence. Whereas 
literature on xenophobia and integration points to accusations of reluctance to open up to 
outsiders being levelled against host populations by refugees and other immigrants (see 
Human Rights Watch 1998; Nyamnjoh 2006), Somali refugee women convey their reluctance 
to be influenced by what they term “Kenyan culture”. When locals portray Somalis as having 
nothing to offer to Kenya but trouble and insecurity, Somali women demonstrate the agency 
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to adopt a similar discourse by depicting Kenyans as a threat to Somali cultural and religious 
values as illustrated by depiction of locals as ignorant, immoral, and violent criminals.  
 
Somali women’s segregation limits the possibility of social and cultural integration which is 
intricately connected with freedom of movement and access to economic opportunities 
outside Eastleigh. Their counter stereotypes and self-segregation demonstrate how local and 
refugee stereotypes reinforce each other and perpetuate the situation emanating from these 
stereotypes. Mutual stereotypes between locals and refugees express self-categorisation 
within the in-group in relation to the out-group or the categorical “Other” (Leyens et al 1994); 
they express the clash between intra- and inter-group integration. They are a manifestation of 
fear of the categorical “Other” and seek “to preserve [each group’s] illusion of control over 
the self and the world” (Gilman 1985: 18). On their part, Hutu Rwandan refugee women who 
physically pass for locals live among Kenyans but resist opening up because they do not trust 
people even their neighbours. While Somali women are more concerned about cultural 
“contamination” and “purity”, Hutu Rwandan women’s concerns are of a political nature. 
Their priority is security which explains their perception of potential spies and sell-outs even 
in their neighbours and their resort to silence as a strategy of self-protection. 
 
Seclusion has a backlash in that refugees become more conspicuous when they live in 
enclaves resulting in local populations believing that they are inundated with foreigners as 
shown by reference to Eastleigh as “Little Mogadishu”. Enclaves as implied in “Little 
Mogadishu” are an obstacle to social and cultural integration among self-settled refugees 
whose ability to integrate in the absence of an official government integration policy largely 
depends on themselves and the locals among whom they live. The physical exclusion of 
Somali asylum seekers denied entry into Kenya is symbolic and reflective of the social 
exclusion of Somali refugees who are in Eastleigh. Simon Turner’s (2006) conceptualisation 
of circumstances of included exclusion is not confined to refugee camps as it also manifests 
itself in urban settings where refugees have self-settled. As mostly non-combatants, it is the 
women who flee in large numbers such that when refugees are criminalised for committing 
atrocities such as the Rwandan genocide and for being terrorists in the case of Somalis, such 
labels are also attached to refugee women who are conveniently hidden behind male faces. 
Stereotypes and xenophobia lead to exclusion by which the women fail to find means of 
sustaining themselves and their children and bringing back normalcy into their lives.  
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On the other hand, Somali women who have reached out to locals have been able to create 
space for themselves even outside Eastleigh. The few Somali women who live outside 
Eastleigh do not see their residence among locals as a threat to their Muslim faith and have 
been able to socially integrate into their neighbourhoods. For example, Hali, a Muslim Somali 
woman living among locals and refugees from the Great Lakes region stated, “When I am 
walking in town and want to pray, I just look for a place where I can do so and whether that 
place is a mosque or a church, it does not matter. I just get inside and pray.” Hali went to the 
mosque every Friday, joined Christian prayer groups with her Christian friends and the five-
day lunch hour prayer session in which her Christian, Rwandan teacher at a tailoring school in 
Hurlingham read the Bible, preached to the class and prayed. 
 
Profiling or stereotyping as it manifests itself in Nairobi portrays difference as “the antithesis 
of the self” and combines “real-life experience and the world of myth” (Gilman 1985: 23). 
Ethnic stereotypes are not about the reality per se but an equivalence of racism experienced 
by migrants of colour in Western host countries. It needs not be understood in terms of 
truthfulness or falsehood or correctness or incorrectness but in terms of usefulness, purpose 
and intention (Leyens et al 1994). Within the framework of social identity theory, stereotypes 
have three functions namely social differentiation, social causality and social justification 
(Leyens et al 1994). By conjuring up images of génocidaires and terrorists both of which 
evoke fear, ethnic and religious stereotypes clarify and accentuate social difference between 
the in-group (Kenyan citizens) and the targeted out-groups (Hutu Rwandans and Somalis 
respectively). Social causality manifests itself in the representation of Rwandans as agents of 
social and moral contamination and of Somalis as dangerous “terrorists” responsible for 
disease outbreak in Eastleigh, proliferation of small arms, the high crime rate, displacement of 
poor Kenyan residents from Eastleigh and economic dislocation of Kenyan entrepreneurs and 
business people by Somali entrepreneurs (see also Campbell 2005; Veney 2005). This leads to 
the social justification function of stereotypes which buttresses and rationalises xenophobia 
and exclusion that thrive on negative construction of the “Other”. Stereotypes lead to feelings 
of insecurity among locals which are a disincentive for host communities to accept refugees 
(Dryden-Peterson and Hovil 2003a).  
 
Ethnic profiling whose appearance requires limited or no knowledge of the group (Leyens et 
al 1994) subsumes refugee women’s individuality under regional, national, ethnic and 
religious identity stereotypes which often do not represent women’s experiences and 
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worldviews. Within this context, when refugee women clamour for resettlement it is not 
because “going for resettlement for them [refugees] is like going to heaven” as the CSO stated 
in the interview. Rather, it is an expression of the desire to find a country where they can find 
social, cultural and economic accommodation. Exclusion plays a major role in promoting 
feelings of detachment from Kenya thus obstructing social and cultural integration. In the face 
of exclusion and alienation, refugees do not shun their cultures or supplant them with local 
cultures in order to be accepted but are disposed to ever more forcefully assert their identities 
and seek security in their numbers as illustrated by Somalis. In doing so, they demonstrate a 
level of agency to define themselves and deal with profiling in ways often suppressed by the 
stereotypical depiction of refugees as timid and passive victims at the mercy of locals. 
 
That the other nationalities namely Congolese, Burundians, Ethiopians, Eritreans, Ugandans 
and Sudanese are not direct targets of the xenophobic discourse shows the politics involved in 
refugee hosting. They often appear in the discourse in the generic term refugees without being 
singled out by their religious or ethnic identity. Even though these nationalities are not 
assisted to integrate, they have the advantage of being able to pursue their everyday business 
without disruptions such as raids and interrogations (at least after 2002 when the Kibaki 
government came into office) and are spared from labelling and ostracism. While hyper-
globalisers perceive globalisation as entailing homogenisation and integration (Held et al 
1999), the circumstances of Somali and Hutu Rwandan refugee women in particular indicate 
reversion to primordial, ethnic and disintegrative ways of identifying each other thus 
shattering globalists’ dream of “one world” and “one people”. Somali and Hutu Rwandan 
refugee women’s experiences in Nairobi can best be understood in terms of localisation of 
global conflicts and the globalisation of local conflicts. 
 
Ethnic, national and religious profiling as presented in this chapter is a conscious strategy 
deployed as part of the refugee regime created to manage refugees who defy encampment and 
self-settle in Nairobi. It is a central aspect of social technologies which are rules, regulations, 
mechanisms and arrangements established to organise, contain, manage and control 
populations, in this case refugees. As the embodiment of exclusionary discourses, identity 
profiling is a well-orchestrated mechanism of demarcating and controlling physical space and 
social distance between locals and refugees. The stigma inherent in stereotypes solidifies 
exclusionary discourses and creates cognitive revulsion among locals which is reflected in the 
physical and social distance between locals and refugees. In this respect, identity profiling 
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serves the purpose of ensuring that “the illusion of an absolute difference between self and 
Other is never troubled” (Gilman 1985: 18). This is significant for the encampment-
repatriation regime which is the centre-piece of refugee hosting in Kenya by which integration 
is deemed detrimental to repatriation. Both encampment and organisation of residential space 
in Nairobi illustrate that space is not neutral. The organisation of space not only demonstrates 
how “social relations and social structures are produced and transformed” (Henrietta Moore 
1996: x); it also illustrates the absence of such relations and marks mutually constructed 
social boundaries between refugees and locals. 
 
As verbal expressions of exclusion, identity stereotypes construct regimes of tolerance and 
rejection which respectively categorise refugees into those who are to be tolerated and those 
who are unwelcome. They give visibility to the latter and portray them as agents of insecurity, 
political instability and moral/social pollution. Refugees who are the target of negative 
stereotypes are treated as not deserving the refugee status. They thus become an aberration, an 
anomaly or “a discordant cue to be rejected” (Douglas 1994: 37). Stereotypical discourses 
stress refugees’ outsider status by which they do not belong to Kenya and are a threat to the 
order created around the trinity of people, nation and state hence the need to contain them in 
camps until they can repatriate. Order is about belonging and “oneness” however this may be 
defined. Conversely, disorder blights pattern and symbolises danger and the power to harm 
(Douglas 1994). Negative stereotypes construct difference “as that which threatens order and 
control [or that which] is the polar opposite of [the in-group]” (Gilman 1985: 21). However, 
through their own agency, refugee women construct counter stereotypes that depict locals as 
equally polluting and dangerous. Counter stereotypes de-legitimise the local, exclusionary 
macro discourse and legitimise refugee women’s own concerns. 
 
That the GoK does not bundle refugees and take them to camps does not mean indifference to 
their presence in Nairobi. The encampment regime is based on the conviction that refugees 
are not only victims but also agents of insecurity with the capacity to destabilise Kenya as 
implied in terrorists or to pollute or contaminate as implied in génocidaires. Agents of 
insecurity require containment in refugee camps where appropriate social technologies have 
been instituted to neutralise the threat they pose (see also Shamir 2005). In this regard, camps 
become “rituals of segregation” (Douglas 1994: 97) where outcasts of the nation-state need to 
be confined until repatriation which symbolises the ritual of re-entry into normalcy and order. 
The stereotypical discourse by local populations, politicians and the media is a verbal form of 
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rejection or a subtle form of sanctions and control which is reinforced by flagrant, punitive 
sanctions and coercion in the form of police raids, interrogation, arbitrary arrests, targeted 
rape and refoulement. These are strategies of exclusion of those considered undesirable 
elements and a reminder of their outsider status by which they cannot claim entitlement to 
space in Nairobi and are therefore expected to reside in camps. The unpredictability that 
comes with raids, arbitrary arrests, targeted rape and refoulement creates chaos, disorder and 
uncertainty and therein lies the efficacy of sanctions as forms of social technologies that 
function as deterrents to integration and rooting. The use of subtle and punitive sanctions 
portrays refugee hosting as a privilege whose enjoyment comes with compliance with the 
encampment regulation by which refugees are expected to reside in areas specifically 
designed to contain them until repatriation. 
 
Refugees who defy the encampment regulation are “matter out of place” (Malkki 1995b) in a 
double sense. They are outside “the national order of things” (Malkki 1995b) – a state of 
existence which strains the trinity of people, nation and state – and also outside the camps 
created as places where refugees wait until they can re-enter the nation-state system of 
organising, managing and ordering populations. One can argue that location of the camps in 
marginal regions of Kenya symbolises the outcast status and marginality of refugees who 
exist betwixt and between. Because they are neither within nor without the nation-state, they 
are in a transitional state which is dangerous because it is neither one state nor the other and is 
therefore “undefinable” (Douglas 1994: 97). Representation of refugees as “matter out of 
place” means that refugees have “crossed some line which should not have been crossed” 
(Douglas 1994: 114).  
 
This becomes the derivative source of displacement’s potentially polluting and dangerous 
characteristics as implied in génocidaires and terrorists. The official refugee regime is 
therefore not a tightly knit system but has space within which locals, politicians and the media 
resort to politics to legitimate their perception of and attitude towards refugees in Nairobi and 
the concerns manifest in this attitude. Similarly, when refugee women come up with counter 
stereotypes, they are demonstrating the agency or capacity to engage locals in this political 
field as opposed to the humanitarian and apolitical field expounded in the official discourse 
on refugee hosting. When they choose to live in national or ethnic enclaves, they are still 
demonstrating the agency to engage in the same politics through physical and social 
disengagement by which they portray isolation as a chosen state of existence aimed at self-
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protection from physical harm, cultural corruption and moral or religious pollution. As actors, 
refugee women are “not unaware of the meanings and values associated with the 
organi[s]ation of space, and they are also in a position to choose how to invoke and reinterpret 
those meanings through their actions” (Henrietta Moore 1996: 85). In this respect, physical 
space acquires communicative characteristics by which it contains a semiotic component 
(Henrietta Moore 1996). Physical space in the form of refugee national or ethnic enclaves 
reflects social categories or classification and marks social boundaries and distinction 
between locals and refugee communities such as the Somalis.  
 
The refugee regime that plays out in Nairobi creates space in which the refugee status is 
contested as indicated by labels such as terrorists and génocidaires. Relations between locals 
and refugees are shaped by perception of refugee hosting as a favour to be bestowed at locals’ 
discretion on those perceived as deserving and withdrawn or grudgingly granted to those 
whose political backgrounds and identities do not augur well with granting of favours. The 
cases of Somali and Hutu Rwandan refugee women demonstrate this and the agency of locals 
in transforming the refugee status from a right into a privilege. This feeds into mutual 
stereotypes that not only show locals and refugee women’s agency but are also inimical to 
integration. Locals relate to refugees in terms of physical appearance, nationality, ethnicity, 
religious affiliation and regional politics consideration of which is denounced in the theory of 
refugee hosting as discriminatory. In doing so, locals demonstrate the agency to assign a 
context-specific meaning to the term refugee – a meaning which serves their own interests, 
deviates from the official definition and whose dynamics create discrepancies between the 
theory of humanitarianism (refugee law) and practice (see Sally Falk Moore 2000).  
 
Different refugee communities have divergent experiences of what Stein (1981) theorises as 
“the refugee experience.” Refugee women’s experiences are as diverse as the heterogeneities 
that characterise the refugee population in Nairobi. In this regard, this study concurs with 
Malkki’s (1997: 224) critique of what she refers to as “dehistorici[s]ing universalism” which 
depoliticises the refugee category by depicting it as “an ahistorical, universal humanitarian 
subject.” Refugee women’s differential experiences are an outcome of their respective 
political histories that overlap with the refugee regime in Nairobi which treats refugees’ self-
settlement in the city as encroachment onto citizens’ space. The encampment regime which 
homogenises refugees in camps by segregating them from locals and creating uniformity in 
order to facilitate control and order manifests itself in Nairobi in the form of identity 
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stereotypes that serve a purpose similar to encampment – exclusion. The chapter portrays the 
link between integration and identity politics as well as the disjunction between the theory and 
practice of refugee hosting. Overall, the reality of refugee hosting in Nairobi illustrates the 
challenges Kenya faces in balancing its legitimate national security concerns with refugee 
hosting and protection. Politicisation of refugee hosting raises the issue of legal protection of 
refugee women. The following chapter accordingly examines the interplay between legal 
protection and the process of integration. 
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Chapter Three 
Legal Protection and Implications for Integration 
 
3.0. Introduction 
Having lost the protection of their own governments, refugees are potential victims of further 
abuse and aggression in the asylum country. In recognition of this situation for refugees, the 
1951 Geneva Convention and its 1967 Protocol as well as the regional 1969 AU Convention 
among other international refugee legal instruments were designed. For self-settled refugee 
women in particular, exposure to physical and sexual abuse is acute thus warranting the need 
for protection. Kenya became a party to the Geneva Convention on 16 May 1966, the 1967 
Protocol on 30 November 198167 and the regional AU Convention on 23 June 199268. This 
chapter analyses the extent to which the UNHCR and the GoK protect refugee women. In 
doing so, it draws attention to relations of power that characterise the UNHCR-refugee and 
the GoK-refugee interfaces. Interface refers to a “critical point[…] of intersection between 
different social fields, domains or lifeworlds, where social discontinuities based upon 
differences in values, social interests and power are found” (Long 2001: 177). The chapter 
argues that even though officials within the UNHCR and the GoK exercise power over 
refugee women, the latter are not docile or passive victims. The interfaces between refugee 
women and institutions are characterised by agency on both sides of the institutional divide. 
In the same way that agency characterises individual officers’ interpretation of their duties in 
the encounter, refugee women are endowed with agency that enables them to circumvent the 
legal barriers they encounter and outmanoeuvre the same officials. The chapter also examines 
the provisions of Kenya’s domestic refugee law namely the Refugee Act passed in 2006 in 
relation to self-settled refugee women’s needs in Nairobi.  
 
3.1. UNHCR and Local Integration in Nairobi 
The majority of refugees in Nairobi are in a protracted situation by which they have spent 
more than five years in exile. The UNHCR has the task of “promoting international 
instruments for the protection of refugees, and supervising their application.” 69  As the 
                                                 
67 Dates according to the UNHCR document “States Parties to the 1951Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the 1967 Protocol” October 2008.  
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/protect/opendoc.pdf?tbl=PROTECTION& (accessed 01.11.08). 
68 Date according to  the African Union  
http://www.africa-union.org/root/AU/Documents/Treaties/List/Convention on Refugees.pdf (accessed 01.11.08). 
69 Introductory Note by the Office of the UNHCR to the Geneva Refugee Convention pg 7; Geneva, March 
1996. See also the UNHCR Statute for a detailed outline of the functions of the UNHCR. 
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watchdog for refugees’ rights, the UNHCR mandate directly entails a responsibility to 
provide protection to refugees and promote their best interest as provided for by the 
internationally recognised Geneva Convention. The refugee women in Nairobi are in a 
protracted situation for which the UNHCR advocates local integration. 70  The UNHCR 
mandate is to protect the women from the moment they avail themselves for protection up to 
the time when they can either voluntarily repatriate, be resettled in a third country in the case 
of a few or when they naturalise in the country of first asylum which is the ultimate goal of 
local integration even though integration can take place without naturalisation (Kibreab 1989, 
see also Harrell-Bond 1986).  
 
The main objective of the Geneva and AU Conventions is to provide guidelines on humane 
treatment of refugees, uphold their rights and enable them to continue with their lives in 
dignity even after the disruption caused by flight. As an aspect of refugees’ lifeworlds, 
protection is treated as a legal concept which translates into the extent to which “pertinent 
authorities comply with the entitlements of individuals under international law, and the 
manner in which these legal precepts are implemented and respected” (Helton 2003: 20). 
Protection in this study accordingly encompasses enjoyment of refugee rights and physical 
security. While the UNHCR encourages refugees to stay in camps in conformity to the GoK’s 
encampment regulation, it states as one of its roles in Nairobi identifying and protecting 
refugees in urban areas.71 Thus, the choice to live outside the camps does not detract from 
self-settled urban refugees’ right to UNHCR protection. Kenya’s largely laissez faire attitude 
towards refugee affairs has left the UNHCR playing a vital role in refugee issues such that the 
UNHCR features in refugee discourses more than the GoK. This state of affairs explains the 
prominence of the UNHCR in this chapter.  
 
The UNHCR plays a key role in promoting the three durable solutions to the plight of 
refugees in consultation with host governments. Local integration is a political, economic, 
social and cultural process which also encompasses a legal dimension by which refugees 
exercise rights that enable them to establish livelihoods and enjoy protection in the country of 
asylum. To what extent has the UNHCR lobbied the GoK to facilitate protection of self-
settled urban refugee women who can neither repatriate nor find a lasting solution in 
                                                 
70 Section 8 (c) of the UNHCR Statute advocates assimilation of refugees in the first country of asylum. The 
term assimilation as it appears in UNHCR documents is increasingly interpreted to mean integration. 
71  UNHCR roles as provided on http://www.unrefugees.org/archives.cfm?ID=117&cat=Archives (accessed 
11.11.07) 
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resettlement in a third country? Currently, the UNHCR does not have assistance and 
integration policies that are specifically formulated to assist refugees self-settled in Nairobi.72 
The UNHCR justifies the absence of such policies by citing the GoK regulation that all 
refugees reside in refugee camps. The UNHCR prioritises diplomacy and maintenance of 
good relations with the GoK by which local integration which the UNHCR recommends as a 
lasting solution for millions of refugees mostly in the poor parts of the world can only take 
place with the consent of the host country.  
 
Contradiction can be noted between the UNHCR argument that refugees should relocate to 
the camps in order to be assisted and the GoK’s laissez faire attitude towards refugees self-
settled in Nairobi. Firstly, the GoK is aware of the presence of refugees in Nairobi and 
throughout the period of fieldwork, refugees were not forcibly taken to the camps. In fact, the 
Head of the DRA stated that “the government’s position on refugees in Nairobi is that we help 
them register as refugees; we provide exit visas to third countries and we give [them] Class M 
permits which allow them to do business. We do documentation to facilitate their living in 
Nairobi.” This is in addition to assistance with appeals at the UNHCR and issuing of 
identification cards and movement passes called Conventional Travel Documents (CTDs).73 
Why would the GoK take UNHCR assistance to urban refugees as disrespectful when it is 
aware of refugees’ presence in Nairobi and indeed, plays a part in facilitating their stay in the 
city? Secondly, UNHCR insistence that those who need assistance relocate to the camps in 
conformity with government regulations contradicts its stated mandate to identify and protect 
refugees in urban areas.  
 
                                                 
72 Personal interview with the CSO, Nairobi, 19.02.07. 
73 Personal interview with the Head of the DRA, Nairobi, 26.02.07. One of the main administrative problems is 
that the UNHCR and the GoK provide contradictory information which makes it difficult to understand who 
does exactly what in the administration of refugee affairs and how exactly these affairs are administered. The 
Head of the DRA stated that refugees are issued with Class M permits that enable them to work in Kenya and 
engage in business and that these permits are free of charge. However, Class M permits are only for purposes of 
immigration and do not function as work permits (see Kenya’s Immigration Act, CAP. 172 25 of 1967, 6 of 
1972). The CSO stated that refugees have problems obtaining licenses to run businesses in Nairobi and that the 
best way for them to get around the hurdle is to get into partnerships with locals. Both the UNHCR and the 
refugees stated that refugees have to pay for work permits in Kenya in contrast to the Head of the DRA’s 
assertion that work permits are free of charge thus pointing to confusion of entry and work permits. According to 
the Head of the DRA, the DRA also registers and gives identity cards to “deserving refugees” and at the same 
time helps refugees with their appeals at the UNHCR when they are denied the refugee status. The DRA helps 
refugees appeal to the UNHCR yet it can issue the very documents refugees need in order to stay in Nairobi and 
avoid or at least reduce incidence of police harassment. This means that the government and the UNHCR run 
parallel programmes of providing identity documents to refugees; such a state of affairs amounts to duplication 
of tasks and gives the impression that there is lack of a coherent, coordinated and comprehensible policy on 
refugee affairs in Kenya. Alternatively, what exists in theory is not translated into practice resulting in a 
confusing state of affairs particularly in view of the GoK’s withdrawal from refugee affairs. 
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3.1.1. Refugee Women and the Status Determination Process 
Since 1991, the GoK has practically relinquished its responsibilities on matters relating to 
refugees to the UNHCR and its partner organisations (Verdirame 1999; Human Rights Watch 
2002; Juma and Kagwanja 2003; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005; Wagacha and Guiney 
2008). Refugee status determination is the prerogative of State Parties or signatories to the 
Geneva and the AU Conventions74 but in Kenya, the UNHCR has had to take over that task 
since government withdrawal from active participation in refugee affairs. It is the UNHCR 
that now determines what constitutes “events seriously disturbing public order” (AU 
Convention, Article 1.2), experiences that constitute persecution and entitle asylum seekers to 
the refugee status and “stories” that are credible and true and those that should be dismissed 
as fabrication. This is in addition to the other non-traditional roles that the refugee agency has 
had to assume over the years which include providing humanitarian assistance and monitoring 
human rights violations in refugees’ countries of nationality with the hope to avoid further 
outflows of refugees (Loescher 2003). Such monitoring also has the objective to establish 
whether the situation in the country of origin is safe for refugees to repatriate.  
 
Legitimacy of claim to the refugee status is not as axiomatic as it is normally portrayed in 
media coverage that captures people in mass exodus from their countries of nationality and 
readily label them refugees as witnessed during the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The refugee 
status for populations fleeing persecution, war or events “seriously disturbing public order” is 
preceded by the status determination process at the UNHCR Branch Office in Westlands, 
Nairobi.75 The process involves two basic stages: i) ascertaining the relevant facts of the case, 
and ii) application of the Geneva Convention, the 1967 Protocol (and the AU Convention) to 
the facts that have been ascertained.76 The latter includes outlining the grounds upon which 
one can be granted the status and the process of establishing these grounds (Forbes Martin 
2004). Upon arrival in Kenya, refugees head for the camps, reception centres or to Nairobi. 
The CSO outlined the process of status determination as commencing with asylum seekers 
taking the first step namely registration with the UNHCR in Nairobi. After registration, the 
asylum seekers are given appointment dates on which they are supposed to visit the same 
                                                 
74  Throughout its text, the Geneva Convention addresses Contracting States thus implicitly showing their 
responsibility to implement provisions of the Convention. On its part, the AU Convention explicitly states that 
the Contracting State of Asylum shall determine whether an applicant is a refugee (AU Convention, Article1.6). 
75 The UNHCR has a Regional Administrative Office in Gigiri, Nairobi and a Branch Office in Westlands, 
Nairobi. Unless otherwise specified, mention of the UNHCR in this study in the context of Kenya refers to the 
Branch Office in Westlands which directly deal with refugees in Kenya. 
76 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Re-edited, Geneva, January 1992, UNHCR 1979. 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e1364.pdf (accessed 05.04.08). 
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offices for interviews to determine eligibility for the refugee status. The whole process is 
long-drawn-out such that asylum seekers have to visit UNHCR offices several times because 
of postponement of the status determination interviews. 77  Asylum seekers and refugees’ 
patience does not always pay (Inhetveen 2006). According to Grace, a Rwandan refugee 
woman:  
They [UNHCR officials] keep giving you appointments one after another for two to 
three years until you get tired. The process of assistance is distressing — “go and come 
back” so that if you have many problems it becomes difficult to follow it up. They 
write all the details about you and use the same information to dismiss you. Refugees 
have many problems. 
 
The UNHCR officials do not send letters deferring interviews in advance but only inform 
refugees about the postponement whey they turn up for the interview. Delays and cancellation 
of appointments without prior communication with refugees are characteristic of UNHCR’s 
work with refugees (Human Rights Watch 2002; Inhetveen 2006). As a result, refugees spend 
their hard-earned cash on transport and some give up because they cannot afford the trips or 
find them humiliating and stressful (see also Verdirame 1999). More than half 78  of the 
refugee women interviewed did not have protection documents and those who did recounted 
experiences of perseverance and expressed apprehension with the annual renewal of 
Protection Letters as some of them would be instructed to repatriate instead of being issued 
with renewed protection documents. The issue of protection documents has a gender 
dimension considering refugee women’s explanation that they were denied protection on the 
grounds that they are not combatants or political activists and therefore do not have credible 
reasons to flee their countries.  
 
However, contemporary conflicts particularly in African contexts take their toll on civilians 
the majority of whom are women and children. This is coupled with the use of rape as a 
                                                 
77 Many refugee women who have Protection Letters or Mandate Refugee Certificates (MRCs) recounted how 
they obtained them after a long process of making appointments for the interviews, having them deferred 
innumerable times, having their applications rejected, appealing and having their cases reviewed. There is 
usually an interval of at least two months between the cancelled appointment and the next; in one case the 
appointment letter showed that the interview had been deferred twelve times and the refugee woman concerned 
had spent the whole year waiting to be interviewed. From the interviews and discussions with refugees, it 
emerged that this case was not exceptional. The process can take up to two years (see also Human Rights Watch 
2002; Wagacha and Guiney 2008). 
78 This percentage shows a slight improvement compared 2000 when the RCK noted that 75% of all asylum 
applications were rejected (see also Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). 
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weapon of war with women’s bodies being the battlefields. Conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Rwanda, Sudan and recently the DRC and Somalia are all characterised by deployment of 
rape as a weapon of war thus making women more of victims of the conflicts than male 
combatants who are often the perpetrators of rape. The CSO explained the postponements in 
terms of staff shortage (three Eligibility Officers for tens of thousands of refugees), 
unforeseen events such as meetings, workshops and illness on the part of Eligibility Officers 
and prioritisation of refugees who intend to relocate to the camps over those who live in 
Nairobi. The latter, according to the CSO, want protection documents “for purposes of 
resettlement or just identity.”  
 
Asylum seekers who are denied the refugee status can appeal after fifteen days and if they fail 
for the second time they cannot appeal again; they have to either seek asylum in another 
country or live as “illegal immigrants” in Kenya and face deportation. For all the months that 
they have to wait because of UNHCR delays on the interviews, asylum seekers are treated as 
non-refugees until they are able to produce Mandate Refugee Certificates (MRCs) commonly 
referred to as “Mandates” or Protection Letters authenticating their refugee status. It is during 
the waiting period that refugees who do not have relatives and friends to take them in sleep in 
the open, get arrested and detained without charges and are forced to pay bribes or face 
deportation (see also Human Rights Watch 2002). Lack of secure accommodation is 
particularly dangerous for women as they are exposed to rape and the attendant risks of HIV 
infection, unplanned pregnancies and trauma. Some are forced into unions of convenience 
with both local and refugee men that are equally exploitative and dangerous. Contrary to the 
CSO’s view that urban refugees need documents just for identity or resettlement, “Mandates” 
are the passport to humanitarian assistance; refugees without them cannot access food and 
medical assistance as well as loans for Income Generating Projects (IGPs). Even though the 
GTZ assists refugees without Protection Letters, its assistance is restricted to Somali refugees 
in particular in a country hosting eight refugee nationalities. Protection Letters, though not 
often, reduce incidence of harassment and extortion by Kenyan security personnel.  
 
The lengthy process of acquiring Protection Letters also means that refugees exhaust 
whatever provisions they would have brought along before they find alternative livelihoods in 
Nairobi. This results in loss of opportunity to adjust early to life in exile leading to long 
periods of suffering due to lack of food, access to secure accommodation and inability to 
establish sustainable livelihoods. After spending several months or even years without 
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Protection Letters and concurrently a source of income, refugee women who have gone 
through this experience have lost hope of being able to engage in economic activities and 
rebuild their lives. Castles et al (2005) point out that early experiences tend to shape long-
term experiences meaning that if the early months in exile are characterised by hardships, this 
usually limits chances of improving circumstances at a later stage in exile. Such difficulties 
are salient for refugee women because they are the ones who usually flee with the children 
and the incapacitated or infirm who need to be taken care of or provided for.  
 
The UNHCR Notification of Negative RSO Decision – which is referred to in this study as 
the Rejection Letter in conformity to refugee parlance – lists the criteria to which refugees’ 
narratives are expected to conform. In this chapter, focus is paid to two of the criteria namely 
the “story” lacking conformity to generally known facts about the country of origin and lack 
of credibility. Item 1.3 of the Rejection Letter reads: “Your statements on the material points 
of your claim are not consistent with generally known facts or reports from your country of 
nationality or country of former habitual residence” (emphasis added, RJ).79 Such criteria 
refer to the general in order to validate the particular; they are based on a presumably 
homogeneous refugee narrative and overlook the uniqueness of individual experience. Lack 
of protection documents among most of the refugee women in Nairobi on the basis of their 
“stories” lacking credibility emerged as the main legal concern among the women.  
 
Granting of the refugee status is also based on findings of the UNHCR fact-finding missions 
to refugees’ countries of origin intended to establish whether there are genuine reasons for 
people to remain in exile. 80  The CSO stated that this information is established through 
UNHCR staff’s interaction with ordinary citizens in countries of origin under the guise of 
ordinary visitors. Apart from the “facts” established by the UNHCR missions, the CSO also 
stated that the UNHCR evaluates refugees’ reasons for flight within the framework of “what 
their governments and embassies are saying.” Highly contentious in the process of status 
determination are reasons for flight within the framework of Article 1.A.(2) of the Geneva 
Convention which cites “well-founded fear of being persecuted” and the AU Convention, 
Article 1.2 which mentions “events seriously disturbing public order” as the valid reasons for 
flight. UNHCR staff restricts these reasons to contexts in which overt and armed conflicts are 
                                                 
79 Quotation taken from the standard Rejection Letter. All refugees who are denied the refugee status receive 
such a letter. Refugees who had such letters presented them in order to receive food aid as they waited to appeal 
for reconsideration of their cases. 
80 Personal interview with the CSO, Nairobi, 19.02.07. 
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taking place. The UNHCR therefore recognises refugees from Somalia and Sudan as prima 
facie refugees, that is, it grants them “group determination” in cases of generalised insecurity 
in conformity to the UNHCR Handbook.81  
 
On the other hand, the absence of overt conflict or war does not mean that a country cannot 
produce refugees as persecution also takes place outside war contexts (see Crawley 2001). 
Human rights violations as is the case for opposition politicians, human rights/civil society 
activists and journalists are some of the reasons people flee in the context of peace. Indeed, 
most of the Ethiopian and Ugandan women are refugees because of their husbands’ alleged 
participation in opposition politics as illustrated by Ethiopians accused of supporting the 
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). The women’s husbands disappeared without trace leading to 
the women being threatened or imprisoned and prompting them to flee after release from 
prison. Even where conspicuous violence has ceased, most conflicts in Africa are too complex 
to be followed by restoration of peace, voluntarily repatriation and harmony. There are still 
many refugees from Burundi, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Rwanda (more than a decade after the 
1994 genocide) who are loath to repatriate because of fear of persecution which may be 
concealed from the outside world.82  
 
Even though the UNHCR accordingly advocates granting of protection to asylum seekers who 
are victims of non-state persecutors such as rebels and militias, it often turns away asylum 
seekers from countries where risk of persecution is not overt or well-publicised. For instance, 
most of the refugee women from Rwanda are deemed ineligible for the refugee status 
although many of them narrate cases of persecution by neighbours in the aftermath of the 
genocide and what they term disappearances. For refugee women who do not have male 
relatives to protect their interests, fear of repatriation is compounded by inability to reclaim 
the land and homes they left behind and retributive persecution for alleged participation in the 
genocide. In fact, the more time that has elapsed after the genocide, the more difficult it has 
become for Rwandan refugees to repatriate as the lengthy period they have spent in exile 
                                                 
81 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, Reedited, Geneva, January 1992, UNHCR 1979. 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e1364.pdf (accessed 05.04.08). 
82 It is likely that refugees from the DRC could also be subjected to the same pressure to repatriate following the 
cessation of hostilities and in view of the country’s first democratic election in forty years held in 2006. 
Regardless of the declaration of peace and the election, fighting and displacement continue in the eastern part of 
the country. The peace deal signed between the Congolese government and General Laurent Nkunda, leader of a 
rebel faction, in January 2008 has not brought lasting peace to the country as shown by eruption of fighting and 
displacement of Congolese in the eastern part of the country towards the end of 2008. It is yet to be seen whether 
the arrest of Nkunda on 22 January 2009 will lead to lasting peace in Eastern DRC. 
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leads to accusations of hiding from justice. Women’s participation in the Rwandan genocide 
only aggravates the situation for refugee women who would want to repatriate. In a world 
where illegal immigration is increasingly associated with criminality, refugee women who are 
denied protection have to contend with eking out a living without assistance and avoid 
deportation for being “illegally” in Kenya.  
 
The UNHCR treats refugees from Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda83 as people 
who are reluctant to repatriate to their respective countries because of economic interests in 
Kenya; the CSO cited refugees who run IGPs in Kenya as indisposed to repatriate because of 
economic interests. This view reflects the stereotypical image of refugees as helpless victims 
which treats the refugee status and entrepreneurship as mutually exclusive. Enterprising 
refugees are accordingly stripped of the refugee status and labelled economic migrants. When 
a new civilian government took over in Ethiopia in 2000, the UNHCR invoked for Ethiopian 
refugees who had fled their country before 1991 the “cessation clauses” under Article 1.C.(5) 
of the Geneva Convention by which an individual ceases to be a refugee when the reasons for 
his/her flight cease to exist (see also Article 1.(4) of the AU Convention). The civilian 
government has turned out to be repressive and is generating refugees at a time when 
Ethiopians who fled to Kenya before 2000 are expected to repatriate. 
 
The CSO asserted that providing assistance to refugees deemed unwilling to repatriate would 
only encourage them to stay in Kenya. Harrell-Bond (1986: 18) contends that humanitarian 
assistance programmes are premised on “the fundamental belief that material aid in and of 
itself has the power to move populations” (see also Harrell-Bond 1985). If the presence of aid 
“pulls” people to a specific location, the CSO’s remark conversely illustrates the belief that 
withdrawal of aid “pushes” people out of that particular location (in this case out of Kenya). 
Are food handouts and dependence more attractive for refugees than formal employment and 
self-sufficiency? Would refugees be content with exclusion from formal employment and 
competition with each other and with Kenyans in the informal sector were it safe to repatriate 
to their countries of origin where many left houses, land and family members and enjoyed the 
right to formal wage employment? Reflecting on these questions, one can only echo Harrell-
                                                 
83 Ugandan refugees who participated in this study fled in the 1980s or fled persecution at the hands of the 
current government instead of the war waged by Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
northern Uganda. Most of the 1980s Ugandan refugees are poor and state that repatriating to Uganda is difficult 
for them because they do not know “where to start”. Their continued presence in Kenya has more to do with lack 
of resources that facilitate reintegration in Uganda. This is contrary to the view posited by the CSO that such 
refugees have businesses in Kenya and have become economic migrants. Most of the Ugandan women struggle 
to make ends meet. 
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Bond’s (1986: 20) observation that “the assumption that refugees are in some sense created by 
the bounty of aid programmes proves to be an illusion.” The UNHCR instructs refugee 
women who fled after disappearances of their husbands and their own subsequent harassment, 
imprisonment and still fear further persecution to “go home” (repatriate).  
 
This is the source of conflicting reference points between refugees on the one hand and the 
UNHCR and aid organisations on the other hand. While UNHCR staff bases its decisions on 
status determination on its experience in dealing with refugee issues, refugee women base 
their contestation of unfavourable decisions on their own individual, lived experiences which 
do not always conform to the notion of the refugee experience. At the root of this clash of 
experiences and refugee women’s struggle for the refugee status can be located two 
problematic questions: Who is in a better position to define experiences that entitle one to 
seek refuge? What kind of experience justifies flight or reluctance to repatriate? The idea of 
granting the refugee status on the basis of credibility of the individual’s narrative is 
particularly problematic. For instance, some refugee women believe that they were denied the 
refugee status because they failed to answer probing questions on experiences they were not 
ready to discuss at the time of the interviews (see also Crawley 2001). On the other hand, 
what the UNHCR staff considers as the true refugee experience is, in some cases, nothing 
more than skilfully concocted stories.84 On the basis of UNHCR staff’s perceived inability to 
grasp refugees’ experiences, Tania challenged the UNHCR criteria for granting the refugee 
status thus:  
They [UNHCR officials] talk about credibility but some people went through unique 
experiences which they say are illegal. Some experiences are unbelievable. But the 
UNHCR does not understand because they never went through the same experience. I 
wish a person who went through the same experience could be a lawyer and represent 
the other refugees. If you haven’t been in a war situation you can’t understand the 
experience.  
 
The UNHCR finds itself having to play contradictory roles of determining the refugee status 
and at the same time having to protect the refugees in a setting similar to that of the 
                                                 
84 On one of the home visits, two Ugandan women who were granted refugee status and have MRCs that enable 
them to receive food and medical assistance from the JRS confided that they in fact ran away from domestic 
violence but invented credible stories about their “experiences” in the northern Uganda war. The women are 
staying in Kenya legally not on the basis of UNHCR’s recognition of domestic violence as a valid reason for 
granting the refugee status but as presumed survivors of war. 
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prosecutor being the defence lawyer for the accused (see also Verdirame 1999). Thus, for the 
UNHCR, the task is on the delicate balancing of granting protection on the one hand and 
determining who is and is not entitled to that protection on the other hand. It is no surprise 
therefore that the UNHCR’s work is characterised by inconsistencies that spur refugees’ 
accusations of indifference to their plight and perception of the refugee agency as playing 
politics. The UNHCR’s failure to promote refugees’ rights in Kenya is attributable to 
UNHCR staff inefficiency, staff shortage and a shrinking budget. This is coupled with 
Kenya’s withdrawal from administration of refugee affairs. 
 
The UNHCR’s discharge of its mandate in Nairobi needs to be contextualised within the 
refugee regime operational in Kenya which revolves around the view that refugees are “matter 
out of place” (Malkki 1995b) or the “by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of 
matter [the nation-state in this case]” (Douglas 1994: 36). As such, refugees are a temporary 
phenomenon that needs to be contained in the refugee camps until repatriation which, in terms 
of restoration of order, symbolically means rejection of matter out of place or tiding up of 
“inappropriate elements” (Douglas 1994: 36). The CSO’s view that refugees who are in 
Nairobi do not seriously need protection documents unlike their encamped counterparts 
suggests that refugeeness comes in degrees with encamped refugees being more of refugees 
than those self-settled in Nairobi (see also Malkki 1997). The latter are not only in defiance of 
the idea of separating matter that belongs without from that which belongs within; their 
residence among locals also makes it difficult to track, identify and control them for the 
UNHCR and GoK’s repatriation agenda. Borrowing from Douglas’ (1994) terminology, their 
self-settlement complicates the task of tiding up and restoring “cleanliness” and order through 
repatriation or placing of people back where they belong – the nation-state. Denial of 
documents to self-settled refugees or delaying to process their cases is a disincentive for 
settlement outside camps or a mechanism of channelling refugees to the camps since it is only 
those intending to relocate to the camps whose cases are prioritised. As a counter strategy, 
refugees present themselves as intending to relocate to the camps and do not follow through 
this after obtaining the required documents. 
 
Taken together with the policy of directing all humanitarian assistance to refugee camps, the 
issue of documents for self-settled refugees illustrates a deliberate strategy designed to 
determine and demarcate space for refugees in Kenya. Demarcation of physical space is 
important for the efficacy of social technologies as the boundaries created between locals and 
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refugees hamper integration thus achieving the goal of creating conditions ideal for waiting as 
opposed to rooting. The notions of separation, demarcation and punishment of transgression 
aim to impose system and order “on an inherently untidy experience” (Douglas 1994: 4). In 
this framework, delaying processing of documents or denying self-settled refugees the 
documents altogether is part of sanctions that are a necessary part of social technologies 
designed to contain refugees in designated areas. Subtle sanctions or disincentives for self-
settlement seek to enforce compliance with the encampment regime without eliciting outrage 
in human rights circles were conspicuous and vicious methods such as flagrantly bundling 
and dumping refugees in the camps to be employed.  
 
The refugee regime also functions through prioritisation of country of origin government 
rhetoric over refugees’ narratives. This reduces the power that refugees have over their 
situation as they find themselves between two institutions that wield power that transcends 
their narratives and determines their situation. There is a congruence of interest between 
country of origin governments on the one hand and the UNHCR and GoK on the other hand 
albeit for different reasons. When country of origin governments communicate to UNHCR 
fact-finding missions the information that there is no more reason for people to remain in 
exile, they are lending credence to the UNHCR and GoK’s argument that repatriation is the 
most desirable solution. While repatriation boosts country of origin governments’ political 
legitimacy, it relieves the UNHCR of the burden of protecting refugees at a time when its 
funding has dwindled and the GoK of the burden of hosting refugees when it sees them as a 
liability rather than a resource and has neither the capacity nor the intention to integrate them 
into Kenya.  
 
It is in the context of social technologies of control and containment of refugees that those 
who resist repatriation are reconstructed as economic migrants thus portraying refugees 
residing in the camps as “genuine” and those self-settled in Nairobi as economic migrants 
abusing the asylum system. Such a distinction is sustained by entrenchment of a humanitarian 
discourse that “pathologises” encamped refugees as dependent on humanitarian aid and de-
legitimises those with the agency to take their fate into their own hands and reside in Nairobi 
in search of opportunities for self-reliance and self-determination. Depiction of self-settled 
refugees as economic migrants spurs the perception by locals that they are economically well-
off. In line with this view, the refugees are in Nairobi not in quest of economic opportunities 
but because they have the resources to sustain themselves in such an urban context as opposed 
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to the camps to which humanitarian aid is directed. This exposes urban refugees to demands 
for bribery by humanitarian staff and police officers. The following sections on the interfaces 
between refugee women and the UNHCR on the one hand and refugee women and Kenyan 
authorities on the other hand need to be situated and understood within this framework which 
casts self-settled refugees as less of refugees than those in camps if not spurious and 
economically stable. 
 
3.1.2. Treading the Fine Line between the Humanitarian and the Political 
In this section, the interaction between refugee women and the UNHCR is referred to as an 
interface because it is characterised by an intersection of different and often conflicting 
lifeworlds or “multiple voices and contested realities” (Long 2001: 50). Interface involves 
transformation and assignment of new social meanings which would not have been 
anticipated in the original plan or policy (Long 1993). The UNHCR operates within a refugee 
regime that is intertwined with regimes of power, knowledge and truth. According to Foucault 
(1980: 112), the problem of these regimes is “the politics of the scientific statement” or the 
involvement of power in the production of knowledge and truth.  
 
Despite the humanitarian label, the interface between refugee women and the UNHCR is 
steeped in politics (see also Harrell-Bond 1986; Malkki 1997). The UNHCR has “its general 
politics” of truth or a type of refugee idiom that it accepts as the truth in conjunction with 
mechanisms it uses to distinguish between true and false refugee narratives. It has in its 
criteria for status determination “techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition 
of truth [in relation to] the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true” 
(Foucault 1980: 131). The truth in this respect is not what the refugee women narrate per se 
but those narratives that fit into “a system of ordered procedures for production, regulation, 
distribution, circulation and operation of statements” (Foucault 1980: 133). The true or 
genuine narrative is one that conforms to UNHCR fact-finding missions and the country of 
origin government and its embassy rhetoric while the atypical narrative is dismissed as 
spurious. Thus, when governments in Rwanda, Ethiopia and Eritrea for example, state that 
peace has been restored, individuals from these countries who lay claim to the refugee status 
are dismissed for telling stories that “lack credibility”. 
 
Refugees are generated by political crises and interpret their quest for the refugee status in 
political terms. In contrast, international refugee law declares that the refugee phenomenon, 
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despite its emanating from political crises, is a problem of a social and humanitarian nature 
(UNHCR Statute, Chapter 1.2; Geneva Convention Preamble, 1951) and that solving the 
problem needs a humanitarian approach (AU Convention Preamble, 1969). In doing so, it 
systematically disqualifies “refugees’ own inescapably political and historical assessments of 
their predicaments and their futures […]” (Malkki 1997: 225). This implies that the 
humanitarian is intrinsically apolitical and if not, there is a possibility of filtering out the 
political from the humanitarian and social. Humanitarian interventions premised on this 
perception accordingly “leach out the histories and the politics of specific refugee 
circumstances” (Malkki 1997: 224). Nevertheless, contradictions can be observed in that 
while the UNHCR champions apolitical discourses of humanitarianism and expects refugees 
to desist from political discourses, it makes reference to countries of origin’s political idioms 
and simultaneously dissuades refugees from engaging in the same discourses. Where refugee 
discourses challenge the UNHCR’s profession of knowledge and possession of the truth on 
situations obtaining in refugees’ countries of nationality, the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organisations dismiss them as political (Inhetveen 2006) and endeavour to de-politicise and 
de-historicise the refugee category (Malkki 1995a; 1997). This leads to contestation between 
the UNHCR and refugee women. 
 
The process of status determination in Nairobi raises questions on knowledge creation. 
According to Foucault (1980: 131), “truth isn’t outside power or lacking power.” As an 
institution endowed with the power to determine narratives that constitute the truth, the 
UNHCR systematically uses its history of humanitarianism to create a specific knowledge 
regime to which refugees’ narratives are expected to conform if they are to be considered 
authentic. Refugee women contest the standardised UNHCR version of the truth by arguing 
that they are in a better position than the UNHCR to determine whether the country of 
nationality is safe for repatriation. The UNHCR assumes that refugees “suffer the loss of all 
contact to the lifeworlds they fled” as if “the place left behind were no longer peopled” 
(Malkki 1995b: 515) and that it has a monopoly of knowledge. Refugees keenly follow news 
on their countries of origin through the local and global media in addition to relying on 
clandestine communication with those they left in their countries for updates on the 
prevailing situation (see also Sommers 2001).85 Interestingly, those who run successful IGPs 
                                                 
85 In my various discussions and conversations with refugee women from Sudan, Rwanda and Burundi, the 
women articulated the nature of the crises and causes of war in their countries. They gave analytical details of 
the complex issues at stake in these conflicts, and debated and discussed the prevailing political situations in 
their countries of origin. Most of the women are well-versed with national, regional and, to some extent, global 
politics; they articulate their views and standpoints and lament their lack of political power to change the 
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in Nairobi and are presumed to be unwilling to repatriate are even more involved in 
monitoring the situation in their countries of origin and maintain contact with people they left 
behind.  
 
Granting of the refugee status is an outcome of power relations at play in the interpretation of 
refugee narratives and assessment of country of origin situations. Operating within the 
framework of a presumably apolitical mandate, the UNHCR professes conformity to the 
positivist tradition which separates law from politics (Chimni 1998) and claims that its status 
determination criteria are objective. The positivist tradition “views international law as an 
abstract system of rules which can be identified, objectively interpreted and enforced with the 
domain outside the system of rules being designated as politics” (Chimni 1998: 352). In 
pursuit of the “objective” criteria of status determination, refugees whose experiences are 
anomalous vis-à-vis predetermined homogenising criteria of what constitutes the true refugee 
story are excluded. On the other hand, the application of international refugee law is 
mediated by the individuality and agency of those involved in its interpretation thus casting 
the separation of law and politics as only theoretical. The application of rules cannot be 
divorced from politics and social reality which is “a peculiar mix of action congruent with 
rules […] and other action that is choice making, discretionary, manipulative, sometimes 
inconsistent, and sometimes conflictual” (Sally Falk Moore 2000: 3). 
 
The situation obtaining in the UNHCR-refugee women interface cannot be understood in 
terms of a law/politics binary. Rather, politics takes place within the process of enforcing the 
law (see Sally Falk Moore 2000). For instance, it is within the framework of law that 
individual staff members grant protection to Hutu Rwandans despite the dominant discourse 
that portrays them as guilty. Conversely, it is also within the same framework that prima facie 
refugees such as Somalis and Sudanese are denied protection. The law as it guides UNHCR 
staff provides space for modification and deviation from organisational or structural norms. 
As Shandy (2007: 53) argues, the “conceptualisation of ‘refugeeness’ as some objective, 
black-and-white state devoid of gr[e]y areas is erroneous.” Similarly, Chimni (2004: 62) 
observes that “objectivism is sustained on the mistaken view that there are facts out there 
waiting to be discovered in order to arrive at a just decision with respect to denial or 
termination of protection.” Harrell-Bond (1986: 17) dismisses the notion that 
                                                                                                                                                        
situation for the better. This is in contrast to the stereotypical image of African refugee women in particular as 
ignorant victims who do not understand the dynamics of conflicts that force them to flee their countries. 
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humanitarianism can be separated from politics as a “myth” that “prevents an examination of 
the effects of local, national, and international politics on refugee policy.” 
 
Despite the grey areas that exist between law and politics, UNHCR staff’s authority is 
underpinned by its operation within a truth-falsehood, knowledge-emotion, and political-
apolitical dichotomy. In the accustomed objective/subjective binary characteristic of the 
interface between the UNHCR and refugee women, the latter are “relegated” to the subjective 
and emotional side of the encounter. While refugees’ exhibition of emotion enables donors to 
“know” the plight of refugees, evokes sympathy and induces donors to give, emotion leads to 
exclusion in the UNHCR-refugee encounter. Within the positivist framework, knowledge is 
created out of a neutral and objective process of testing and proving information as “facts” 
and this practically translates into juxtaposition of refugees’ subjective, involved and 
emotional “anecdotes” with the UNHCR’s predetermined criteria and its fact-finding 
missions. A refugee in this context is “one who conforms to institutional requirements” 
(Zetter 1991: 51) as opposed to one whose “anecdote” is considered atypical or curious. As an 
institution, the UNHCR’s exercise of power “perpetually creates knowledge and, conversely, 
knowledge constantly induces effects of power” (Foucault 1980: 52). For many refugee 
women, these “effects of power” and the exclusion and dismissal of emotions as deceptive in 
status determination and humanitarian assistance translate into what they term rejection. 
Within this milieu, the CSO claimed that assisting refugees encourages them to stay in Kenya. 
It is also within the same framework that Jean-Claude, the Africa Refugee Programme (ARP) 
Chairman, declared: 
[W]e judge according to the experience we have in the field. Emotions and everything 
else will collapse and we take our time to check. I have been working in the field of 
refugees for fifteen years; I don’t work on emotions; I take my time and can tell when 
the other person is lying.86
 
Dismissal of refugee women’s discourses when they ask for assistance as emotional and 
therefore lacking credibility combines with the women’s subordinate position as needy 
foreigners to make the task of authenticating their standpoints monumental. Labels are 
readily attached to subjugated populations on the presumption that they are cheats or 
inarticulate; refugees are no exception to treatment of the subjugated as the “known” rather 
                                                 
86 Personal interview with Jean-Claude, Nairobi, 03.02.07.  
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than the “knower”. The refugee status determination process is contentious because 
knowledge is hierarchical and an outcome of power relations as the UNHCR-refugee women 
interface demonstrates. Refugees are constituted as the “object of knowledge and control” 
(Malkki 1995a: 52; 1997). It is in this context that physical or corporeal evidence to sustain 
claims to the refugee status carries more weight than the verbal account that it silences 
(Malkki 1997). The body or external, visible wounds are considered as providing an 
objective, credible storyline than the verbal narrative expressing internal, invisible wounds.  
 
It is because of the operation of the UNHCR and refugee women on different planes that the 
interface between them is characterised by contestation and resistance on the part of the 
women. Analysis of the status determination process is about how, as Foucault (1980: 118) 
explains, “effects of the truth are produced within discourses which themselves are neither 
true nor false.” The truth is not to be understood as “the ensemble of truths which are to be 
discovered and accepted” but rather “the ensemble of rules according to which the true and 
the false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true” (Foucault 1980: 
132). The truth is not to be found in what the refugee women narrate per se but in a specific 
narrative that conforms to the predetermined criteria for status determination which 
accordingly endows the UNHCR with power to decide on the true, genuine and legitimate.  
 
3.1.3. Dealing with Power: Quest for Legitimacy 
Hutu Rwandan refugee women dominate this section because it is in their narratives that the 
contestation between refugee women and the UNHCR is most pronounced. In chronicling 
refugee women’s responses, the study takes into cognisance two main issues. Firstly, refugee 
women’s manoeuvres, instead of being directed at radically transforming the structure of the 
UNHCR are basically strategies of self-help. According to Scott (1985), resistance yields real 
gains where it avoids confrontation, challenging the symbolic order and overt contestation of 
hierarchy and power. In all the strategies that refugee women resort to, one observes the goal 
to change their situation for the better or, in Scott’s (1985: 350) words, “a spirit and practice 
that prevents the worst and promises something better.” Secondly, refugee women’s 
responses are diverse and there is need to avoid creating a monolithic image of refugee 
women as a socio-legal category or creating what Long (2001: 16) refers to as “reification of 
classificatory schemata.” Refugee women’s responses are an outcome of individual 
consciousness, expectations and goals. Indeed, the relevance of interface here is that it 
explains why different groups or individuals react differently to the same situation (Long 
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1993). It is pertinent to point out that even where refugee women have similar experiences 
with UNHCR staff, they resort to differential courses of action or responses and therein lies 
the relevance of agency to this study.  
 
Despite the constraints encountered in the UNHCR-refugee interface, refugee women are not 
docile bodies (Foucault 1977) but social actors who possess the capacity to “process 
information and strategise” (Long 2001: 13). They create alternative forms of knowledge in 
order to make sense of their situation and find solutions where UNHCR staff members adopt 
a dismissive attitude towards them. Where staff grounds knowledge in the UNHCR’s history 
of humanitarianism and ideology, refugee women deploy their lived experiences as the 
source of knowledge. In making sense of the UNHCR’s stance concerning them, Hutu 
Rwandan women generally perceive conspiracy between the UNHCR and NGOs not to assist 
them. According to Grace:  
One day we were told that we do not have Rwandan refugees. The whole process is 
about disempowering us, even our children. When they notice you are Rwandese and 
need assistance, the organisations close it. People like [name of the NGO woman 
provided] are committing an intellectual genocide [by not assisting with refugee 
education]!  
 
By invoking the concept of genocide which many Hutu Rwandan refugees describe as an 
“ideology” meant to criminalise them in Rwanda and marginalise them elsewhere as, from 
their perspective, when they are denied the refugee status and assistance, Grace demonstrates 
the capacity to appropriate the same political idiom that is used to exclude her to legitimise 
her own concerns. Education which usually falls into the socio-economic sphere of life 
becomes a highly politicised theme in this form of refugee narrative. The perception of 
“intellectual genocide” augurs well with Hutu refugees’ allegation that the Rwandan 
government is eliminating Hutu intellectuals in Rwanda so that they do not articulate and 
champion the Hutu cause as well as challenge the Tutsi-led government (see also Malkki 
1995a; Sommers 2001 on Hutu Burundian refugees in Tanzania). 87 Where this alleged 
                                                 
87 The Hutu Burundian refugees in Tanzania studied by Malkki (1995a) and Sommers (2001) are survivors of a 
less-publicised genocide committed in 1972 by the Tutsi in Burundi. On the other hand, the Hutu Rwandans in 
Kenya fled the globally publicised 1994 Rwandan genocide committed by Hutu extremists on the Tutsi and 
moderate Hutus and its aftermath. The Hutu Burundians in Tanzania are viewed as victims while the Hutu 
Rwandans in Kenya have a contested refugee status and are largely perceived as criminals who participated in 
the genocide and fled Rwanda when the Tutsi-dominated RPF overran the Hutu-dominated government. This 
contentious distinction notwithstanding, the two groups of refugees share a lot in terms of their discourses and 
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physical elimination is impracticable as in cases where the Hutu are in exile, the refugee 
women construe the perceived denial of education as an intellectual form of genocide 
perpetrated by the UNHCR and NGOs in collusion with the Rwandan government. 
 
Accusations of “intellectual genocide” levelled against the UNHCR and NGOs feed into the 
perceived connivance between these organisations and the Rwandan government to achieve 
the latter’s “secret project”. Implicating the Rwandan government in the Hutu Rwandan 
women’s experiences in exile illustrates the deployment of what Malkki (1995a: 55-56) terms 
“mythico-history”, that is, a narrative that “seize[s] historical events, processes, and 
relationships, and reinterpret[s] them within a deeply moral scheme of good and evil.” Thus, 
in the politicised encounter, Hutu women denied assistance and protection impugn the 
UNHCR and NGOs’ work and turn the concept of genocide into a double-edged sword whose 
meaning constantly shifts depending on the context from an ideology of exclusion to a 
resource that exerts moral pressure on the UNHCR which claims to be apolitical and therefore 
impartial. The women’s coining and deployment of the notion of “intellectual genocide” and 
conversion of the “genocide ideology” from a strategy of exclusion to an avenue of possible 
inclusion illustrates their innovativeness and agency. While Hutu women rarely discuss the 
genocide, they ironically validate their refugee status through strategic invocation of the 
genocide and its meaning. In this respect, access to legal protection which is vital for 
integration becomes a battle as the women resort to discourses and actions that politicise a 
supposedly humanitarian encounter. 
 
Hutu Rwandan refugee women in particular criticise the UNHCR for what they consider as 
the agency’s politicisation and entanglement in national politics as well as deference to the 
Rwandan government’s presumed posturing on peace and reconciliation as when the UNHCR 
attempts to “forcibly” repatriate the refugees on the basis of the Rwandan government 
rhetoric. Hutu Rwandan women generally perceive the UNHCR as partial towards the Tutsi 
ethnic group in a chronological conflict characterised by ethnic polarisation. The women refer 
to anecdotal evidence to support their allegation of UNHCR partiality. For instance, Grace 
claimed that her Hutu friend was turned away by the UNHCR but granted protection the 
second time when she returned with the same story but identified herself as Tutsi rather than 
Hutu.  
                                                                                                                                                        
theorisation of ethnic, national and regional politics such that parallels can be drawn between Hutu Burundians 
and Hutu Rwandans particularly in terms of their suspicion towards Tutsi-led governments in their respective 
countries.  
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Hutu women appropriate the Tutsi identity in order to forestall the crisis of legitimacy which 
they experience due to indictment of their ethnicity in the genocide. In playing Tutsi victims 
when they are in fact Hutu, they adopt and present a discourse hostile to the Hutu that is 
officially accepted as the truth in their encounter with the UNHCR and refute the same 
discourse outside this encounter. In this case, the interface between the women and the 
UNHCR is characterised by agency which manifests itself as performance or “the activity of 
an individual which occurs during a period marked by his [/her] continuous presence before a 
particular set of observers and which has some influence on the observers” (Goffman 1959: 
22). Marie, herself a Tutsi married to a Hutu, charged that Hutu Rwandan refugees cannot be 
assisted by the UNHCR because the refugee agency is staffed by Tutsis and that it is only the 
Tutsi who obtain UNHCR scholarships to study in Western countries. Epi asked why the 
UNHCR cannot assist her when it assisted Burundian refugees in Rwanda and provided them 
with scholarships before the Rwandan genocide.  
 
In general, the women ironically use a version of knowledge which is intended against them 
to access protection and assistance and beat the UNHCR at its own perceived “political 
game”. In this respect, “power is not exercised simply as an obligation or a prohibition on 
those who ‘do not have it’; […] it exerts pressure on them, just as they themselves, in their 
struggle against it, resist the grip it has on them” (Foucault 1977: 27). Such resistance entails 
agency or the capacity to convert obstacles into a resource or political capital. While the 
UNHCR considers its fact-finding missions and country of origin governments’ 
pronouncements of peace as reliable sources of information for status determination and 
renewal of Protection Letters, the views prevailing among women from the different 
nationalities were articulated by Tania as follows:  
We did not have our own house and when we built one in 1993 we were so happy. But 
we stayed in our house for only six months, and then the war broke out… We left our 
country, stayed in Burundi and Tanzania and then came to Kenya and they say we are 
not refugees. When they see us here what do they take us for, do they think we are here 
as tourists?  
 
As a pre-condition for repatriation, Tania needs what she termed “real peace not the one they 
[Rwandan government officials] talk about at conferences or to the international community.” 
There are cases of refugee women who repatriated to Rwanda only to return to Kenya because 
of tensions that are still characteristic of Rwanda and disappearances which they explain in 
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terms of abduction of people accused of participating in the genocide. Hutu Rwandan refugee 
women argue that their stay in Kenya is perpetuated by the “genocide ideology” which 
disqualifies them from UNHCR protection for allegedly “commit[ing] a crime against peace, 
a war crime, or a crime against humanity […]” (Article 1.Fa, Geneva Convention; see also 
Article 1.5.a of the AU Convention). While the CSO confirmed that Great Lakes region 
refugees are denied the refugee status and attributed the rejection to claims lacking credibility 
and restoration of peace in the Great Lakes region, most of the women attribute their rejection 
to prejudice emanating from “the genocide ideology” and politics. The UNHCR-Hutu 
Rwandan women interface is therefore characterised by mutual de-legitimation of 
standpoints. 
 
In coming up with alternative forms of knowledge and explanations for their rejection, 
refugee women in general de-legitimise the status determination process and in doing so, 
invalidate knowledge as generated by the UNHCR. The latter is then held culpable for 
inability to access NGO loans, scholarships and material assistance all of which are 
contingent upon possession of Protection Letters proving that the women are indeed refugees. 
While the UNHCR premises its decisions on its fact-finding missions, refugee women’s 
perspectives directly challenge these missions, dismiss them as strategic cajolery and 
construct peace as experiential rather than visual and verbal as illustrated by Tania, “They 
[UNHCR officials] say there is peace in our country but peace is not in the mouth, peace 
comes from the heart. We know what’s going on there and people are disappearing.” A 
similar rebuttal of the UNHCR fact-finding missions came from Jackie, another Rwandan 
woman:  
When I told them [UNHCR officials] I needed asylum, he [Protection Officer] told us 
he cannot give us that asylum because we have no problems in my country; there is no 
insecurity in my country. But you cannot see the insecurity in your eyes; you can only 
see that there is no security when you live there. Security is not in the mouth, it is what 
you experience when you go there [to Rwanda]. 
 
It is important to note how Jackie presents herself as an individual as shown by the pronoun 
“I” and how the Protection Officer presumably addresses her as a group of asylum seekers as 
indicated by “we” and “us” in the quotation. Even though the status determination process is 
conducted with an individual, Jackie’s personal narrative is subsumed under her country thus 
showing how her personal experience is treated on the basis of a homogenising knowledge 
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regime in which the national or regional eclipses the individual and personal. In Sacks’ 
(2000: 573) terminology, Jackie is treated as a “local representative” of absent others; her 
treatment carries a “categorial import” which assumes similarity of circumstances between 
her and those who share her national identity category. Burundian and Rwandan refugees’ 
fear of repatriation has to be contextualised within the geopolitics of the Great Lakes region. 
For instance, in Burundi, Hutu returnees expelled from Tanzania have been attacked on 
several occasions and killed by the Tutsi-dominated armed forces (Crisp 2000). The same 
fate also befell Hutu Rwandan refugees after the genocide when they were hunted down in 
Zaire (DRC) by the Rwandan army (see Umutesi 2004).  
 
The foregoing does not mean that the other nationalities do not encounter similar problems. 
For instance, even though Somali and Sudanese refugees are prima facie, women from these 
two nationalities also cast aspersions on the UNHCR. Despite the group status conferred on 
the basis of the ongoing conflicts in their respective countries, there are some among them 
who do not have Protection Letters because they were rejected. Ethiopian women also 
criticise the UNHCR for overlooking human rights abuse and persecution of political activists 
in their country both of which are the reasons they cannot repatriate. On their part, Sudanese 
refugee women take issue with what they perceive as the UNHCR putting them under 
pressure to repatriate and point out that regardless of the ceasefire, they will not repatriate as 
fast as they fled their country. They consider development of infrastructure, construction of 
hospitals and schools and, above all, stability in southern Sudan as a precondition for 
repatriation.  
 
Similarly, Agfa from Uganda who has successfully integrated into Nairobi indicated that 
Kenya provides a reliable market for her artefacts as it is a tourist destination. She, however, 
was working on plans to repatriate and had already repatriated her children who attend school 
in Uganda. Agfa considers both security and viability of her business in the event of 
repatriation to Uganda. Cases of women such as Agfa whose circumstances straddle the 
perceived refugee/economic migrant binary spur the claim that foreigners running successful 
businesses in Nairobi are not or no longer refugees. What can be argued here is that 
entrepreneurship and quest for security are not mutually exclusive; the women left their 
countries of origin in search of security and that they now run small businesses does not 
detract from their quest for security. Refugees consider repatriation on the basis of their own 
evaluation of the country of nationality situation and its implications for them as individuals. 
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This is illustrated by the reaction to a meeting organised in 2006 by the UNHCR which 
brought together Great Lakes region refugees and staff from their respective countries’ 
embassies in Kenya. Tania who attended the meeting evaluated it as follows:  
The meeting was meant to sensitise refugees about the situations in our countries so 
that we would repatriate. They were trying to tell us that Rwanda is peaceful but there 
is something hidden. They failed to answer our questions on security, missing people, 
why people are still fleeing the country, democracy and why they are asking us to go 
back home when other people are leaving. To force us back home, they cut off 
assistance or refuse to extend Mandates. My protection is not from them but from God. 
If they refuse to help I will simply stay as an illegal immigrant because I am forced to 
do so. 
 
While denial of documents and assistance is a subtle form of sanctions congruent with social 
technologies instituted to promote the encampment-repatriation regime, refugee women 
without the documents describe this as an illegitimate strategy tantamount to denial of their 
rights. Yet, in a rather contradictory kind of logic, when the women fail to obtain protection 
documents and assistance, they trivialise and downplay the implications of living in Nairobi 
without the documents by crediting the supernatural for their protection and welfare as 
indicated in the quotation above. Criticising the visible (UNHCR) by extolling the invisible 
(God) is not only a way of coping with anxiety and uncertainty; it is also a form of retaliation 
against the UNHCR which cannot practically commune with the supernatural for 
confirmation or refutation of the women’s claims as it would with another earthly entity, for 
instance, the GoK. That the women opt to reside in Nairobi rather than yield to pressure and 
either relocate to the camps or repatriate shows that social technologies do not only impact on 
refugee women but are also impacted upon by the refugee women’s agency. 
 
The legal challenges refugee women encounter emanate from the mutual distrust between the 
UNHCR and the refugee women. The women accuse the refugee agency of indifference and 
inability to grasp the reality of their lives. They also criticise the UNHCR for alleged failure 
to apprehend the women’s capacity to interpret the nature of the problems bedevilling their 
countries of nationality as when Jackie traced the Rwandan conflict to the nineteenth century 
and cynically dismissed repatriation because of what she described as “a cycle of war” (see 
also Malkki 1995a; Sommers 2001). Hopeless that this “cycle of war” will ever be broken, 
many refugee women from the Great Lakes region remain vocally opposed to repatriation.  
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Despite the women’s resistance to repatriation, the entrenchment of a refugee regime that is 
premised on a repatriation agenda prevents integration and rooting in Kenya by portraying the 
two as inimical to repatriation. The repatriation agenda is sustained by the UNHCR coaxing 
and/or forcing refugees to repatriate; refugee women in turn deal with the pressure by 
accusing the UNHCR of conniving with country of origin governments whom they blame for 
forcing them to remain refugees in the first place. In this clash of forms of knowledge 
between the UNHCR and refugee women, the latter’s ways of knowing that derail the 
repatriation agenda are decried as subjective yet subjectivity is celebrated where it involves 
refugees’ spontaneous repatriation (Chimni 2004). Cynthia, a Burundian woman, described 
the UNHCR-organised meeting with embassy staff as tantamount to “betrayal”. Faced with 
the pressure to repatriate, many refugee women respond by resolving to remain in Nairobi 
even without documents as illustrated by Tania above. Cynthia remarked, “When I came here 
no one told me to leave for my security. The same way I came is the same way I will go 
back.” Such resistance to repatriation shows the women’s capacity to make decisions 
independent of the UNHCR and even GoK standpoint. The decision to stay reflects the same 
agency that brought the women to Nairobi in defiance of the encampment regulation. 
 
Without legal protection, the majority of refugee women do not believe that UNHCR 
operations in Nairobi conform to the refugee agency’s mandate. Refugee women familiar 
with provisions of the Geneva Convention argue that the problem is not about the Convention 
being limited in its scope and therefore failing to provide adequate protection that could 
facilitate integration but with the UNHCR. Whereas the Rejection Letters handed to those 
who cannot be protected state that the agency is “unable” to protect them, refugee women do 
not see this as a case of inability to protect them but of the refugee agency rejecting them. In 
most of the narratives, refugee women view the UNHCR as anti-refugee rather than the 
guardian of refugees’ rights. Criticism and sometimes vehement aspersions cast on the 
UNHCR for “violation of refugees’ rights” are therefore stronger than those directed towards 
extortionist Kenyan security officers and Kenyan citizens in a clear demonstration of the 
women’s disappointment with the UNHCR. As a way of coping with the perceived unfairness 
which refugee women do not have the power to redress, the supernatural which is 
conceptualised as omnipotent is once again invoked to counter and neutralise UNHCR’s 
power by “punishing” the refugee agency as when Grace, a Pentecostal woman, appealed:  
The UNHCR; let God pay them according to their actions; I don’t have anything to 
add […]. God will not forget how they treat refugees. They don’t treat you like a 
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person; they treat you like merchandise. If there is someone who is really helping 
refugees in UNHCR that person is transferred.  
 
In a similar appeal, Sofie, an Ethiopian woman stated that she prayed everyday and asked 
God to punish the UNHCR for rejecting her. For Grace also, the problem is not with 
individual staff members but institutional as she charged that the UNHCR weeds out those 
who conform to its mandate and conversely, retains staff members who mistreat refugees. 
Referring to the UNHCR logo, Zanie, a Sudanese woman stated that the UNHCR needs to 
remove the human image enclosed within two hands which is an emblem for protection 
because it does not reflect the reality for refugees who exist, in figurative terms, outside the 
enclosed hands on the UNHCR logo. According to Tania: 
The Convention is broken when they reject us. They put rules and they are the first to 
break them. For example, about the [identity] papers and repatriation; they decide your 
fate and do not consult you and do what is in their political interests and you don’t 
know which rules they are following. Their mandate may have limitations but that is 
because of politics. If they take politics as a priority and not human rights then they 
cannot help refugees. They are protecting their interests and they talk about financial 
shortage but if she [the UNHCR official who attended the Human Rights Day 
Commemoration] wants to drive a big car she has to close the door for refugees. Are 
they interested in human rights? That is the question. Sometimes there are so many 
things to do. Am I going to fight for myself and for the rights of my children? 
 
That the UNHCR exercises power does not turn the refugee women into docile and subjected 
bodies in Foucauldian terms. Power is not a zero-sum game in which some wield it and 
others do not; it is relational and “a joint product of the encounter and fusion of horizons” 
(Long 2001: 184). Refugees are not blank slates as they bring with them history (Malkki 
1997; Simon Turner 2006) into their encounter with the UNHCR. As Foucault (1979: 92-97) 
observes, “[W]here there is power there is resistance.” Power does not “constitute an 
obligation or prohibition imposed upon the ‘powerless’, rather it invests them, is transmitted 
by and through them” (Smart 1988: 77). Power is not a property possessed by the dominant 
part in an interface but “a complex strategical situation”; it is a “multiplicity of force 
relations” that are concurrently “intentional” but “non-subjective” (Foucault 1979: 92). The 
UNHCR-refugee women encounter as presented above can be termed a field in Bourdieu’s 
112
(1992) terminology or an arena characterised by struggles and manoeuvres over access to 
specific resources (Jenkins 1992).  
 
3.2. Lack of Protection Documents and Integration 
It is the state of not being recognised as a refugee that complicates the situation of many 
refugee women. Harrell-Bond (2002) observes that it is not possible for refugees to enjoy 
fundamental rights such as freedom of movement and the right to work unless legal obstacles 
are removed. Exclusion from UNHCR protection leaves refugee women who are young and 
unmarried, single mothers and widows particularly vulnerable to sexual exploitation and 
violence. The women are caught up between two different institutions. On the one hand, the 
GoK does not have a policy to assist refugees and if anything, state institutions such as the 
police evoke fear in refugees because they are notorious for harassment, raids, arbitrary 
arrests and bribery (see also Verdirame 1999; Human Rights Watch 2002). On the other hand, 
failure to obtain the refugee status excludes the women from UNHCR and NGO assistance 
which includes secure accommodation provided by UNHCR partner organisations such as 
GOAL.  
 
Physical insecurity among the women is coupled with economic hardships; single refugee 
women related instances in which they had contemplated prostitution or marriages of 
convenience as a survival strategy.88 Women who succumb to manipulation in the hope of 
finding social and economic security are left to care for children born out of exploitative 
sexual relations as single mothers. For example, Emma, a young Congolese woman, was 
forced to drop out of school at the age of nineteen when she became pregnant; the Kenyan 
man who had promised to marry her subsequently disappeared. For women who do not have a 
stable way to sustain themselves, this exposes them to further manipulation, more unplanned 
pregnancies, poverty, HIV/AIDS, stress and depression. The women came to Nairobi in 
search of means of livelihoods and self-sufficiency but most of them find themselves in 
circumstances that perpetuate the very poverty and dependence that forced them out of the 
camps. Higher levels of poverty and perpetual dependence measured against pre-flight socio-
economic circumstances indicate inability to become functioning members within Kenya’s 
economy.  
 
                                                 
88 Prostitution remains stigmatised in many African countries such that even if the women had actually engaged 
in it, they were unlikely to reveal that particularly to an African researcher. 
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Although refugee women with protection documents equally face structural obstacles, this 
problem is more pronounced for women who do not have the documents because they are 
treated as illegal immigrants and barred from accessing institutions such as the judiciary. 
Refugee women are not in a position to enjoy protection of the Kenyan judiciary system as 
they need to possess valid protection documents in order to obtain official recognition. For 
this reason, the women share with their encamped counterparts the same challenge of legal 
exclusion; encamped refugee women rely on traditional systems of settling disputes which 
tend to further violate women’s rights (Verdirame 1999). When the women are subjected to 
sexual harassment, rape, robbery, raids, arbitrary arrests and extortion by both the police and 
locals particularly home owners,89  they fear reporting the cases because, without identity 
documents, this only exposes them to further violation of their rights. Thus, denial of the 
refugee status translates in experiential terms into a series of legal barriers interconnected with 
economic constraints resulting in feelings of exclusion and psycho-social problems even for 
those who have spent several years in Kenya or Nairobi in particular.  
 
Inability to access humanitarian assistance also means that refugee women cannot obtain 
scholarships for their children’s secondary and tertiary education. Many refugee women 
without protection documents express anger with the UNHCR because they see it as directly 
dashing their hope to have their children educated (see also Sommers 2001). Formal 
education for the women and their children is an indicator of integration bridging the gap 
between the pre-war/flight and post-flight periods as well as the cleavages between refugee 
and local children through interaction in school. The importance of education cuts across 
nationality; the women generally echoed Therie, a Sudanese refugee woman’s observation 
that “the only good thing is that my daughter can now go to school and we are no longer on 
the run.” In cases where refugee children are unable to access secondary and tertiary 
education, the women attribute this to exclusion from gainful employment which would 
enable them to pay tuition fees thus demonstrating the connection between economic 
resources and access to services. Many refugee women state that the only form of assistance 
they need from the UNHCR is education particularly for their children. As Sommers (2001) 
observes, refugees interpret the lack of assistance on the education issue as an indicator of 
UNHCR’s lack of commitment to refugees. 
                                                 
89 House owners sometimes mistreat refugee tenants by monitoring their visitors and objecting to them without 
giving reasons. Sometimes refugees are told that these visitors have to leave before 9pm. When refugees decide 
to move out because they cannot comply with some of these rules, house owners often sit on the refundable 
deposit for one contrived reason or another. Many refugees opt to leave without the refund instead of reporting to 
the police even if they have a lease for fear of further harassment. 
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Denial of the refugee status portrays refugees as spurious which inflames xenophobia and 
perception of those who are not repatriating as either criminals and fugitives or economic 
migrants who are manipulating the refugee apparatus for economic ends. The argument that 
the distinction between refugees and economic migrants is artificial because of the nexus 
between failed economies and weak states, human rights abuse and political instability has 
gained prominence (see Kuhlman 1994; Castles 2003; Shandy 2007; Holtzman 2008). This 
argument, valid as it is, largely reflects the aspirations of refugees resettled in developed third 
countries and is difficult to sustain among refugees who are in poor asylum countries where 
their circumstances are even worse than they were prior to flight. For many refugee women in 
Nairobi particularly professional women who find themselves out of formal employment, 
flight marks “transition from relative security and prosperity to uncertainty and poverty” 
(Hansen 1981: 191). Exile for these women is synonymous with the term problems which 
they invoke to summarise their present socio-economic circumstances.  
 
The UNHCR’s emphasis on repatriation plays a pivotal role in sustaining and perpetuating the 
encampment regime which is based on the hypothesis that integrated refugees will not 
voluntarily repatriate. This is a cause for concern for Kenya which would not be able to 
sustain hundreds of thousands of additional people. Harrell-Bond (2002) argues that it is 
encamped refugees that are less likely to repatriate because of the tendency for them to be 
impoverished over time; repatriation requires resources for successful reintegration in the 
country of origin (see also Kuhlman 1994). Even in cases where refugees have become 
integrated to the extent that there are more indicators of permanence than those of 
temporariness, refugees retain the hope to repatriate (Zetter 1991). Refugee women indicated 
quest for conditions that enable them to lead “normal” lives for all the years they have to 
remain in exile rather than permanence. For them, this is to be superseded by voluntary 
repatriation when it becomes safe to repatriate.  
 
While the ultimate goal of local integration is naturalisation (Kibreab 1989), 98% of the 
women interviewed expressed the wish to repatriate provided security is restored.90 Harrell-
Bond (1986) contends that rumours of security are enough for people to attempt to repatriate. 
Intention alone is not enough to disprove the hypothesis that integrated refugees will not 
repatriate. However, there are empirical cases of refugees repatriating even after decades in 
                                                 
90 Those who do not wish to repatriate (2% of the women) cite the impact the conflicts have had on their lives. 
They believe that they cannot lead normal lives in their countries after what they witnessed and endured. Most of 
these refugees see the solution in resettlement in a third country. 
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exile once they feel safe to do so as shown by Mozambicans who repatriated in the mid-1990s 
after a protracted civil war and the 1959 Tutsi Rwandan refugees who repatriated after the 
1994 genocide (Veney 2005). Hovil (2006) makes a similar observation on Sudanese refugees 
settled in Uganda.91 Even resettled refugees who are often cited as illustrating the artificiality 
of the distinction between security concerns and economics express the wish to repatriate 
provided that peace is restored (see Shandy 2007; Holtzman 2008). The issue of who 
repatriates and who does not is more complex than the simplistic view that those who are 
integrated will not repatriate. More than economic considerations, the decision to repatriate 
involves consideration of a complex web of refugees’ socio-political conceptualisation of 
reasons for flight, interpretation of exile and definition of peace and security (see Malkki 
1995a). Repatriation is closely connected to refugees’ reasons for flight (Harrell-Bond 1986).  
 
In many African countries, the post-conflict period, instead of being a period of restoration, is 
often characterised by problematic social relations (Castles 2003). This needs to be 
considered together with the intermittence of most of the conflicts in Africa which leads to 
refugees resisting repatriation as a pre-emptive strategy to avoid the next round of violence, 
displacement and flight from their countries. For many refugee-producing countries 
particularly those whose citizens are hosted in Kenya, peace is more than the end of overt or 
conspicuous violence. Refugees are often reluctant to repatriate because of post-conflict 
harassment, persecution and discrimination, complete destruction of their homes and 
sometimes loss of homes to those who stayed, pre-flight traumatic experiences, old age and 
incapacitation as well as lack of capital to facilitate reintegration (Crisp 2002). Arguing that 
refugees who resist repatriation do so because of economic interests in Kenya is consequently 
simplistic and inadequate in explaining the dynamics of repatriation. However, the rationale 
for this argument becomes clear when it is contextualised within social technologies of 
channelling refugees firstly to refugee camps and secondly back to their countries of 
nationality in a bid to restore the order disrupted by flight which creates disorder by detaching 
people from the nation-state. 
 
Refugee women view economic integration in Kenya as a stepping stone to repatriation; it 
provides them with economic capital for reintegration in their countries of origin. In view of 
this, integration becomes a solution in so far as it enables refugees to lead “normal” lives 
                                                 
91 Lucy Hovil, “Self-settled Refugees in Uganda: An Alternative to Camps. Presentation made at the pre-
EXCOM meeting in Geneva, 24 September 2006.  
http://www.refugeelawproject.org/resources/seminars/EXCOMintegration.htm (accessed 04.01.08). 
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rather than wait until repatriation as is the case for those warehoused in camps. Integration 
enables refugees to become self-sufficient pending voluntary repatriation should this become 
practicable. In this respect, integration can be taken as a temporary solution (Dryden-Peterson 
and Hovil 2003b) in so far as it does not close opportunities for repatriation. The absence of 
regulations for refugee naturalisation in Kenya functions as a disincentive to rooting and 
permanence thus inducing refugees to repatriate once they feel safe to do so. Indeed, Harrell-
Bond (2002) contends that refugees are de facto integrated if they have the right to return to 
their country of origin.  
 
Some of the women are investing in their countries of origin in preparation for repatriation. 
Susan from Rwanda who runs a thriving tailoring and retail business and is one of the few 
examples of women who have successfully integrated into Nairobi bought a house and a car 
in Rwanda as part of her plans to repatriate once she is certain she will be safe in her country. 
Some of the women particularly those from Rwanda have their neighbours protecting their 
homes and land until such a time when they feel safe to repatriate. On the basis of this study, 
the likelihood of self-settled refugee women repatriating is high (see also Jacobsen 2001; 
Harrell-Bond 2002). That the women have not repatriated in the face of exclusionary 
circumstances in Nairobi largely points to fear of insecurity in their countries and inability to 
reintegrate without the requisite resources rather than disinclination to repatriate because of 
economic interests and successful integration in Kenya. The women question the logic of 
permanence in Kenya when even Kenyans are poor and exclude each other on the basis of 
ethnic politics. The women’s narratives portray the bone of contention as not whether or not 
they intend to repatriate but as the alleged coercion by the UNHCR whose relationship with 
refugees is chiefly characterised by lack of consultation, coordination and refugee 
participation in decision-making (see also Inhetveen 2006).  
 
3.3. Refugee Women and Physical Protection  
The host government has the responsibility to ensure physical security for refugees (Harrell-
Bond 1986). Notwithstanding, security officers in Kenya are widely viewed as agents of 
insecurity among refugee women. Physical protection goes beyond bearing a Protection Letter 
which states that the bearer is “a person of concern to the UNHCR” (quoted from protection 
and travel documents). It involves “an international presence to encourage states to respect 
their obligations to give asylum” (Harrell-Bond 1986: 161). Having left their countries of 
origin because of insecurity, many refugee women who have Protection Letters are 
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disgruntled with the absence of actual security and physical protection. Disaffection with the 
UNHCR emanates from protection going nowhere beyond “permission to remain in the 
asylum state” (Hathaway 1991: 118). In terms of physical and legal protection, there is an 
insignificant difference between refugees who possess Protection Letters and those who do 
not; a mere “piece of paper” cannot deter police officers from harassing, arresting and 
extorting from refugees (see Human Rights Watch 2002; Wagacha and Guiney 2008). As 
Verdirame (1999: 59) observes, “the ‘protection letter’ gives very little protection to its 
bearer.”  
 
Marie stated that her family was at risk of attack because her Hutu husband was accused of 
killing two Tutsi children in GOAL accommodation in Nairobi. Although Marie and her 
husband both said that he was acquitted because he was found innocent, the family still lives 
in fear of reprisals; they live in an insecure corrugated iron sheet structure. Waving their 
Protection Letters at this author, Marie asked how just being in possession of these documents 
could deter anyone who came to attack them. Even though the UNHCR gave Marie and her 
husband protection documents and allowed them to reside in Nairobi because of security 
reasons, they have been left to their own devices. Without any guarantee of physical 
protection, refugee women rely on their individual resourcefulness and find means and ways 
of keeping themselves and their children secure. Sarah, a single mother from Ethiopia moved 
from the densely populated Eastleigh suburb to a quieter and less populated neighbourhood 
where she felt she could protect her daughters from being pestered by men and possibly being 
raped. Sarah felt insecure and feared for her daughters’ security to the extent that she 
instructed them to move around together with their younger brother especially on their way to 
and from school. Despite her pleas for secure accommodation provided by NGOs such as 
GOAL, she has not been able to access such accommodation. In Hali’s words:  
When they [women] are raped that is the time when they [the UNHCR and NGOs] are 
helping and that help of this time, it's actually nothing […]. These organisations that 
protect refugees — they only get serious when your situation is worse […]. But when 
you need the help before that it's nothing. All the work they do, it’s nothing; I should 
say when you have already died [that is when they help]; let them help people when 
they are still alive. Like if a woman has been raped by ten men and you do not know 
who was HIV positive — who was sick, who was not sick. In fact, even the 
embarrassment in the society, also the psychological problems the woman has [as a 
result], they should help before that, why do they keep quiet before all this? They want 
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you to tell them I was raped, they want you to tell them I am HIV positive so that I 
should get something […]. Also, they still want medical record from Nairobi Women’s 
Hospital where they take all the rape cases and then [to] who[m] are you going to say, 
“Come and rape me so [that] I go there [to the UNHCR and NGOs]?”  
 
The requirement of evidence of rape prompts some of the women to take the evidence from 
consensual sex and pose as rape victims thus demonstrating their capacity to devise strategies 
to draw the required attention. The UNHCR, presented in the quotation above as retroactive 
rather than proactive, has a mandate to protect refugees but is implicated in the violation of 
refugees’ rights in Nairobi. The situation echoes Malkki’s (1995b: 518) observation that “[…] 
the discourse of human rights sometimes seems grotesquely abstract and ceremonial in the 
service of many of the very organisations (like the UN) that claim this discourse in their 
mandates.” Donor countries are said to be suffering from donor fatigue (Veney 2005) and 
host countries from fatigue of hosting refugees from protracted conflicts. Could it be that 
overall, the UNHCR staff in Nairobi is fatigued with fulfilling the refugee agency’s mandate? 
Through forcible repatriation in countries such as Tanzania (Crisp 2000; Whitaker 2003) and 
Zaire (now DRC) (Malkki 1997; Umutesi 2004) and meetings with refugees in Nairobi 
coaxing them to repatriate, the UNHCR exposes itself to refugees’ accusations that it protects 
host countries from refugees and legitimises countries of origin governments’ 
pronouncements of peace.  
 
While some of the women react to the challenges of obtaining protection documents by 
engaging the UNHCR and persevering, others express their disaffection by disengaging or 
severing ties with the refugee agency. The desperation and anger caused by fruitless trips to 
the UNHCR offices as already shown above has resulted in some of the women giving up on 
the refugee agency or simply pretending it does not exist on the basis of other refugees’ 
accounts of their experiences at its offices. This is particularly the case for those women who 
possess adequate resources to sustain themselves and their families. With most of the conflicts 
having stretched for decades, countries such as Sudan and Somalia have established diasporas 
particularly in Western countries which sustain their refugee relatives in Kenya through 
remittances (see Al Sharmani 2003; 2007; Horst 2006a, 2006c; Shandy 2007). For instance, 
the Somali money transfer facility (Dhabshil) in Eastleigh is often a hive of activity as 
Somalis collect money sent by relatives in the diaspora. A Sudanese woman nicknamed 
“Commander” explained that she came to Kenya with immigration documents and that she 
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survives on money sent by her husband from Sudan. Referring to the presence of the UNHCR 
in Nairobi, she nonchalantly stated:  
I never contacted the UNHCR. Even (sic) I don't know the way. Nobody showed me 
the way and the programme (sic) you can follow until you reach there. I don’t have a 
Protection Letter and when I came to Kenya I came with immigration papers. 
 
In a country that hosts hundreds of thousands of refugees not in the least Sudanese, 
“Commander”’s views imply indifference rather than inability to reach UNHCR offices. 
While earlier sections show how some of the women devise strategies to deal with the 
UNHCR, “Commander” is one of those women who respond to narratives of abuse at the 
UNHCR offices by avoiding the refugee agency altogether. Even though women in desperate 
situations also resort to the same response as in the case of Mose presented in Chapter Four, 
this response is prevalent among refugee women who are economically self-sufficient who 
then deny that they are refugees and present themselves simply as immigrants. This is a pre-
emptive strategy to avoid the stigma they perceive to be attached to the refugee status and the 
accompanying abuse and hostility from Kenyans. Refugee women who disengage from the 
UNHCR and are able to sustain themselves show a level of agency that defies the 
stereotypical image of refugees as desperate, dependent and docile. Using their own resources 
and social relationships, they are able to find security in Nairobi without going through 
UNHCR offices, an avenue they perceive as demeaning. 
 
Refugee women believe that even if non-refugee foreigners are subjected to extortion, they 
are spared the hostility that refugees are subjected to. In view of this, economically stable 
refugee women deny that they are refugees in order to access the relative hospitality extended 
to non-refugee immigrants in Kenya and enjoy a degree of social integration into Kenyan 
communities. Many refugee women who have the wherewithal have taken their fate into their 
own hands by severing ties with the refugee agency and NGOs, using the money they obtain 
from their IGPs and remittances to pay bribes whenever they get into trouble with the police 
for not possessing identity documents. Such women create space for themselves in Nairobi 
without UNHCR legal and material assistance. Existing outside UNHCR ambit as they do, the 
women are among those who refuse to heed the refugee agency’s call for repatriation and 
make their own decisions independent of its position. Existence outside the UNHCR sphere of 
influence is thus a form of resistance to real or perceived humiliation UNHCR protection 
entails – queuing, being counted, begging, being told to come another day, denial of 
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assistance and being instructed to repatriate all of which are integral aspects of social 
technologies of controlling refugees. Economically self-sufficient women have successfully 
integrated into Nairobi as their economic capital has enabled them to normalise their lives in 
exile. Nonetheless, failure to find formal employment remains a challenge for the majority of 
refugee women.  
 
3.3.1. Corruption, Discrimination and Refugee Women Protection 
A notable achievement in line with the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee 
Women (1991) is that refugee women can have protection documents in their own names. 
However, this achievement is overshadowed by refugee women’s criticism of UNHCR staff 
for alleged discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion and nationality. Refugee women 
also cite corruption, favouritism and sexual harassment as among the reasons why some 
UNHCR officials refuse to renew Protection Letters and instruct them to repatriate instead. 
The women allege that the UNHCR has a certain “type” of refugees that it houses in secure 
and expensive accommodation to the exclusion of needy refugees.92 The CSO denied the 
allegations and instead chronicled cheating incidents by refugees that make it necessary for 
UNHCR staff to be wary of refugees. This is typical of the UNHCR-refugee interface which 
is suffused with claims, counter-claims and mutual accusations. This is characteristic because 
the interface occurs in the informal structure in which the impersonal and formal is supplanted 
by the personal and informal thus bringing into the encounter socio-political dynamics that 
create situations ideal for contention and contestation. 
 
Corruption charges are often in the form of refugees being forced to buy their way to 
resettlement. As a result, only those with money can be resettled while deserving cases are 
disqualified by inability to raise the required sums. Even women from Somalia and Sudan 
who are accepted as prima facie refugees are not spared from corruption. In FGDs, Sudanese, 
Somali and Great Lakes region refugee women complained about bribery while some of the 
women narrated experiences in which male UNHCR officials demand sexual liaisons in 
return for protection documents and resettlement. Claire is quoted at length in this section to 
depict the nature of experiences refugee women, particularly those who are young and single, 
                                                 
92 Refugee women alleged that the well-connected are the ones who get the best from the UNHCR while the 
majority of refugees who are poor are turned away and rejected. I lived in a guest house for one week with an 
Ethiopian opposition politician. One paid Ksh1,200 (US$17) per day. The man is one of the 10 refugee men 
interviewed for this study. He stated that the UNHCR was paying for his accommodation and upkeep at the 
guest house. This daily amount could pay a month’s rent in the crowded neighbourhoods in which the majority 
of refugees live. 
121
encounter at the UNHCR offices. Claire described her encounter with a male UNHCR 
Protection Officer as follows: 
You come for assistance but UNHCR does not care. Men there want to sleep with you. 
One Kenyan Protection Officer [name provided] at UNHCR told me to bring US$500 
but where would I get it from? But he told me, “If you don’t have money you are a 
young lady and you know what to do; come and see me!” I refused and the papers 
which I had from 1994 which showed my status were confiscated by the Protection 
Officer and he gave me a Rejection Letter. He was later arrested when some of the 
people at UNHCR were arrested for corruption but not everyone was arrested so his 
colleagues who remained at UNHCR helped him. When I went back to get a 
Protection Letter and asked them to check my file they said that they could not take 
what was in my file [the Protection Letter from 1994] but what I had [the Rejection 
Letter]. 
 
Similarly, Hali related that when she went to renew her Protection Letter, she declined an 
invitation for “a cup of coffee” in town by a male UNHCR officer who promised that he 
would assist her with third country resettlement in return. Sexualising protection results in 
refugee women who resist male staff’s sexual advances living without legal recognition. This 
closes other livelihood opportunities for them. For instance, Claire met an Australian woman 
who wanted to help her migrate to Australia but without the appropriate documents she could 
not travel and lost the opportunity. Claire expressed frustration with both the UNHCR and the 
GoK. While in Kenya, she can neither find a job despite her university qualification obtained 
in Kenya and marriage to a Kenyan man nor obtain assistance because she does not have the 
appropriate documents to prove her refugee status. Despite that the encounter takes place 
between individual staff members and refugee women, women with experiences like Claire’s 
blame the UNHCR rather than the individual(s) who attend to them. 
 
The CSO stated that refugees are free to lodge complaints with the UNHCR if they are not 
satisfied with the services offered. This is difficult for many refugee women because of what 
Inhetveen (2006) refers to as control of direct communication and social distance. 
Mechanisms of such control are arbitrary and they create barriers such that refugees fear 
victimisation and do not know who to approach with their complaints. The fact that some of 
the women, out of desperation, write letters to convey their complaints to the UNHCR 
Headquarters in Geneva illustrates the extent to which communication channels are closed for 
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the refugees at the Branch Office in Nairobi. Having failed to obtain a Protection Letter 
because of the encounter presented above, Claire approached the Refugee Consortium of 
Kenya (RCK), an NGO whose mandate is to promote refugees’ rights. Her case went as 
follows: 
I went to [the] RCK and shared with them and they approached UNHCR but they were 
told that my file is an X-file93 which means that once the file is put under X nobody 
can work on it. The Kenyan Protection Officer I told you about wrote in the file that he 
doubted my identity whether I am a Burundian or a Rwandese but how could he say 
that when I had documents going back to 3years showing that I am Rwandese? 
 
The power that refugee status determination vests in UNHCR staff members enables them to 
create an informal structure in which they pursue their own individual goals which are the 
cause of refugee women’s endless accusations of corruption and favouritism. The informal 
structure enables staff members to “operate outside the rules, to use rules, or abandon them, 
bend them, reinterpret them, side-step them, or replace them” (Sally Falk Moore 2000: 4). It 
is in this informal structure which exists within the formal, impersonal and bureaucratic 
structure of the UNHCR that the interaction between the women and UNHCR staff occurs. In 
coming up with this informal and personalised structure, UNHCR individual staff members 
demonstrate the agency to unmake, (re)interpret and transform the UNHCR mandate in ways 
that facilitate pursuit of their own personal agenda instead of operating as cogs in the 
UNHCR bureaucratic machine.  
 
Officials’ conformity to the UNHCR mandate in the form of provision of protection 
documents co-exists with deviation from the mandate which takes the shape of demands for 
bribes and sexual favours. Discharge of the UNHCR mandate and pursuit of individual staff 
members’ personal goals have a symbiotic relationship by which they are mutually 
sustaining. In this respect, conformity to rules that guide the UNHCR is not an end in itself 
but an enabling feature in the pursuit of personal, social transactions; it is a case of 
“individuals ‘working the system’ for individual ends” (Chanock 2000: 8).94 This concurrent 
pursuit of organisational and individual goals shows how individuals’ actions are 
                                                 
93 An X-file is also referred to as a “closed file”. The file is “closed” after a refugee is rejected on appeal which 
means that the applicant cannot apply again and should he or she apply, will not be considered for the refugee 
status thus explaining the “closure” of his or her file or case. 
94  Martin Chanock in his introduction to Sally Falk Moore’s (2000) Law as Process An Anthropological 
Approach. (see Reference list for full reference to Moore’s book). 
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simultaneously circumscribed and facilitated by the UNHCR structure. As Claire’s case 
shows, it is social processes that shape rules and not vice versa; even deterrent measures or 
tighter legislation such as arresting corrupt officials do not necessarily curb social processes 
within contexts governed by rules and the law (see Sally Falk Moore 2000). In this case, 
interface is the space within which the essential is confronted by the contingent and 
unanticipated which often exists outside the precepts guiding staff conduct. 
 
Corruption is a manifestation of individual staff members’ agency and innovativeness in the 
interpretation, operationalisation and contextualisation of the UNHCR mandate and refugee 
law. Individual officials create a system of mutual expectation by which discharge of duties is 
to be reciprocated in cash or kind. While refugee women expect assistance and protection 
because this is the mandate of the UNHCR, individual staff members within the refugee 
agency expect the women to express gratitude for assistance. This translates into 
commoditisation and conversion of the UNHCR mandate from an act of humanitarianism to a 
form of exchange or “an act of giving and receiving” (Bohannan and Bohannan 1968: 225). 
Contrary to the ideas implicit in the concept of humanitarianism, services are not dispensed or 
doled out as charity but exchanged in that they assume a market or exchange value or 
“equivalent” (Bohannan and Bohannan 1968: 226). The UNHCR-refugee women interface 
becomes a symbolic market place where services, money and sexual favours are traded, 
bargained, invested and exchanged. In this personalised and commercialised encounter, male 
UNHCR officials in particular do not see clients to be served but women with whom they can 
have sexual liaisons. Where the women are viewed as clients, this is in the sense of the 
women paying the officials in cash for services rendered. The UNHCR-refugee women 
interface is therefore an arena where individual staff members engage in “manipulation, 
circumvention, remaking, replacing, and unmaking of rules” (Sally Falk Moore 2000: 1).  
 
Similarly, when UNHCR officials deny protection to Hutu Rwandan women, they do so not 
as neutral professionals but as individuals with opinions and perspectives on regional politics 
which are inconsistent with the institutional image of the UNHCR as impartial. The UNHCR-
refugee women interface is not a neutral encounter between professionals and clients in an 
impersonal, formal and bureaucratic structure but between individuals on both sides of the 
institutional divide with the capacity to bring their own interests into the encounter. Male staff 
cited by Claire and Hali see the interface as presenting the opportunity to engender a culture 
of exchange and bargain or negotiate sexual favours with refugee women in the same way that 
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traders and customers in the market place bargain and negotiate commodity value or worth 
(see Bohannan and Bohannan 1968). Humanitarian organisations’ offices and other locations 
accordingly become the physical market place where services and protection documents are 
sold and bought.  
 
The interface occurs between individuals on both sides of the institutional divide whose 
agency renders the encounter susceptible to personalisation, manoeuvre, manipulation and 
negotiation. Rules as the guiding principle of the encounter do not function by and for 
themselves; they are very much shaped and mediated by individuals involved and the broader 
socio-political milieu within which their interpretation and enforcement occur. Rules by 
themselves do not predict the outcome of the UNHCR-refugee women encounter. Rather, 
there are multiple outcomes which are determined by or predicated upon refugee women’s 
possession of economic, social and political capital or lack thereof and their ability or 
willingness to invest the requisite forms of capital in the encounter. As such, “legislation is 
intrusive. It is a tinkering with an ongoing social field that has relatively autonomous activity 
and self-regulation” (Sally Falk Moore 2000: 7). 
 
3.4. Refugee Women and Kenyan Authorities 
For all the decades that Kenya has been hosting refugees, it did not have a domestic legal 
framework within which it could implement and uphold the international refugee legal 
instruments that it ratified. Kenya’s domestic refugee law, the Refugee Act (2006) was yet to 
be implemented by October 2009. In recent years, refugees’ experiences in African countries 
show that hospitality in the spirit of “African brotherhood” that characterised the decades of 
anti-colonial struggles has drastically waned to such a level that the open-door policy has 
been substituted by a door-in-the-face policy. Erosion of the prosperity that characterised 
many African states at independence, reduced donor assistance and the fact that the current 
refugee populations are no longer victims of anti-colonial and liberation struggles have all 
militated against refugees in Africa (Crisp 2000). A case in point is the violence in South 
Africa against immigrants who are accused of “taking away” jobs from South Africans and 
fuelling the high crime rate.95  This is coupled with association of refugees with national 
                                                 
95 In May 2008, South Africans particularly those in the townships went on a rampage setting ablaze foreigners’ 
housing structures and foreigners who got caught were forced to wear the “necklace” – a tyre doused in petrol 
and torched which is notorious for its use during the apartheid era. While foreign men who got caught were 
killed, women were raped. Foreigners’ household goods and shops were looted. The violence, which targeted 
immigrants mostly from Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, left more than 62 people dead as South Africans 
sought to drive home their message – “South Africa for South Africans!” 
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insecurity which has changed lenient policies towards refugees “almost overnight” (Veney 
2005: 13). In Kenya, the substitutive door-in-the-face policy has manifested itself in 
politicians delivering anti-refugee speeches which incite locals against the refugees (see Juma 
and Kagwanja 2003; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005).  
 
The discourse on democracy, good governance and human rights prevailing in Kenya 
notwithstanding, human rights are envisaged in a hierarchical order whereby refugees’ rights 
are well below citizens’ rights and can only be enjoyed after citizens — who also come in a 
hierarchical order — have been satisfied, a situation which seems unlikely to change in the 
foreseeable future.96 Considering that many citizens lack access to health care, employment, 
housing and tertiary education among others, it is improbable that refugees would enjoy such 
rights (Veney 2005). In addition, refugees’ rights are largely construed as an act of charity by 
asylum countries (Feller 2001) such that conceptualisation of refugee law as “a rights based 
regime is largely illusory” (Hathaway 1991: 115).  
 
Implicit in Kenya’s treatment of refugees is the expectation that refugees appreciate that they 
are allowed to stay instead of being turned away. The exclusionary refugee regime is 
sustained by notions of belonging which tether refugees to their countries of origin and 
accordingly treats them as not having the right to claim territorial space in Kenya where they 
are foreigners. Conceptualisation of refugee hosting as a temporary favour is vocalised by 
politicians who engage in anti-refugee rhetoric. Predictably, the history of refugee hosting in 
post-colonial Africa is marked by manipulation and abuse in the form of SGBV and Kenya is 
no exception to violation of refugees’ rights (see Martin 1999; Verdirame 1999; Human 
Rights Watch 2002; 2009; Juma and Kagwanja 2003; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). 
Describing the possibility of integration and naturalisation, the Head of the DRA also stated 
that: 
The only kind of integration I can talk about is when the refugees get married to a 
Kenyan. By the very act [of marriage], they automatically fall under the government 
body concerned with registration of aliens and the Attorney General Chambers as per 
the Marriage Act of the country.  
 
                                                 
96 At the Human Rights Day commemoration, a Ugandan refugee expressed concern that refugees were not in a 
position to freely exercise their rights to which an official from the RCK replied, “Your rights [as a refugee] end 
where mine [a citizen] begin.” 
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Local integration may be the preferred solution for refugees who have established close 
family, socio-cultural and economic ties with the host country.97 Claire, who is married to a 
Kenyan man, stated that she and her husband were informed by Immigration Department 
officials that even though the child she has with the Kenyan man is considered Kenyan, she 
remains a refugee her marriage notwithstanding and cannot be formally employed in Kenya. 
Claire’s predicament lies in that relocation to a country where refugees are allowed to work 
would place her marriage in jeopardy. Claire explained that her case was dismissed by the 
Immigration Department.98 Having been rejected by the UNHCR, Claire is not in a position 
to seek UNHCR intervention because she is not “a person of concern” to the refugee agency. 
Although the Kenyan Constitution (Section 92(1) of Chapter VI) allows refugees from 
Commonwealth countries to become citizens, Uganda which is listed among other 
Commonwealth countries has refugees in Kenya but these refugees are neither recognised as 
citizens nor are they aware of the Constitutional provision in question which is silent on 
refugees. This has a happy union with the agenda of repatriation which has seen the erection 
of barriers to integration and creation of conditions ideal for waiting for the conflicts back in 
the refugees’ countries of origin to subside.  
 
Kenya conceives refugees as “UNHCR’s problem” (Juma and Kagwanja (2003: 230; 
Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005: 49). This is despite that local integration in protracted 
situations requires active involvement of the host government if it is to be feasible (Harrell-
Bond 2002). The UNHCR states that “Contracting States undertake to cooperate with the 
Office of UNHCR in the exercise of its functions and, in particular, to facilitate its specific 
duty of supervising the application of the provisions of these instruments.”99 On the contrary, 
the GoK does not actively participate in refugee affairs except in cases where refugees are 
linked to insecurity as in the case of the Somali refoulement in January 2007. This is coupled 
with the UNHCR’s lack of legal authority to enforce the Geneva Convention.  
 
The legal challenges refugee women encounter in Nairobi are part of the broader 
encampment-repatriation regime. The Head of the DRA insisted that resettlement in a third 
country and repatriation are the lasting solutions and to this end the government encourages 
                                                 
97 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme Standing Committee 33rd Meeting, 2 June 
2005, “Local Integration and Self-reliance”. http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/42a0054f2.pdf (accessed 
05.04.08). 
98 Claire charged that she was turned away because she did not have money to bribe the Immigration Department 
officials. She claimed to know refugee women from the Great Lakes region who were granted Kenyan 
citizenship after paying bribes. She lamented her inability to raise money for bribery. 
99 Introductory Note by the UNHCR to the Geneva Refugee Convention, pg 7; Geneva, March 1996. 
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and promotes durable solutions by providing exit visas for those being resettled and 
“help[ing] to see that people are assured of their security back home.” On the latter, he cited 
Rwandan refugees whom he said were afraid of the Gacaca Courts.100 The UNHCR sustains 
Kenya’s encampment regulation through direction of assistance to camps which is a 
disincentive for refugee self-settlement.  
 
3.4.1. Harassment, Extortion and Sexual Violence 
Refugee women are harassed by Kenyan police officers who sometimes destroy their 
UNHCR identity documents,101 arrest them and ask for bribes so that the women can be 
released. Refugee experiences with the Kenyan police have been widely documented (Martin 
1999; Verdirame 1999; Human Rights Watch 2002; 2009; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005; 
Wagacha and Guiney 2008). Most of the refugee women who participated in this study had 
experienced police harassment, arbitrary arrests and threats of expulsion particularly 
following the bombing of the USA embassy in Nairobi in 1998. Refugee women recounted 
experiences in which they were raided and rounded up at night. Grace from Rwanda related 
how the police came at night, forced her to open the door and bundled her into their truck 
together with other refugees living in her neighbourhood. Grace recalled, “They took me 
away in a night dress and forced me to leave my children alone at night.”  
 
Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans and Sudanese who are easily identified because they are 
physically different are approached in broad daylight and asked to produce their identity 
cards. Even if they produce Protection Letters, they are sometimes ordered into police trucks 
and taken to police stations where they are only set free after paying bribe or kitu kidogo in 
the local Kiswahili language. 102  Hali recounted her experience when police officers 
                                                 
100 Personal interview with the Head of DRA, Nairobi, 26.02.07. The Gacaca Courts are a traditional system of 
arbitration particularly given prominence in the handling of individuals accused of participating in the 1994 
Rwandan genocide. 
101 The shredding of refugees’ UNHCR protection documents, besides showing ignorance of refugees’ rights and 
hostility on the part of police officers, also portrays the contradiction that characterises the refugee regime that is 
operational in Kenya. When the Kenyan government withdrew from active participation in the refugee status 
determination process in 1991, the UNHCR took over the process. The government then confronted the UNHCR 
and announced in the press that the refugee agency had no authority to grant refugee status in Kenya (Verdirame 
1999). The GoK further demanded that refugees hand over their UNHCR documents to the Immigration 
Department. At the time of fieldwork, the UNHCR was still engaged in status determination and issuing of 
identity documents; many refugees had UNHCR identity documents. Only a few had Alien Cards from the 
government. This gives the impression that the UNHCR and the government are engaged in duplication of tasks 
which leaves many refugees confused. 
102 Kitu kidogo is Kiswahili for something small. In this context, it means a little bit of money. In reality though, 
the amounts refugees are expected to pay in order to regain their freedom are nothing small as they frequently 
pay as much as Ksh5,000 (about US$70). This amount is enough to pay 5months’ rent for many refugees who 
live in the slums. Many refugees narrated incidents in which they had to borrow the money in order to be 
128
approached her in the city centre and ordered her into their truck even though she showed 
them her valid Protection Letter. The police officers drove her to the outskirts of Nairobi 
where they stripped her of money and a mobile phone before abandoning her in the forest to 
find her own way back to Nairobi. Hali only managed to travel back to Nairobi when a 
motorist offered her a ride. In order to extricate themselves from the problem of staying in 
prison for lack of identity documents, for allegedly being génocidaires in the case of Hutu 
Rwandans or, in the case of Somali women, for allegedly harbouring terrorists, the women 
have to pay kitu kidogo. Kadija narrated her experiences as follows: 
I was harassed in Eastleigh by police and anytime they harass me, I have to bribe them 
to secure my release and at the border I was asked for sexual favours so that I could 
cross the border or pay money. I had to pay them the little [money] I had from back 
home. I was also raped on my way to Nairobi. 
 
For Monica, a Sudanese woman, the police target refugees because they know that refugees 
part with money because they do not want to be taken to court where they fear deportation 
for lack of protection documents. Monica went on to observe that, “When you are arrested, 
they [police] do not say ‘this is a refugee’, they say ‘this is a client’; this is in a police camp!” 
Even though refugee women from the Great Lakes region and Sudan credit the government 
of President Mwai Kibaki for reducing levels of harassment and extortion, refugee abuse 
persists particularly among Horn of Africa refugee women who are easy to identify as 
foreigners with those who are Muslim being subjected to raids and interrogation on terrorism. 
Human Rights Watch (2009) notes that incidence of harassment, sexual and physical abuse 
as well as refoulement of Somali refugees by Kenyan police has become rampant. 
 
On the whole, lack of access to gainful employment and violation of the right to freedom of 
movement remain major issues among refugee women. This is aggravated by the fact that 
when UNHCR staff members and Kenyan police officers uphold refugee rights for women 
who are outside the camps and self-settled in Nairobi, they construe this not as discharge of 
their professional duties but as a favour for which refugee women are expected to reciprocate 
in conformity to the obligations and dynamics of informal, social relationships. While police 
officers are tasked with maintaining law and order, the operative, social reality of their 
                                                                                                                                                        
released from prison after being arrested not so much for not having protection documents as for being refugees 
because even those with valid documents are also victims of the arbitrary arrests. Rwandan refugees are 
sometimes forced to bribe their way out of prison by threats of extradition to Rwanda for alleged participation in 
the genocide (see also Verdirame 1999; Human Rights Watch 2002). 
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interface with refugee women, like that between the latter and staff in humanitarian 
organisations, demonstrates how formal, official relations are “mediated by and modified by 
‘informal’ arrangements which, though often disavowed, are an integral part of the 
operations of the whole” (Sally Falk Moore 2000: 29). Like bribery and sexual favours in the 
refugee women-humanitarian staff interface, kitu kidogo in the refugee women-Kenyan 
police interface explicitly demonstrates commoditisation of refugees’ right to asylum. Rights 
in this interface are not an entitlement; instead they acquire a commercial value and become 
a tradable commodity with the police station, forests on the outskirts of Nairobi among other 
sites or arenas becoming the market place. The difference is that where humanitarian staff 
bargain and negotiate the exchange value of services and protection documents, Kenyan 
police resort to use of force or violence (arbitrary arrest, extortion, harassment, rape and 
refoulement).  
 
Ordinary Kenyan citizens also extort from refugees. Susan related an incident in which a 
group of Kenyan men demanded Ksh50,000 (US$694) from her and fellow refugee women 
who ran tailoring and retail shops in Kibera slum and threatened to get their businesses closed 
if they did not comply. The ethnic profiling presented in Chapter Two is used as a reference 
point to extort from refugees as when Kenyans declare that Sudanese and Somali refugees 
have money and extort from the Sudanese in particular by inflating telephone bills in call 
shops on the grounds that Sudanese refugees do not complain because they have the money 
and even after overcharging them, they still come back to make more international phone calls 
(Bukuru et al 2002). Both nationalities have to deal with extortion by home owners who prey 
on refugees’ desperation for accommodation. Prices of commodities in some of the local tuck 
shops are sometimes inflated for customers who are identified as foreigners. Among these 
foreigners, it is mostly refugees who become victims of extortion as they are the ones who 
frequent tuck shops in search of relatively lower prices in contrast to the more expensive 
supermarkets whose prices do not fluctuate on the basis of individual customers’ identities. 
Refugee women, particularly those from Sudan pointed out that extortion is the reason why 
they prefer to buy from Somali shops in Eastleigh as they view Somalis as honest and 
trustworthy. According to Zanie: 
So, for me personally, what is there and what they [Kenyans] are doing to refugees 
especially Sudanese refugees is not how the other refugees are treated. It is exactly the 
opposite. You go to houses, you rent a house today, and tomorrow the rent is hiked 
because you are Sudanese. You go to the shop now and you buy milk at Ksh27 
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(US$0,38) because you are a Sudanese and a refugee. Why? But if you want the milk 
and you send a Kenyan to buy the milk you get it cheaper. Why? You see a [piece of] 
cloth like this, you want to buy [but] because you are Sudanese, you do not know 
Kiswahili, you don't know English just the small [little bit of] English that we learn 
here [SWAN Centre] and they hike the prices. Why? Is it because you are a refugee or 
is it just because you are a Sudanese? To me it is specifically targeted at Sudanese. 
 
Zanie raises two pertinent issues. In the first instance, if refugee women experience extortion 
on the basis of their refugee status, this legitimises their concerns that the “piece of paper” 
they obtain as a protection document does not provide any protection in experiential terms. In 
the second instance, Zanie suggests that extortion targets Sudanese refugees in particular thus 
emphasising the aspect of identity as a significant factor in the acceptance or lack thereof of 
refugees. Extortion in local shops is not confined to Sudanese though as women from the 
Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa raised similar concerns. Tania who runs a tailoring 
business related that Kikuyus who own fabric shops speak in Kikuyu instead of Kiswahili so 
that they can identify non-Kikuyus and inflate prices for them. Cases of extortion by locals 
illustrate how “otherness” or difference occupies the ambivalent position in which it is feared, 
shunned and spurned and concurrently brought close to oneself and embraced for purposes of 
exploitation. Where other foreigners can afford to buy milk in supermarkets and avoid 
extortion, refugee women resort to their social relationships with Kenyans thus coming up 
with a counter-strategy to avert extortion. The refugee status is not incapacitating as the 
women find ways to outmanoeuvre locals in search of fairness. 
 
Whether it is a case of extortion or sexual harassment and violence, many refugee women 
prefer not to report such cases even to the UNHCR. The women generally come from cultural 
backgrounds where recounting experiences of rape is considered shameful. Many women 
expressed anger with Kenyan police officers and the UNHCR staff for asking probing and 
“humiliating” questions only to do nothing to assist the rape or extortion victim. Hali 
recounted that when she reported the extortion incident cited above at the UNHCR, she was 
laughed at. Refugees rely on their own devices to cope with the legal challenges they 
encounter in Nairobi. This affects women in particular because of their vulnerability and 
inability to defend themselves in most cases where force or violence is employed. Many 
refugee women find themselves in a perilous position where they cannot be protected either 
by the UNHCR or the GoK. Refugees who are rejected by the UNHCR cannot appeal to the 
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GoK at the same time that they cannot lodge complaints with the UNHCR or obtain its 
protection from harassment and extortion by Kenyan police officers. Refugee women eke out 
a living in Nairobi within this environment of a largely uninvolved state and a Janus-faced 
UNHCR that views assisting urban refugees as “working against the government”. 
 
3.5. Refugee Rights Awareness among Refugee Women 
The majority of refugee women do not view seeking assistance from the UNHCR as a right 
that they are entitled to. In the Introductory Note to the Geneva Convention, the UNHCR 
states that the provisions of the Convention and the Protocol “should be known as widely as 
possible, both by refugees and by all those concerned with refugee problems” (1951: 7). Even 
so, there is lack of awareness among refugee women on the UNHCR’s responsibilities and 
obligations. Most of the refugees are not aware of the existence of the Geneva and AU 
Conventions as well as the Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women and the Sexual 
Violence Guidelines. Mose, who led a near destitute life with her three children, when asked 
whether she knew about the UNHCR, responded that she only heard about the agency but did 
not know anything about it. There is lack of education on both refugees’ rights and refugee 
women’s rights. Of the 34 refugee women who were interviewed, a paltry 9% expressed 
familiarity with the Geneva Convention and none with the AU Convention.  
 
Many refugee women are also not aware of the NGOs that work to protect their rights such as 
the RCK which provides legal advocacy for refugees. 103  Eunice Ndonga, the RCK 
Programme Officer observed that many refugees do not even think that they have rights and 
that even those who come to the RKC conceptualise all their problems as social even where 
these are legal. She attributed this to refugees’ preoccupation with safety and basic needs such 
as food and shelter. Most of them view rights as a favour and this explains the inability among 
refugee women to seek redress where their rights are violated. Apart from lack of awareness 
among the women, most of them have become disillusioned with the UNHCR and NGOs that 
work with refugees. Even though some of the refugee women use the term “rights” in their 
narratives, for many this is based not on an understanding of the legal provisions for their 
welfare but on their own judgement of what constitutes fairness or unfairness, positive 
treatment or mistreatment. While advice from the RCK could help refugees stop buying their 
rights through payment of bribes, many refugee women spend their hard-earned incomes 
                                                 
103 Personal interview with Eunice Ndonga, RCK Programme Officer, Nairobi, 05.02.07. Details on the RCK are 
provided in Chapter Five. 
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bribing the police to regain their freedom when arrested. This has a discernible economic 
impact on refugee households that perpetuates the cycle of poverty. For instance, refugees can 
be ordered to pay Ksh5,000 (US$69) as bribery when they struggle to raise Ksh1,000 
(US$14) to pay monthly rentals. 
 
The few women who are aware of the Geneva Convention locate the problem not in its scope 
being limited and in need of expansion as Hathaway (1991) argues but in lack of UNHCR and 
GoK commitment to its implementation. Epi argued that the only “person” who was violating 
her rights was the UNHCR; she stated that she obtains assistance from her Kenyan neighbours 
and no assistance at all from the refugee agency. Refugees generally refer to their struggles 
with UNHCR officials as “fighting for our rights”. Refugee women accuse UNHCR staff of 
withholding crucial information because, in Michelle’s words, “the UNHCR fears that if we 
know our rights we will exercise them.” Denial of information is coupled with use of force 
through deployment of security officers in cases of perceived trouble among refugees (see 
also Inhetveen 2006). Refugees’ knowledge of their rights upsets the exercise of power that 
characterises the informal structure in which UNHCR staff and refugee women interact. 
Security officers are accordingly deployed to ensure that refugees do not challenge the status 
quo. Denial or withholding of information and the use of force are key features of 
technologies of power and control by which refugees are kept in their “proper” place. 
 
The FGDs revealed that those refugees that are vocal at the UNHCR offices on rights issues 
are penalised and sent away without documents or assistance for, in Margaret’s words, 
“thinking that [they] have more knowledge than the UNHCR.” Such refugees are punished so 
as to set an example that deters all the other refugees from exercising their rights as this 
undermines the viability of the informal structure in which officials commoditise services and 
pursue their own individual goals. Knowledge or information (about rights) is power 
(Foucault 1980; Harrell-Bond 1999) in that it is those who possess it who are in a position to 
challenge UNHCR staff members. For this reason, officials withhold information where it 
upsets the balance of power by empowering refugees (see also Verdirame 1999; Inhetveen 
2006).  
 
Punitive measures or sanctions such as denial of assistance and characterisation of refugees’ 
resort to the rights discourse as political discourage political agency among refugees; these 
are hallmarks of social technologies of enforcing compliance and keeping refugees subdued. 
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Many refugee women have, as a result, internalised the view that pursuing their rights is 
political. For Epi, this stance combines with failure by the UNHCR Geneva Office to respond 
to refugees’ letters asking it to intervene in the alleged abuse of refugees’ rights by the 
UNHCR Branch Office in Nairobi. Epi demonstrated her frustration with this lack of response 
thus, “I have never taken my rights anywhere but I am dying inside.” The issue is lack of 
awareness of rights and inability to seek redress where these rights are violated; refugee 
women generally lack both. 
 
3.6. A Promising Future? Kenya’s Refugee Act  
The absence of a domestic legal framework has accentuated Kenya’s incapacity to translate 
international Conventions into practice and adequately address legal and administrative issues 
relating to refugees (Juma and Kagwanja 2003; Wagacha and Guiney 2008). The situation is 
expected to change once Kenya’s Refugee Act of 2006 becomes operational. The Act which 
is a culmination of more than a decade of advocacy by NGOs adopts the Geneva 
Convention’s definition of a refugee and its cessation clauses that outline circumstances in 
which one ceases to be a refugee. Under the Act, the government will resume the status 
determination exercise which is currently conducted by the UNHCR. The DRA, headed by a 
Commissioner for Refugee Affairs will play a key role in the administration of refugee 
matters. Among other functions, the Commissioner shall “promote as far as possible durable 
solutions for refugees granted asylum in Kenya” (Article 7.2. e). There shall also be a 
Refugee Affairs Committee (RAC) to assist the Commissioner. The Committee shall be 
composed of representatives of various ministries and government departments as well as 
representatives of the host community and one member of the civil society. Among other 
provisions, the Act outlines how the status determination process shall be conducted and how 
refugees appeal in the event that they are denied the refugee status.  
 
However, one main issue can be noted about the Act, it does not address refugees self-settled 
in Nairobi. The Act was drafted on the assumption that all refugees will automatically reside 
in camps. As mentioned by the Head of the DRA, the government is aware of the presence of 
refugees in Nairobi and actually assists them yet Articles 16. 2. b and 17 a, c, d, e and f of the 
Act which focus on domicile all mention refugee camps only. It remains unclear how refugee 
women who are in Nairobi will access the protection of the Act. Refugee women who are 
aware of the Refugee Act expressed scepticism and adopted a “we will wait and see” attitude. 
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Even though the women have not familiarised themselves with the fine details of the Act, they 
do not believe that the Act has anything significant in store for them. According to Tania: 
The refugees’ Bill takes ages. Even their own [Kenyan] Constitution is not in order so 
how can they help refugees? I don’t believe that. About those Bills and what, we will 
wait and see. The implementation is something else but if they do something it is OK. 
 
While the Refugee Act is premised on the encampment regime, movement of refugees from 
the camps to urban centres in Kenya is increasingly becoming the trend. Exclusion of urban 
refugees points to how refugee policy remains intricately bound to security concerns in Kenya 
(Juma and Kagwanja 2003). The Act which is the formalisation of the encampment regime is 
silent on local integration and implicitly refers to repatriation and third country resettlement 
as the durable solutions. Even though local integration is increasingly becoming the most 
feasible solution for millions of refugees in developing countries (Jacobsen 2001; Dryden-
Peterson and Hovil 2003b), there are no signs of Kenya actively implementing it at the 
present moment or in the foreseeable future going by the content of the Refugee Act. Because 
of confusion caused by duplication of tasks between the UNHCR and the government and 
what they construe as indifference to their plight, refugee women predict an implementation 
process of the Act which will be fraught with problems. By April 2009, the GoK had not yet 
started implementing the Refugee Act. Commenting on this state of affairs, Jared Okweya 
noted, “The programmes at the UNHCR is (sic) still as usual including refugee status 
determination since the [K]enya[n] govt [government] is slow in the transfer process and as 
things stand it will take years for things to change on (sic) the refugee sector.”104
 
3.7. Dilemmas of the Refugee Status in the Process of Integration 
The foregoing sections have presented the difficulties that accompany living in Nairobi 
without valid protection documents. In particular, this has a direct impact on refugee women’s 
access to NGO assistance and loans both of which are provided only if refugees produce valid 
protection documents. Lack of protection documents also leaves refugee women with a 
perpetual sense of vulnerability to sexual harassment particularly at the UNHCR offices and 
insecurity caused by police raids, arbitrary arrests, targeted rape and refoulement. Possession 
of protection documents reduces instances in which the women are labelled illegal immigrants 
and threatened with deportation. Yet, being recognised as a refugee sometimes becomes a 
                                                 
104 E-mail correspondence from Jared Okweya, Chairman of a Refugee Community-based Organisation (RCO) 
called Zindua Afrika, received on 07.04.09. 
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liability as manifest in the contemporary world where being a refugee no longer evokes 
hospitality but fear, suspicion and hostility.  
 
In order to negotiate the contradictions that come with the status, refugee women turn the 
refugee status into a fluid and negotiable status which they accept as a positive category and 
deploy in certain situations and reject and conceal in other contexts depending on their 
evolving needs and interests (see also Malkki 1995a; 1997). Concealment or what Malkki 
(1995a) refers to as “strategies of invisibility” enable refugees to deflect unwanted attention 
from locals or what refugee women perceive to be negative connotations of the term refugee 
(see also Sommers’ [2001] reference to kujificha – Kiswahili for “hiding oneself” among 
Hutu Burundian refugees in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania). The calculative acceptance and 
rejection of the refugee status is a tactic to capitalise on possibilities that come with legal 
recognition as a refugee without necessarily losing out on the perceived advantages accruing 
to non-refugee foreigners such as social acceptance. Refugee women take the refugee status 
not only as a burden but also as a resource thus portraying their capacity to innovate and 
expand their sources of social and economic capital. 
 
The negotiability of the refugee status enables refugee women to embrace and instrumentalise 
it on the one hand and resist, conceal and subvert it on the other hand in their self-
representation Scott (1985) demonstrates how low status is not only a constraint but also a 
resource that those who bear it can deploy and capitalise on. For example, some of the refugee 
women attributed their presence in Kenya to quest for education and referred to war in their 
respective countries in terms of how it had disrupted education and destroyed infrastructure 
rather than in terms of the direct threat it posed to their lives. The women view the refugee 
status as a burden which constrains them in many ways; many women consider being called a 
refugee an insult as when Tania observed that “[b]eing called a refugee is bad. I wish I could 
come to Kenya as a visitor or tourist. Some people look at you like you are an idiot.” The 
stereotypical labelling or essentialist depiction of refugees as vulnerable becomes a resource 
or a form of capital refugee women deploy in different circumstances; the women accept the 
label refugee and conform to the stereotypes in order to achieve specific goals and disavow 
the status and stereotypes where they are cumbersome (Zetter 1988a; Mazur 1989). If 
refugees are poor and dependent on humanitarian aid, refugee women who are self-sufficient 
and do not fit into these stereotypes deny that they are refugees. As such, refugee women 
fluctuate between visibility and invisibility or strategies of concealment in conformity to their 
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needs and objectives in specific contexts (see also Polzer 2008). This renders the refugee 
status “malleable and dynamic” (Zetter 1991: 40). 
 
In conclusion, the interfaces between refugee women on the one hand and the UNHCR, 
Kenyan authorities and local populations on the other hand occur within a broader framework 
of a refugee regime that conceptualises refugee presence in Kenya as temporary and therefore 
opts to deter integration and rooting. This is achieved by sequestering refugees, keeping them 
in limbo in the camps and creating disorder and uncertainty among those self-settled in 
Nairobi. The encampment-repatriation regime is sustained by UNHCR officials and Kenyan 
police officers’ agency which transforms their encounter with refugee women from a formal, 
professional encounter governed by rules and the law into an informal, personal interface 
characterised by “multiple autonomies and parallel structures of organisations and arenas [in 
which] wheels turn and deals are made” (Sally Falk Moore 2000: 29). Sexual favours and 
financial benefits through bribery and extortion are examples of such deals which illustrate 
the discrepancy between rules and their application thus showing how contexts guided by 
enforcement of rules in reality provide space for extra-legal activities. Rules can be altered 
“whenever it is situationally advantageous to do so” (Sally Falk Moore 2000: 6). Rules and 
laws that govern the conduct of UNHCR officials and Kenyan police officers are interpreted 
and enforced in a context of social life, processes and action by which they produce 
unanticipated consequences such as a socio-economic field characterised by investment, 
acquisition and accumulation of political, economic and social capital. 
 
Refugees’ residence in Nairobi in defiance of the encampment regime plays into officials’ 
hands in a country where politicians and the media constantly remind the general public and 
refugees alike that the latter do not belong to Kenya and should be confined to the camps. The 
informal structure in which UNHCR staff members and police officers assign new social 
meaning to rules and the law in the execution of their duties lies at the point where regimes of 
power, knowledge and truth intersect with the encampment-repatriation regime. The informal 
structure and these regimes reinforce each other and are in turn upheld by social technologies 
or structures devised to contain refugees’ political agency and control the physical and social 
space they occupy. However, refugee women devise counter strategies to avert the crisis of 
legitimacy that comes with lack of protection documents to validate their refugee status. 
Refugee women possess the capacity to mediate social technologies and the informal structure 
within which they are implemented such that the women’s agency and these social 
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technologies impact on and shape each other. Legal experiences presented in this chapter 
impact on refugee women’s economic, social and cultural circumstances. These 
circumstances and their connection to integration are the subject of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Four  
Integration: Economic, Social and Cultural Dimensions 
 
If you have never been in a war situation you cannot understand the experience. When 
you flee you take anything, anyhow and you go anywhere even in the direction where 
the gunshots are coming from.  
— Tania, a Rwandan Refugee Woman 
 
4.0  Introduction 
The quotation above depicts the abruptness of flight and how it is rarely preceded by 
preparation because for many refugees, flight tends to be reactive rather than proactive. 
Following Kunz’s (1981) categorisation, the refugee women who participated in this study 
fled their countries of origin as acute rather than anticipatory refugees who flee before the 
conflict escalates and therefore have enough time to make the necessary preparations. The 
women studied are principally reactive fate-groups who “flee reluctantly, without a solution 
in sight; they flee because they react to a situation which they perceive to be intolerable” 
(Kunz 1981: 44). Grace, another Rwandan refugee woman explained, “You do not decide to 
leave, you are forced and it goes against your will.” This is not to suggest though that 
refugees only react rather than act (Hansen 1981) or that they lack the capacity to make 
decisions on whether to flee, how to do so and to which destination as claimed by Kunz 
(1973: 131) that they “resemble the movement of the billiard ball: devoid of inner direction 
[…].” Rather, many people who flee acute situations do not have enough time to prepare for 
departure and life in the next country because of the urgency to be away from immediate 
danger inherent in the events they are fleeing. Many in acute refugee situations particularly 
those from poor backgrounds often reach a safer destination with barely the minimum they 
need to survive or nothing at all.  
 
This chapter examines refugee women’s experiences and their economic, social and cultural 
circumstances as they endeavour to rebuild their lives in Nairobi. It explains how these 
circumstances shape the process of integration which theoretically encompasses legal, 
economic, social and cultural dimensions. In practical and experiential terms, however, these 
dimensions cannot be easily delineated into neat separate categories without one getting 
entangled in the exercise; they are simultaneously distinct and interrelated. On the one hand, 
the dimensions of integration are not mutually exclusive as they are inextricably linked or 
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interconnected and influence each other. On the other hand, what complicates understanding 
the level of integration among refugee women in Nairobi is that the women can be 
economically integrated and still indicate low levels of social and cultural integration and vice 
versa thus showing the independence of the various dimensions. This partly explains the 
diversity that characterises refugee women’s experiences and circumstances.  
 
4.1. Economic, Social and Cultural Circumstances in Nairobi 
The sudden and involuntary nature of flight in conflict situations means abandonment of 
established and familiar livelihoods and supportive economic, social and cultural structures in 
the country of origin. As a result, arrival in the country of asylum signals the beginning of 
challenges that would have been overshadowed by quest for security during flight. The 
circumstances of the women upon arrival in Kenya were succinctly depicted by Tania thus: 
I went to the social worker and she asked me to tell her the kind of assistance that I 
needed. I was speaking through a translator because I could not speak Kiswahili at that 
time and my English was too little. I told her that the way I was standing there with 
nothing was the way that I was in my house. She gave me beans, flour, soap – a bit of 
everything that she had for distribution. Now we had food but when I arrived home 
there was another source of stress — no stove and kerosene to cook the food. 
 
For refugee women in developing countries, the challenges are exacerbated by these 
countries’ lack of capacity to provide for the needs of the refugees (Kuhlman 1991). Kenya is 
a developing country which is still grappling with providing for the needs of its own citizens 
and does not provide material and financial assistance to the refugees that it hosts. On its part, 
the UNHCR does not provide humanitarian aid to refugees self-settled in Nairobi and views 
assisting refugees outside the camps as inconsistent with the GoK’s encampment regulation. 
 
Refugee women who participated in the study come from a wide range of backgrounds.105 
The women in Nairobi are from both rural/agrarian and urban/professional backgrounds. 
Others were self-employed as small-scale traders before they fled their countries. Most of the 
younger women were students when they fled. The UNHCR assumption that refugees are 
from rural background contradicts the trend that has been going on in Africa (Harrell-Bond 
2002). The choice to live in Nairobi cannot be confined to a specific socio-economic 
                                                 
105 Summaries of the women’s profiles are presented in Appendix A. 
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background but is premised on refugee women’s aspirations and agency against the 
constraining circumstances prevailing in refugee camps. Agency among refugees is not a 
monopoly of a specific social class or category as refugees from diverse socio-economic 
backgrounds strategise to obtain the best for themselves and their families (see Shandy 2007). 
This study which represents experiences of women from diverse socio-economic backgrounds 
underscores the aspect of heterogeneity in understanding the women’s circumstances and 
experiences in Nairobi. 
 
4.1.1. Unemployment and Financial Constraints  
Quality of life is central to integration; employment is therefore the most prominent feature of 
the integration process in that it is directly linked to living standards besides that it fosters 
active participation in other societal spheres through contacts established in the workplace 
(Valtonen 1998). Refugee women highlight employment as a priority; it gives refugees a 
sense of economic security and self-respect (Ager and Strang 2004). Notwithstanding its 
accession to the Geneva Convention which provides for refugee employment, Kenya pursues 
a restrictive employment policy which in practice deters refugees from entering the formal 
labour market. Most of the refugee women have been in Kenya for more than three years yet 
they are still unable to join the formal employment sector. 
 
Kenya prioritises its own citizens in the formal employment sector especially considering that 
it has a high unemployment rate. The terms and conditions that apply to economic migrants in 
Kenya are also applied to refugees. Foreigners are required to pay 30,000 Kenyan shillings 
(Ksh30,000) or US$417 in order to secure work permits and access the Kenyan labour 
market.106 Refugee women who trained and worked as teachers, nurses and civil servants in 
their countries of origin are out of employment in Kenya because they cannot afford to pay 
the required amount in order to obtain work permits. The refugees, particularly those with 
professional skills, do not see Kenya’s employment policy as restrictive but as discriminatory 
and exclusionary. They stated that prospective employers in Kenya ask for identity documents 
                                                 
106 An exchange rate of US$1 is to Ksh72 is used throughout this study. The Head of the DRA stated that 
refugees are allowed to work in Kenya with Class M permits, which are free of charge (personal interview, 
Nairobi, 26.02.07). Kenya’s Immigration Act CAP. 172 (25 of 1967, 6 of 1972) categorises the permits which 
range from Class A to M as immigration or entry permits rather than work permits. The Class M permit which 
the Head of the DRA cites is issued to refugees recognised by the Government of Kenya at no charge 
http://www.immigration.go.ke/index.php?id=35 (accessed 28.01.07). The discussions held at the Human Rights 
Day Commemoration also showed the difference between immigration and work permits. Indeed, an Eritrean 
refugee woman specifically mentioned the issue of work permits as one of the problems refugees in Nairobi 
encounter and asked the UNHCR to assist refugees to obtain work permits. Both male and female refugees 
interviewed pointed out that they cannot work in the formal sector because the work permits require payment 
which most of them cannot afford. This was corroborated by the CSO interviewed for the study. 
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and when the refugees produce Protection Letters which are legal identity/protection 
documents issued by the UNHCR, the employers do not recognise UNHCR documents as 
valid for purposes of employment. Epi narrated her experience with a priest at a Catholic 
parish in Nairobi where she had applied for a job as follows:  
I went to (sic) an interview and I was asked, “Do you think a refugee can work?” I 
asked myself, “I have a head [to think] and he [the priest] has one, so why should I not 
be able to work? For how long do I have to be a beggar?”  
 
The priest’s question points to the rationale for encampment which treats security concerns 
and economic interests as mutually exclusive. Confining refugees to the camps means 
suspending their economic aspirations until they can repatriate and this explains the exclusion 
from formal employment of the refugee women in Nairobi. According to Jane, a Ugandan 
woman, the problem for refugees in Nairobi is that the UNHCR does not help them because 
they are outside the camps and tells them that they have been in Kenya long enough to have 
jobs and provide for themselves. This is despite the fact that the refugee agency is aware of 
the restrictions refugees face in the Kenyan labour market. The CSO stated that if refugees 
have the requisite professional qualifications, Kenyan employers offer them loans to pay for 
the work permit and cited a case in which this happened. In practical terms, this is improbable 
except in cases of special skills; there are no incentives for employers to invest in refugees 
when many of the refugees have skills that can easily be found among Kenyans. Exclusion 
from formal employment is a recurrent theme which refugee women cite as the dividing line 
between their lives back in their countries of nationality and life in Kenya. In this regard, the 
absence of economic integration can be understood in terms of discontinuity or a break 
between circumstances in the country of origin and in Kenya. Integration is lacking where 
there are discrepancies between goals and actual, unsatisfactory conditions and life quality 
(Valtonen 1998).  
 
Where refugees are unable to access jobs because of their refugee status rather than lack of 
requisite qualifications, economic integration cannot be said to have taken place. 
Unemployment is both a cause and a result of isolation and social exclusion. Even in cases 
where refugee women can afford secure houses in Nairobi similar to those they owned before 
flight, they view this continuity as a discontinuity in that they do not own these houses and do 
not have the freedom they enjoyed in their own houses; they can be evicted as happens to 
some of them when they fail to pay rentals. The gap between life in the country of origin and 
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in the asylum country was symbolised by some of the refugee women’s presentation of 
photographs taken before flight to depict areas of negative change or discontinuity. This is a 
juxtaposition of home and exile; the past as a happier time characterised by economic well-
being as opposed to the present in which the term problems is deployed and stressed to 
summarise the experiences of exile. 
 
Lack of access to formal employment transcends ethnic, national and religious categories to 
bring the refugee women together as a specific socio-legal category that has to deal with the 
challenges of economic exclusion in Nairobi. Barriers to formal employment also transcend 
refugee women’s socio-economic backgrounds in terms of educational levels, pre-flight 
occupation as well as the rural-urban divide. A corollary of refugee exclusion from formal 
employment is that refugees keep searching for other countries where they can exercise the 
right to use their skills in the formal sector. It is difficult for refugees to seek to integrate in 
Kenya when they perceive their stay in that country as ephemeral. Such is the case whether 
refugees consider the next step as either resettlement or repatriation (see Kibreab 1989). As 
such, for Sudanese and Ethiopians in particular, their perceived reluctance to integrate is more 
of a manifestation of the interplay between economic, social and cultural integration rather 
than pride. Circumstances that deter economic integration by extension prevent social and 
cultural integration. In Valtonen’s (1998: 41) words, refugees who are not integrated into the 
labour market are “integrated into the vast army of alienated and marginalised unemployed.” 
 
In the interviews and FGDs, refugee women converged on the wish to be resettled in a third 
country. Although some came to Nairobi with this goal and saw the city as a transit point 
rather than a place in which they could settle, inability to be formally employed in Kenya and 
use their professional skills to become self-reliant increases this wish despite the limited 
opportunities for resettlement. Tania specifically described her situation and extended it to the 
other refugee women thus, “You have hands and intelligence. […] But we are staying like 
stagnant water. We are surviving instead of living.” The quest for resettlement is therefore an 
expression of the desire to live instead of merely surviving; to have economic relevance and 
usefulness as opposed to redundancy. The women punctuated their discourses by observing 
that they are foreigners in Kenya and this expresses a deeply rooted feeling of exclusion. 
Jossie, an unmarried Ugandan woman explained that she wanted to be resettled in a Western 
country because life in Kenya “is all trouble” and that even if she worked as a maid in the 
West she would earn enough to enable her to build her own house and eventually repatriate to 
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Uganda unlike working as a maid in Kenya where, as a refugee, she believed she would be 
mistreated. 
 
Literature on refugees resettled in Western countries generally shows how the refugees are 
eager to become part and parcel of their adopted countries in terms of participation in social, 
cultural and civic activities (see Korac 2001; Ager and Strang 2004). Many refugee women 
explained that they clamour for resettlement not because they do not want to stay in an 
African host country but because they find the formal employment policy in Kenya 
exclusionary and frustrating. Refugees are integrated in the country of asylum if they “are 
able to participate in [its] economy in ways commensurate with their skills and compatible 
with their cultural values” (Kuhlman 1994:57). This is not the case for professional refugee 
women who exist on the fringes of the formal sector economy in Nairobi not because they 
lack the necessary qualifications but because they are refugees. Exclusion from formal 
employment affects refugee women’s capacity to provide for their families and, in 
consequence, their aspirations for upward socio-economic mobility (Newland et al 2007).  
 
Inability to participate in formal employment leaves the women with two main options 
namely i) seeking assistance from NGOs and churches, and ii) becoming entrepreneurs. Both 
options entail difficulties. Refugees have to produce valid UNHCR protection documents in 
order to obtain assistance and loans for entrepreneurship from NGOs in Nairobi. For instance, 
JRS provides assistance to persons with UNHCR appointment slips for status determination 
interviews, valid Protection Letters also referred to as “Mandates” in refugee parlance and 
refugees with travel documents to the camps. Refugees who successfully apply for protection 
obtain one way travel documents to the camps which, unlike Protection Letters, cannot be 
renewed. If the refugees do not travel to the camp within the indicated time frame, the travel 
documents become invalid leading to loss of NGO assistance.  
 
This system excludes i) refugees who overstay in Nairobi up to a point when their travel 
documents become invalid, ii) refugees with valid “Mandates” but decide to live in Nairobi 
instead of going to the camps, and iii) refugees denied UNHCR protection and “Mandates” 
because their claims to the refugee status were deemed invalid or lacking credibility. A few 
agencies such as GTZ provide assistance to even those without valid UNHCR documents but 
GTZ focuses mainly on refugees from the Horn of Africa particularly Somalis because, 
according to the GTZ Programme Officer, Somalis encounter more problems to integrate in 
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Kenya than the other refugee communities. Of the 34 refugee women interviewed, only 10 
were receiving assistance from NGOs. 
 
Without formal employment and even in cases where they obtain humanitarian assistance, 
refugee women rely on self-employment. Humanitarian assistance is temporary and limited to 
food stuffs, payment for medical services and accommodation in exceptional cases. In 
February 2007, JRS Nairobi announced its intention to halt assistance to beneficiaries who 
have been on its programme for more than one year. Refugees have to provide for their other 
needs such as tuition fees where they have children in secondary and tertiary institutions, 
accommodation rentals, health services, transport and general upkeep of the family. Fifty-five 
percent of the women interviewed were in the tailoring business while the other 45% 
combined Income Generating Projects (IGPs) such as basketry, small shops and Christmas 
card decoration using banana leaves with doing laundry mostly in Kenyan households except 
for one Somali woman who did laundry for single Somali men.  
 
Self-employment requires capital and most of the refugee women who run tailoring 
businesses obtained their training in Kenya with the assistance of the JRS which paid for their 
tailoring courses and provided loans so that the women could get into IGPs. Just as when they 
receive food and medical assistance, refugees are required to produce valid Protection Letters 
so that their applications for loans can be considered. Possession of the requisite documents 
does not guarantee the women that their applications will be successful as the NGOs can also 
turn down applications for reasons such as the proposed project not being viable or the 
refugee women requiring capital which the NGOs consider beyond their capacity to provide.  
 
4.1.2. The Need for Supplementary and Staple Foodstuffs  
For refugees who obtain food assistance, NGOs provide a standard basket of foodstuffs 
without variety. At St Faith, JRS provided maize-meal, beans, porridge and rice from the time 
the research commenced up to the end without variety. Refugees from the Horn of Africa in 
particular complain that they cannot eat the food distributed by NGOs because it is foreign to 
them and Kenyan in composition. For instance, Sarah, an Ethiopian refugee woman asked the 
social worker in charge of the JRS POP to give her more rations of beans in lieu of the maize-
meal rations because she and her children do not eat ugali, the Kenyan dish made out of 
maize-meal. In some cases, the food is not suitable for refugee families’ nutritional needs. 
Harrell-Bond (1986; 1999: 141) observes that humanitarian aid is often oblivious to 
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differences in terms of culture, age and gender whether it is food or clothing; it is planned on 
the assumption that refugee populations are “homogeneous, undifferentiated masses.” 
Donation and distribution of food aid are characterised by the power to label recipients and 
designate them into a specific category “with a categorical prescription of assumed needs” 
(Zetter 1991: 44).  
 
There is also the assumption that refugees’ needy circumstances compel them to adopt new 
diets and that needy populations cannot choose. As a result, the food that is provided 
demonstrates the replacement of refugees’ socio-cultural identities with “a designated 
stereotype, shorn of variety and individuality” (Zetter 1991: 50-51). Despite the difficulties of 
obtaining adequate food for the household, refugees do not see food only through hungry eyes 
but also through cultural lenses that result in them failing to accept everything that is offered 
to them as charity. This explains the fact that even after spending years in Kenya, many 
refugees from the Horn of Africa refuse to incorporate Kenyan food into their diet (see also 
Harrell-Bond 1999). Because of their responsibility for the everyday consumption needs of 
refugee households, women carry the responsibility of finding the appropriate foodstuffs. 
 
It emerged that the type of food which is an issue during the initial period of adapting to life 
as a refugee remains essential to refugees’ lives; food is cultural and failure to access staple 
food is considered a significant loss and an indicator of the problems that come with exile. 
Provision of the same type of foodstuffs without variety often forces refugees to sell the food 
and other provisions such as blankets in order to buy supplementary foodstuffs lacking in the 
NGO diet or staple foods such as a form of pancake called anjera in the case of refugees from 
the Horn of Africa. Conversion of humanitarian assistance into a resource to meet other needs 
not provided for by the NGOs demonstrates innovativeness by which refugees also show that 
their needy status notwithstanding, their own priorities come before those of the NGOs that 
assist them. NGOs disapprove of this practice and interpret selling of food and other NGO 
provisions as irresponsible behaviour. NGOs generally believe that money accruing from the 
selling of rations is spent on drinking sprees by refugee men or used for “luxury” non-food 
expenditure such as hair dressing by women. The social worker who oversaw the JRS POP at 
St Faith cited the selling of provisions as one of the “problems” NGOs face in their work with 
refugees. This illustrates further assumptions about refugees as persons whose priorities are 
limited to immediate consumption needs.  
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4.1.3. Housing and Rentals 
Many refugee women stated that upon arrival in Kenya, they had to move in with refugees 
from their countries or ethnic groups until they had enough money to live on their own. The 
majority of the women live among local populations in poor neighbourhoods characterised by 
overcrowding, high levels of crime and insecurity (see also Human Rights Watch 2002). Most 
of the women live in corrugated iron sheet housing referred to as mabati in the local Kiswahili 
language because these are cheaper than stone houses in Nairobi. Many refugee families 
divide a single iron sheet room into smaller sections using curtains to provide a semblance of 
privacy between parents and their children because they cannot afford to rent more rooms. 
Lack of the wherewithal to access houses suitable for family accommodation translates into 
refugees being forced by circumstances to circumvent cultural notions of decency. According 
to Kuhlman (1994: 57), integration has taken place where refugees “attain a standard of living 
which satisfies culturally determined minimum requirements.” 
 
Why should the refugee women’s circumstances draw attention when Kenyans live in the 
same conditions? Firstly, the circumstances of refugee women merit consideration because 
they live in the insecure and squalid conditions not because they are unemployable but 
because the very status of being refugees keeps them out of gainful employment which would 
enable them to pay for decent and secure accommodation. Refugee women particularly those 
from urban backgrounds had jobs in their countries of origin that enabled them to provide for 
themselves, afford decent and secure accommodation and send their children to school. Some 
of the refugee women from urban backgrounds left their own houses in their countries but 
have to live in insecure corrugated iron sheet structures that are susceptible to temperature 
fluctuations. Secondly, the circumstances of refugee women are compounded by deliberate 
exploitation and victimisation of refugees by locals including state apparatus such as the 
police.  
 
Thirdly, while Kenyan citizens are equally vulnerable to crime, refugees are sometimes 
victims of targeted crime as when law enforcement agents extort from them. Even when they 
are discriminated against by Kenyan police, they are unable to seek assistance from their 
countries’ embassies in Kenya because of the very status of being refugees. In cases where the 
police do not take the appropriate action, Kenyans resort to mob justice but for refugees, 
doing so would put them on a collision course with locals. In this instance, law enforcement 
agents’ indifference to the plight of refugees illustrates how refugees are treated as outsiders 
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whose protection is more of a favour rather than an obligation. Integration entails acceptance 
of refugees as part of the society rather than manipulation of their precarious circumstances. 
 
Fourthly, refugee women experience another form of insecurity in the form of hostile political 
agents from their countries of origin being able to locate and abduct them in Nairobi. As 
much as the women feel more secure in Nairobi than in the camps, the overcrowded 
neighbourhoods and insecure houses they live in do not provide adequate protection (see 
Human Rights Watch 2002). Marie whose husband was once imprisoned on accusation of 
murdering two refugee children in a GOAL shelter in Nairobi feared that there were people 
who believed that her husband had committed the crime despite his acquittal and that these 
people would come to their insecure single room and harm the family. Insecurity is of 
particular concern among Hutu Rwandan refugee women who live in constant fear of spies.  
 
The neighbourhoods in which refugees live are characterised by both insecurity and health 
hazards in the form of poor sanitation, uncollected refuse and limited access to clean water. 
The disparities between the types of accommodation refugee women had access to in their 
countries of origin and in Kenya indicate the absence of economic integration when the 
women are juxtaposed with locals who possess similar skills and qualifications but have jobs 
by virtue of being citizens. Marie, who left a house in her country but now shares a single iron 
sheet room with her husband and two children complained about her circumstances thus: 
You can see I am sleeping by the roadside with rats; no blankets and bed sheets; we 
are living by the love of God. This room is small, not [big] enough for four people. 
There are rats, it is noisy and not secure because it is close to the road. I cannot sleep at 
night because of the noise. 
 
Paying rent for accommodation is a challenge next to obtaining food. Even though refugees 
reside in relatively cheaper neighbourhoods where rentals cost an average of Ksh1,500 
(US$20) per month, many struggle to raise the amount. Access to secure housing is one of the 
markers of integration; refugee women cite their inability to pay for secure houses such as 
those they owned or rented before flight as indicating their outsider status and that “Kenya is 
not home.” There is a close connection between housing and feeling at home; refugee women 
do not feel at home when they live in structures that do not measure up to standards of what 
home in its physical and social sense should be like. Home is not only about shelter; it is “a 
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symbolic space, usually with other symbols inside” (Kuhlman 1994: 38). Safety and security 
are also closely connected to the type of accommodation refugee women live in. 
 
Sudanese refugee women recounted in an FGD that if they fail to pay rent, they are often 
locked out of the house with their children and possessions. For women and children, this 
means exposure to sexual abuse in particular. Sandra stated that the house owner often takes 
the television set until she pays the rent. The women argue that Kenyan tenants have relatives 
and friends to borrow from and that if house owners treat Kenyans the same way, the latter as 
locals can move in with relatives and friends or relocate to their rural homes for some time. 
Cynthia, a Burundian woman, asked, “But when they do it to us, where do they expect us to 
go? They know we cannot go back to our countries.” While refugee women emphasise their 
refugee status, for house owners they are tenants who have an obligation to pay rent on time. 
Cases of refugees who move out just before rent is due in order to evade payment make home 
owners wary of refugee tenants as in the case of Sandra’s landlady. 
 
Payment of rentals requires a constant source of income every month and for women who are 
self-employed, incomes are unstable and keep fluctuating depending on whether the women 
obtain jobs such as doing laundry or have regular customers for their wares. In some cases, 
Kenyans prey on refugees’ desperation for accommodation and hike rentals to exorbitant 
amounts because of a pervasive belief that “foreigners have money” (see also Bukuru 2002). 
The majority of refugees who stay in relatively secure neighbourhoods in Nairobi are from 
Somalia, Sudan and Ethiopia. Somalis and Sudanese in particular have diaspora connections 
while Ethiopians run thriving restaurant businesses; this spurs the belief among Kenyans that 
refugees from these nationalities have money. Somalis are in conspicuous businesses in 
Eastleigh which they have turned into a thriving commercial hub. Still, Rennie from Uganda 
observed that extortion is not limited to Sudanese and Somali refugees and claimed that 
Kenyans who lease out houses hike rentals when they notice that the tenant is a foreigner.  
 
4.1.4. Access to Medical Services 
Refugee women with medical problems cite access to medical care as the main reason for 
their decision to stay in Nairobi where they do not have to go through UNHCR bureaucracy 
as refugees in the camps do which sometimes leads to loss of life. All the same, with the low 
and unstable incomes, the women struggle to raise money for medical services and burial in 
the event of death. In the limited cases that refugees are considered eligible for medical 
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assistance, the latter is provided on specific days such as every Monday in the case of the 
JRS. This means that refugees have to wait for Mondays to obtain medical vouchers from the 
organisation’s POP. It is only the refugees eligible for food assistance who are also eligible 
for medical assistance. The GTZ directly provides medical assistance but this service is 
specifically meant for refugees from the Horn of Africa especially Somalis. Refugees are 
unable to openly complain or suggest better service delivery methods as humanitarian 
assistance is provided as an act of generosity rather than obligation.  
 
Although refugee women from the Great Lakes region have better chances of social and 
cultural integration, this does not translate into better chances of economic integration. Great 
Lakes women are still excluded from formal employment and equally experience economic 
hardships thus rendering them as deserving of GTZ medical assistance as those from the Horn 
of Africa. In cases of complications and medical problems that require specialist services, 
refugees have to pay for such services. Hali, who had undergone breast cancer surgery, related 
her experiences and failure to go for radiotherapy and post-surgery check-up because of lack 
of money and failure to obtain assistance from NGOs. She lamented the loss of her family and 
home and pointed out that if she had had such a problem before the war that killed her father, 
her family would have afforded the treatment that she needed. In cases of illness in refugee 
households, it is the women who shoulder a greater responsibility because of their care giving 
roles; they have to feed the sick family members when food is not readily available and take 
them for treatment when they do not have money to pay for medical services. 
 
4.1.5. Education 
Under Kenya’s Children Act of 2001, refugee children in Kenya benefit from the free primary 
education policy just like Kenyan children.107 Nonetheless, parents are required to buy books, 
uniforms and sometimes desks to facilitate their children’s education. Considering that many 
refugee women live in poor neighbourhoods and are themselves poor, refugee parents are 
usually unable to contribute to the maintenance of infrastructure in the schools their children 
attend.108 In addition, most of the women cannot afford to buy uniforms and books thus 
resulting in them failing to send their children to school. Refugee women argue that the free 
                                                 
107 That refugee children are treated as citizen children in terms of access to free primary education is to Kenya’s 
credit. This is in fulfilment of Article 22 of the Geneva Convention which states that State Parties shall accord to 
refugees the same treatment that is accorded to citizens with respect to elementary education. 
108 Source: Nairobi Refugee Forum Bulletin of the Nairobi Initiative Interagency Network, November 2006, Vol. 
2. “Refugee Children Find Hope in Nairobi Schools”, compiled by GTZ and UNHCR Community Services 
Team. 
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primary education does not benefit the children much because they learn in overcrowded 
classrooms with limited resources.  
 
As a result, parents have to pay teachers for private extra classes so that children can learn in a 
less crowded environment. Zanie argued that paying for primary education was cheaper than 
having to pay for private extra lessons. However, lodging complaints about the free primary 
education policy would be perceived by authorities as a sign of refugee ingratitude especially 
when citizens extol the policy. Parents are required to pay tuition fees for secondary and 
tertiary education and this is particularly difficult for refugee women when combined with 
lack of stable sources of income. Grace related that she and her husband had saved some 
money for their children’s education but when they fled, they left the money in a bank 
account in Rwanda and could not access it from Kenya thus resulting in them relying on 
sponsors to educate their children.  
 
Some of the refugee women were professionals in their countries of nationality or university 
students when they fled. Commenting on how race and economics coalesce to position Nuer 
refugees resettled in the USA on the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder, Shandy (2007: 
60) observes that educational achievement becomes the most dynamic way for refugees to 
alter their situation (see also Holtzman 2008). In Africa too, being a refugee entails a low 
status and refugee women in Nairobi accordingly view education as an instrumental goal in 
that it is an avenue to a higher status and better future. Educational achievement is therefore 
an aspiration that is central to refugee women’s understanding of integration. For this reason, 
refugees invest their limited incomes in education (see also Valtonen 1998; Horst 2006b). 
Refugee women are frustrated with failure to find sponsors for themselves and their children 
so that they can complete their university education or in the very least pursue courses such as 
tailoring.  
 
Despite the exclusion refugees encounter in the Kenyan labour market which means that 
education does not guarantee refugee families a better future for as long as they remain in 
Kenya, refugees invest in education in the hope of repatriation or third country resettlement 
(see Valtonen 1998; Shandy 2007 on education and repatriation). Claire who has a 
qualification from one of the universities in Nairobi regretted her circumstances because 
relocation could also threaten her marriage to a Kenyan man. A point of consensus among 
refugee women is the view that when education facilitates formal employment, it concurrently 
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engenders independence and emancipation from cultural constraints. Overall, refugees are 
integrated when they have access to education, health services and housing (Harrell-Bond 
2002; Grabska 2006). Integration entails the objective or “hard” quantifiable measures such as 
employment, access to housing, health and education as well as the subjective or “soft” 
indicators such as sense of well-being and inclusion in the host society (Griffiths et al 2005: 
200). The foregoing shows that accessing basic needs is a daily struggle; most of the women 
rely on unstable sources of income to pay for daily needs and this uncertainty has a negative 
impact on their sense of well-being. 
 
4.2. Humanitarian Assistance as an Obstacle to Integration 
Assistance is a humane gesture which is expected to evoke a positive response where it is 
provided. Various organisations pride themselves in their humanitarian mission of assisting 
refugees. Annual statistics are churned out on numbers of refugees assisted and how aid 
changes refugees’ lives for the better with evidence to back up such proclamations being in 
the form of refugee testimonies that extol the work of these organisations and attribute 
refugees’ ability to rebuild their lives in exile to them. Nevertheless, humanitarian aid is not 
always humane particularly in terms of how it is provided. This becomes clear when one 
considers the role of aid recipients in comparison with that of the aid provider. The 
humanitarian discourse portrays refugees as vulnerable, helpless and dependent leading to the 
ultra-paternalistic approach that continues to characterise refugee work (Malloch-Brown, 
quoted in Harrell-Bond and Karadawi 1984).  
 
Refugee women complain that they have to beg and lie so that they can be assisted. Grace 
claimed that some sponsors opt to pay high tuition fees for practical or technical courses in 
private colleges where they have vested interests while beneficiaries of the scholarships could 
pursue university programmes of their choice at a lower cost. Refugee women accuse 
sponsors of funding “lower class” courses and assert that this is meant to keep them 
dependent. The issue is not whether or not refugees need aid but “the kind of help they 
receive, the way help is provided, and the role which they are forced to assume to get it” 
(Harrell-Bond 1999: 139, emphasis in original). Hali related an incident in which her sponsor 
chose to fund a tailoring course instead of a degree programme in International Relations at 
one of the universities in Nairobi. According to Hali, “They [sponsors] like it if you keep 
going back to them asking for more help — telling them that you cannot buy a sewing 
machine on your own, that you need a loan.” This perpetual dependence enables aid 
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organisations to exercise power and control over the women in terms of what they can and 
cannot do with the kind of assistance they receive. Ironically, it is this very dependence that 
the women intended to escape when they opted out of the camps and relocated to Nairobi. 
 
For Grace, “You study for one year [only] and which course can you do in one year if you 
want to empower yourself? That is like genocide!” The women do not view relief assistance 
as a solution besides that it leaves them with a low self-esteem (see also Valtonen 1998). 
Refugee women’s views buttress the observation that where humanitarian aid is concerned, 
refugees express feelings of humiliation and loss of status, self-esteem and self-confidence 
because of the way they are treated by humanitarian agencies (Harrell-Bond 1999). Refugees’ 
needy circumstances turn them into “objects of a special, philanthropic mode of power […] 
the political, historical, and biological specificity of their lifeworlds vanishes into a vast 
register labelled ‘unknowable, irrelevant, unconfirmed, unusable.’” (Malkki 1995a: 296). In 
constructing refugee women as dependent, humanitarian assistance providers fail to capitalise 
and build upon the women’s skills and capacities (Byrne and Baden 1995). The homogenising 
depiction of refugees as bearers of an immutably vulnerable and victim status exemplifies 
what Malkki (1997: 225) refers to as the “accustomed circuits of international policy science.” 
 
Many Kenyans are in the tailoring business as well and this means that refugee women face 
competition in the market resulting in them struggling to obtain money for basics such as food 
and rentals. Refugees are not economically integrated in situations where they obtain “from 
hand to mouth” assistance which does not facilitate self-reliance in the long run. Nevertheless, 
aid workers continue to operate on the basis of the stereotypical image of refugees, 
particularly those in poor parts of the world as perpetually dependent and incapable of being 
weaned from relief aid (Harrell-Bond 1986; Hyndman 1997). Refugee women’s experiences 
illustrate how they are treated as the “known” and rarely consulted, allowed to lead or get 
involved in issues that affect them (Mazur 1989; Verdirame and Harrell-Bond 2005). It is a 
paradox that NGOs cite inadequate resources as a major problem yet their programmes 
demonstrate reluctance to wean refugees from assistance by harnessing their resources and 
enabling them to become economically independent in the long run.  
 
The “he who pays the piper calls the tune” attitude is observable where aid is given (see 
Harrell-Bond 1986: 14; Hanlon 1987). Some of the women pointed out that they do not seek 
assistance from NGOs and the UNHCR not because they do not need it but because they 
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cannot bear being treated as beggars and being related to, in Cynthia’ words, as “people who 
cannot think” by staff in these organisations. The women related experiences in which NGOs, 
just like the UNHCR, keep turning them away without assistance and asking them to come 
back another time until the women give up. Refugee women’s perspectives are rarely heard 
beyond the common heart-rending narratives of their experiences of violence and trauma. The 
provision of humanitarian assistance has a power dimension to it in that it is the UNHCR and 
NGOs that determine the kind of assistance that refugees receive on the basis of the 
assumption that people in need cannot choose. As a result, emphasis is placed on relief 
assistance which is expensive and wasteful in human and financial terms because it stifles 
refugees’ creativity (Harrell-Bond 1986). 
 
There are cases in which NGOs assist some of the women after turning away equally 
deserving women. Even where the NGOs have valid reasons for their actions, failure to 
understand the criteria used to determine who gets assistance raises charges that NGOs are 
biased towards specific nationalities. For example, Zeinab, a Somali refugee woman, accused 
the JRS of prejudice against Somalis and favouritism towards refugees from the Great Lakes 
region. In fact, every nationality accuses NGOs of discrimination and believes that the other 
nationalities or ethnicities are the ones receiving assistance. In highlighting the challenges that 
the JRS encounters, Mercy Muchai, the JRS Officer, pointed out that the organisation has 
financial problems that hamper its efforts to assist refugees as it intends.109 She cited Somali 
women in particular and pointed out that the organisation cannot afford the huge sums they 
ask for as they prefer big businesses such as flying to Dubai to buy clothes and jewellery for 
retail in Kenya while the other refugee women are mostly into small tailoring businesses.  
 
The organisation of assistance to refugees and other needy populations is such that there are 
no mechanisms put in place to enable refugees to evaluate the assistance programmes that are 
meant to benefit them. Evaluation of these projects is usually the prerogative of the 
organisations themselves. Refugees are expected to appreciate whatever is offered in the name 
of aid and those who complain are reprimanded for ingratitude (Hyndman 1996; Malkki 
1997; Harrell-Bond 1999). For most aid organisations, aid is an act of charity which can be 
withdrawn if the beneficiaries “misbehave” (see Verdirame 1999). Sponsors therefore 
exercise the power to “discipline” refugees who do not conform to behaviour expected of 
them. Assistance is used as a mechanism of control, a form of social technology by which 
                                                 
109 Personal interview with Mercy Muchai, the JRS Officer, Nairobi, 23.02.07. 
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refugee women are expected to exhibit a specific kind of attitude and behaviour with failure to 
do so being punished by withdrawal of aid. Accordingly, Hali was asked to find another 
sponsor if she wanted the university degree instead of the tailoring course; faced with such an 
option when sponsors are difficult to find, she ended up taking the tailoring course. 
 
Although many humanitarian agencies subscribe to the principles of participatory approach in 
handling refugee-related issues, most of them are not prepared to go beyond the rhetoric 
particularly where refugees’ views are at variance with agencies’ priorities and interests 
(Kibreab 2004). Denying refugees the opportunity to communicate their honest opinion has 
resulted in relief aid being offered where refugees prefer investment in their education so that 
they become self-reliant in view of the protracted nature of conflicts in their countries of 
origin. Self-reliance entails the ability to provide food, access housing, health services, 
education and cope with unexpected events such as death with little reliance on outside 
assistance.110  It is a precursor to local integration as well as the other durable solutions 
namely voluntary repatriation and resettlement in a third country.111 The absence of refugee 
feedback is also detrimental to the organisations in that the refugees simply draw their own 
conclusions which often overshadow the organisations’ achievements. Shandy (2007: 2) aptly 
observes that “the tendency to highlight refugees’ presumed helplessness augments the power 
of those offering assistance while diminishing the ways in which refugees are social actors.”  
 
Humanitarian assistance facilitates economic integration where it has self-sufficiency rather 
than relief and immediate sustenance as its long-term goal. Instances in which refugees spend 
years of their lives in exile depending on food handouts only demonstrate the 
inappropriateness of the assistance that is provided. Most of the women in the tailoring 
businesses still need assistance, for example, on tuition fees. Nonetheless, the organisations 
continue to provide relief assistance for refugee women in protracted situations because of the 
presumption that if refugees become self-sufficient they will not repatriate. On the basis of 
this presumption, humanitarian organisations provide aid that merely creates a “bare life – the 
kind of life that is suitable for waiting [for repatriation]” (Simon Turner 2006: 57). As part of 
social technologies put in place to channel refugees towards repatriation, the aid provided is 
enough to keep them alive but not adequate enough to facilitate integration which is perceived 
                                                 
110  Global Consultations on International Protection, 4th Meeting, 25 April 2002, “Local Integration”. 
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3ccd64536.pdf (accessed 05.04.08). 
111 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Standing Committee 33rd Meeting, 2 June 
2005, “Local Integration and Self-reliance”. http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/42a0054f2.pdf (accessed 
05.04.08). 
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as antithetical to repatriation. Humanitarian organisations operate on the presupposition that 
they know what is best for refugees. They dispense their duties on the basis of “a benevolent 
but bureaucratic rational logic” (Simon Turner 2006: 39) which endows them with the power 
to label refugees as people with “bureaucratically assumed needs” (Zetter 1991: 40). 
Refugees’ self-perception is usually different from these labels and stereotypes leading to 
discrepancies between refugees’ real and assumed needs. 
 
4.3. Exile, Gender Roles and Intra-household Dynamics 
Although both refugee women and men encounter challenges in exile, experiences emanating 
from these challenges are gendered. Hali presented the gendered nature of the experiences 
that come with refugeeness and exile as follows: 
[M]ost of African women are stronger than men, […] in terms of fetching water and 
going for food distribution, when you look at it, the majority are women, when men 
run away from the country [of origin] and they don't even know where to start from 
and the lifestyle they are supposed to have, they just sit somewhere thinking and 
wondering in which way they can get out of this situation. But women have to go 
ahead making the house, following [taking care of] children, fetching water, going for 
food distribution, bring[ing] the food, cooking, […] there are so many things they can 
do. But an African man ... even sending him to buy tomatoes in the market, he feels 
ashamed and I have never seen a man doing such work like that […]. And not all men 
help their wives; there are very few or selected men who can do such a thing. And 
unless also they are interested in getting something from the wife; […] otherwise they 
don't.  
 
It is mostly refugee women who find it difficult to leave Kenya for countries where they can 
be formally employed because they have children in their care and movement could only be 
possible through UNHCR, third country governments and NGO resettlement programmes. 
This is illustrated by the fact that of the ten refugee men interviewed, only one of them has his 
family with him in Nairobi. Of the remaining nine, four of the men left their wives and 
children in their countries of origin while the other five are single. One of the men left Kenya 
towards the end of fieldwork for South Africa and another was planning to leave Kenya also 
for South Africa because refugees are allowed to stay in urban areas and work in the latter. In 
contrast, only two out of the thirty-four refugee women interviewed do not have children but 
the two women have to look after their siblings who depend on them. Although refugee men 
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are also unable to work in the formal labour market in Kenya, refugee women see this 
restriction as more detrimental to women. According to Marie: 
Women have more problems than men. As a woman I need sanitary towels every 
month. A woman needs to go to the salon and take the children too but if you don’t 
have money it is a problem. When the child cries, I have to do something when she 
wants food but my husband can go outside. My children have no shoes, no slippers and 
no body cream. I do not have money for shopping for the children; this problem is for 
me. As a mother, when I see these problems I get affected emotionally and 
psychologically and when the children go to school without food it is a problem for me 
as a mother.  
 
The gendered nature of the refugee status and the challenges that it entails is rationalised by 
reference to biological facts that place women and men in different circumstances. Exile as 
presented by Marie poses unique challenges for women in terms of both biology and gender. 
Loss of livelihoods in exile has repercussions for refugee women regarding performance of 
roles and fulfilment of responsibilities that define womanhood in African contexts. Lack of 
income premised on the refugee status places the very essence of womanhood, femininity and 
motherhood on unstable ground thus illustrating how economic circumstances impinge on 
social and cultural integration in Nairobi. Maternity is invoked to sustain the argument that 
women have more problems than men. A point of convergence among the different refugee 
nationalities is gender relations within households; across the diverse national and cultural 
backgrounds, men are assigned the position of household head while child-rearing is a 
responsibility for women. In the logic of refugees’ cultures which can be extended to African 
cultures and social organisation in general, women as mothers are assigned a pivotal role in 
family life such that relationships within the family are organised around them (Oyewumi 
2001; 2003; Sideris 2003).  
 
It is the refugee women who play the child-rearing role and where they cannot provide for the 
children even in the presence of their husbands; this becomes a case of failed motherhood 
leading to the emotional and psychological stress mentioned in the quotation above. 
Construction of motherhood in African contexts portrays it as conferring respect, dignity and 
privilege on women (Oyewumi 2001; Makinde 2004). Womanhood and motherhood are a 
source of pride and dignity where the obligations they entail can be fulfilled and become a 
source of embarrassment and humiliation where circumstances do not permit the women to 
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perform their gender roles to cultural expectations. On the other hand, refugee men as 
husbands and fathers play culturally-defined gender roles that enable them to distance 
themselves “from the children’s cries for food” (Moser 1993: 24). As men seek refuge outside 
the home, it is the women who have to fill in the permanent or temporary void besides 
fulfilling the obligations that motherhood and womanhood entail. This practically translates 
into refugee women shouldering the burden of sustaining the family without respite. In this 
respect, lack of employment is one of the vicissitudes of exile and a major obstacle to 
economic integration with repercussions for refugee women’s ability to fulfil their culturally-
defined roles in Nairobi. 
 
The difficulties of economic integration are also experienced by single refugee mothers who 
fled their countries of nationality after their husbands’ abduction by their political adversaries. 
Four refugee women are in this category and in all the four cases, the husbands disappeared 
without trace and the women do not know whether they are still alive. Jane and Mandy, two 
of the women who are from Uganda stated that before flight, it had mainly been their 
husbands who earned incomes while they stayed at home looking after the children. The other 
two women, Sarah and Sofie, are from Ethiopia and operated small businesses such as kiosks 
before flight while their husbands had formal jobs. A fifth case involved Shaki, a Somali 
widow who was the last wife in a polygamous marriage. The women’s main challenge is how 
to fill the economic and social void created by loss of their husbands. Forbes Martin (2004) 
points out that refugee women’s assumption of new roles in exile is one of the main 
challenges the women have to grapple with. This is particularly the case for African refugee 
women because of the clear delineation of gender roles that characterises the continent’s 
peoples.  
 
For Shaki, the challenges are exacerbated by the fact that her circumstances as a refugee 
widow subvert her Islamic faith which places the responsibility of providing for the family on 
the man. The institution of purdah or the seclusion of women is largely upheld by those who 
have the resources to keep their wives from the public sphere (Salamone 2005). In exile, 
many Muslim Somali refugee women are re-socialised by circumstances into roles defined in 
cultural and religious terms as male which they have to shoulder together with the burden of 
child-rearing in a country where opportunities for gainful employment or regular incomes are 
severely constrained. It is refugee women from backgrounds where men provided for the 
households who tend to have fewer personal resources to fend for themselves compared to 
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women from backgrounds where they had to provide for themselves (Byrne and Baden 1995). 
The women’s children have been forced to drop out of secondary school or to stop after 
completing their primary education and where possible, find ways of earning incomes to help 
their mothers. With the value refugee families attach to education, this is a form of social 
dislocation that results in the children’s failure to get an education being a source of stress for 
refugee mothers. A combination of assumption of responsibilities culturally defined as male 
and barriers to economic, social and cultural integration results in life in exile being a struggle 
or what Zeinab from Somalia termed “another war without guns”.  
 
The gendered implications of the refugee status and exile are further illustrated by the 
circumstances of refugee women who came to Kenya with their husbands but the latter 
abandoned the family because of the hardships that life in Nairobi entails. There are two 
deserted women with a third case being Mary, an Ethiopian woman whose husband went to 
find his daughter in Mombasa but never came back. Mary believes that her husband did not 
abandon her but might have been killed by the man who took their daughter away from 
Nairobi on the pretext that he wanted to employ her; both the husband and the daughter could 
not be located. Mary faces challenges similar to those faced by Mose, a Ugandan woman and 
Zanie, a Sudanese woman whose husbands abandoned them and the children. Like women 
who came to Kenya without their husbands, women who are forsaken by their husbands in 
Kenya or widowed face the challenge of raising children as single mothers. The cultural 
definitions of gender roles in many parts of Africa are such that child rearing and nurturing 
roles are feminised while fatherhood and masculinity are distanced from the children 
(Magwaza 2003). While this enables African men in general to evade nurturing of children, in 
Nairobi refugee men go on to subvert the same cultures that confer on them the status of 
household heads; the privileges that patriarchy bestows on them entail obligations and refugee 
men forego the former in order to evade the latter. 
 
Refugee men who cannot live up to cultural expectations resort to abandonment as a way of 
soothing masculinities bruised by the vagaries and uncertainty of life in Nairobi. This 
tendency can also be observed among non-refugee men in Kenya where men deal with the 
inferiority complex emanating from inability to provide for the family by engaging in extra 
marital affairs in order to “relax” and be “comforted” (Silberschmidt 2005: 195). Despite the 
vulnerability that comes with the unmarried status, Mose, a twenty-seven year old woman 
who knew that her husband was staying in Kibera slum in Nairobi while she stayed in a part 
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of Nairobi called Kangemi, expressed lack of interest in asking him to help take care of their 
three children. She explained her reluctance to do so by stating that the husband had always 
spent his income from an informal construction job on alcohol and beaten her up when she 
asked for money. She also expressed trepidation that after the time the husband had spent 
away from her, he may have contracted HIV/AIDS and it was better for her to struggle on her 
own to take care of the children rather than risk getting infected with the virus. For Mose: 
My biggest problem is the children and a place where I can stay. I need to eat and pay 
rent but I do not know how to do that without a job. I have two sons and a daughter 
and my problem is when my children grow up where will they go since I do not have 
any land? I do not see men’s problems; I only see my problems. I am the one with the 
children and the man does not have the children and it is easier for him. 
 
The financial challenges and the concomitant struggle to meet refugee families’ immediate 
needs intersect with lack of land as an economic asset. In agrarian economies such as those 
that characterise many parts of Africa, land is a valuable economic asset with a socio-cultural 
meaning as it also defines notions of belonging. Land ownership in the context of Nairobi is 
about ownership of plots where Kenyans produce maize, vegetables and fruits, and most 
importantly in such an urban context, space where residents can build homes. For refugee 
women from rural backgrounds, exile entails loss of ownership and access to land leading to 
loss of heritage for their children. In this case, inability to own land in Kenya thwarts efforts 
at economic integration in addition to its socio-cultural ramifications for refugee children in 
the absence of legal provisions that facilitate their naturalisation in Kenya. Land ownership is 
a marker of belonging which is the ultimate indicator of integration (Ager and Strang 2004). 
Inability to own or access land is in consequence a pointer to the outsider status. It is in this 
context that refugee women deploy concepts such as foreigners and problems in defining 
themselves and their economic, social and cultural circumstances.  
 
Exile means loss of livelihoods and social networks which are particularly important in kin-
based societies such as those that still prevail in many parts of Africa. Without appropriate 
supportive economic, social and cultural structures, it is difficult for refugee women to create 
a home in Nairobi. Many refugee women regret how flight severed their ties with the 
extended family and, in consequence, the economic and social support that accrues from this 
broad family institution. The women observe that back in their countries of origin, siblings 
and other relatives would assist. According to Jane, a Pentecostal Ugandan woman, “Home is 
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home, but here once you have a problem you face it on your own; no brothers and sisters and 
at home you run to your brother, sister or friend but in Kenya you are only with God.” 
 
Although refugee women abandoned by their husbands encounter problems underscored 
above, having a man in the house in the context of exile entails challenges of a different 
nature. Most refugee couples had jobs in their countries of origin. In Nairobi, it is mostly the 
refugee women who run IGPs. For married refugee women, this means providing for the 
children as well as the husbands. Having been shut out of the formal sector, most men find it 
difficult to earn incomes in the informal sector which they feminise by arguing that tailoring, 
basketry and doing other people’s laundry constitute “women’s work.” Of the ten men 
interviewed, only two earned incomes from wood carvings and designing Christmas cards 
using dried banana leaves. In a discussion, refugee men argued that they could not carve even 
after watching other men carve because, unlike “women’s work”, carving was difficult. On 
the contrary, women who are into basketry learnt by watching other women (see also Martin 
1999) and stated that the difficult economic situation they find themselves in had taught them 
to weave baskets.  
 
Michelle who is employed as a tailor by a Catholic priest who runs a tailoring project for 
refugee women in Kangemi, Nairobi sees as the main challenge the task of raising five 
children in a household where the husband is not engaged in any kind of economic activity 
and depends on her income. Tania complained that when her husband goes out he comes back 
with nothing and when he stays in the house and she goes out, she finds everything exactly 
the way she would have left it. Although Tania’s husband assists in the tailoring business, 
Tania presents life in refugee households as difficult because the men are inflexible. She 
complained of being overworked; she has to do the domestic chores in addition to the 
tailoring business and declared that men’s lack of flexibility is the reason why refugee 
marriages do not last once refugees are resettled in Western countries. It is worth quoting her 
at length: 
When you get there [Western countries], you get the chance to work and you see men 
working and you ask yourself what you are doing with a man who is not helping you. 
Women are suffering. Men are suffering too; they are suffering from an inferiority 
complex because the men cannot provide anything. He [her husband] went out today 
and the children are here and cooking because I am here to see to it that things work 
well in this house. Men are not flexible. I can come and wash [clothes] for you but a 
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man cannot do that; they are selective. The problem is cultural. They are not patient. I 
am married but as a woman I still have many responsibilities like all the work in the 
house — cooking, cleaning, and washing. You know in Africa all these things are for 
women. Even when I was going to school [tailoring course], I still had to do all these 
things. He [her husband] would help but how many times? After I had complained and 
complained and when he helped it was like a favour. If I have a garment for a 
customer, I can work on it until 12am. I take the responsibility to feed the family and 
do the other duties. It is a double burden. 
 
Tania’s juxtaposition of Kenya with Western countries points to the predicament that married 
refugee women find themselves in. Even though the women realise that their husbands cannot 
perform the economic roles that come with household headship as they used to before flight 
and that the women can provide for themselves and their children, they feel compelled to stay 
in the marriage as long as they are in Kenya or Africa where they fear cultural censorship and 
vulnerability for being single mothers. Tania’s view of Western countries is corroborated by 
how Nuer refugee women resettled in the USA have been able to take advantage of a legal 
system favourable to women and the absence of restraining elders to divorce, assert their 
freedom and shape their own destinies (see Shandy 2007; Holtzman 2008). Tania’s problem is 
not the idea that the man is the head of the household but that the man fails to live up to the 
responsibilities that come with this status (see also Silberschmidt 2005). In this case, gender 
ideology is flexible enough to provide reference for refugee women’s viewpoints in the same 
way that it provides reference for men to sustain their position of dominance. Tania’s 
dilemma can be understood relative to cultural censorship of the unmarried status which 
manifests itself in the form of labels attached to unmarried women in many African contexts 
and the vulnerability and insecurity that come with such labels as shown in the circumstances 
of single refugee women in the next section. 
 
Refugees do not strip themselves of their cultures at the border besides that they flee to 
neighbouring countries that, in a broader patriarchal context, usually share the same structures 
of social organisation. Even if refugee women realise that they can provide for their children 
and themselves and render their husbands expendable in economic terms, as long as they are 
in Kenya or Africa as opposed to the West, the husbands remain indispensable and relevant in 
socio-cultural terms; they provide security whether in name only or in real terms. Life in 
Nairobi entails experiences that overturn refugees’ cultural notions of masculinity and 
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femininity. At the same time, it is difficult for refugee women to discard these cultural 
constructions altogether because life in Nairobi also comes with challenges such as refugee 
women’s vulnerability to rape and sexual harassment which can be averted through unions 
with men where there are no brothers and fathers to protect the women. Taking into account 
these socio-cultural contradictions, life in Nairobi is fraught with predicaments such as 
choosing between two different but equally problematic marital statuses. 
 
What makes refugee women’s situation unique is that they have to struggle with problems of 
womanhood and motherhood as well as those that affect refugee men particularly within their 
households. A frustrated husband and an overworked and equally frustrated wife provide 
fertile grounds for domestic violence. Refugee men whose circumstances in exile render them 
incapable of fulfilling the obligations that come with cultural definitions of masculinity often 
experience an identity crisis. Exile ironically opens up opportunities for women that place 
them in positions of comparative advantage over their male counterparts; this riles men within 
refugee households and implicit in the men’s reactions is apprehension that women’s relative 
empowerment disempowers men. The subsequent contestation for power and legitimate 
authority within refugee households often leads to domestic violence (see also Silberschmidt 
2005; Amuyunzu-Nyamongo and Francis 2006; Fangen 2006; Shandy 2007; Newland et al 
2007; Holtzman 2008, Nowrojee 2008). Even though women take on new roles including 
those culturally defined as male, this is not accompanied by a corresponding change of status 
because of the prevalence of gender regimes and ideologies that perpetuate the hegemony of 
masculinity even where the latter is in crisis. Refugee women find themselves ensnared in 
male-dominated structures such that articulation and representation of their worldviews and 
position does not occur within an alternative model but within the framework of meanings 
and cultural categories that these structures foster (Henrietta Moore 1996). 
 
A discussion with refugee men from the Great Lakes region revealed as the basis of men’s 
aggression alarm that women are losing respect for their husbands and “seeing themselves as 
men” (see also Holtzman 2008). Solidarity group leaders in refugee communities pointed out 
that experiences in Nairobi are causing rifts in refugee marriages and that domestic violence 
in refugee households is one of the main problems they have to contend with. Epi, a 
community leader in Kabiria, Nairobi pointed out that in a number of refugee households, the 
crisis manifests itself in the form of aggression and anger displaced on women. For refugee 
women who find themselves at the receiving end, this means fighting a battle on three fronts; 
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they have to struggle in Nairobi to fulfil obligations premised on cultural definitions of 
womanhood and motherhood, assume new roles and responsibilities and simultaneously cope 
with their husbands’ expression of troubled masculinity.  
 
Another perceived source of disempowerment for married refugee men is the fact that while 
they had always controlled their wives’ sexuality prior to flight as a matter of a cultural right 
which could not be questioned in most cases, in exile women seek NGO intervention on 
issues such as contraception and protection from HIV infection. According to the social 
worker at St Faith, counselling sessions go beyond helping refugees cope with trauma and 
stress and incorporate reproduction-related issues which involve pointing out the advantages 
of birth control for people without reliable and stable sources of income.112 Parallels can be 
drawn between the role of NGOs in refugee women’s lives in Nairobi and that of the police in 
the lives of Nuer refugee women resettled in the USA (see Shandy 2007; Holtzman 2008). 
Exile presents refugee women with the opportunity to appeal to NGOs for intervention 
because of the absence of the extended family system which tends to give its backing to men 
in such matters. In taking advantage of the absence of the extended family, refugee women 
demonstrate the agency to turn exile into an opportunity which they exploit to change their 
cultural and social status as women. The transformation of gender relations and the tilting of 
the scale in favour of women partly explain the abandonment of refugee women by their 
husbands. 
 
In a redefinition of gender roles within the household prompted by exile, visits to UNHCR 
offices for identity documents are masculinised in that trips to UNHCR offices are seen as the 
responsibility of men while women have to look for food for the family. Such a redefinition 
of gender roles illustrates how notions of masculinity that confer the title of breadwinner on 
men are undermined to suit men’s evolving circumstances in exile. Nonetheless, refugee 
women still find themselves going to the UNHCR offices when their husbands give up 
because of the several trips that obtaining UNHCR identity documents entails. The process of 
obtaining and renewing Protection Letters and the treatment of refugees at UNHCR and NGO 
offices involves humiliation (Verdirame 1999). The process requires a degree of endurance, 
humility and perseverance and all this does not augur well with cultural notions of 
masculinity; a “real” man is culturally expected to feed his family and provide for all the other 
needs without having to beg. He is “economically and emotionally self-reliant” (Dover 2005: 
                                                 
112 In one instance, such advice was given in the presence of this author during a home visit where the refugee 
woman had had pre-natal complications that had persisted in the form of general ill-health at the post-natal stage. 
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184). The idea of men giving up on the UNHCR and NGOs has to be understood within this 
socio-cultural milieu especially considering that some of the officials who attend to the 
refugee men in these organisations are women. This explains the fact that in some of the 
refugee households, the women and children have Protection Letters while the men do not. 
For Tania: 
The UNHCR gave endless appointments for the whole year and they were telling me, 
“You are patient.” My husband was given for 3months but he gave up. Right now he 
does not have a Mandate but what can I do? I cannot take him by the hand like a child 
and take him to UNHCR. Men neglect small things but sometimes they regret. 
 
The contradictions between the experiences in Nairobi and refugees’ cultural backgrounds 
notwithstanding, refugee men insist that their female counterparts should not adopt what they 
term “Kenyan culture.” A group discussion with refugee women from the Great Lakes region 
identified the problem in refugee households as men’s apprehension that the women would 
emulate Kikuyu women who are reputed for owning many of the housing properties in 
Nairobi and, according to refugee and non-Kikuyu Kenyan ethnic profiling alike, wield power 
to the extent that men in their lives defer to them. Most of the refugees live in houses owned 
by the Kikuyu and claim that even in Kikuyu households where men are present, tenants pay 
rentals to the woman and not the man. According to both refugee women and men, women in 
Kenya boast more power than men and whether this is real or perceived, the possibility of 
married refugee women emulating their Kenyan counterparts rouses feelings of insecurity 
among refugee men who claim that such a state of affairs is “against our culture.” Refugee 
men’s resort to the rhetoric of cultural values can therefore be considered as a form of 
resistance by which they seek to naturalise, renegotiate, recreate and legitimise their position. 
As a dynamic phenomenon, perpetuation of dominance requires it to have the capacity “to 
retain control over the principles of construction of reality, to frame all competing 
constructions within its own definitions, to maintain and control the socially dominant 
representations” (Henrietta Moore 1996: 181). 
 
Refugee men’s conceptualisation of the African woman is epitomised by Sandra, a twenty-
one-year-old Congolese woman with three children and does not engage in any kind of 
income generation. Sandra’s husband is a flower vendor and she related that she stays at home 
waiting for him to bring money; if the flowers do not sell they sleep hungry. Explaining her 
experiences as a refugee woman, she believes that: 
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As a woman, my experiences are different from those of my husband. The husband is 
the one who always has power and I am under him. The man is the head of the family. 
Even if I am employed what my husband says is what I do. It is my belief that as a 
woman I must be under the leadership of a man. […] the man has more problems 
because he has to look after the family. 
 
It is the refugee man who “looks after the family” whose wife believes that she is “under the 
leadership of a man.” Sandra’s views as a woman who depends on her husband are in stark 
contrast to Michelle, Epi, Agfa and Tania’s who provide for their households. Thus, refugee 
men can only enjoy their culturally bestowed privileges where they combine them with 
fulfilment of the obligations that are inherent within these cultures. Integration is not about 
assimilation or abandonment of refugees’ cultures and adoption of local cultures (Kuhlman 
1991). Conversely, refugees’ cultures as presented by refugee men become an albatross 
around refugee women’s necks where refugee men insist that these cultures should not be 
adapted to the circumstances of exile. The men’s depiction of culture as immutable and 
natural and as well as their rigid interpretation of their cultures constrain rather than enable 
refugee women to negotiate their economic, social and cultural circumstances in exile.  
 
The vicissitudes of womanhood are not confined to deserted or widowed refugee mothers and 
those who are married. Unmarried refugee women without children have to provide for their 
siblings where parents are absent. Two single women, Hali from Somalia and Jossie from 
Uganda provide for their siblings from their scholarship allowances of Ksh6,000 (about 
US$83) per month which are not enough to meet their own needs. For both women, loss of 
their parents and the resultant responsibility for their siblings have imposed mothering roles 
on them; motherhood in many African societies is not only biological but also social (see also 
Henrietta Moore 1988). Jossie explained that she has to send her younger brother to school 
using part of the allowance she receives for her tailoring course. She observed that life 
became difficult after losing her mother in 1995 and that there was a time when she 
contemplated prostitution; she described living in Kenya as “a disaster”. 
 
4.4. Vulnerability to Sexual Abuse 
The reality of life for refugee women in Africa requires the presence of close male family 
members within refugee households because security which in many cultures is defined as a 
male responsibility is one of the main challenges for unmarried refugee women. Where 
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unmarried refugee women, widows, single mothers and their daughters do not have male 
relatives around to protect them, they suffer a kind of vulnerability that their married 
counterparts rarely experience in the form of targeted sexual harassment and rape. They are 
vulnerable to sexual abuse by security personnel in Kenya, individuals in positions of 
authority such as humanitarian staff, police and (para-) military officers, members of the local 
communities as well as male refugees (Martin 1999; Human Rights Watch 2002; 2009; 
Forbes Martin 2004). Hali presented the difference between refugee men and women as 
follows: 
The experiences we go through are all the same for both male and female refugees but 
one thing for women, the major thing for women; they fear rape, they fear domestic 
violence, they fear forced marriage. Those are the three major things women face.  
 
Several rape cases are outlined here to illustrate refugee women and girls’ vulnerability. In the 
FGD with Somali women, four revealed that they were raped in Kenya; one stated that her 
daughter was raped while another woman’s sister was raped. For instance, Shaki aged thirty-
nine, is Somali and was raped by two Kenyan policemen at a roadblock while travelling to 
Nairobi. Because of the stigma attached to rape in the Somali community and the fact that 
some of the culprits are police officers, the women did not seek help and expressed reluctance 
to ever do so. Claire, who calls herself a “mixture” because she is of Hutu and Tutsi 
parentage, had her life spared during flight from the Rwandan genocide by a rebel leader who 
forced her to become his “wife” at the age of nineteen until she escaped to Kenya where she 
gave birth to a daughter as a result of the sexual abuse. In another case, Mimi, an Ethiopian 
girl was raped at the age of fourteen in Kenya soon after arrival and had a daughter as a result 
of the rape. Marian, a Congolese girl was raped at the age of fifteen by a soldier from the 
MONUC, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC. She fled to Kenya with the baby born as 
a result of that rape and did not have any family resulting in her being taken in by a refugee 
woman from her country. The last case involves a ten-year-old Rwandan refugee girl who 
was raped by two Kenyan men living in the same compound as her family.  
 
At the time of research, the Ethiopian and Congolese child mothers were both aged seventeen. 
Their problems are about looking after children when they themselves are still children113 
                                                 
113 Under the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the African Charter on the Rights of the 
Child, everyone below the age of 18 is a child. The two mothers are therefore children at law. However, in social 
terms in many African contexts, adulthood has more to do with parenthood than with chronological age. Thus, 
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who need to be looked after and assisted to cope with their experiences and fear of further 
rape. The quandary unmarried refugee women find themselves in is paradoxical in that 
security from sexual abuse by men is often found in attaching oneself to a man. Marian, the 
Congolese child mother, described her predicament by stating that she had objected to 
UNHCR suggestion that she stay in Kakuma Refugee Camp with a family that speaks her 
language because the family could still abuse her and throw her out such that she would end 
up becoming pregnant again. She believes that in Nairobi she can improve herself by going to 
school and “find[ing] even a widower” to marry her. As refugees, the young victims of rape 
need emotional support but the NGOs with the mandate to attend to them are already 
overwhelmed because of the numbers that need counselling.  
 
Even where the women are not targeted for rape, they still suffer harassment because of the 
combined effect of being a refugee and being unattached to a man. Hali, an unmarried 
woman, stayed in a compound where she was subjected to verbal abuse by male Kenyan 
tenants who even threatened to evict her from her room. For single refugee women, the main 
challenge is the pervasive patriarchal belief in many African societies that self and security 
for a woman are mutually exclusive statuses; an unmarried woman cannot be secure unless 
she places herself under the “protection” of a man. Being unmarried for women in many 
African contexts is still associated with indecency and unmarried refugee women have to 
contend with labels such as prostitutes and home-breakers. Language as structured in this 
form of labelling is homologous to structures of social domination (Henrietta Moore 1996) in 
that it forces some of the refugee women into abusive marriages in search of security which, 
in the context of exile, proves to be elusive in that the husbands can still abuse the women or 
desert them because of economic hardships leading to a vicious circle of economic, social, 
cultural and insecurity problems.  
 
For Hali, marriage comes with other forms of insecurity as when the husband turns out to be 
violent or promiscuous resulting in contraction of HIV/AIDS. Hali argued that even though 
marriage can offer some form of protection from sexual abuse and harassment, it is 
constraining in that once a refugee woman gets married, she loses opportunities that require 
her to leave Kenya; she has to consider her husband and family first unlike men who can 
                                                                                                                                                        
socially, the two child mothers are considered as adults. Marian’s appointment slip with the UNHCR for status 
determination categorised her as a minor. A Ugandan refugee man registering the refugees for JRS food 
distribution at St Faith remarked to this author that the UNHCR was not supposed to take Marian as a minor 
because she was a mother. 
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leave their wives and children behind. The vicissitudes that come with the single marital 
status have a bearing on unmarried refugee women’s efforts to integrate into Nairobi; they 
have to juggle their own individual interests with societal censorship and the accompanying 
pressure often leads to more social problems rather than solutions.  
 
4.5. Refugee-Local Populations Interface 
The process of integration depends as much on local people as it does on government policy 
and the refugees themselves (Jacobsen 2001). The concept of interface in this section refers to 
the point where refugees and locals meet. Awareness of refugee presence in Nairobi and 
relations with them depend on their presence in given neighbourhoods. Mainly in middle class 
neighbourhoods, some Kenyans are not aware of the presence of refugees in Nairobi and 
assume that refugees in Kenya are all in the camps. In an interview, Jennifer, a Kenyan 
woman who teaches at a university in Nairobi stated that she had never met refugees in the 
city and related that her only encounter with refugees had taken place in the USA where she 
encountered Somali refugees. In the middle income neighbourhoods, it is only those Kenyans 
with refugee tenants or neighbours who are aware of refugees’ presence in Nairobi. Since 
these neighbourhoods have limited encounters with the refugees because most of the refugees 
cannot afford to pay the required amounts of rentals, Kenyans in such neighbourhoods 
generally view refugees in terms of the broader regional geopolitics presented in Chapter 
Two.  
 
Heightened awareness of the presence of refugees in Nairobi was noted among Kenyans who 
live in neighbourhoods that carry significant numbers of refugees as is the case in Eastleigh, 
Waithaka, Kawangware, Kangemi, Kabiria, Kibera and Kayole among others. Among these 
Kenyans, attitudes range from tolerance to hostility particularly where the refugees are 
perceived to be in relatively better economic circumstances. In cases where locals express the 
view that they do not have problems with Kenya hosting refugees, they point out that the 
political situation in Africa is volatile such that anyone can become a refugee including 
Kenyans.114 They also express sympathy and tolerance for refugees; most of the Kenyan 
respondents defined a refugee as “a person with problems”. For these Kenyans, only refugees 
“from a warring place” (an indirect reference to Somalis), are not welcome because they bring 
                                                 
114 Such views have since been vindicated by events following Kenya’s presidential election on 27 December 
2007. When President Mwai Kibaki was announced the winner of the election, the opposition and its supporters 
charged that the presidential election had been rigged. This led to violent clashes which left between 1000 and 1 
500 people dead and more than 250 000 displaced. Some of the Kenyans in the affected regions fled to Uganda 
while the majority was internally displaced.  
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guns and insecurity into Kenya. While the government pursues a restrictive employment 
policy to protect citizens from competition, 80% of Kenyans who were interviewed expressed 
the view that the government needs to assist refugees by creating jobs for both Kenyans and 
refugees so that the latter can support themselves. Paul, a Kenyan man asked how refugees 
could live without jobs in Nairobi which he described as “the garden of rocks.” Poor Kenyans 
who live with refugees who do not obtain assistance from NGOs empathise with refugees; 
they live in similar conditions of deprivation and understand the poverty in their 
neighbourhoods as a shared plight.  
 
Nevertheless, refugee women encounter problems in their everyday experiences with locals as 
indicated by the example of Somali women in Chapter Two. A thorny issue between locals 
and refugees is the assumption by many Kenyans that refugees obtain assistance from the 
Kenyan government. Interviews with refugees and the Head of the DRA revealed that the 
government does not provide material and financial assistance to refugees. The majority of 
Kenyan respondents stated that although they do not object to their country hosting refugees, 
they want refugees’ stay in Kenya to be “temporary” or “for not more than five years” while a 
few stated that one year was enough for refugees’ respective countries to solve the problems 
that would have led to flight. The majority of Kenyan respondents including those who want 
the government to assist refugees view integration as implying permanence. They argued that 
refugees should not be integrated because “they should go back and help rebuild their 
countries” (see also Harrell-Bond 1986). Refugees that are not perceived as agents of 
insecurity are tolerated but the fact that locals do not want refugees to live permanently in 
Kenya points to the conceptualisation of refugees as ephemeral, a conceptualisation upon 
which refugee encampment is based. Unlike confinement in refugee camps, refugee presence 
in Nairobi raises fears of insecurity, inundation with refugees leading to competition for 
resources and dispossession all of which explain the GoK’s reluctance to facilitate integration. 
 
Although refugee women in general describe their relations with Kenyans as peaceful, they 
cannot freely exercise their rights in their everyday interaction with Kenyans as neighbours or 
landlords/ladies. This is particularly the case where there is contestation for resources such as 
water. In neighbourhoods such as Kangemi and Kawangware where many refugees from the 
Great Lakes region live, water is available for three or four days a week prompting queues at 
the water tap on the days that the water becomes available. In such instances, some of the 
refugee women are sometimes forced to buy water as their Kenyan neighbours resort to a 
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“residents first” slogan which means that Kenyans have the right to get the water before the 
refugee women regardless of who arrives first at the water tap. Sandra pointed out that if she 
tries to argue that she has the right to get the water first on a first-come-first-served basis, she 
is told, “You did not come with a water tap from your country.” This shows the hierarchical 
nature of rights in which the refugee status is below the status of being a citizen. Belonging is 
central to access to resources provided by local authorities; locals view refugees as not 
belonging to Kenya but as foreigners who forfeit their rights by the very act of crossing the 
border in search of asylum. In view of how the refugee status is deployed where there is 
competition for access to limited resources, the refugee status cannot be dismissed as a mere 
“policy category” in Blakewell’s (2008) terms as it is also experiential. 
 
Having been forced out of their own countries, refugee women find themselves in a 
disadvantaged position from which they cannot challenge discrimination by locals. 
Hospitality is granted to refugees if they refrain from contesting discrimination regardless of 
the women’s keen awareness of their rights being trampled on by locals with impunity. This 
conceptualisation of the refugee status is not lost on refugee women as shown by Maria, a 
Sudanese woman who asked, “If our own countries cannot protect us, what can we expect 
here? What can we do? This is not our country.” Integration is characterised by access to 
services without facing discrimination, feelings of belonging and respect regardless of the 
women’s refugee status (Ager and Strang 2004). The women’s experiences and resignation to 
their position portrays how their outsider status works against them in refugee-local 
encounters. 
 
Where refugees in poor neighbourhoods receive NGO assistance, they encounter resentment. 
In such cases, locals view refugees as privileged and this leads to tension between locals and 
refugees (Harrell-Bond 1986). Lack of understanding as to why NGOs assist refugees and 
exclude equally poor if not poorer Kenyans is one of the causes of antipathy. Even in 
developed countries such as the USA, assisting refugees in the face of catastrophes such as 
the floods of 1997 in Fargo, North Dakota and Moorhead, Minnesota was met with angry 
debates resulting in suspension of refugee resettlement during the flood relief effort (Shandy 
2007). In Nairobi, perception of the refugee status as providing access to resources feeds into 
the supposition that refugees have money because NGOs assist them besides the belief that 
foreigners are economically well-off. Thus, for refugees to live in harmony with house 
owners and local neighbours, they have to pay their monthly rentals on time and at the same 
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time present the image of struggling foreigners. It is the stereotypical image of refugees as 
poor, wretched and perhaps illiterate that can save refugees in such instances. 
 
4.5.1. Language and Cultural Barriers 
The nature of social and cultural challenges of adapting to life in Kenya largely depends on 
the length of time individual refugee women have spent in Kenya. Those who have been in 
Kenya for less than one year cite the language barrier as one of the main problems they have 
to overcome in order to relate with and have contact with Kenyans. Kenya has two official 
languages namely Kiswahili and English. This is particularly an issue for the women most of 
whom incidentally come from countries where both languages are not official, not common or 
not spoken. Except for Ugandans whose country’s official languages are English and 
Kiswahili, refugees from the Great Lakes region countries of Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda 
all share French as the official language and speak indigenous languages such as Kirundi, 
Lingala and Kinyarwanda respectively. Similarly, Sudanese refugees speak Arabic and ethnic 
Sudanese languages and, with a few exceptions among the younger generations, most of the 
refugee women cannot speak English while older Ethiopian women are not fluent in English 
and communicate better in Amharic. The language barrier is to a large extent a gendered 
problem in that more refugee men than women already spoke English when they arrived in 
Kenya. This is attributable to preference for the education of men over that of women in many 
African societies (see also Holtzman 2008). 
 
The language barrier constrains refugee women’s access to the assistance they need unless 
they have a translator. Language also influences locals’ attitudes towards the refugees; 
refugees that are fluent in Kiswahili are viewed as more appreciative of the Kenyan way of 
life and willing to integrate. Refugees from the Great Lakes region come from countries 
where local languages share some words with Kiswahili and some of them could speak a bit 
of Kiswahili even before they came to Kenya. Even so, in a country characterised by a keen 
awareness of identities, Kenyan respondents pointed out that even if refugees speak 
Kiswahili, they can identify foreigners from Kenyans because the former speak the language 
with foreign accents. For Somalis, the segregation of their community makes it even more 
difficult to speak Kiswahili and by extension English; learning a foreign language becomes 
less challenging where there is social interaction with those who speak the language. The 
cultural misunderstandings between locals and Somali refugee women who generally have 
unfavourable views about living with locals are exacerbated by the language barrier. 
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Refugee women charge that if one cannot speak Kiswahili and reports a case, Kenyan police 
treat them with indifference. This partly explains Verdirame’s (1999) observation that refugee 
matters seldom reach Kenyan courts. Integration on the other hand means the absence of 
discrimination and enjoyment of equal rights and opportunities by refugees (Grabska 2006; 
Newland et al 2007). Even where refugee women engage in formal employment, inability to 
speak Kiswahili and/or English results in Congolese women working as tailors for clothing 
shops earning lesser than their Kenyan counterparts. Refugee women earn Ksh5,400 (US$75) 
where Kenyans employed by the same shops earn salaries of between Ksh14,400 (US$200) 
and Ksh21,600 (US$300). Even in their own community in Eastleigh, Somali refugee women 
also suffer the consequences of inability to fluently speak Kiswahili and English in that 
Somali shop owners employ those who speak Kiswahili and/or English in view of the fact that 
the majority of the customers are Kenyans or non-Somalis. Thus, many Somali refugee 
women are excluded even by members of their own community on the basis of the language 
barrier apart from contentious clan politics around which social, economic and political 
capital is created and accessed.  
 
For Horn of Africa refugee women in particular, their distinct language and cultural 
differences reduce chances of social and cultural integration which involves a sense of shared 
values between locals and refugees at the same time that the two communities maintain their 
respective cultural values (Ager and Strang 2004). Inability to come to terms with different 
values and practices potentially leads to inhibition and withdrawal from contact with locals 
while shared values, traditions, religion, political views and food habits accelerate integration 
(Kunz 1981). Shaki, a Somali refugee woman, described Kenyans as “westernised” — an 
adjective she used to refer to rampant abuse of drugs among the youths. Most of the Somali 
refugee women express anxiety at the idea of their children interacting with local youths and 
observe that even Somali youths in Kenya are also “spoilt” because they too are involved in 
drug abuse. Similar worries were also expressed by Tania in a paper which she presented at 
the Human Rights Day Commemoration. In this kind of refugee discourse, preoccupation 
with moral, social and cultural pollution or disorder becomes prominent once again. In this 
respect, fears of cultural and moral pollution are mutual between locals and refugee 
communities.  
 
Where children attend school and interact with their local counterparts, they facilitate their 
parents’ social integration. Several refugee women pointed out that they had learnt Kiswahili 
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with the assistance of their children who learnt the language faster because they played and 
attended school with Kenyan children; some refugee children even speak ethnic languages 
depending on the ethnicity of their local friends. It is the Somali refugee women who express 
disapproval of “immoral unions” in Kenya such as homosexuality and prostitution; they claim 
that such practices do not exist in their culture and also in Islam.115 Somali women also cite as 
one of their social problems in Kenya the criminalisation of female circumcision which they 
allege results in them being imprisoned.116 The women get around this by taking Somali girls 
for circumcision in Garissa and Isiolo in the North-eastern Province which is dominated by 
Kenyans of Somali ethnicity. 
 
Somali women also view the high crime rate in Kenya as an expression of “Kenyan culture of 
violence” rather than a manifestation of socio-economic challenges such as poverty. While 
Kenyans view Somali refugees as hostile and violent, Somali women’s narratives portray this 
fear and suspicion as mutual. Zeinab stated that she prefers to live in Eastleigh and explained 
her reasons thus, “I see them [Kenyans] on television killing each other, what is going to 
happen to me who is not from here? I do not know how I can live with Kenyans. No.” She 
also explained that she prefers to live in Eastleigh with other Somalis because she does not 
feel lonely there and that she does not want to live with Kenyans because she does not know 
their languages and culture and as a result would “not be happy” living among them. Three 
main issues run through Somali refugee women’s narratives; these are language problems, 
cultural barriers and alienation as well as fear of Kenyans and concern for personal security. 
These are salient factors in the process of integration (see also Ager and Strang 2004).  
 
Most of the women view clustering along national or ethnic lines as providing protection from 
local aggression. Residential concentration reduces interaction with people outside the Somali 
refugee community in Eastleigh (see also Newland et al 2007 on Somali refugees resettled in 
the USA). The majority of Somali women stated that they “have no relations with Kenyans.” 
Lack of interaction and reluctance to nurture close relations with locals feed into the women’s 
                                                 
115 It is difficult to distinguish between Somali culture and Islam because the two are intertwined in the women’s 
narratives. 
116 The allegation by Somali women that they would be arrested for practising circumcision is intriguing because 
female circumcision is not criminalised in Kenya. Former Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi’s declaration of his 
intention to ban the practice backfired as women urgently circumcised girls younger than the usual age in a bid 
to beat the date when the ban would take effect. Community leaders also resisted the ban on the grounds that 
circumcision was an age old cultural practice and the government had no relevance to the issue; this forced Moi 
to relent. The Women’s Organisation in Kenya, Maendeleo ya Wanawake Organisation (MYWO) uses 
persuasion and collaborates with rural families to end female circumcision (see Reaves 2006): 
http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/36/194.html (accessed 07.11.07) 
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unfavourable perception of local ways of life. De facto integration can be said to have taken 
place where refugees and locals create social relationships so that intermarriages and 
ceremonies such as weddings and funerals are attended by both refugees and locals (Jacobsen 
2001). Somali women’s views indicate that this is not the case with some among them 
revealing that they can speak Kiswahili but only speak the language when it is in their best 
interest to do so. Knowing when to deploy a particular resource such as the ability to speak 
Kiswahili constitutes a strong strategy of negotiating relations with locals.  
 
Segregation or seclusion for Somalis aggravates mutual suspicion and fear thus illustrating the 
symbolic meaning of locals coining names such as “Little Mogadishu” in reference to Somali-
dominated Eastleigh. Although Somali women are involved in lucrative businesses in which 
they sell merchandise imported from Dubai in contrast to women in small tailoring 
businesses, they encounter more problems with social and cultural integration compared to 
the other nationalities. In this case, economic integration on the one hand and social and 
cultural integration on the other hand are independent of each other. Nonetheless, there are 
few cases in which both refugee women and Kenyans reach out to each other and create 
positive social relations as shown by the case of Hali who lives among Kenyans and refugees 
from the Great Lakes region. More on these cases is presented in Chapter Five.  
 
From the women’s narratives, several factors emerge as most salient in the process of 
integration. These are: i) unemployment and the accompanying deterioration of living 
standards in terms of access to food, housing, education and medical care, ii) feelings of 
exclusion or discrimination that weaken social connections with locals, iii) limited provision 
of assistance that is aimed at helping the women become self-sufficient, iv) cultural and 
gender-based problems such as vulnerability to rape and other forms of SGBV, v) concern for 
personal security, and vi) language and cultural barriers. In the context of refugee women’s 
diverse economic, social and cultural backgrounds, these challenges lead to varying 
experiences and levels of integration among the women; this makes it more appropriate to 
refer to refugee women’s experiences rather than the refugee woman experience. On the one 
hand, the situation of refugee women from the Great Lakes region shows that the stronger the 
language and cultural ties between refugees, the greater the chances of social and cultural 
integration. On the other hand, the circumstances of Somali refugee women demonstrate that 
the wider the language and cultural gap between refugees and locals, the more difficult it is 
for social and cultural integration to take place. Social and cultural integration is about 
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receptiveness to difference. This is not the case because of locals and refugees’ representation 
of difference as dangerous and a threat to in-group integration and order (see Douglas 1994). 
 
Refugee hosting in Nairobi is characterised by divergent expectations between refugee 
women and locals. Refugee women expect hospitality where locals expect them to reside in 
refugee camps. Locals generally argue that refugees should not integrate into Kenya because 
they have to eventually repatriate to their countries of origin where they belong. This view is 
not incongruous with the broader refugee regime which bonds or tethers people to specific 
territorial spaces, treats repatriation as the lasting solution and accordingly provides 
humanitarian assistance directed towards survival rather than integration. In this respect, 
refugee women in Nairobi have to wait for repatriation just like their counterparts in refugee 
camps who are in a situation created with one goal – waiting.  
 
However, integrating the hundreds of thousands of refugees from eight nationalities into 
Kenya is beyond the country’s capacity to sustain considering that Kenya is still a developing 
country facing challenges to adequately provide for its own citizens. Cognisant of this 
situation, scholars such as Dryden-Peterson and Hovil (2003) argue that integration could be 
implemented as a mid-term solution which enables refugees to use their skills without closing 
the prospect of repatriation. Nevertheless and even in their disadvantaged position, refugee 
women manoeuvre in order to get the best out of the severely constraining circumstances and 
find solutions to their situation even without official support. Resourcefulness characterises 
refugee women’s relations with the UNHCR, government authorities and locals in their 
everyday life as they seek to create homes for themselves away from their home countries. 
The role of humanitarian organisations and refugee women’s own resourcefulness and agency 
which are vital for survival and integration in Nairobi are presented in depth in Chapter Five.  
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Chapter Five 
Refugee-oriented Organisations and Refugee Women’s Initiatives 
 
5.0. Introduction 
This chapter focuses on external and internal resources that refugee women rely on in their 
quest for sustainable livelihoods in Nairobi. External resources refer to the role of NGOs and 
other agencies in providing livelihood opportunities. On the other hand, internal resources 
refer to refugee women’s own strategies, resourcefulness and initiative to establish livelihoods 
in exile and overcome the barriers they encounter. Refugee agency is not confined to how the 
women deal with power and exclusionary discourses as shown in previous chapters but 
extends to the initiative they take in order to improve their circumstances in ways that 
challenge the stereotypical images of refugees, particularly women, as helpless, dependent 
and pathological. The chapter underscores that the absence of an official policy of integration 
notwithstanding, refugee women strategise in order to get the best possible results out of their 
lives in Nairobi. In presenting how women negotiate the circumstances of living in Nairobi as 
refugees, the chapter depicts exile as not solely about constraints and struggling but also about 
opportunities which refugee women seize and exploit to improve their economic, legal, social 
and cultural circumstances. 
 
5.1. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and Integration 
Whereas women had relied on their jobs, self-employment and the extended family network 
prior to flight, in Nairobi most of the women do not have enough resources and capital to 
engage in IGPs. NGOs, some of which work as partners to the UNHCR, play a significant 
role in filling in the void left by disruption of established livelihoods and separation from the 
extended family. NGOs aim to bridge the gap between country of nationality and exile. 
Assistance from NGOs ranges from the economic to the social and legal. Although many 
refugee women no longer receive NGO assistance apart from those who are disqualified by 
lack of protection documents, this does not detract from the role NGOs previously played in 
these women’s lives and continue to play in those of women who are current beneficiaries. 
Involvement of NGOs in refugee women’s lives has been alluded to in previous chapters. 
This section systematically outlines NGO contribution towards refugee women’s integration. 
There are several NGOs that assist refugees in Nairobi but for purposes of this study, three 
such NGOs are presented in this section to provide insight into the nature of their work among 
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refugee women self-settled in Nairobi. The NGOs presented here are i) Jesuit Refugee Service 
(JRS), ii) Peace-building, Healing and Reconciliation Programme (PHARP), and iii) Refugee 
Consortium of Kenya (RCK). 
 
5.1.1. Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) 
Jesuit Refugee Service is an international, church-based organisation which was established 
on 14 November 1980 by Pedro Arrupe, then Superior General of the Society of Jesus 
(Jesuits), a priestly religious order in the Catholic Church.117 JRS is based on St Ignatius of 
Loyola, founder of the Jesuits’ principles and has a mission to “accompany, serve, and defend 
the rights of refugees and forcibly displaced people” as well as to “promote the justice of 
God’s Kingdom, in dialogue with cultures and religion.”118 JRS’s work with refugees can be 
categorised as follows: i) Parish Outreach Programme (POP), which assists with food, 
medication, blankets (the latter are provided to refugees recently arrived in Nairobi) and 
payment of rentals for refugees in especially difficult circumstances, ii) IGPs which provide 
loans for small businesses, iii) education/scholarship programme which provides financial 
assistance for tailoring courses, secondary and tertiary education, and iv) counselling, pastoral 
care and peace education. The POP provides sustenance to refugee women who do not have 
the means to provide for themselves. Refugee women generally extol the JRS for its POP and 
IGPs. JRS’s POP which provides for immediate needs ensures that refugee women survive 
the most critical stage of life in exile while its IGPs have the long-term goal of ensuring that 
the women are able to sustain themselves once they are weaned off the POP. 
 
JRS addresses areas of refugees’ lives that are crucial for the process of integration which 
begins with access to basic needs such as food, health services, accommodation and 
education. Mercy Muchai, the JRS Officer, explained that the organisation prioritises refugee 
women because they are the ones who usually flee with dependent children.119 Nonetheless, 
the organisation also assists male single parents with dependent children and its scholarship 
programmes support both male and female students who meet the eligibility criteria in the 
form of protection documents and the requisite educational qualifications. The organisation, 
however, faces financial constraints in view of the tens of thousands of refugees self-settled in 
Nairobi. In addition, JRS restricts its programmes to refugees who possess appointment slips 
                                                 
117 Source: “Everybody’s Challenge Essential Documents of Jesuit Refugee Service 1980-2000”. Compact Disc 
produced by the JRS, October 2000. 
118 Jesuit Refugee Service Eastern Africa Region Strategic Plan 2007-2010. 
119 Personal interview with Mercy Muchai, the JRS Officer, Nairobi, 23.02.07. 
178
for the status determination interview with the UNHCR and those with travel and/or 
protection documents. Refugees in these categories access the organisation’s POP for not 
more than two years. Because of the long time it takes to obtain Protection Letters, many 
refugees are weaned off the POP before they acquire the Letters which facilitate access to 
NGO small business loans.  
 
JRS also focuses on an important aspect of life for refugee women namely spiritual well-
being which combines with psychotherapy to help refugee women come to terms with 
experiences of violence and the difficulties of life as a refugee. JRS, through its pastoral care, 
also provides “healing of the soul”. This spiritual assistance is not restricted to Catholic 
refugees and is accessible to refugees from other faiths and Christian denominations. The role 
of spiritual well-being in the process of integration cannot be over-emphasised as most of the 
women attribute their ability to come to terms with life as a refugee to God. Faith in God was 
noted to be an integral aspect of refugee women’s daily struggles as it is in moments of 
achievement. 
 
5.1.2. Peace-building, Healing and Reconciliation Programme (PHARP) 
Peace-building, Healing and Reconciliation Programme is an international Christian 
organisation that began its work in response to the Rwandan genocide in 1994. The 
organisation was registered in 2001 and currently serves all refugee nationalities in Kenya. As 
the name suggests, PHARP’s work is on i) peace building, ii) trauma healing, iii) responding 
to conflict through training, conflict identification and mechanisms of peaceful conflict 
resolution, iv) attending to HIV/AIDS related issues, and v) counselling.120 PHARP also plays 
an advocacy role for refugees through its networking with other organisations including the 
UNHCR. Refugees who seek assistance from PHARP include those with security problems 
and those in need of counselling because of traumatic experiences such as physical violence 
and rape as well as stress caused by unemployment and the attendant problems of obtaining 
food and paying for accommodation, educational and health services.  
 
PHARP addresses issues that affect both refugee men and women and initiates IGPs for the 
refugees. Sébastien Bukuru, a PHARP official, underscored formal employment and 
education as the main issues for refugees. He highlighted limited resources and the difficulties 
                                                 
120 The Mediator, the PHARP Newsletter presents the mission of the organisation. It provides news on events, 
projects and activities relating to conflict resolution and how to achieve the latter through peaceful means with 
specific reference to the role of the church in peace-building. 
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of working with refugees from different backgrounds as the main challenges the organisation 
faces.121 A pre-condition for integration is peaceful co-existence between refugees and host 
populations. Harrell-Bond (1986) points out that conflict between the two communities is 
detrimental to the process of integration and underlines the importance of harmony for 
integration to take place. PHARP’s peace-building work is about peace in the event of 
repatriation and also peace in Kenya. Peace education is particularly relevant to Burundian 
and Rwandan refugees as the sporadic ethnic conflicts in these twin countries have often 
involved ordinary citizens turning against their neighbours whenever the simmering ethnic 
hatred has exploded into orgies of mass killings as happened in 1972, 1988, 1993 in Burundi 
and in 1994 in Rwanda (see Malkki 1995a; Mamdani 2002; Umutesi 2004).  
 
Integration requires unity and cooperation among refugees particularly those from the same 
national, ethnic and religious backgrounds. This can only be achieved where refugees manage 
to contain country of origin hostilities and work towards unity of purpose and peace. PHARP 
builds peace by engendering a culture of tolerance and promoting non-violent conflict 
resolution among refugees and between refugees and local communities. Emphasis on peace-
building does not mean the absence of conflict but the ability to settle disputes in a non-
violent manner and foster mutual understanding and respect among the refugees as well as 
between refugees and Kenyans. Once locals realise that refugees do not conform to the 
stereotypes they have about them, they are willing to co-exist with them and in some 
instances assist the refugees as illustrated by Kenyan respondents who live in the same 
neighbourhoods as refugees. Peace education stresses the common interests among refugees 
as opposed to issues that divide them and this cultivates a spirit of cooperation and oneness 
among them. 
 
5.1.3. Refugee Consortium of Kenya (RCK) 
The Refugee Consortium of Kenya, a local NGO, was established in 1998 and was called a 
Consortium because it was formed by people from different fields to look into the needs of 
refugees. 122  The RCK aims to provide i) legal advocacy for refugees and legal aid, ii) 
counselling, iii) advocacy for a humane environment, and iv) specialised mental assistance as 
some of the refugees are desperate and suicidal. Eunice Ndonga, the RCK Programme 
Officer, noted that it has been basically difficult for refugees to take recourse to the legal 
instruments that are meant to protect them because there has been no refugee law in Kenya for 
                                                 
121 Personal interview with Sébastian Bukuru, Nairobi, 25.01.07. 
122 Personal Interview with Eunice Ndonga, the RCK Programme Officer, Nairobi, 05.02.07. 
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a long time. Issues that refugees bring to the RCK relate to newly arrived refugees who need 
advice on how to adapt to life in Nairobi. Refugees also seek legal advice on arbitrary arrests 
by the police, rejection by the UNHCR and problems with the Immigration Department as 
well as food, clothes, school fees and medical assistance. RCK has counselling sessions; 
Ndonga pointed out that among the refugees who come for such sessions are those:  
[who] had businesses back in their country and now they have lost all that. They may 
be having some means of earning a life here but it is different and not as good as what 
they had back home. Some of them have been here for ten years or more [and] they ask 
us, “So this is how I am going to spend the rest of my life?” 
 
The RCK attends to issues affecting refugee women and children such as rape, trauma and 
domestic violence; it reserves Mondays for refugee women and children. The organisation 
provides counselling and sends rape victims to the hospital. It also provides a platform for 
refugee women to share their experiences through FGDs. However, in view of the lack of 
awareness among refugee women, many women do not seek assistance from the organisation. 
The RCK played a major role in the drafting of the Refugee Bill that culminated in the 
Refugee Act (2006) discussed in Chapter Three. Ndonga outlined as the main challenge the 
absence of a long-term solution in view of the GoK’s reluctance to accept local integration. 
The RCK refers refugee cases that fall outside its mandate to its partner organisations such as 
the JRS, Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society (HIAS), Refugee Trust, Africa Refugee Programme 
(ARP) and Kenya Human Rights Commission (KHRC). 
 
Because of the huge numbers of refugees in Nairobi, refugees’ needs surpass NGOs’ capacity 
to provide. All the same, while staff in these organisations identifies limited resources as a 
constraint on their work, refugee women criticise NGO staff for allegedly abusing refugees by 
obtaining money from donors in refugees’ name and withholding the money from the 
refugees. The women accuse NGOs of indifference to their plight and argue that NGO staff, 
which usually consists of locals, does not understand refugees and is more interested in 
enriching itself than in alleviating the plight of refugees. Such charges are spurred by the 
hierarchical nature of the relationship between refugees and NGO staff which often hinders 
open communication and feedback from the refugees thus creating room for accusations of 
prejudice and favouritism. This goes back to the issue of NGO accountability and provision of 
humanitarian assistance presented in Chapter Four. NGOs evaluate their own projects and are 
more accountable to their sponsors than the intended beneficiaries — the refugees. As a 
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result, refugees rely on the grapevine and speculation for information on organisations that 
assist them.  
 
5.2. Government Agencies 
Currently, the GoK does not provide assistance to refugees. However, one foreign 
government agency, German Technical Development Cooperation is actively involved in 
providing assistance to refugees in Nairobi.  
5.2.1. German Technical Development Cooperation (GTZ) 
German Technical Development Cooperation is an international agency run by the German 
government. It runs various projects which are mostly development-oriented. Of relevance to 
this study is GTZ’s Urban Refugee Assistance Programme (URAP) which assists refugees in 
Nairobi. The GTZ Programme Officer explained the agency’s work with refugees in Nairobi 
as follows: 
Although the government says refugees must live in camps, we are able to assist those 
in urban areas without problems because the government is aware of refugees’ 
presence in Nairobi. For example, one can see whole communities of refugees from 
Somalia in Eastleigh.123
 
GTZ’s position pertaining to refugees self-settled in Nairobi as outlined by the Programme 
Officer is salient in that it contradicts the UNHCR’s claim that assisting these refugees is 
tantamount to “working against the government”. GTZ’s assistance programmes fall into four 
specific categories namely: i) medical and community assistance/counselling, ii) education 
programme for refugee children, iii) legal assistance to refugees who run into problems with 
the police because they do not have protection documents, and iv) accommodation of refugees 
especially refugee infants and children abandoned outside UNHCR offices. Unlike NGOs 
such as the JRS, GTZ assists even those refugees who do not have protection documents. 
GTZ’s gender-specific programme provides medical assistance to sexually abused women or 
those infected with sexually transmitted diseases. Experiences of sexual violence among 
refugee women impact greatly on their psychological capability to cope with the demands of 
life in exile. GTZ helps Somali refugee women in particular to access treatment at a city 
council clinic in Eastleigh. At the time the GTZ was interviewed for this study (February 
2007), it intended to start an income generating project for the women. GTZ specifically 
                                                 
123 Personal Interview with the GTZ Programme Officer, Nairobi, 12.02.07. 
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targets refugees from the Horn of Africa for all its projects and the rationale for this regional 
bias, as explained by the GTZ Programme Officer, is: 
[Refugees from the Horn of Africa] have a problem of integration. Somali and 
Ethiopian refugees have language problems so we pay for extra lessons so that the 
children can learn and we have reports of some of the children having improved a lot. 
Kiswahili is spoken in the Great Lakes region and this helps refugees from the region 
to integrate in Kenya. They are Bantus and their languages are Bantu and this helps 
them to understand Kiswahili and they also share cultural values with Kenyans. 
Refugees are well-treated by Kenyan communities they live with particularly those 
from the Great Lakes region because they are not physically recognisable as 
foreigners. On the other hand, refugees from the Horn of Africa are easily identifiable 
because of their different physical features.  
 
The Programme Officer also explained the Somali bias by describing Somali refugees as 
having what she termed “a religious mentality” which she contrasted to Sudanese and Great 
Lakes refugees who “value education”. GTZ’s education programme aims to convince Somali 
parents to send their children to school as these parents, according to the Programme Officer, 
“do not want their children to go to formal schools in Kenya and prefer sending their children 
to madrasas which are religious schools where the children learn the Qur’an from cover to 
cover.” The parents distrust formal education in Kenya and charge that it is Christian and 
therefore an instrument for proselytising Muslim children. On the success of the GTZ’s 
education programme, the Programme Officer stated that 80% of the children in school in 
Eastleigh were Somali and 60% of them were refugee children as of February 2007.  
 
Even so, the Programme Officer described the organisation’s efforts to encourage Somali 
parents to send their children to school as “difficult” and noted that around 3 000 Somali 
children in Eastleigh were not in school. She made this remark as part of her description of 
Somalis as resistant to changing their (religious) mentality and beliefs with Somali women 
being allowed to attend madrasas only after which they are married and kept out of 
professions such as nursing and teaching. GTZ’s work is complementary to that of JRS in that 
it assists refugee women who are unable to access JRS assistance because they do not have 
the requisite documents as well as refugees with special needs as is the case for refugees from 
the Horn of Africa. Although the latter also benefit from JRS programmes, it is the GTZ that 
specifically focuses on their identity-related problems in Kenya. However, targeting a specific 
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community for assistance is not viewed positively among refugees as shown by accusations of 
prejudice and favouritism. 
 
5.3. Shedding off Stereotypes: Quest for Economic Independence 
Whereas refugees fleeing from Eastern Europe during the Second World War were bestowed 
with agency, refugees in Africa have been portrayed as “helpless, starving masses who 
depend on agents of compassion to keep them alive” (Harrell-Bond 1999: 10). African 
refugees have been constituted as “needing outsiders to plan for them and to take care of 
them” (Harrell-Bond 1986: 11). This perception persists and attitudes towards African 
refugees have not deviated much from the earlier stereotypes. Even organisations that have 
worked with refugees and not less African refugees for decades continue to base their 
programmes on these stereotypical views. That these organisations and the UNHCR in 
particular continue to treat refugees as pathological was demonstrated at the Human Rights 
Day commemorations when the UNHCR representative admonished refugees thus:  
Refugees can never be satisfied. It is not possible to fulfil your needs. If you are sitting 
there as a refugee expecting the UNHCR to come and make your life secure, safe and 
happy, that is not possible. Find ways to sustain yourself. You should know that as a 
refugee you are not helpless, do not become dependent; try as much as you can to help 
yourself and the other organisations will also try their best to help you.124
 
Although they are in the minority, there are refugee women who still look up to humanitarian 
assistance in ways that confirm the stereotypical image of refugees as helpless and dependent. 
Even so, the UNHCR representative’s admonition was remarkable more for its failure to 
apprehend what most of the refugees need from humanitarian organisations than for its 
directness. It is based more on assumptions that “add up to a view of the refugee world which 
is distorted” (Harrell-Bond 1986: 20) than on the realities of refugee women’s lifeworlds. The 
reprimand is also notable for the contradiction imbedded in it namely; many refugees flee 
without capital to invest and help themselves such that they need external assistance before 
they can become self-reliant and not the other way round.  
 
The UNHCR representative’s address exposes assumptions based not on whether refugees 
need assistance but on failure to grasp the nature of assistance refugees need and the 
                                                 
124 UNHCR representative at the Human Rights Day Commemoration held on 8 December 2006 in Nairobi. 
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concomitant view that refugees expect humanitarian organisations to make their lives “safe 
and secure”. The UNHCR and aid organisations in general assume that they know what 
refugees need and their conviction that refugees are objects of charity has led to continued 
imposition of a condescending, demeaning and patronising identity on refugees (Harrell-Bond 
1986; 1999; Hyndman 1996). It is in resistance to this perception that refugee women in 
Nairobi have taken the initiative to work towards self-reliance and in some cases render 
humanitarian assistance irrelevant to their everyday needs.  
 
Instead of exhibiting signs of helplessness and dependence, refugee women express anger and 
frustration with refugee stereotyping which emerged as one of the major challenges that the 
women have to overcome in their dealings with humanitarian organisations. The reality of 
refugee women’s lives contradicts the stereotypical perception of them as passive, compliant 
and vulnerable victims of armed conflict (Sommers 2001). The UNHCR representative’s 
views were directly contradicted by Nancy, an Eritrean refugee woman trained as a nurse who 
implored the UNHCR thus, “We want to work and look after ourselves. Why are you not 
talking to the government [of Kenya] so that we can be allowed to work? Please, we need 
work permits.” The UNHCR representative assured the refugees that the refugee agency was 
working to address the issue of work permits and pave way for refugee entry into formal 
employment. Refugee women point out that the contentious issue is not the absence of relief 
assistance but i) lack of protection documents, ii) UNHCR’s failure to lobby the GoK so that 
refugees can formally work in Kenya, and iii) the limited availability of small business loans 
and sponsorship for secondary and tertiary education. These three issues have a bearing on 
refugee women’s ability to become self-reliant and independently meet those needs that are 
provided for by humanitarian organisations namely, food, medical care, education and, in 
some cases, payment of housing rentals. 
 
In contrast to stereotypes that portray refugees as dependent, refugee women in Nairobi point 
out that they do not expect the GoK to provide material assistance when they live among 
Kenyans who are equally poor and needy. The women indicate that what they need from the 
GoK is an enabling environment and loans or start-up capital from the UNHCR and other 
humanitarian organisations to set themselves up in business rather than charity. Mose, despite 
her near destitute circumstances, asked, “How can the government help us when Kenyans are 
also poor and suffering?” Mose’s view was echoed by many other refugee women who 
unambiguously stated that they found charity demeaning and preferred to be self-reliant — 
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one of the major reasons they left refugee camps and self-settled in Nairobi. A similar attitude 
has also been noted among Middle Eastern refugees in Finland (see Valtonen 1998). The 
women’s needs and expectations of humanitarian organisations can be summed up here using 
the cliché “assisting refugees to assist themselves” (Horst 2006b: 6). While refugee women 
express anger with humanitarian organisations particularly the UNHCR for not providing 
adequate assistance and for its perceived indifference and negligence of its duties, they 
express gratitude to the GoK for hosting them their complaints about police harassment 
notwithstanding. Harrell-Bond (1986) makes a similar observation on Ugandan refugees in 
Sudan and their gratitude to the latter for hosting them even though the Sudanese government 
did not provide them with material assistance.  
 
Surviving in Nairobi entails innovativeness, resilience and the ability to strategise and obtain 
the best out of even severely constraining circumstances (Long 2001). Faced with exclusion 
from formal employment, refugee women secure alternative livelihood options in Nairobi 
through their own ingenuity. It has already been observed in earlier chapters that some of the 
refugee women were professionals in their countries of origin which means that they possess 
skills and qualifications that would enable them to become self-sufficient if they could obtain 
opportunities to put them to productive use. Professional refugee women use their skills to run 
small retail shops and tailoring businesses with the assistance of NGOs that provide loans for 
these small businesses. In addition to individual tailoring businesses, refugee women, 
particularly those from the Great Lakes region, work as tailors in refugee women programmes 
run by the Nairobi Archdiocese Refugee Assistance Programme (NARAP).125 These women 
do not earn salaries but are paid on commission and receive a percentage of the profits 
accruing from their finished products. On average, an individual woman earns Ksh7,200 
(US$100) per month.  
 
The women also engage in casual work such as doing laundry in Kenyan households and earn 
between Ksh100 and Ksh150 (between US$1,39 and US$2) per laundry basket. Making of 
traditional artefacts such as sisal baskets is a vital income generating activity for Rwandan 
women who target the lucrative tourist market in Nairobi. Excluded from formal employment, 
school teachers from the Francophone countries (Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda) are 
informally employed as French teachers who organise with parents at certain schools in 
Nairobi so that the parents directly pay for these teachers’ services. Refugee women who 
                                                 
125 NARAP offers scholarships for vocational training and higher education. It is located in Hurlingham, Nairobi. 
My request for an interview was turned down on the grounds that the organisation “does not talk to researchers”. 
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successfully create economic space for themselves in Nairobi maximise their chances for 
social and cultural integration as their economic ventures open up avenues for interaction with 
Kenyans who constitute the market for refugee artefacts besides foreign tourists. 
 
Resourcefulness among refugee women who are teachers by profession entails adaptability or 
the ability to utilise “peripheral” components of their college training to earn incomes instead 
of waiting for opportunities to work as teachers where these are severely limited. In the few 
cases in which refugee women have successfully integrated, this success is mainly attributable 
to versatility and creativity. Notable examples of women who have successfully integrated 
into Nairobi include Susan, Grace and Tania from Rwanda and Agfa from Uganda. Agfa, a 
school teacher by profession, illustrated this versatility and creativity as follows, “I also 
thought [before flight] it [tailoring] was for those people who are stupid or not knowledgeable 
enough. I didn’t like it when I was in school but now it is the one [occupation] that is making 
me survive.” Tania, also a school teacher, explained women’s ability to find alternative means 
of livelihoods by contrasting women and men: 
Women love their children. You know that pain that we go through [during childbirth] 
gives us many lessons and it is a gift from God. […] In life everything is possible. I 
learnt to do something else. Courses like home sciences which I was taking one hour 
per week [during her teacher training course] are now helping me. Don’t neglect 
anything when you are learning because you never know; that little course will help 
you. It is good to be flexible. 
 
Flexibility entails the ability to strategise and earn the highest possible income from the small 
businesses. It enables refugees to see opportunities in constrained situations and adapt to 
change (Kramer and Bala 2004). It has to be noted that the informal sector is not a refugee 
monopoly; Kenyans are also into tailoring businesses among other informal sector activities. 
The sector is therefore characterised by competition for customers which results in the most 
innovative and creative being able to run thriving businesses and accrue profits. Agfa 
explained that she deals with the competition by developing new designs that attract 
customers from the other tailors. She cited the example of a Noah’s Ark which she designed 
and introduced onto the market. She was assisted by an American woman to sell the Ark in 
the USA and she had to share the pattern for the Ark with other tailors in 1997 because she 
could not meet the demand. Agfa also employs two women, a Ugandan and a Kenyan, in her 
tailoring shop. As a woman who has successfully integrated into Nairobi, Agfa has created 
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employment even for a Kenyan woman and has plans to employ more people should her 
tailoring business continue to flourish. This challenges the position by both host governments 
and some humanitarian organisations that “refugees constitute a problem; a burden, rather 
than an economic opportunity” (Harrell-Bond 1986: 10-11; see also Campbell 2005).  
 
Women’s capacity to strategise goes beyond food provision within refugee households to 
include devising means and ways to cope with payment of rentals. The clustering of refugees 
in specific suburbs of Nairobi is not limited to the tendency for immigrants to settle among 
people from their respective countries and the quest for security in numbers. Clustering is 
strategic in that it also incorporates pooling of money for rentals. Somali and Sudanese 
refugee women in particular live in shared accommodation and this enables them to pay for 
accommodation where, as individuals, they would have to struggle to pay the often exorbitant 
rentals in relatively secure neighbourhoods. Grabksa (2006) highlights a similar economic 
strategy among Sudanese refugees in Cairo, Egypt (see also Holtzman 2008 on young, 
unmarried Nuer refugee men in the USA). Thus, social relationships within refugee 
communities provide a significant source of refugee support (Valtonen 1998). 
 
While Kenyan tenants resent Somali refugees in particular for “displacing” them from 
Eastleigh where Kenyan property owners believe that Somalis are able to pay exorbitant 
amounts because they have money, Somali women’s ability to pay rentals without problems 
can be partly explained by their communal way of life which facilitates resource-pooling. 
Most of the Somali refugee women who participated in the FGD could not afford to travel to 
the Middle East and engage in the lucrative business of importing merchandise for retail in 
Nairobi. Their ability to pay rentals is attributable to sharing of costs wherever possible. 
Resource-pooling also characterises even those Somali women who import merchandise from 
the Middle East. The women pool money for air fare to the Middle East and rotationally send 
one among them to buy merchandise for all the other women in the group. Although 
clustering and the accompanying resource-pooling brings economic stability into Somali 
refugee women’s lives, it accounts for Somali and, to some extent, Ethiopian and Sudanese 
refugees’ low levels of social and cultural integration as illustrated by Somali women’s 
unfavourable attitude towards what they term “Kenyan culture” (see also Grabska 2006). In 
view of this, strategies meant to achieve economic integration are sometimes detrimental to 
social and cultural integration. This could be averted by resource-pooling that incorporates 
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members of Kenyan communities which can be facilitated by development of inter-
community trust and mutual understanding. 
 
Strategies for economic well-being in refugee households incorporate refugee camps. Refugee 
women’s residence in Nairobi does not mean severance of ties with the refugee camps as the 
camps play a role in refugee women’s scheme of things in Nairobi. Camps are significant 
sites in refugee women’s split-family survival strategies. Since the UNHCR insists that 
refugees in need of humanitarian assistance reside in refugee camps, the women get around 
this hurdle by having some members of their households stay in the camps. This ensures that 
they have somewhere to fall back on should their entrepreneurship in Nairobi fail to yield 
incomes (see also Sommers 2001). The women are able to stay in Nairobi without forfeiting 
humanitarian assistance by registering themselves and all the members of their households as 
resident in the camp so that the family member(s) in the camp receive(s) rations for those who 
live in Nairobi. For example, Hali’s siblings resident in the camp receive her food rations. 
 
In some cases, the women live in Nairobi with all the members of their households and travel 
to the camps for head counts and food distribution. In such cases, they rely on personal 
relationships and communication with refugees in the camps. Zanie is a case in point; she 
lives with her two children in Nairobi but travels to the camps for food rations. Movement of 
food is not unidirectional, that is, from the camps to Nairobi. In the same way that the women 
shuttle between Nairobi and the camps, so do food and money depending on who gets what 
first between family members in Nairobi and those in the camps. Women also use the strategy 
of dispersal across Kenya and flexible attitudes towards mobility as opposed to rooting in 
order to maximise opportunities for accessing incomes, food and humanitarian assistance (see 
also Harrell-Bond 1986; Shandy 2007). For example, a single refugee household can have 
some of its members residing in Nairobi and the other major cities of Mombasa, Eldoret and 
Nakuru besides the refugee camps.  
 
The majority of the women’s earnings are low. For instance, many refugee women who run 
tailoring businesses earn a monthly average of Ksh6,000 (US$83). The women supplement 
their monthly incomes by forming mutually beneficial rotating clubs in which they pay a 
specific amount of money to one individual each month in a rotational order. This was 
observed among young refugee women and their Rwandan refugee teacher in a tailoring class 
in Hurlingham, Nairobi. Each woman contributes Ksh1,000 (about US$14) per month 
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meaning that in a group of six women, every individual receives Ksh6,000 (US$83) after 
every five months; this lump sum enables the women to attend to their major plans for the 
month that they have the turn to receive the money. Refugee women’s ability to provide for 
themselves and their families in Nairobi despite the absence of aid or after NGOs have 
weaned them from assistance points to the women’s agency. Instead of being helpless 
victims, refugee women are people with certain resources and survival strategies who happen 
to be in a difficult situation (Kuhlman 1994).  
 
5.4. Refugee Community-based Organisations (RCOs) and Integration 
In the absence of structural and institutional integration policies, there is need to examine the 
role of internal resources of the refugee communities themselves (Valtonen 1998). Refugees 
have specific social and cultural needs which are not met by NGOs that usually cater for 
culturally diverse refugee populations. In order to fill the void beyond NGOs’ reach, refugees 
resort to their own resourcefulness and organise themselves into community groups meant to 
meet their collective needs as members of specific nationalities, regions or ethnicities (see 
also Griffiths et al 2005; Newland et al 2007). Living in exile does not translate into loss of 
cultural identity; refugees desire to maintain their vernacular and cultures. RCOs provide a 
platform for refugees to perpetuate their cultures and pass them on to the next generation.  
 
The notion of community implies both warmth and interconnectedness among members of the 
group (Kelly 2003). It entails social cohesion which involves building of shared values, 
creation and cementing of social relations through interaction and social solidarity (Griffiths 
et al 2005). In this section, the term community is broadly used to refer to national or regional 
organisations that bring together refugees for specific purposes as well as those that consist of 
refugees and local populations. RCOs provide a platform for investment, accumulation and 
utilisation of social capital. Bourdieu (1986: 241) defines social capital as “the aggregate of 
the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more 
or less institutionalised relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition.” As such, social 
capital entails activities that are premised on co-operation and mutual trust and support or 
reciprocity. RCOs have the aim, among others, to construct group consensus and an identity 
that conveys a specific, desired message which counters the negative stereotypes that 
generally characterise locals’ attitudes towards refugees (Valtonen 1998). In the process, 
communities similar to those that exist in the country of origin are reconstructed thus enabling 
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refugees to build a home away from home. RCOs also enable refugees to pool resources for 
events such as weddings and funerals.  
 
Whereas NGOs do not necessarily comprise members of the community or populations they 
serve, RCOs are formed by individuals who view themselves as belonging together because 
of a shared identity such as ethnicity, nationality, religion, language or region of origin and 
shared needs. While NGOs are often formally conferred with charity status, RCOs are 
voluntary associations without formal legal status and organisational structures and a 
professional core staff (Zetter and Pearl 2000). Thus, individuals who are members of specific 
communities join RCOs for purposes of self-help. Although they are initially brought together 
into a contingent community by perceived similarity of interests rather than common 
interests, members of the contingent community over time develop feelings of 
interdependence and interconnectedness leading to formation of a strong community (Kelly 
2003). The challenges refugee women encounter in Nairobi create an atmosphere which 
restricts their ability to realise their full potential. Nevertheless, this does not deter them from 
coming together and embarking on social, cultural and economic ventures whose objective is 
the improvement and transformation of the women’s lives and their families.  
 
RCOs provide contexts in which refugee women receive additional assistance through 
mutual dependence and sometimes from donors who empathise with the refugees and their 
cause as manifested by the formation of these organisations. They are substitute structures 
of social and economic support in the absence of the extended family caused by flight and 
the subsequent rupture of family and friendship ties as people flee to different destinations 
while others perish in the conflicts. Relationships among RCO members are as symbiotic 
as those that characterise the extended family structure that they replace. This mutual 
dependence distinguishes RCOs from NGOs that are often characterised by NGO staff 
dominance and refugee subordination.  
 
By virtue of members’ capacity to alternately provide and receive assistance without 
necessarily feeling helpless, RCOs play a significant role in maintaining refugee women’s 
self-esteem. They provide refugee women with a sense of purpose which counters feelings 
of redundancy and idleness caused by exclusion from formal employment and limited 
resources to fully participate in the informal sector. Although RCOs, particularly those 
formed along national, ethnic and religious lines often segregate refugees from non-
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members or locals, they enable refugees to organise and promote their interests (Grabska 
2006; Newland et al 2007). RCOs provide a platform for refugees to present a united front 
in the event of real or imagined threat from the local population and host government. 
 
Moreover, integration is a gradual process and RCOs provide a structure on which refugee 
women can fall back up to a time when they become self-reliant and economically 
integrated in Nairobi. This is in addition to the social and cultural support these 
organisations provide for members. Unlike NGOs that operate in line with specific 
mandates or mission statements which require them to maintain a professional distance 
from refugees, RCOs are personal for refugees and have evolving and flexible functions as 
they respond to emerging needs even where these are not connected to their founding 
principles. Their activities are mainly an outcome of feedback from members and 
therefore responsive to unanticipated problems in refugee communities. RCOs also 
facilitate integration in that they create an environment conducive for development of 
social capital as opposed to the impersonal relationship refugees usually have with the 
UNHCR and NGOs. Harrell-Bond (1986) aptly observes that refugee-organised groups 
play a significant role to the extent of being more efficient than international NGOs.  
 
Nonetheless, as Griffiths et al (2005) contend, limited resources confine RCOs to a stop-gap 
measure of filling in the void in basic services instead of the active development of 
individuals and community resources in the form of running educational, training and 
employment programmes. Because they are cash-strapped, RCOs sometimes rely on 
contributions from members who are also poor. This handicap was highlighted by Hali who 
pointed out that contributions to RCOs can be stressful if one does not have the money as 
failure to pay makes it difficult for the individual to turn to the RCO in time of need and 
distress. In this respect, RCOs as contexts in which social capital is accumulated and utilised 
also have negative consequences as Portes (1998) argues. The claims they have on members 
apply pressure on them and restrict their individual freedom as members need to invest in 
them for future profit and credit.  
 
Three RCOs are presented in this section to illustrate the role of these organisations in 
facilitating refugee women’s integration in Nairobi. What is striking about these RCOs is that 
they run programmes that concurrently facilitate integration in Nairobi and prepare refugees 
for eventual repatriation to their countries of nationality. Although country of origin politics 
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are part and parcel of RCOs, this study does not chronicle refugee women’s involvement in 
politics as it has to balance its quest to understand the refugees with protecting them. Political 
activism is considered incompatible with the refugee status and refugees risk refoulement for 
defying this condition for asylum. Suffice it to say although many refugees’ rhetoric carries 
political undertones, the mundane activities observed in the RCOs cannot be categorised as 
seditious. 
 
5.4.1 Sudanese Women Action Networks (SWAN) 
The Sudanese Women Action Networks started as Sudanese Women Association in Nairobi 
before it broadened its focus to embrace all Sudanese women in the diaspora in Africa and 
beyond. SWAN was formed in 1992 by Sudanese women who were compelled to come 
together by the realisation that, despite their ethnic and religious differences, the war in Sudan 
has affected them all.126 Zanie, a SWAN Committee Member, noted that regardless of these 
differences, the war was affecting the women in very personal ways. Women were losing 
fathers, husbands, brothers and sons to the war and bearing the brunt of the war themselves 
through rape, death, destruction of homes and displacement. SWAN was grounded on the 
conviction that Sudanese women have a role to play in engendering and promoting peace and 
security in southern Sudan as well as in the (re)construction127 of their war-ravaged country. 
With the aid of donors, SWAN is housed in a middle density neighbourhood in Nairobi. At 
the height of the war in Sudan, SWAN members met to chart ways to end the war. SWAN’s 
objectives also include economic, social and political empowerment of women through 
education and skills training, raising awareness on women and children’s rights and reduction 
of the gender gap in education. 
 
Despite sporadic fighting, relative peace has finally been restored in southern Sudan with the 
notable exception of the Darfur region in western Sudan. SWAN members currently meet to 
contribute towards the construction of southern Sudan. Many women interviewed at the 
SWAN Centre are actively involved in the political process as well as in infrastructural and 
economic development of southern Sudan through membership in the various committees that 
have been formed for these purposes. Conversely, SWAN activities are not solely directed to 
southern Sudan as the organisation also runs programmes to facilitate Sudanese women’s 
                                                 
126 Personal interview with Zanie, a SWAN committee member, Nairobi, 29.09.06. 
127 Sudanese refugees prefer to describe what is taking place in post-war southern Sudan as construction rather 
than reconstruction. The women argue that southern Sudan has always been neglected by the government in 
Khartoum and the post-war construction of roads, clinics, schools among other social amenities is taking place in 
areas that never had them before the war. 
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integration in Nairobi and Kenya in general. SWAN operates an adult literacy programme 
under which the women learn English, Maths and General Science. As Newland et al (2007) 
point out, imparting knowledge to refugees particularly women advances leadership skills and 
empowerment which are crucial for integration. The SWAN adult literacy programme serves 
the dual purpose of facilitating economic, social and cultural integration in Nairobi as well as 
preparing the women for active participation in the construction of southern Sudan after 
repatriation. At the time of fieldwork, there were two literacy classes for women at the 
elementary and intermediate levels; the elementary class had a woman in her 70s who could 
now read and write basic English and work out simple arithmetic.  
 
SWAN also runs self-help economic projects for women. For instance, at one point it ran a 
project in which Sudanese women made water filters and sold them to people who needed 
them in Sudan where they were required to combat disease outbreak due to the unavailability 
of clean drinking water. The project enabled the women involved to earn incomes. The 
women also attend tailoring courses at the SWAN Centre. After successful completion of the 
course, the women are provided with fabric for sewing and the finished items are marketed at 
the SWAN Centre which has a small shop which sells Sudanese cultural dresses and artefacts. 
This enables women to benefit economically as well as to reduce the marketing challenges 
and risks associated with individual trading. Such a marketing strategy assists the organisation 
to attract more financial assistance from donors.  
 
The Centre also trains Sudanese women in micro-finance management which enables them to 
set up small businesses which are the major source of income for most of the Sudanese 
women who participated in the FGDs. SWAN has helped women to strengthen their social 
capital through relations based on trust and mutual support and thus find strength in the midst 
of adversity. However, Zanie, the SWAN Committee Member pointed out that donor funding 
has declined because of the relative peace in southern Sudan. In addition, accusations and 
counter-accusations of ethnic exclusion in leadership positions in southern Sudan reach those 
who are still in Nairobi and derail SWAN’s work. This state of affairs also discourages 
Sudanese women abroad particularly those in Western countries from providing moral and 
financial support as they used to before. 
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5.4.2. Africa Refugee Programme (ARP) 
The Africa Refugee Programme is comprised of refugees from Burundi, the DRC and 
Rwanda who are brought together by virtue of hailing from the same region and by French as 
the lingua franca. The ethnic nature of conflicts in the country of origin particularly for 
Burundians and Rwandans is another unifying factor as Hutus from both countries are 
currently in exile. ARP was formed in 1996 as a brain-child of a Missionary of Africa priest 
as part of the Association of Member Episcopal Conferences in Eastern Africa (AMECEA) 
project.128 ARP’s primary aim is to enable Great Lakes refugees to have the Catholic Mass in 
French and provide a place for them to meet and cultivate social relationships as well as for 
refugee children to have informal classes in French.  
 
The ARP focuses on medical care, education and IGPs. It emphasises social integration and 
has a pastoral section that deals with programmes related to the Catholic social teaching 
(which encompasses forgiveness, reconciliation, justice and peace-building among others), 
church services, choir, small Christian groups and visiting the sick. It also has non-violence 
activities in the form of seminars on conflict management, resolution and transformation 
meant to enable members of the three nationalities to co-exist in peace. The latter aspect of 
the organisation, although a daunting task as noted by Jean-Claude, the ARP chairman, is 
designed with the foresight to facilitate refugee reintegration in their countries of origin in the 
event of repatriation. The ARP works in collaboration with a network of organisations such as 
the RCK to which the ARP refers issues relating to refugees’ rights.  
 
The organisation also has counselling sessions and meetings to discuss the problems affecting 
refugees from the Great Lakes region. ARP provides a platform for discussion of topics 
relating to political situations in countries of origin and this is pertinent for refugees from the 
Great Lakes region because the ethnic conflicts characteristic of the region are replayed in 
Nairobi between refugees from hostile ethnic groups. ARP has community solidarity groups 
which are units that cater for refugees living in the same neighbourhood. These community 
solidarity groups attend to issues of domestic violence and illness in refugee households 
among others. According to Jean-Claude, ARP works with 750 families or 3 750 people and 
                                                 
128 Personal interview with Jean-Claude, ARP Chairperson, Nairobi, 03.02.07. AMECEA was founded in 1961 
by a group of bishops from East and Central Africa with the Most Rev. Adam Kozlowiecki, S.J. being its first 
chairman. Member countries of AMECEA are Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia. Somalia and Djibouti are Affiliate Members. http://www.amecea.org/ (accessed 05.04.08). 
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assists 350 students in secondary school with payment of tuition fees; it pays half the required 
amount and the family has to pay the balance which is a problem for many families.  
 
5.4.3. Zindua Afrika 
Zindua Afrika, which is Kiswahili for Wake up Africa, was formed in 2001 and works with 
refugees mainly from the Great Lakes region and a few from Ethiopia and Sudan.129 Zindua 
Afrika sometimes obtains assistance from the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and World Vision but its sustenance derives mainly from its own environmental 
programme which involves refuse collection for which it charges Ksh20 (US$0.28) for every 
garbage bag, garbage sorting and recycling in addition to community awareness on 
environmental issues. Jared Okweya, a Kenyan who is the founder and chairperson of the 
organisation explained that Zindua Afrika was established to facilitate better relations and 
peaceful co-existence between refugees and Kenyans. The latter “could not understand” 
refugees and accused them of bringing their conflicts to Kenya and depriving Kenyans of 
resources. Locals also resented refugees for obtaining assistance from humanitarian 
organisations. Zindua Afrika’s main objectives are to sensitise Kenyans to the plight of 
refugees and facilitate the latter’s adaptation to life in Nairobi. Okweya outlined the aims of 
the organisation as follows: 
We aim to have social integration for refugees. There are differences between 
communities. We had youths at the Catholic Church rebelling because refugees were 
getting help from organisations. There was anarchy and we started to get deep into 
refugees’ lives. There were people who were saying refugees were getting Ksh20 000 
[US$278] from UNHCR and we asked, “If people are getting support, how can they 
live in slums where accommodation is Ksh200 [US$3]?” People who attended the 
workshop realised [understood] the plight of refugees but not those who did not attend. 
Refugees bring their own cultures and traditional dances, intermarriages and mutual 
understanding and peace. Isolation is a challenge to the security of the entire world. If 
you push someone into isolation they can come up with anything. When people notice 
that they are being stigmatised they can work hard to become powerful as underground 
cartels and become dangerous. Integration between refugees and Kenyans brings 
peace.  
 
                                                 
129 Personal interview with Jared Okweya, Chairman of Zindua Afrika, Kayole, Nairobi, 02.02.07. 
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In engaging both refugees and Kenyans, Zindua Afrika recognises that integration is an 
interactive process involving the two communities and that integration requires acceptance of 
diversity.130 Zindua Afrika engages in awareness campaigns meant to draw attention to issues 
affecting refugees through the use of theatre and sensitisation forums in schools, residential 
neighbourhoods and on church premises. Educational programmes such as these promote 
communication and understanding between refugees and local populations which are crucial 
for integration (Newland et al 2007). Zindua Afrika’s emphasis on refugee participation in 
identification of their priority needs reinforces their sense of belonging and support for 
integration projects.  
 
In order to maintain relevance to Kenyans, the organisation is beneficiary blind in that 
assistance is based upon need and includes both locals and refugees. It has programmes on 
community health that focus on HIV/AIDS and the environment – issues that affect both 
refugees and citizens. The organisation has a women’s programme which deals with women 
who are HIV positive; it has empowerment sessions on how to manage living with HIV — the 
roles of community care givers and diet besides IGPs. Okweya pointed out that IGPs are 
important for HIV positive women because counselling only works if the women live in good 
conditions and have access to nutritious food. Following the post-election violence that 
rocked Kenya in early 2008, Zindua has extended its peace-building programmes to internally 
displaced Kenyans among whom it seeks to foster peaceful co-existence among different 
ethnic groups. In April 2009, Zindua Afrika introduced free English lessons for refugees and 
Okweya explained this as follows, “We reali[s]ed that many refugees cannot acces[s] vital 
support from UNHCR, RCK, GOVT etc because they do not know English.” 131  Zindua 
Afrika also advocates refugees’ rights and intervenes in cases of illegal detention of refugees. 
On the issue of rights, Okweya observed: 
We want more training on people’s rights; people do not know their rights […]. People 
are ignorant especially the police. Colonial structures are still affecting human rights; 
the British put the Indians in charge and told them that every black person had to be 
arrested because blacks were criminals. It should be that you are innocent until proven 
guilty but here you are guilty until proven innocent. The police just say, “Let’s go, you 
                                                 
130  Global Consultations on International Protection, 4th Meeting, 25 April 2002, “Local Integration”. 
www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3ccd64536.pdf (accessed 05.04.08). 
131 E-mail correspondence from Jared Okweya on 07.04.09. 
197
will explain when we get there [at the police station].” If you say you know your rights 
you can be beaten like hell. Police talk about refugees being rich. 
 
Unlike SWAN and ARP which facilitate integration more into the women’s national or 
regional communities than into Kenyan communities, Zindua Afrika promotes refugee 
integration into the local communities by engendering cooperation between refugees and 
locals. RCOs that do not embrace locals usually perpetuate marginalisation as integration 
takes place where there is engagement of the host country and its members (Griffiths et al 
2005). Although SWAN and ARP facilitate economic integration, the absence of locals in 
their membership and programmes hinders social and cultural integration. Zindua Afrika’s 
approach to integration is in tandem with the Agenda for Protection’s advocacy for refugee 
integration through self-reliance programmes and strategies that are based on a participatory 
approach that involves local communities in refugee hosting areas.132  
 
As articulated by Okweya, integration takes place where there is mutual understanding and 
acceptance of difference between refugees and locals. Establishing this mutual understanding 
involves stressing those areas where refugee and local interests converge such as poverty, 
crime, health and environmental issues. Zindua Afrika provides conditions in which refugees 
become integrated in Nairobi without necessarily becoming assimilated and loath to repatriate 
which is the cause for concern for the government and many locals as expressed by the Head 
of the DRA and Kenyan informants. Refugees who are members of Zindua Afrika extol the 
organisation for its facilitation of their integration through cooperation between refugees and 
Kenyans.  
 
Overall, cultural and political differences and divisions particularly those relating to country 
of nationality conflicts that compelled the refugees into exile hamper the activities of RCOs 
(see also Valtonen 1998; Kelly 2003; Griffiths et al 2005; Newland et al 2007; Holtzman 
2008). The mutual suspicion between Hutu and Tutsi refugees because of country of 
nationality politics fosters mutual avoidance rather than cooperation.133 In the case of SWAN, 
                                                 
132 The Agenda for Protection (October 2003, Third Edition) is a UNHCR programme of action formulated to 
improve protection of refugees and asylum seekers around the world. It provides guidelines to the UNHCR, 
governments, NGOs and other partners on how to handle refugee issues.  
133 One Wednesday at St Faith parish where refugees received JRS food rations, a scuffle broke out between two 
refugee men, a Congolese and a Rwandan because of an argument over the ethnic conflict in eastern DRC in 
which the now arrested rebel leader, General Laurent Nkunda, argued that his intention was to protect Tutsi 
Congolese. The scuffle was between a non-Tutsi Congolese refugee and a Tutsi Rwandan refugee. The post-
genocide government in Rwanda is led by a Tutsi president.  
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the mistrust emanating from the post-conflict ethnic exclusion unfolding in southern Sudan is 
straining relations among SWAN members of various ethnic groups. Similarly, clan politics 
among Somali refugees have a bearing on the formation of an RCO in that many Somali 
refugee women cite the clan as determining inclusion and exclusion (see Hopkins 2006). 
According to Somali women, access to jobs in the Somali-owned shops in Eastleigh is 
determined by clan affiliation. Kadija observed that wealthy Somalis ignore those who are 
poor thus emphasising social class as a criterion for inclusion and exclusion. For instance, one 
of the Somali participants in the FGD who had arrived in Nairobi a month earlier stated that 
she worked as a cook for business people yet women who had come to Kenya as early as 
1992 were still struggling to find informal jobs. As such, it is those women who have the 
“right” clan connections who are in a better position to benefit from well to do members of 
the Somali community.  
 
5.5. Exile as an Empowering Experience 
The UNHCR, host governments and NGOs often portray life in the country of nationality as 
the ideal/normal and exile as an aberration. Yet, exile is not solely about constraints and the 
anomalous. “Included exclusion” (Simon Turner 2006: 57) or spaces of marginality that 
refugee women occupy present them with opportunities that may not have been available to 
them prior to flight. Of importance to this section is refugee women’s agency or capability to 
identify and exploit opportunities in diverse contexts (Giddens 1985). Exile has contradictory 
implications for refugee women in that it is simultaneously constraining and enabling. As 
much as exile means loss of established means of livelihoods and social relationships, it 
creates possibilities for the women. For Sudanese refugee women, exile opens up 
opportunities for literacy and education particularly for those who fled largely secluded 
village communities 134  in contrast to cosmopolitan Nairobi. Zanie, a Muslim Sudanese 
woman, stressed her appreciation of individual Kenyans especially women whom she 
described as “good”. Kenyan women taught her “to be independent”; advice which helped her 
to continue on her own after being abandoned by her husband. Monica, another Sudanese 
woman juxtaposed southern Sudan with Nairobi as follows: 
Women in Sudan suffer a lot, they walk for five hours to get water which they carry on 
their heads in the heat, and in Nuba Mountains sometimes the temperatures can go up 
                                                 
134 Southern Sudan has mainly been marginalised in terms of development such that many Sudanese in the 
region depend on migration to the northern part of the country for jobs (see Holtzman 2008). For Sudanese 
women coming from rural/agrarian backgrounds, Nairobi is in sharp contrast to their pre-flight lifeworlds. 
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to 54 degrees. Now, five hours fetching the water, you almost spend the whole day 
fetching water. They also do the household work like pounding maize, millet or 
sorghum to make food for the children. There is no time to go to school in Sudan even 
if there is a school to go to because much of the time women have to do domestic work 
and this is what makes women suffer a lot in Sudan. […] We missed it [education] at 
home and there is an opportunity here, we have to come [for classes at the SWAN 
Centre]. Sometimes we walk [when they do not have money for transport] to get the 
little that can help us like the education that we are getting. We have seen that people 
grow up in education but sometimes we find it very difficult. The little [money] that 
we get, we want to use [it] at home and for transport to come to school. Without this 
little knowledge we would go nowhere so we are trying our best so that we get this 
little knowledge to help us.  
 
The cosmopolitan character of Nairobi enables refugee women to meet and interact with 
women from different socio-cultural backgrounds and familiarise with alternative ways of 
life. Refugee women’s greater economic participation relative to refugee men combines with 
access to information on women’s rights and opportunities for empowerment (Newland et al 
2007). This enables many refugee women to challenge certain cultural practices in their 
communities. Women sometimes openly do so without fear of reprisals usually from men in 
their communities because of the atmosphere of security which the presence of vocal NGOs 
and women’s and human rights groups in Nairobi engenders. Gender is a buzzword in the 
NGO world such that women who have gender-related problems easily strike a cord with 
NGOs. As such, occupation of marginal spaces is empowering in that it enables refugee 
women to create new identities and narratives as women and resist the conduct imposed by 
their own cultural norms and values as well as those of the host society (see Larsen 2004). 
 
Refugee women are members of both the category “refugees” and the category “women”. 
Within the framework of Sacks’ (2000) Membership Inference-rich Representative (MIR) 
device, membership in a specific category implies certain characteristics and activities that are 
identified with the particular category. As such, when refugee women fail to obtain assistance 
as refugees, their membership in the category “women” is what opens up opportunities for 
them. This is because local women, through inference to their own experiences, are able to 
understand refugee women who share similar experiences as shown by Zanie’s relationship 
with Kenyan women above. As well, it becomes difficult for women’s rights activists and 
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organisations to advocate local women’s rights and turn a blind eye to refugee women’s 
circumstances in so far as these are directly related to gender. Refugee women’s shared 
identity with local women enables them to overcome the social and legal barriers that are 
created by the refugee/foreigner category. The case of a Somali woman detained as a proxy 
for her missing husband presented in Chapter Two is illustrative of how refugee women find 
protection from local human rights organisations. Human rights-oriented NGOs’ work with 
refugee women is complemented by the UNHCR’s endeavour, although piecemeal, to 
promote gender equality among refugees (see also Brown 2006).  
 
Nairobi presents refugee women with the appropriate environment to openly object to and 
sever themselves from traditional, cultural and religious practices such as polygamy, female 
circumcision and forced marriage and seek NGO intervention by which the women 
circumvent age-old traditions and cultural practices that they consider detrimental to their 
rights, liberties, needs and interests. Merlin, a Rwandan refugee woman, confided that when 
her husband decided to reunite with his first wife, she asked him to take the first wife for an 
HIV test before the reunion and when the husband objected, she appealed to JRS whose 
intervention resulted in both women and the husband going for the test. Hali, a Muslim 
Somali woman, seldom wears the veil because her residence among refugees from the Great 
Lakes region who are predominantly Christian enables her to evade Somali elders who 
enforce strict compliance with the Islamic dress code and social etiquette. Although the veil 
also symbolises empowerment as when Muslim women insist on wearing it, for Hali, not 
wearing the veil is a symbol of freedom. Nairobi provides a setting in which she finds 
protection from religious and cultural practices that she disapproves of. She expressed her 
anger with female circumcision practised in her community which she referred to as Female 
Genital Mutilation (FGM).  
 
Hali also pointed out that staying in Nairobi among non-Somali/Muslim refugees protects her 
from forced marriage which she also criticised for being unfair because divorce is a difficult 
process in her religion/culture in the event that the marriage turns out to be abusive. Most 
Somali women, particularly those widowed by the war in Somalia, run their own businesses 
in Eastleigh where they sell clothes and a wide array of merchandise. Some of these women 
are employed to sell jewellery by fellow Somalis who are the business owners. This 
employment undermines cultural and religious beliefs that prohibit women’s employment and 
assign the wage-earning role to men. Nairobi also enables refugee widows to evade cultural 
201
arrangements such as widow inheritance. Hali portrayed the changes that take place for 
refugee women in the event that they decide to divorce their husbands thus:  
This gender balance and support [for women] has given the best to her [woman]. She 
has to go with the property and the children [custody] and that man or that old [ex-] 
husband — he has to start from zero which is not easy for him. As a woman, actually 
some of the things [that the UNHCR and NGOs do], I support [them] because [of] 
early marriage and forced marriage. We have that in our communities and that is a 
must, nobody can complain. That's why I support them. This kind of domestic 
violence, […] whoever is a polygamous husband, the woman has to divorce him.  
 
The circumstances of life in Nairobi provide refugee women with the opportunity to re-
evaluate gender roles and come up with new arrangements in their households. As the women 
interact with locals and form relationships outside their refugee communities, they find new 
opportunities which some of them view as emancipating. For some refugee women, Nairobi 
gives them confidence to live on their own as demonstrated by cases of refugee women 
deserted by their husbands who express unwillingness to find these husbands and coax them 
back. Refugee women in general openly express admiration for single Kenyan women who 
have their own houses but do not have husbands and describe them as “free”. During an 
informal discussion with Epi, she explained that at one time when she attended a young 
Kikuyu woman’s wedding, she was surprised that the bride’s father gave her title deeds to a 
piece of land he bought her as a wedding gift. Epi described such practices as uncommon in 
Rwanda and stated that they needed to be emulated. The ability to appreciate difference is 
instrumental in the process of social and cultural integration. 
 
5.6. “Beating the System”: Deception and Manipulation as Survival Strategies 
Even though NGOs and RCOs play a role in alleviating poverty and destitution among 
refugee women, they cannot fulfil all of the women’s needs or address them to the women’s 
satisfaction. The inadequacy of organisational resources measured against need among 
refugee women is coupled with suspicion among refugees that humanitarian organisations’ 
staff benefits at refugees’ expense. This prompts refugee women to devise strategies to “beat 
the system” through deception and manipulation. Deception is interpreted in this study as a 
conscious strategy deployed to access services and resources that refugee women deem 
otherwise inaccessible. It is a strategy by which refugee women exercise their agency or the 
capacity to intervene through perpetration of certain events or actions in order to influence a 
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specific process or the state of affairs (Giddens 1985). As a form of resistance and 
manoeuvre, deception has immediate gains as its objective rather than challenging UNHCR 
authority. Its success at achieving its targeted objective is premised on its assumption of a 
largely uncoordinated form that lacks institutional visibility and significance in the eyes of 
organisational staff.  
 
Parallels can be drawn between the resistance Scott (1985) observes among the peasants in 
Sedaka, Indonesia and deception among the refugee women; similar to resistance among the 
peasants, deception among refugee women is not directed towards changing the legal 
abstractions in humanitarian organisations but towards changing the impact of these 
abstractions on the realities of every day experiences. Deception aims to deal with what Scott 
(1985) refers to as the “symptoms” or the manifestations of subordination and exclusion 
rather than the structures upon which these are based. If anything, refugee women use the 
legal abstractions or structures to challenge practical translations of the same as when they 
cite refugee law to challenge their experiences with UNHCR staff. Deception thus becomes a 
way to redress the contradiction the women perceive between refugee law and how officials 
tasked with its implementation interpret and implement it. 
 
In their dealings with the “faceless” and impersonal system of humanitarian aid, refugees 
resort to deception and play a role which conforms to the victim identity in order to obtain 
more attention and access to resources (Harrell-Bond et al 1992; Kibreab 2004). Refugees 
resort to deception and manipulation in order to “achieve goals in the face of organisational 
inconsistencies” (Harrell-Bond 1986: 93). In addressing the issue of deception and 
manipulation among refugee women, the aim of this section is not to suggest that the women 
lack respect for socially approved behaviour. Rather, refugee women principally view 
deception as an indirect way of accessing material resources and services or a way of 
maximising these benefits. Deception is a logical course of action in the informal, 
personalised structures of humanitarian organisations in which staff members engage in 
corrupt activities such as demanding bribes and sexual favours in return for assistance. When 
individual staff members exercise their agency by engaging in corruption without being 
constrained by the formal, bureaucratic organisational structure, rules and professional ethics, 
refugee women correspondingly exercise their own agency by engaging in deceptive 
behaviour without feeling restrained by their cultural and religious values. Deception by 
refugee women is a direct reaction to entrenchment of the personalised and informal structure. 
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The informal structure which facilitates bending of rules by staff in humanitarian 
organisations and refugee women’s resort to deception and manipulation in response to this 
structure are therefore mutually reinforcing.  
 
Deception and manipulation take numerous forms and meanings depending on their target. 
On the one hand, dealing deceptively with institutions such as NGOs, the UNHCR and the 
GoK is treated with humour and pride among refugee women as it demonstrates their ability 
to outwit the “powerful” organisations. On the other hand, deception of fellow refugees and 
locals is censured and in the latter case viewed as having negative repercussions for entire 
refugee communities in Nairobi. A typical example is cases where refugees default on 
payment of rent and abscond; refugees generally reprimand this behaviour as it has 
repercussions for all of them should home owners decide to avert the problem by rejecting 
refugee tenants. Deception is therefore perceived as a legitimate survival strategy where it is 
directed at the GoK and humanitarian organisations, and as reprehensible where it targets 
individuals with whom refugees share common experiences or residence.  
 
Kibreab (2004: 13) explains that refugees’ interaction with humanitarian organisations is not 
subject to moral constraints because “they consider these organisations rich, powerful, corrupt 
and unaccountable (to them).” This explains the fact that refugee women resort to cheating in 
their encounter with humanitarian organisations and simultaneously take God as the point of 
reference in their lives without seeming to apprehend the contradiction. Even if the women 
apprehended the contradiction, what is at stake for them is survival rather than the dissonance 
between faith and behaviour caused by such inconsistency. In the refugee women’s 
lifeworlds, deception or cheating is therefore neither good nor bad; its meaning is subject to 
varying sets of moralities that shift depending on the context, the goal and the “victim” (see 
also Harrell-Bond 1986). Deception is mediated by the capability to play need against 
religious and cultural values and strike a balance between the two in given circumstances; 
refugee women use need rather than religious and cultural values to rationalise their deceptive 
actions at the same time that they use the latter to censure humanitarian staff’s behaviour. 
 
In the FGDs, refugee women revealed that they hide the truth and cheat because humanitarian 
organisations force them to do so; they claimed that they do not get assistance when they tell 
the truth. Thus, the women misrepresent facts and adopt normative discourses they believe 
appeal to humanitarian organisations. The refugee-humanitarian organisations interface is 
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characterised by relations of power. Although refugees occupy a subordinate position in this 
interface, this does not render them helpless. Refugee women strategise to wiggle out of the 
most unfavourable conditions and circumvent rules and laws they perceive to be to their 
disadvantage. As the women manoeuvre and strategically position themselves, deception 
becomes a strategy to stave off competition for scarce resources or, in Bourdieu’s (1992) 
terminology, a strategy to access capital at stake in the field.  
 
In view of this, dependence offers some resources which enable those who find themselves in 
a subordinate position to influence the activities of those in a powerful position (Foucault 
1979; Giddens 1985). Refugee women argue that aid organisations assist “their own type of 
refugees” and accordingly assume characteristics and narratives associated with this “type” in 
order to be assisted. The idea of conforming to anticipated narratives was explicitly put across 
by Cynthia thus, “We tell them [UNHCR and NGOs] what they want to hear!” This lends the 
interface a performative dimension by which refugee women conceal their experiential 
realities and assume the anticipated, standardised behaviour or conduct and physical 
representation. In the accusations and counter-accusations between refugees and humanitarian 
organisations, one finds power and resistance at play. This is characteristic of hierarchical 
relations (see Foucault 1979; Giddens 1985; Scott 1985; Long 2001).  
 
The issue is not the existence of a single irrefutable truth with everything diverging from it 
being a falsehood. Rather, what can be noted here is that refugee women and humanitarian 
organisations tend to have different truths with either side relating with the other’s truth as a 
falsehood. In this regard, this study does not necessarily aim to identify a single truth but 
portrays both parties’ respective positions which they justify by citing their unfavourable 
experiences with the other party. Refugee women believe that the truth that matters is that 
they need protection documents and assistance and not what they say and do to obtain 
assistance. On the other hand, the CSO confidently referred to the UNHCR’s experience with 
refugees as justification for the treatment of anomalous behaviour as deception. Generally, 
there is a tendency among administrators to portray refugees as “dishonest, prone to 
exaggeration, even crafty and untrustworthy” (Malkki 1997: 232). Lack of trust underlies the 
criteria used to determine what amounts to cheating as portrayed by the CSO: 
We also have cases of cheating. Some come and say I have been raped even when it’s 
consensual sex because they want to be paid or to go for resettlement in a third 
country. For them, going to a third country is like going to heaven yet there are some 
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who have come back because life there was just difficult for them. We also have those 
who come with security claims saying, “There are people following me from home 
who would want to kill me.” But we tell them to follow the right procedures. We ask 
them, “Have you reported to the police?” Some come with claims of destitution to get 
money. So if we assist them here it doesn’t end there; they go to all the other 
organisations with the same problem to get more money. It’s a way of survival. We 
have children who come to say they have lost their parents but sometimes it is the 
same parents who come with them and leave them at the UNHCR gate.135  
 
Organisations that are exposed to cheating are particularly those that provide material 
assistance as opposed to, for example, legal advice. Mercy Muchai, the JRS Officer, cited 
cheating as one of the problems the organisation has to deal with. JRS provides loans to 
refugees particularly women who apply for them with the intention to engage in small 
businesses such as tailoring, tuck shops, barber shops and hair salons. JRS staff visits refugees 
who obtain the loans to monitor progress. On their part, refugees are expected to visit JRS 
offices and pay back the loans once their businesses start yielding profits. Yet, after obtaining 
the loans, some refugees relocate to other residential areas and change their mobile phone 
numbers so that JRS cannot reach them. Muchai is quoted here to portray the dynamics of the 
JRS-refugee relationship: 
What I have realised is that even when you know their [refugees who cheat’s] friends 
and you ask them, “Where is so and so?” – they don’t tell; they don’t want to create 
enemies. So we don’t expect them to tell and they actually tell us, “I know where the 
person is but I am not going to tell you. […] That person is my friend and I prefer her 
as a friend and not as my enemy.” There are those… you tell them you are visiting and 
they will make sure they are not there. So people are really disappearing [and] it’s 
becoming rather difficult to get [the] money back especially from those ones who 
don’t make things they can bring here [to the JRS Mikono Shop]. When you tell them 
that you want to see them they will tell you, “Ok, you come.” But you will go and find 
the shop closed. You call them and that day they will not be available; you call maybe 
the following day [and] they say they had an emergency but you know they are hiding 
themselves. But that is one of the major problems that we are having.  
 
                                                 
135 Personal interview with the CSO, Nairobi, 19.02.07. 
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Muchai situated this problem in what she described as refugees’ attitude that they are entitled 
to the money they obtain from JRS and therefore should not pay back. Most of the women 
believe that when NGO staff turns them away and cite lack of funds as the reason, this is a 
mere pretext to misappropriate funds. This, according to the women, is illustrated by NGO 
staff that drives expensive cars yet the organisations fail to provide basic assistance and small 
business loans to the women. This suspicion explains the lack of compunction in the retort 
quoted by Muchai, “You ask one person, ‘Why aren’t you paying?’ [T]hey say, ‘Even so and 
so is not paying.’ So you have no other alternative. It is a challenge following them up.” In 
this kind of refugee women logic, argument and accusations are not a trivial attempt to evade 
loan repayment but well-calculated forms of resistance (see also Scott 1985).  
 
Refugee default on loan repayments poses a challenge to the sustainability of JRS’s IGPs 
which depend on a revolving fund or the repayment of loans. Nevertheless, refugees lack 
information and many do not understand the implications of their actions and how NGOs 
obtain their funding in the first instance. As a result, refugee women who default on loan 
repayments take this as harmless and, if harmful, this is so only to the “faceless” organisations 
rather than fellow refugee women whose access to loans is possible if the revolving fund 
remains viable. Refugees become accountable and refrain from cheating where they have a 
sense of ownership of the resources concerned and of these resources being fairly dispensed 
(Kibreab 2004). Many refugee women do not view humanitarian organisations as having the 
agenda to assist refugees but as institutions where staff is more interested in self-enrichment. 
Such women argue that staff in organisations begs in the name of refugees only to withhold 
from the refugees the resources they receive from donors. As refugee women resort to 
deception, they legitimise such behaviour by deploying a discourse of entitlement by which 
they argue that deception is a way of accessing what legitimately belongs to them by other 
means. 
 
Deception also characterises the Kenyan authorities-refugee interface. In a country where 
refugee employment is restricted, some refugee women have both valid UNHCR Protection 
Letters and country of nationality passports which they used to cross the international border 
at the designated points as visitors to Kenya. Depending on their changing needs and 
circumstances in varying contexts, such refugee women identify themselves either as refugees 
in which case they produce their UNHCR protection documents as proof or as economic 
migrants and visitors in which case they produce their country of nationality passports. For 
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refugee women who have the means, the latter identity enables them to obtain work permits 
and seek employment as immigrants, something that many refugees cannot afford. In doing 
so, they circumvent the UNHCR Handbook136 which provides that once recognised, a refugee 
should not retain his/her passport except under special arrangements which are not 
incompatible with the refugee status. As the refugee women alternately put on and take off the 
refugee and economic migrant categories, they are able to resist and navigate around the 
constraints that being pigeonholed in arbitrary, rigid categories entails.  
 
Because refugee women interact with humanitarian organisation officials and Kenyan 
authorities in contexts where rules are side-stepped, circumvented and manipulated, this 
creates an enabling environment for refugee women to do the same. It is within a context 
where rules are treated as peripheral that refugee women are able to feign ignorance and 
memory relapse where admission of knowledge would expose the inconsistencies in their 
stories and work against their best interest. Several women related stories of how they had to 
feign mental illness in order to gain sympathy and timely attention as officials seek to swiftly 
send away from the UNHCR premises refugees they identify as trouble-makers. Feigning 
madness also enables refugee women to express views that antagonise staff and evade 
punishment in the form of denial of documents or assistance. This is sometimes coupled with 
violent behaviour. Hali narrated how, after several futile trips to the UNHCR offices, she 
physically attacked one of the officials. Although she was subsequently taken to the police 
station, she claimed that she was released immediately after explaining her story and obtained 
a Protection Letter on her next trip to the UNHCR offices.  
 
As refugee women become more familiar with the operations of humanitarian organisations 
and Kenyan immigration and security officers, they deploy this familiarity as a resource that 
has the potential to create opportunities in Nairobi. Deception is not confined to actions, it 
also extends to choice of “appropriate” language or what the refugee women describe as “the 
language that the people at the UNHCR understand”. This is combined with cultivation and 
presentation of specific images that are consistent with the stories the refugee women narrate 
to officials who attend to them. Aligning images with narratives includes dressing in ways the 
refugee women perceive to be consistent with their stories and changing their names, ages and 
life histories as the situation demands. Such changes enable refugee women to hide their true 
                                                 
136 Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 
1967 Protocol relating to the Status Determination of Refugees, Re-edited, Geneva, January 1992, UNHCR 
1979. http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3d58e1364.pdf (accessed 05.04.08). 
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ethnic identity or their country of origin and also to obtain assistance from various 
organisations under different identities where using the same name and life story could 
expose their cheating in inter-organisation communication leading to denial of assistance. 
Even though refugee women find themselves in relations of power, this does not mean that 
they are “trapped and condemned to defeat” (Foucault 1980: 142). The narratives and actions 
refugee women adopt in combination with the appropriate images portray how the women 
engage power or confront it in often benign ways and use their state of being powerless to 
empower themselves. Such actions are not consciously directed towards neutralising the 
power organisational staff wields but towards winning the battles of daily survival. 
 
5.7. Religion: Spirituality, Economics and Integration 
As Sommers (2001) observes, the role of religion in refugee lives remains fundamentally on 
the periphery of refugee studies yet religion is closely tied to how refugees fare in the country 
of asylum. God is a central being in refugee women’s lifeworlds; they refer more to the 
presence of God in their lives than they do to that of humanitarian organisations. Faith in God 
is a prominent feature of the narratives of many refugee women. The women generally invoke 
God to make sense out of their suffering, account for their survival in the face of difficulties 
as well as to sustain hope for a better future. In an environment where assistance that 
addresses refugees’ real concerns and needs is in short supply, faith in God becomes the only 
source of hope and consolation (see also Valtonen 1998; Mayer 2007). Refugee women 
explain their ability to survive in Nairobi as a manifestation of “God’s grace”. Consequently, 
narratives on adversities such as how to obtain money to pay for accommodation and tuition 
fees for children in secondary school and tertiary institutions or rejection by the UNHCR are 
punctuated by refrains such as “I look up to heaven, God will provide”; “In Kenya you are 
only with God”; “My protection is not from them [UNHCR officials] but from God; “I pray 
that God punishes the people at UNHCR.” Spiritualism thus provides refugee women with 
solace and soothing encouragement to face the future with hope and optimism despite the 
present anxieties. 
 
Religion, besides providing spiritual nourishment which invigorates the women in the face of 
hardships, also plays the vital role of uniting them as members of specific national or regional 
communities and bringing them together with Kenyans as fellow congregants. Harrell-Bond 
(1986: 137) succinctly observes that religion has “immediate consequences for adaptation of 
[refugees] and local people to one another.” Churches and mosques provide arenas in which 
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refugees forge friendships among themselves as well as with locals in that they are contexts in 
which religious identities assume a primacy that transcends identities that are pertinent to 
contexts outside prayer (see Sommers 2001). In so far as integration entails societal 
participation (Valtonen 1998), refugee women’s involvement in places of worship is an 
indicator of social integration. Arenas of worship provide local congregants with the 
opportunity to view refugees through a lens different from the citizen-refugee, insider-
outsider lens which often characterises daily life outside the places of worship. The role of 
religion as a vehicle for unity which transcends cultural differences between refugees and 
Kenyans is portrayed in Jane’s remark on social and cultural integration in Kenya, “I do not 
follow Kenyan culture and I am saved and a follower of Jesus and do not have any culture.”  
 
In the arenas of worship, both citizens and refugees become insiders in that they are exposed 
to and believe in a discourse that surpasses ethnic and national identities and gives pre-
eminence to the homogenising identity of being Christians or Muslims as the case may be. 
The “we are all children of God” discourse transcends the other “earthly” identities that shape 
life outside arenas of worship. Religion in this instance becomes an important source of social 
capital which is crucial for integration. It is not only about cultivating a relationship with God 
but also with locals and in the latter case refugees make a social investment which yields 
profit in the form of assistance and solidarity from fellow, local congregants in times of 
difficulties such as death as well as in good times. Christian refugee women capitalise on the 
friendly environment they find in their churches by joining women’s groups within the 
churches and participating in voluntary church activities such as preparation for church 
services and prayer meetings in their residential communities. This enables locals to relate 
with the women as individuals in contrast to the stereotypes characteristic of the dominant 
discourse on refugees.  
 
Places of worship also provide contexts for refugees and locals to engage each other and work 
through their mutual prejudice. As already explained in this Chapter by Jared Okweya, it is at 
a Catholic parish that refugee-local tensions exploded into riots by local youths leading to 
awareness campaigns on the plight of refugees and formation of Zindua Afrika which works 
to improve relations and facilitate refugee integration. As the women spend more time in 
exile, relationships forged on church and mosque premises find their way out of these 
premises into the neighbourhoods where refugees and locals live together. Religion thus acts 
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as a counter to the exclusion that the category refugee entails and opens an avenue for refugee 
women to become part and parcel of the communities in which they reside. 
 
The importance of religion in the women’s lives goes beyond spiritual and social matters to 
incorporate the economic. Religion emerged as a resource that can be deployed in order to 
access assistance from humanitarian organisations. This occurs as part of deception and 
manipulation presented above. Without denying that there are genuine cases of Somali 
refugee women who are persecuted by their communities for converting to Christianity or 
marrying non-Muslims, realisation that individuals who have these problems are sheltered in 
secure NGO accommodation and given priority for third country resettlement has resulted in 
some Muslim refugee women using this as a strategy to access material assistance and 
services.  
 
The CSO, perhaps without realising that some of the cases of religious persecution brought to 
the UNHCR offices are spurious, indicated that the UNHCR deals with cases of religious 
persecution and treated this as involving genuine cases. She cited Muslim Sudanese as being 
victimised by the predominantly Christian communities from southern Sudan on accusations 
of spying for the predominantly Muslim north. The CSO also made reference to Somali 
refugees who are ostracised by the Somali community for marrying Christians and converting 
to Christianity. Hali, a Muslim Somali woman, explained that there are Somali Muslim 
refugees who attend church services on Sundays and pray in the mosque on Fridays. Here, 
one can refer to Goffman’s (1959) notions of the back and front regions. The encounter with 
the UNHCR and other humanitarian organisations becomes the front region or stage where 
some actions are accentuated while others are suppressed. Conversely, the back region or 
stage is when “the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course […]. Here, 
the performer can relax: he can drop his front, forgo speaking his lines, and step out of 
character” (Goffman 1959: 112). Attending church services is the front region meant to 
convince NGO and UNHCR staff that one is indeed a Christian while the mosque is the arena 
in which these refugees unmask themselves and reveal their true religious faith and identities. 
Adopting the specious identity of vulnerable Christian converts places the women involved in 
a high priority category that has better access to scarce resources, services and secure 
accommodation.  
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Religious identity is manipulated and/or relinquished where it presumably restricts refugee 
women’s access to resources. As Muslim refugee women relate with assistance providers, 
they portray Islam as anti-Christianity by claiming that Muslims persecute them for 
converting to Christianity and oppressive when they appeal for protection from arranged and 
forced marriages. For the performance before the UNHCR and other humanitarian 
organisations to achieve its objectives, such Muslim women dissociate themselves from Islam 
only to vehemently defend it once the performance is over as indicated by Somali women 
who label Kenyans ignorant because of their perceived or real Islamophobia. Accessing 
humanitarian assistance is therefore about impression management or “putting on and taking 
off of character” (Goffman 1959: 121). Of relevance to refugee women’s strategy to access 
scarce resources through deployment of religious affiliation is Giddens’ (1985: 16) argument 
that “all forms of dependence offer some resources whereby those who are subordinate can 
influence the activities of their superiors” – a notion Giddens (1985: 16) refers to as “the 
dialectic of control in social systems” (italics in original).  
 
Material benefits accruing from membership in religious groups are also an outcome of local 
members’ charity (see also Lewis et al 1988). The close interaction on church and mosque 
premises enables local members to understand the plight of refugee members of the 
congregation and induces them to assist whenever possible. Shandy (2007) observes in her 
study of Nuer refugees resettled in the USA that the refugees also receive assistance from 
American church members. In addition and in the same way that refugees use split-family 
survival strategies to augment sources of income, some refugee women also expand their 
sources of material assistance through concurrent membership in various Christian 
denominations. Jackie explained: 
Some of the unacceptable things that we have been forced to do by circumstances are 
changing religion. I had to change my religion [church denomination] to survive. 
There are churches that assist their members so we go to different churches where we 
are recognised as members and as a result you multiply your sources of assistance. 
Some give you food, clothes, school fees for children, etc and that makes life 
materially speaking better. 
 
In brief, religion is an avenue for spiritual well-being as well as economic, social and cultural 
integration. As a means to an end, religion is treated with great flexibility; it is appropriated 
and upheld on the one hand and disowned and sometimes relinquished altogether on the other 
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hand as refugee women mobilise and deploy it as a resource in their quest for survival in 
Nairobi. Whether these women openly identify with Christianity or dissociate themselves 
from Islam, such actions are remarkable in that they are characterised by calculation or a cost-
benefit analysis of the end results of such association and dissociation. Refugee women’s 
ability to deploy the religious into the secular field of everyday interaction in their quest for 
survival demonstrates the extent to which they creatively rely not only on the minimal 
resources within their reach but also proceed to use their imagination to create or “invent” 
more resources. This is achieved by engagement in a balancing act between manipulation of 
religion, a field where themes of morality — the good and the bad — are expounded and 
instilled into believers and everyday needs which require flexibility and the capacity to either 
straddle this “moral” binary or evade its restrictions altogether. 
 
5.8. Social Relationships and Integration  
Acquisition of social capital is not confined to places of worship as relations are also forged in 
the neighbourhoods where refugees live. Among local and refugee neighbours, the challenges 
and adversities of everyday life particularly in poor neighbourhoods surpass the citizen-
refugee divide thus bringing both sides together as members of the same social class or people 
sharing the same material circumstances. This facilitates interdependence and sharing 
between the two communities both of which are important for the formation of social 
relationships and integration in the long run (Valtonen 1998). In the interviews with Kenyans, 
those who live in the same neighbourhoods as refugees underscored the sharing aspect of 
social life in their communities. For instance, these Kenyans sometimes lend refugees money, 
groceries from their tuck shops and give them food. Whereas stereotypes criminalise refugees, 
Kenyans who interact with refugees on an everyday basis view refugees through a different 
lens as illustrated by Kenyan respondents who stated that refugees “are just like us”. This 
observation indicates that interpersonal relationships do not always reflect the stereotypes that 
often permeate macro discourses on refugees; locals who interact with refugees understand 
them better than those who mostly rely on the media and politicians’ rhetoric to form an 
opinion on refugees. Kenyans who live with refugees portray the “otherness” subsumed in 
refugee ethnic profiling as peripheral.  
 
A notable corollary of close interaction between refugee women and Kenyans is the formation 
of substitutive kinship relationships. These are family-like relationships based on reliability 
and responsibility (Tilbury 2007). For example, Susan has such a relationship with a young 
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Kenyan woman whom she calls her “daughter”. This culminated in her playing an active role 
at the young woman’s wedding for which she was chosen to make the bridal clothes thus 
boosting her tailoring business. Social interaction, the formation, expansion and nurturing of 
social relationships with locals and participation in social life are key elements of integration 
(Valtonen 1998; Korac 2002; Griffiths et al 2005). Susan is one of the few women who enjoy 
a considerable degree of social integration because of her capacity to cross the citizen-refugee 
boundary. Creation of family-like relations challenges the construction and representation of 
refugees as dangerous “Others” and their criminalisation thus facilitating positive relations 
between refugees and their hosts (Tilbury 2007).  
 
The role of substitutive kinship relationships can be understood within the framework of 
Sacks’ (2000) Membership Categorisation Devices (MCDs) which are collections of 
categories of relationships that belong together. Membership in a category is “presumptively a 
representative of that category for the purpose of use for whatever knowledge is stored by 
reference to that category” (Sacks 2000: 41). When refugee women cultivate mother-daughter 
relationships with local women for instance, they are essentially creating a family which is a 
category that implies “values of trust, acceptance, closeness, and similarity of kind” (Tilbury 
2007: 645). Family and home as categories are often heard together meaning that once 
refugee women create family relations with locals, this implies the possibility of finding a 
home in Nairobi — a state of affairs which blurs the insider-outsider boundary that 
characterises macro discourses on refugee-Kenyan relations. Micro or interpersonal 
relationships enable refugee women to counter ethnic profiling at the macro level of 
interaction and structural barriers they encounter in Nairobi. That some refugee women are 
able to cross the refugee-citizen, foreigner-local boundary and establish familial relationships 
that are both functional and affective illustrates a high level of close interaction between the 
women and locals which is a significant indicator of social and cultural integration.  
 
The occurrence of social integration is buttressed by the accompaniment of the created family 
category with activities closely associated with family contexts or what Sacks (2000: 582) 
refers to as “category-bound activities”. Susan’s performance of a motherly role in the life of 
the young Kenyan woman as cited above is illustrative. Refugee women’s family-like 
relations with locals are not confined to special occasions as they can be observed in everyday 
life in terms of sharing of food and money-lending. Hali, who was orphaned when she was 
still a child, has a local woman whom she calls “mama” or mother. From Hali’s narrative, the 
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woman plays a motherly role in her life by providing advice on existential vicissitudes that 
include relationships with men, marriage and HIV/AIDS. Hali also has a Kenyan friend with a 
well-paying formal job who often assists by paying her accommodation rentals. Susan and 
Hali are examples of women who have successfully integrated in Nairobi through formation 
of social relationships with locals. Refugee women’s creation of social relationships and 
home away from their countries of origin de-naturalises the trinity of people, nation and state 
as it reverses the tethering of identity, family and home to specific territorial spaces.  
 
Refugee women generally believe that it is their responsibility to reach out to Kenyans and 
underline good neighbourliness which they identify as facilitating positive rating by Kenyans. 
This has worked out well for some refugee women particularly those from the Great Lakes 
region who speak fluent Kiswahili. Interviews with Kenyan citizens indicate that in 
interpersonal interaction, Kenyans accommodate and, where possible, assist refugees although 
Kenyan respondents emphasise that they want refugees to eventually repatriate. Tania referred 
to instances in which Kenyans assisted her by giving her food and at one time providing 
transport at night when her husband was taken ill. In a comparative study of Italy and the 
Netherlands, Korac (2002) observes that informal local networks may be more effective in 
promoting integration than state-run programmes. Thus, the absence of the latter in Kenya is 
countervailed by the presence of social relationships that facilitate interaction and sometimes 
sharing of resources between refugees and Kenyans. 
 
The women also exploit their relationships with locals to access services that they cannot 
easily access as refugees. Sudanese women’s circumvention of the problem of Kenyans 
inflating prices for refugee or foreign customers is enabled by Kenyan friends and neighbours 
who consent to buy the groceries for them. As an aspect of deception and manipulation 
presented above, Hali pointed out that sometimes refugee women borrow their citizen friends’ 
national identity cards. In her case, Hali borrows the identity card from her Somali-Kenyan 
friends and this is one of the occasions when she wears the Muslim head scarf in order to 
reduce chances of detection. Waving an identity card works where the officer on duty does 
not bother to scrutinise it and detect the physical difference between the bearer and the picture 
on the identity card. In some instances, the use of locally acquired driver’s licenses helps 
refugees as these do not indicate one’s nationality thus enabling refugees to pass for locals 
(see also Grabska 2006). Refugee women ironically rely on Kenyans’ assistance in order to 
manipulate the loopholes in Kenya’s administrative systems and wiggle out of the difficulties 
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that characterise the Kenyan authorities-refugee encounter. It can be noted here that the site of 
opportunities to circumvent rules, legal and social barriers is situated where social 
relationships with locals intersect with corruption. Refugee women’s payment of bribes in 
order to evade arrest or find their way out of confinement in prison is replayed in instances 
where they resort to the same strategy in order to obtain passage into restricted spaces. 
 
5.9. Diaspora and Transnational Networks 
Refugee women’s survival strategies transcend Kenya’s borders to incorporate relatives and 
friends particularly those who have resettled in Western countries. One of the hallmarks of 
globalisation is how it links metropolitan cities in Western countries with cities and villages in 
developing countries. Globalisation facilitates the transfer of incomes earned in the affluent 
parts of the world to those where people grapple with everyday existence. Refugees who have 
been resettled in a third country where they have found opportunities to earn incomes remit a 
share of these incomes to their families in the home and regional host countries (see also 
Shandy 2002, 2007; Grabska 2006; Horst 2006c). This renders the distinction between 
refugees as helpless victims and voluntary migrants as resourceful questionable as refugees 
prove to be equally resourceful, competent and very much a part of the contemporary 
transnational linkages. In this respect, refugees are not different from their non-refugee 
counterparts and in some cases, they are in a better position to establish themselves in the 
country of resettlement than non-refugee migrants who do not have access to institutions that 
assist with integration as refugees do.  
 
Refugees’ quest for security beyond the neighbouring countries particularly in developed 
countries encompasses economic calculation on their part. Thus, it is the able-bodied 
members of refugee households who are encouraged and financially supported to seek 
resettlement in the hope that once resettled, the whole family will benefit through remittances 
(see Shandy 2007; Holtzman 2008). Accumulation of social capital among refugee women 
involves investment in resettlement of able-bodied and better qualified family members who 
are then expected to assist or fulfil filial and family obligations to those who remain in 
Nairobi or even the country of nationality. Remittances are coupled with assisting family 
members in Nairobi to resettle and this explains the fact that refugee women with diaspora 
connections are able to overcome the limitations of the refugee status namely exclusion of 
refugees from formal employment.  
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Improvements in transport and communication enable migrants to maintain links with co-
ethnics in the place of origin and elsewhere, while also building communities in the place of 
residence (Castles 2003: 20). Refugees therefore straddle both traditional models of migration 
as permanent or leading to permanent settlement and current models of transnational 
communities. Resettled African refugees resort to their own resourcefulness to facilitate their 
families and relatives’ integration in countries of asylum in Africa. Despite the tensions that 
come with transnational ways of life, transnationalism enables resettled refugees to provide 
for themselves as well as their relatives in African host countries such as Kenya as well as 
those in the country of origin (Horst 2006c; Al-Sharmani 2007). Payment of housing rentals 
and tuition fees in Nairobi depends on opportunities in far away cities in North America, 
Western Europe and Australia as these regions are the source of financial capital for refugee 
women in Nairobi who have connections in the diaspora. Social capital in this context is not 
confined to physical or geographical proximity as it transcends Kenya’s borders and straddles 
continents. Participation in the global money transfer systems is not a monopoly of huge 
conglomerates and wealthy business people as it incorporates refugees resettled in the affluent 
regions of the world and their poorer counterparts in Africa who are recipients of remittances. 
Refugees’ existence outside “the national order of things” (Malkki 1995b) enables them to 
occupy transnational spaces and access benefits accruing from these spaces. They maintain 
ties at the local, national, regional and global levels particularly as recipients of remittances. 
Forced migration is therefore one of the most important social expressions of global 
connectedness and processes (Castles 2003: 24). 
 
Remittances from across the globe play a vital role in facilitating refugee self-sufficiency in 
Nairobi. Among Somali refugees with diaspora connections, Dabshil, the money transfer 
facility in Eastleigh is an integral part of economic well-being. Using refugee women’s 
criteria for integration which are predicated on the capacity to handle everyday issues such as 
access to “good” food, decent accommodation, medical services and the ability to send 
children to school, refugee women with connections to those resettled in Western countries in 
particular enjoy higher living standards that are essential for successful integration. 
Differences between those who have diaspora connections and receive remittances and those 
who do not were observable in terms of living conditions and material possessions during 
home visits. Refugee women who receive remittances from resettled family members live in 
stone houses which are more expensive than the corrugated iron sheet rooms found in 
Nairobi’s poor neighbourhoods. For example, Grace and her family comprising of her 
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husband, seven children and her elderly mother live comfortably in a secure stone house 
because she receives remittances from her two resettled daughters. In contrast, refugee 
women with similarly big families and even those with small families but do not have 
resettled family members to assist them live in single corrugated iron sheet rooms with curtain 
partitions within. In this regard, remittances or economic capital which is a direct translation 
of refugee women’s transcontinental social capital create social inequalities among the 
refugee women which result in the circumstances of life in Nairobi varying depending on the 
women’s access to economic capital or lack thereof (see also Horst 2006c). 
 
This chapter portrays the role of refugee-oriented organisations in facilitating integration 
although shortcomings in how assistance is provided cannot be downplayed. Refugee women 
also resort to their own resourcefulness and innovativeness in order to extricate themselves 
from the difficulties and existential uncertainties that confront them in Nairobi and build a 
home away from home. Resourcefulness among the women encompasses individual skills and 
acumen, versatility, resilience, the capacity to strategise, manoeuvre and exploit available 
opportunities or create/invent them, manipulation of religion, creation of social relationships 
with locals and drawing on broader global connections involving resettled refugees. In the 
absence of an official UNHCR or GoK integration policy, the majority of refugee women in 
Nairobi demonstrate the capacity to facilitate their own integration to the extent that some of 
them live in better economic conditions than their Kenyan neighbours. This does not imply, 
however, that the women have been able to overcome most of the problems associated with 
life as refugees and the structural barriers they encounter. The consequences of exclusion 
from formal employment cannot be underestimated. Many women still struggle to meet basic 
needs such as food, housing, health care and education.  
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Chapter Six 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
6.0. Overview 
The study takes a gender perspective which specifically focuses on refugee women. Chapter 
One outlines the key themes of the study namely refugee women and local integration. The 
study accordingly presents the experiences of local integration among refugee women self-
settled in Nairobi. It highlights the various factors that influence the process of integration. 
These factors are presented in the subsequent chapters as aspects of the political, legal, 
economic, social and cultural dimensions of integration. A theme that runs through all the 
chapters is that the various dimensions of integration are concurrently dependent on and 
independent of each other. For instance, legal integration is closely connected to access to 
small business loans which are essential for refugee women’s economic integration. 
Similarly, social and cultural barriers lead to economic exclusion and vice versa. Considering 
these links, comprehension of integration is predicated on a holistic approach which 
acknowledges the interconnectedness of the various dimensions.  
 
Chapter Two focuses on the close connection between integration and refugee identity 
politics. Gender overlaps with refugee women’s national, ethnic and religious identities which 
play a significant role in determining who gets accepted, tolerated or shunned in Nairobi. The 
circumstances of Somali and Hutu Rwandan refugee women depict the interplay between 
integration and refugee identities in which stereotypes are a verbal form of controlling and 
demarcating physical space and social distance. Physical space is integral to concepts of 
pollution and danger but for pollution and harm to take place, contact needs not only be 
physical but also social (see Douglas 1994). Negative stereotypes construct specific refugee 
identities as posing a threat to Kenya as implied in the equation of Hutu Rwandans with 
génocidaires who have the capacity to pollute or contaminate and Somalis with terrorists who 
have the capacity to destabilise Kenya. Stereotypes portray difference as polluting and 
dangerous (Douglas 1994) as when they politicise and criminalise the Somali Muslim and the 
Hutu Rwandan identities and create social boundaries between these communities and locals. 
Refugees from these communities accordingly draw negative attention among locals where 
the other refugee nationalities and ethnicities are identified by the generic term refugees or 
economic migrants who are at worst illegal immigrants and treated with relative tolerance. 
Profiling is a form of social technology meant to channel refugees to the camps where 
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movement of refugees is expected to occur only in the form of repatriation to the country of 
nationality. However, the chapter shows refugee women’s agency in defining themselves and 
coming up with a counter-narrative which portrays exclusion as a chosen state of existence. 
 
Chapter Three highlights refugee women’s legal experiences and the importance of legal 
protection in the process of integration. The refugee status determination process which is 
currently conducted by the UNHCR is characterised by power relations and contestation to 
the extent that the majority of refugee women do not have Protection Letters. Refugee 
women’s experiences are shaped by the encampment regime which argues that “genuine” 
refugees reside in camps and constructs and labels those self-settled in Nairobi as economic 
migrants. Apart from this distinction, other forms of social technologies are established in the 
form of disincentives to self-settlement such as denial of or delaying to process documents for 
self-settled refugees and direction of humanitarian assistance to the camps both of which are 
conscious strategies to channel refugees from Nairobi to the camps. The chapter portrays the 
agency of UNHCR officials by which they reject the formal, constraining bureaucratic 
structure and create and operate within an informal structure which enables them to engender, 
nurture and foster a culture of exchange with refugee women. This transforms the refugee 
women-UNHCR interface from a humanitarian encounter to a market place where services 
acquire a market value (see also Bohannan and Bohannan 1968). In creating the informal 
structure in which discharge of professional duties is construed as a favour for which refugee 
women are expected to reciprocate in cash or in kind, UNHCR staff shows that rules and the 
law cannot be separated from the broader social milieu within which they are enforced (Sally 
Falk Moore 2000).  
 
The informal structure and the encampment regime reinforce each other in that refugees’ 
defiance of the encampment regime and self-settlement in Nairobi create the opportunity for 
staff to treat services they provide to self-settled refugees as a favour rather than a duty. 
Similarly, police officers operate within their own informal structure in which they treat 
refugee presence in Nairobi as a crime as illustrated by raids, arbitrary arrests and 
refoulement. In police officers’ scheme of things, refugees are not only agents of insecurity; 
they are also a source of supplementary income. The encampment regime creates space for 
police officers to demand bribes and extort from refugees in Nairobi who are in defiance of 
the regime thus creating an interface in which the legal and illegal are entangled, aligned and 
conflated. The refugee women-UNHCR and refugee women-police officers interfaces 
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demonstrate that the ideology of jurisdiction is not always reflected in the operative, social 
reality of organisations in which “more untameable activities and processes are at work” 
(Sally Falk Moore 2000: 29). However, agency is characteristic of both sides of the 
institutional divide in both the refugee women-UNHCR and refugee women-police officers 
interfaces. The chapter shows how refugee women innovate and manoeuvre in order to get the 
best out of this constraining situation. Refugee women engage UNHCR staff and police 
officers within the informal structure which also provides them with space to negotiate and 
capitalise on the malleability of rules within such a structure.  
 
Chapter Four presents the economic, social and cultural circumstances of refugee women. 
Achievement of economic security is derailed by lack of access to formal employment due to 
Kenya’s restrictive employment policy which excludes refugees. This exclusion leads to 
deterioration in living standards in terms of access to food, housing, education and medical 
care. Economic problems are exacerbated by limited provision of humanitarian assistance 
aimed at helping the women become self-reliant and self-sufficient. This is an integral part of 
the quest to provide assistance which enables refugees to survive but which is not adequate 
enough to facilitate integration under the assumption that the latter would deter repatriation. 
Many refugee women rely on the informal sector where incomes are unstable leading to a life 
of uncertainty and daily struggle to meet basic needs. Even after years spent in exile, the 
majority of refugee women still need humanitarian assistance which is not forthcoming in 
most cases. Among married refugee women, economic hardships lead to marital problems 
while the same adversities render unmarried refugee women susceptible to sexual exploitation 
and the attendant risk of HIV/AIDS infection and unplanned pregnancies as they seek to 
sustain themselves. 
 
On the social and cultural dimension of integration, refugee women’s experiences are 
particularly diverse as they are closely connected to the women’s national, ethnic and 
religious identities. Women from the Great Lakes region have generally been able to cultivate 
social relationships with locals mainly because of the language and cultural ties although the 
politics of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda still impact negatively on Hutu Rwandan women. On 
the other hand, feelings of exclusion or discrimination and limited social connection with 
locals are particularly prevalent among Somali refugee women for whom cultural and gender-
based predicaments such as vulnerability to sexual harassment and targeted rape among others 
are salient (see also Human Rights Watch 2009). This is not to suggest that women from the 
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other nationalities are not vulnerable to Sexual and Gender-Based Violence. SGBV and 
concern for personal security remain important issues among women from Burundi, the DRC, 
Rwanda, Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Sudan although incidence of such violence is 
comparatively lower among these nationalities. 
 
Chapter Five focuses on the critical role humanitarian organisations and the GTZ play in 
enabling refugee women to adapt to life in Nairobi although they still face challenges in 
satisfying the women’s needs. On the other hand, women do not solely rely on assistance for 
their survival in Nairobi; most of the women interviewed are not beneficiaries of 
humanitarian assistance programmes. The existential uncertainties that come with living in 
Nairobi on limited or no assistance at all besides lack of protection documents for the 
majority do not deter the women from manoeuvring and deploying individual acumen, 
resourcefulness and versatility in order to negotiate life in Nairobi. Refugee women’s 
resourcefulness or creativity involves engaging the UNHCR and aid organisations in the 
informal structure created by staff members in these organisations. Refugee women’s resort to 
deception is a well-calculated response to this structure.  
 
The majority of refugee women defies the odds and endeavours to bridge the gap between 
pre- and post-flight circumstances by engaging in self-employment and forming mutually 
beneficial RCOs in which they provide each other with mutual support and assistance. 
Chapter Five further demonstrates that exile is not solely about constraints as it also opens up 
opportunities that may not have existed for the women prior to their flight to Kenya. Refugee 
women who have created a niche for themselves through formal employment and those with 
diaspora connections demonstrate that the absence of an official integration policy does not 
necessarily deter integration; it only derails the process.  
 
6.1. The Encampment-Repatriation Regime 
The study contextualises refugee women’s experiences within the framework of a refugee 
regime that is premised on encampment and repatriation. In this regime, refugees are 
perceived as “matter out of place” (Malkki 1995b) and therefore a threat to the trinity of 
people, nation and the state. This perception portrays difference or “otherness” as disorderly, 
polluting and harmful and thus deserving segregation (Douglas 1994). Refugee camps are 
therefore devised to contain refugees until the order created around the trinity can be restored 
through repatriation. Social technologies or mechanisms of control and managing refugees are 
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therefore instituted in order to deal with the women’s defiance of the encampment regime and 
curb integration and rooting which are perceived as antithetical to repatriation long taken as 
the lasting solution by both the UNHCR and the GoK. The study shows how these social 
technologies play out in the broader framework of channelling refugees to the camps and 
deterring integration in Nairobi on the one hand and how refugee women wiggle in order to 
evade the intended impact of creating conditions ideal for waiting. In this respect, refugee 
women’s actions impact on the efficacy of these social technologies in the same way that the 
latter shape the women’s experiences in Nairobi. 
 
6.2. Gender and the Refugee Status 
The study is on the whole premised on the view that although both refugee men and women 
face difficulties, refugee women encounter challenges of a peculiar nature mainly because of 
the interplay between their gender roles and social status as women in African contexts both 
of which are buttressed by the constraints of exile. Because of their gender, age and social 
position, refugee women have special needs which often manifest themselves in the form of 
physical abuse, gender discrimination, sexual exploitation and rape among other forms of 
SGBV. However, the study underscores the need to appreciate the diversity that characterises 
refugee women who play differential roles in refugee households depending on their marital 
status and family responsibilities. This leads to uniqueness in individual circumstances, 
experiences and opportunities in Nairobi.  
 
For many married refugee women, exile impacts on gender relations and intra-household 
dynamics in ways that often strain their marriages as is the case where refugee women are the 
sole income-earners. This upsets the balance of power within refugee households leading to 
domestic violence and desertion in some cases. Because of the insecurity that comes with the 
unmarried status, many refugee women endure domestic violence rather than opt for divorce 
which comes with cultural censorship and vulnerability to sexual violence. Unmarried, 
divorced, deserted and widowed refugee women, although they seldom face the problem of 
domestic violence, equally have gender-related problems namely exposure to sexual 
harassment, violence and exploitation in which the low status generally accorded to 
unmarried women in many African contexts intersects with the vulnerability that comes with 
being a refugee. It is on the basis of this shared vulnerability to SGBV among refugee women 
that refugees’ experiences are gendered. SGBV remains a recurrent phenomenon in refugee 
women’s experiences across time and space. 
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In focusing on refugee women, the study raises conceptual issues relating to refugees as a 
socio-legal category. Stein (1981) argues that despite the heterogeneity that characterises 
refugee populations, there is a refugee experience which produces specific refugee behaviour 
and refugee problems. He conceptualises refugees as a social psychological type. In contrast, 
this study demonstrates that refugee experiences are not only gendered but also an outcome of 
differential political histories as well as legal, economic, social and cultural factors which 
translate into varying experiences and circumstances even in the same context. On the basis of 
this heterogeneity, the study refers to refugee women rather than the refugee woman who is a 
specific “type”. It concurs with Malkki’s (1995b: 496) observation that the term refugee is “a 
broad legal or descriptive rubric that includes within it the world of different socio-economic 
statuses, personal histories, and psychological or spiritual situations” (see also Malkki 1997). 
This is the case even where the term relates to gender as a specific category; gender as a 
category is not characterised by uniformity and universality but by diversity particularly in 
terms of how women experience and deal with gender. Even though refugee women’s 
experiences are recurrent across time and space, to homogenise refugee women is to deny 
them agency which elicits varying responses to the same experience or situation that 
correspondingly yield varying outcomes (Long 2001).  
 
6.3. The Refugee Phenomenon: Contemporary Realities  
On the basis of the findings of this study, the notion of refugees being a transient phenomenon 
is largely illusory. Many among the refugee women have spent decades in exile while some of 
them were born in Kenya and have an inherited refugee status thus portraying refugees on the 
East African geopolitical landscape as a socio-legal category of people in a state of permanent 
waiting. Kenya pursues an encampment regime premised on the assumption that refugees are 
ephemeral and that the lasting solution is repatriation. In contrast, the movement that is taking 
place among refugees in Kenya is predominantly relocation to urban centres in the country 
rather than repatriation. Circumstances in the camps push refugee women out in search of 
economic opportunities although Nairobi does not necessarily provide the pull factors that are 
a hallmark of traditional models of migration. Nairobi’s appeal lies in how it captures refugee 
women’s imagination of the possibilities and opportunities beyond camp warehousing. 
 
The longer it has taken to restore peace, the stronger the momentum among refugee women to 
find alternative livelihoods outside refugee camps that are more sustainable and compatible 
with the goal to live in the present rather than spend decades or even a lifetime waiting for 
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largely elusive peace. Refugee women’s urban-bound movement not only illustrates the 
inappropriateness of refugee camps for refugees in protracted situations. It also has 
implications for conceptualisation of refugee camps as the “natural habitat” for African 
refugees and therefore the archetypal field for an anthropological study of refugees as implied 
by the abundance of literature on encamped refugees. The urban refugee women studied here 
constitute a shifting and mobile anthropological object located in a cosmopolitan urban centre 
with transnational linkages instead of a remote, marginalised refugee camp reminiscent of the 
largely self-contained traditional societies that were the focus of the discipline in its infancy 
and for the greater part of its history. With their flexible attitude towards mobility and their 
transnational connections, the refugee women in Nairobi defy the sedentary approach whose 
preoccupation is with the rooted as opposed to the mobile. 
 
Kenya, like many other host countries in Africa, resists local integration on the assumption 
that integrated refugees will not repatriate and accordingly confines refugees in refugee 
camps. However, integration, instead of being a deterrent, is a prerequisite for repatriation. It 
is refugee women who are economically integrated who are in a better position to reintegrate 
in the event of repatriation in contrast to their encamped counterparts. Encamped refugees 
find themselves in a more difficult situation to repatriate because years spent confined in the 
camps lead to problems of adjusting to life outside the camps in the absence of resources to 
facilitate reintegration in the country of origin. The absence of a policy of naturalisation 
which is the culmination of integration means that refugees are not fully integrated and for 
this reason also, many cherish the hope to repatriate or go for third country resettlement as 
shown by the majority of the women and the few cases in which successfully integrated 
women are investing in their countries of nationality in the hope of repatriating when it 
becomes safe for them to do so. In brief, integration is not necessarily incompatible with 
repatriation. Instead, it simultaneously enables refugees to lead “normal” lives and prepare for 
repatriation should this become feasible. 
 
6.4. Towards a Conceptual Understanding of Integration 
Theoretical and conceptual issues relating to integration are pertinent for this study. Despite 
the differences and divergences on points of emphasis emanating from specific empirical data 
relating to what the process of integration entails, various scholars concur that integration is a 
legal, economic, social and cultural process which also includes a political dimension where 
refugees naturalise (see Kibreab 1989; Kuhlman 1991; Crisp 2004; Feller 2003). Integration 
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is located between the two extremes of segregation and marginalisation on the one hand and 
assimilation on the other hand. Of these extremes, assimilation is distinguished from 
integration in more detail because the two concepts are often confused and used 
interchangeably. Borrowing from Kuhlman’s (1991) model of integration, the study 
highlights the differences between the two concepts and how their confusion has resulted in 
host countries such as Kenya eschewing integration policies. Whereas assimilation involves 
the complete dissolution of refugees’ social and cultural identities to the extent that they 
become indistinguishable from locals, integration entails refugees becoming part of the whole 
(Kenya in this case) at the same time that they can be separated and given a name, identity 
and visibility as implied in Congolese, Rwandans, Somalis and Sudanese as the case may be. 
Integration involves refugees’ social and cultural identities co-existing with creation of and 
engagement in social relations with locals.  
 
Even though retention of refugees’ social and cultural identities is one of the distinguishing 
aspects between integration and assimilation, it does not automatically point to the occurrence 
of integration. The case of Somali refugee women indicates that retention of social and 
cultural identity can be both a cause for and result of isolation and marginalisation rather than 
an indicator of integration. Instead of marginalisation leading to refugees losing their cultural 
identity and failing to attain that of the host country as Kuhlman (1991) argues, Somali 
women’s perception of ostracism which they attribute to ignorance impels them to become 
even more protective of their cultural and religious difference and create an enclave for 
themselves thus accentuating social aspects that detach rather than unite them with their host 
country. On the other hand, the ethnic and cultural diversity in Nairobi leaves refugees with 
no particular culture to assimilate into thus illustrating Kuhlman’s (1991) observation that 
assimilation is difficult in pluralist societies.  
 
The study borrows from Kunz’s (1981) refugee theory and Kuhlman’s (1991; 1994) model of 
integration which highlight the political, legal, economic, social and cultural dimensions of 
integration. Integration is also influenced by the kinetics of refugee movement or whether the 
women fled their country as anticipatory or acute refugees (Kunz 1973). Women who fled as 
anticipatory refugees had the time to prepare for life in exile although such women constitute 
a minority because flight for most of the women was resorted to as the last option. Most of the 
women therefore fled acute refugee situations and sometimes had to stay in other countries 
before their arrival in Kenya in what Kunz (1973) terms two-vector movement. Flight without 
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much preparation leads to economic difficulties in the process of adaptation to life in exile 
and eventual integration in the country of asylum.  
 
Under the political dimension of integration, Kenya’s perception of and receptiveness to 
refugees is influenced by refugees’ national, ethno-cultural and religious affiliations in 
relation to local, regional and global identity politics. Local populations’ perceptions of 
refugees’ ethnic and cultural identities as well as conflicts in the countries of origin inform 
how they relate with refugees. Locals who view their country as unlikely to produce refugees 
tend to see the latter as an economic burden, an environmental threat and a threat to national 
security and stability as shown by media coverage of Somali refugees as well as the view 
among Kenyan respondents that refugees should not spend more than five years in Kenya. 
The political discourses directed towards Somali and Hutu Rwandan refugees demonstrate 
that humanitarianism and politics are not mutually exclusive. Refugee integration is therefore 
influenced by political factors by which some refugee nationalities and ethnicities are shunned 
and denied the tolerance extended, even if reluctantly, to the other refugee communities. 
However, Kenyans such as Jared Okweya’s work with refugees demonstrate divergence in 
terms of Kenyans’ perception of the phenomenon of refugees in East Africa. 
 
Integration begins with the legal dimension which involves refugee women’s capacity to 
claim the refugee status and the extent to which they can exercise their rights as enshrined in 
international legal instruments. This is closely linked to the socio-political orientation of the 
asylum country or its receptiveness to refugees (Kunz 1973) and its refugee policies or lack 
thereof. Kenya has sloughed off its responsibilities under international refugee law to which it 
is a signatory. This has been exacerbated by the absence of domestic refugee law in Kenya 
until 2006 which saw the passing of Kenya’s Refugee Act. All the same, the Act which is yet 
to be implemented addresses refugees in camps and its impact on urban refugees remains to 
be seen. Legal protection is a fundamental aspect of integration which counterbalances the 
obstacles inherent in refugee women’s outsider/foreigner status.  
 
Legal protection goes beyond possession of Protection Letters to include the actual protection 
availed to refugee women particularly in terms of physical security and safety. 
Notwithstanding the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women (1991) and 
Sexual Violence against Refugees: Guidelines on Prevention and Response (Sexual Violence 
Guidelines) (1995) among other legal provisions to protect refugee women, the experiences of 
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many refugee women in Nairobi indicate that the implementation of the Guidelines have 
largely been piecemeal. Refugee women continue to experience SGBV in the form of 
domestic violence, desertion, abduction, sexual exploitation, targeted rape, female 
circumcision and forced marriages; the latter three are salient for Somali refugee women. 
Sexual violence and harassment are not only at the hands of local men, refugee men and 
security personnel but ironically also at the hands of individual staff members in humanitarian 
organisations who largely operate in informal structures in which their activities deviate from 
organisational rules and laws. In terms of actual security, the difference between refugee 
women who possess Protection Letters and those who do not remains insignificant in Nairobi. 
 
The economic dimension of integration is identified as a “conditio sine qua non for self-
settled refugees” (Kuhlman 1991: 3; see also Ager and Strang 2008). Economic factors focus 
on Kenya’s restrictive employment policy which excludes refugees from formal employment 
resulting in many refugee women relying on the informal sector where they compete with 
locals. Educational background, pre-flight occupations and the rural-urban divide which are 
often emphasised in theories of integration do not play a significant role in Nairobi because 
refugees are excluded from formal employment regardless of their professional qualifications. 
This wholesale exclusion leaves refugee women from professional backgrounds in the same 
situation as their counterparts from rural/agrarian backgrounds who do not possess skills 
easily transferable to formal employment in an urban context. With their professional 
qualifications having been rendered irrelevant, how refugee women from professional 
backgrounds fare is mainly an outcome of their individual capacity to strategise and make a 
difference in their lives. Here, refugee women’s agency has a countervailing impact on the 
structural barriers women from both rural and urban backgrounds encounter. 
 
On the social and cultural dimension, integration is mainly influenced by what Kunz (1981) 
identifies as host-related factors namely cultural and language compatibilities and barriers 
which are linked to refugee identities. Cultural incompatibility is an obstacle to social and 
cultural integration and inability to bridge this gap results in refugee withdrawal (Kunz 1973) 
and mutual fear and suspicion between refugees and locals as illustrated by refugee women 
from the Horn of Africa in general and Somalis in particular. Social and cultural integration, 
particularly the ability to speak local languages, is also contingent upon the time spent in 
exile, language and cultural ties between refugees and locals as well as the ability to nurture 
social relationships with locals.  
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Antagonism or, in the very least, mutual suspicion and avoidance between refugees and locals 
is an important indicator of lack of integration as demonstrated by the cases of Somali and 
Hutu Rwandan refugee women. The former are mainly secluded in Eastleigh while the latter’s 
fear of spies whom they perceive in locals and fellow refugees alike principally remains a 
barrier to close interaction and cultivation of social relationships with the locals among whom 
they live. As such, the absence of (overt) conflict does not automatically indicate the 
occurrence of integration as suggested by Harrell-Bond (1986) as it is also a manifestation of 
mutual exclusion, the absence of social connection, marginalisation and seclusion as happens 
where there is no interaction between locals and refugees. Mutual stereotypes which are part 
of local, regional and even global identity politics are a deterrent to social and cultural 
integration although these stereotypes do not necessarily manifest themselves in the form of 
overt conflict or confrontation. 
 
A viewpoint that dominates literature on refugee integration in Africa is that refugees 
belonging to ethnic groups that straddle the border between the country of origin and the 
asylum country are in a better position to integrate because of the shared identity. This has 
been noted among refugees self-settled along the border regions (see Rubin 1974; Hansen 
1981; Schultheis 1989; Kuhlman 1991; Bakewell 2000; 2002; 2008). Such studies have 
argued that the term refugee is a mere policy label or category which does not necessarily 
capture the circumstances of refugees who become indistinguishable from locals. While 
integration is facilitated by the presence of co-ethnics along border regions, this is not 
automatically the case in urban centres as cosmopolitan as Nairobi. This is attributable to 
existence of diversity in the city and, in the case of Somalis who have co-ethnics in Kenya or 
the so-called Somali Kenyans, also to politicisation of the Muslim identity in East Africa as in 
many parts of the world. This has resulted in Somali Kenyans who are also Muslim distancing 
themselves as citizens from the Somali refugees who are often blamed for terrorism in the 
region and the high crime rate in Kenya. Even so, Somali Kenyans are often mistaken for 
Somali refugees and marginalised in their country of citizenship thus creating a situation ideal 
for ethno-nationalism among people of Somali ethnicity. The circumstances of refugee 
women in Nairobi demonstrate that the term refugee is not a mere label but experiential as 
illustrated by targeted rape, arbitrary arrests, wholesale exclusion from formal employment, 
restrictions on freedom of movement and refoulement. 
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On the other hand, the physical, lingual and cultural similarities between Kenyans and 
refugees from the Great Lakes region facilitate the latter’s social and cultural integration in 
Nairobi notwithstanding the fact that their ethnic identities are not represented among 
Kenya’s ethnic groups. Still, Hutu Rwandans who are also from the Great Lakes region only 
find security in hiding their ethnic identity because of its condemnation in the aftermath of the 
1994 Rwandan genocide. In brief, refugee and local identity politics intertwine with 
integration in very complex ways whose delineation does not have consistent results across 
time and space as it depends on shifting geopolitical factors. The link between identity and 
integration remains fluid and unstable as its manifestations are contingent upon political 
relations prevailing at a given time between the host country and refugees’ countries of origin 
as well as in the broader regional and global contexts. Be that as it may, a recurrent feature of 
the identity-integration nexus is that refugee identities that are regarded as harmful and 
incompatible with local values, worldviews and political orientations are inimical to social 
and cultural integration in particular. Conversely, refugees similarly choose to segregate 
themselves from Kenyans where they perceive local cultures to be detrimental to their own 
cultural and religious values as illustrated by Somali refugees. 
 
This study emphasises that the objective aspects of integration as outlined by Kunz (1981) 
and Kuhlman (1991; 1994) are mediated by subjective factors that translate into different 
experiences among refugee women. Great Lakes refugee women who encounter fewer 
obstacles to social and cultural integration underscore the economic dimension of integration. 
In contrast, refugee women from the Horn of Africa and Somalia in particular who are often 
employed by business people in their own communities stress the social and cultural 
dimensions of integration. For Somali women, religious, cultural and language differences 
and the accompanying ethnic profiling are the contentious issues closely linked to 
vulnerability to targeted rape, raids in search of “terrorists” and the accompanying 
interrogations, harassment, arbitrary arrests of women as substitutes for their missing 
husbands and refoulement. Conversely, while refugee women from the Great Lakes region in 
general and to some extent Ethiopia identify as the most contentious issue the refugee status 
determination process, a vital component of the legal dimension of integration, their 
politically charged discourses towards the UNHCR are principally absent among Somali and 
Sudanese refugee women who are prima facie refugees. Considering these different 
situations, integration manifests itself as a value-laden concept whose practical meaning is 
closely tied to refugee women’s experiences, priorities and needs. This explains the fact that 
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integration remains a contested concept as scholars grapple with coming up with a theory 
applicable across diverse empirical material. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
Overall, the study concurs with Kuhlman’s (1991; 1994) model of integration which 
underlines that integration is predicated on country of origin factors such as the prevailing 
politics and asylum country factors such as receptiveness to refugees, perception of refugees 
and refugee policy or lack thereof. Political, legal, economic, social and cultural factors 
illuminate theorisation of integration in this study. On the gender aspect, recurrent 
experiences among refugee women in the form of assumption of new roles, desertion by 
husbands, abduction and exposure to SGBV in conflict situations can be observed across time 
and space but these experiences are mediated by the dynamics of individual circumstances 
and refugee women’s agency in dealing with their situation. Instead of the women being 
locked up in circumstances out of which they cannot extricate themselves, the outcomes of 
refugee women’s recurrent experiences are largely influenced by this mediation. 
Understanding gender and refugee integration therefore requires balancing conceptual 
consistency or coherence (objective factors) with subjective factors that capture refugee 
women’s diverse experiential realities. This is neither to suggest that integration of refugee 
women eludes theorisation nor to refute existing theories of refugee integration and gender. 
The study does not advocate eclecticism. Rather, its findings function not to refute the 
existing theories on integration and gender in refugee studies but to augment them by 
providing new insights that consider women’s agency in dealing with their plight. In 
conclusion, integration and gender theories that transcend the circumscription of time and 
space as advocated by Kunz (1973) are mediated by inconsistent factors and the dynamics of 
refugee hosting.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Profiles of the 34 Refugee Women Interviewed 
Name Pre-flight 
Occupation 
Age Marital Status No. of 
Children 
Yrs in 
Kenya 
Home 
Country 
Cynthia school teacher 39 single  1 4 Burundi 
Margaret housewife 40 married 7 7 Burundi 
Emma student 23 single  1 11 DRC 
Marian primary school 
pupil 
17 single  1 1 DRC 
Michelle school teacher 41 married 5 9 DRC 
Sandra student 21 married 3 3 DRC 
Nancy nurse 40 married 2 7 Eritrea 
Mary informal trader 62 husband disappeared 
in Kenya 
6 3 Ethiopia 
Mimi primary school 
pupil 
17 single  1 3 Ethiopia 
Sarah informal trader 57 husband disappeared 
in Ethiopia 
5 4 Ethiopia 
Sofie informal trader 56 husband disappeared 
in Ethiopia 
2 3 Ethiopia 
Claire nurse 32 married 2 12 Rwanda 
Epi school teacher 39 married 2 11 Rwanda 
Jackie nurse 35 married 3 11 Rwanda 
Grace civil servant 59 married 9 10 Rwanda 
Marie school teacher 42 married 2 9 Rwanda 
Merlin student 25 married 2 5 Rwanda 
Susan informal trader 58 widow 3 10 Rwanda 
Tania school teacher 40 married 3 11 Rwanda 
Hali primary school 
pupil 
23 single 0 14 Somalia 
Kadija housewife 37 married 4 14 Somalia 
Shaki housewife 39 widow 2 10 Somalia 
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Zeinab informal trader 56 widow 6 14 Somalia 
Joy housewife 70s widow 6 16 Sudan 
Maria housewife 50 married 2 12 Sudan 
Monica housewife 49 widow 4 14 Sudan 
Therie school teacher 56 widow 2 4 Sudan 
Zanie clerk 34 husband deserted in 
Kenya 
2 20 Sudan 
Agfa school teacher 53 married 6 18 Uganda 
Jane housewife 50 husband disappeared 
in Uganda 
4 22 Uganda 
Jossie born in Kenya 21 single 0 21 Uganda 
Mandy housewife 36 husband disappeared 
in Uganda 
3 4 Uganda 
Mose pre-school 27 husband deserted in 
Kenya 
3 19 Uganda 
Rennie housewife 48 single mother 5 20 Uganda 
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Appendix B: Open-ended Questionnaire for Refugee Women 
 
This questionnaire is part of fieldwork for my doctoral studies at Bayreuth University, 
Germany. The research intends to understand the experiences of refugee women in Nairobi, 
Kenya. The questions below seek to establish demographic characteristics of the persons on 
whom the questionnaire will be administered. The questions also seek to obtain an overview 
on the experiences of refugee women in Nairobi.  
 
Informants reserve the right to decide to participate in the research or otherwise and no 
reprisals will ensue should they decide not to participate in the study. The researcher assures 
all participants that information provided will be used strictly for purposes of the research 
and that it will not be used to harm them in any way. PLEASE DO NOT WRITE YOUR 
NAME ON THE QUESTIONNAIRE. 
 
Please write your answer in the space provided below the question. Your cooperation is 
greatly appreciated. Thank you. 
 
1. Age 
 
2. Marital Status  
 
3. Number of Children 
 
4. Nationality 
 
5. When did you come to Kenya? 
 
6. Why did you leave your country? 
 
7. Where was the first place you stayed after leaving your country?  
 
8. If you stayed elsewhere, why did you leave for Kenya/Nairobi? 
 
9. How did you come to Kenya? 
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10. In which part of Nairobi do you live? 
 
11. What were you doing in your country before coming to Kenya? 
 
12. What did you do to settle to life in Kenya? 
 
13. After all the years that you have stayed in Kenya, how do you see life in Kenya? 
 
14. What are the changes that have taken place in your life since your arrival in Kenya? 
 
15. What roles did you play in your family before you left your country? 
 
16. How do you take care/ feed yourself at the present moment? 
 
17. Do you receive help from organisations? 
i. If yes, from which ones? (Name them) 
ii. What kind of assistance do you receive from these organisations? 
iii. If you do not receive help from any organisation, explain why. 
 
18. Do you know about the UNHCR? If yes what does it do for you? 
 
19. What is the role of UNHCR in your life here in Kenya? 
 
20. What kind of assistance do you get from the Kenyan government? 
 
21. Have you ever stayed or considered staying in a camp? 
 
22. Why did you choose to stay in Nairobi instead of staying in a camp? 
 
23. How do you relate with Kenyans? 
 
24. How do you see life in your country today? 
 
26. Do you think you can fit into life in your country? 
252
i. If no, why? 
 
27. Do you intend to return to your country? When? 
i. If no, why? 
ii.  
28. What kind of experiences do you go through as a refugee woman? 
 
29. Do you see any difference(s) between your experiences as a refugee woman and those of 
refugee men? 
 
30. As a refugee woman, what issues would you want the UNHCR to address for you? 
i. Are you familiar with the Geneva Refugee Convention? 
ii. If yes, do you think the Convention grants you enough protection? 
iii. If yes, do you feel that your rights are respected in Kenya? 
 
31. Have you ever experienced violation of your rights in Kenya? 
i. If yes, who violated your rights? 
ii. How were your rights violated? 
 
32. Are you familiar with any organisation that works to protect your rights? (If yes name 
them). 
 
33. If your rights as a refugee are violated, what do you do to protect them? 
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Appendix C: Interview Schedule for the UNHCR 
 
This interview schedule is part of the fieldwork for my doctoral studies at Bayreuth 
University, Germany. The research seeks to understand the nature of the work of the UNHCR 
with urban refugees, specifically refugee women self-settled in Nairobi. The researcher 
assures UNHCR staff that information obtained during the interview will be used strictly for 
the above-mentioned purpose. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. Thank you. 
 
1. What is the estimated number of refugees in Kenya? 
 
2. What is the estimated number of refugees in Nairobi? 
 
3. What are the criteria for granting the refugee status to applicants? 
 
4. In what cases do you find it difficult to grant the refugee status to applicants? 
 
5. Does UNHCR have a policy for urban refugees and if yes could you explain the 
policy. If it does not, why? 
 
6. In what ways does the UNHCR assist urban refugees? If you do not assist urban 
refugees, what are the reasons for that? 
 
7. If refugees have special needs that make it difficult for them to stay in the camps, do 
you assist such refugees?  
 
8. In what ways does the UNHCR protect refugee women in particular? 
 
9. What kind of assistance does UNHCR provide to help refugees in Nairobi to become 
integrated? 
 
10. How does the UNHCR view integration of refugees in urban areas in Kenya? 
 
11. With specific reference to integration for urban refugees, what are the challenges that 
UNHCR encounters particularly here in Nairobi? 
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12. Why are refugees here in Kenya required to stay in camps in order to access UNHCR 
assistance? 
 
13. What are the criteria for refugee eligibility for UNHCR assistance? 
 
14. Refugees complain about the time it takes for them to obtain Protection Letters and 
say that they have to come to UNHCR offices so many times, why does it take so 
much time for them to get the documents? 
 
15. What are the types of documents that you issue refugees? 
 
16. Has it always been UNHCR Nairobi’s policy that you do not provide material and 
financial assistance to urban refugees? 
 
17. When was the last time that you helped urban refugees? Why the change of policy? 
 
18. Refugees argue that you reject them because you do not understand them, can you 
comment on that? 
 
19. Refugees particularly those from the Great Lakes Region complain that the UNHCR 
treats refugees from the Horn of Africa and Sudan better, that the UNHCR wants to 
forcibly repatriate them by denying them assistance, what do you say to that? 
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Appendix D: Interview Schedule for the Department of Refugee Affairs 
 
This interview schedule is part of the fieldwork for my doctoral studies at Bayreuth 
University, Germany. The research seeks to understand the nature of the work of the 
Department of Refugee Affairs with urban refugees, specifically refugee women self-settled in 
Nairobi. The researcher assures the DRA that information obtained during the interview will 
be used strictly for the above-mentioned purpose. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. 
Thank you. 
 
1. What are the duties or functions of the National Refugee Secretariat? 
 
2. What is Kenya’s refugee policy? 
 
3. How does this policy reflect or deal with the circumstances of refugees in Nairobi? 
 
4. What is the government’s position on refugees who settle out of camps in Nairobi? 
 
5. What are the processes that refugees who settle in Nairobi take to formalise their stay 
in Kenya? 
 
6. What is the government’s position on refugee integration in Kenya? 
 
7. How does the government of Kenya facilitate the integration of refugees within the 
Kenyan society? 
 
8. What is the status of Rwandan refugees who fled to Kenya in 1959 or their 
descendants? 
 
9. What is the status of refugees who are married to Kenyans and the children born out of 
such marriages? 
 
10. What is the status of children born of refugee parents in Kenya? 
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11. How does the recently promulgated Refugees Act (2006) address the needs of 
refugees outside the camps? 
 
12. In what ways do this Department influence government policies and their 
implementation in respect of the refugee community in Nairobi? 
 
13. What is the relationship between your Department and 
i. the UNHCR; 
ii. other NGOs working with refugees? 
 
14. Are there possibilities of refugees becoming Kenyan citizens? 
i. If yes, what are these possibilities? 
ii. If no, why not? 
 
15. What are the restrictions on refugees in Nairobi? 
 
16. What are the reasons for these restrictions? 
 
17. Are refugees allowed to be formally employed in Kenya? 
 
i. If refugees are allowed to work, why are many of them in Nairobi 
unemployed? 
 
18. What are the differences between the conditions that are applied to economic migrants 
and those applied to refugees? 
 
19. What is the nature of the relationship between the refugee community and Kenyan law 
enforcement agencies? 
 
20. Have you recorded cases of harassments of refugees by Kenyan government officials? 
 
21. If yes, what is the government’s response to such incidents? 
 
22. Are there refugee communities that you have reservations about? 
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i. If yes, which one(s) and why? 
 
23. What is the government doing to keep refugees safe and minimally comfortable? 
 
24. What permanent solution does the government propose for refugees in Kenya? 
 
25. Is the government of Kenya working in cooperation with any other State Government 
in the refugee-sending countries in sorting out the issues concerning refugees in 
Kenya? 
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Appendix E: Interview Schedule for Kenyan citizens 
 
This interview schedule is part of the fieldwork for my doctoral studies at Bayreuth 
University, Germany. The research seeks to understand the nature of relations between 
Kenyan citizens and urban refugees, specifically refugee women self-settled in Nairobi. The 
researcher assures all participants in the research that information obtained during the 
interview will be used strictly for the above-mentioned purpose. Your cooperation is greatly 
appreciated. Thank you. 
 
1. Who do you think is a refugee? 
 
2. What kind of picture comes into your mind when you hear the term refugee? 
 
3. Have you met a refugee before in Nairobi? 
 
4. Can you identify a refugee when you meet one in Nairobi? How do you identify them? 
 
5. What do you think about the presence of refugees in Kenya? 
 
6. Do you think refugees should stay outside the camps and among Kenyans here in 
Nairobi? 
i. If yes, why? 
ii. If no, why? 
 
7. Do you get to relate with the refugees? 
i. If yes, how and where? 
ii. If no, why not? 
 
8. Where do you think these refugees come from? 
 
9. In your experience, are you in support of their presence in Kenya? 
 
10. Are there refugees you would not like to live in your neighbourhood? 
i. If yes, which ones and why? 
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11. How would you want the government to help the refugees in Nairobi? 
 
12. As a Kenyan citizen, do you think you have a role to play in refugees’ lives? 
i. If yes, what is that role? 
ii. If no, why? 
 
13. If a refugee asked you to help them, would you help? 
i. If no, why? 
 
14. Would you want the refugees to be part of Kenya, to work and live among you? 
i. If yes, why? 
ii. If no, why not? 
 
15. Are there things refugees do you do not like or people around you complain about? 
 
16. Do refugees have something to offer to Kenya?  
i. If yes, what is it? 
ii. If no, why? 
 
17. Would you want refugees who have stayed in Kenya for more than five years or 
refugee children born in Kenya to be allowed to become Kenyan citizens? 
i. If no, why? 
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Appendix F: Interviews with NGOs137
 
This interview schedule is part of the fieldwork for my doctoral studies at Bayreuth 
University, Germany. The research seeks to understand the nature of the work of the refugee-
oriented organisations with urban refugees, specifically refugee women self-settled in 
Nairobi. Information obtained during the interview will be used strictly for the above-
mentioned purpose. Your cooperation is greatly appreciated. Thank you. 
 
1. When was the organisation formed? 
 
2. Tell me about the mission and objectives of the organisation. 
 
3. Explain to me the nature of your work with refugees. 
 
4. What are the criteria that determine who gets assistance from this organisation and 
who does not? 
 
5. In what ways does the organisation’s work relate with the work of the UNHCR? 
 
6. What kinds of problems do refugees bring to this organisation? 
 
7. What does this organisation consider as the solution(s) to the plight of refugees in 
Nairobi? 
 
8. For all the time that your organisation has been working with refugees in Kenya, what 
is the organisation’s evaluation of the experiences of refugees in Nairobi? 
 
9. What is your comment on the view that refugees should stay in camps? 
 
10. Do you notice regional disparities in terms of refugees’ integration in Nairobi? 
i. If yes, in which areas of life and what are the causes of such disparities? 
 
11. What are the challenges that the organisation faces in its work with refugees?  
                                                 
137 This is a standard schedule which, however, varied depending on the organisation that was being interviewed. 
261
